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Abstract 
 
In a series of works, Landau (1999, 2000) defends a typology of obligatory control 
predicates that distinguishes between verbs of exhaustive control (EC) and verbs of partial 
control (PC). These distinct classes are furthermore associated with a number of robust 
empirical correlations that remain consistent across clausal complement constructions in a 
number of different languages. This dissertation is foremost an investigation of the 
empirical effects of the EC/PC split as it applies to non-clausal, non-canonical complement 
domains, with specific focus on event-denoting nominalisations. First, it is discovered that 
the effects of EC as they exist in clausal environments also manifest in controlled English 
de-verbal nominalisations. Furthermore, it is found that the effects of PC are almost entirely 
absent in this same environment, save for the temporal properties associated with the 
selecting predicate. We thus defend a framework of control based on Wurmbrand (1998, 
2001, 2002), such that the EC/PC split corresponds to a semantic/syntactic division of 
labour, respectively.  
We first provide a fundamental analysis of English de-verbal nominalisation based 
on the novel observation that argument-structure does not disambiguate event-denoting 
nominals (contra Grimshaw 1990). Based on work by Adger (2012) and Moulton (2014), 
we lay out a framework in which compositionality – not verbal argument-structure – is at 
the heart of the nominal paradigm. We then propose an account of semantic control, as 
invoked by verbs of EC. First, we provide a simplified semantic representation of aspectual 
predicates, such that control is entailed. Furthermore, we show that this semantic analysis 
– when combined with an (anti-)causative syntax – can derive the raising/control ambiguity 
without further stipulation. Next, we motivate an account of try, such that the predicate 
encodes two separate arguments: an action and an intention. We provide an analysis such 
that any interpretable control effects result from the relation between these two arguments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. A suggestive correlation and its implications 
 
At its core, this thesis concerns the tools that a given language employs to establish a 
thematic relation between a single individual and two (or more) predicative expressions. 
This may be achieved through several mechanisms, including anaphoric pronominal 
binding (Johni said that hei would leave) as well as raising (Johni seemed ti to be leaving). 
The primary focus of the present work, however, will be the singular phenomenon known 
within the generative tradition as obligatory subject control, of the sort illustrated in (1). 
Here we follow notational convention such that PRO corresponds to the implicit subject of 
the embedded non-finite clause. 
 
(1) a.  Johni began [PROi/*j/*ARB to examine the patient].  
 b.  Maryi demanded [PROi/*j/*ARB to investigate the suspect].  
 
Obligatory control and control theory have occupied a markedly prominent place in the 
generative research programme since at least the Equi-NP Deletion transformational 
analysis proposed in Rosenbaum (1967, 1970), and has spawned nearly as many variant 
analyses as there are control scholars. Many such proposals seek to derive the effects of 
obligatory control from the grammatical properties and distribution of a null pronominal 
element PRO (see Chomsky 1981; Chomsky and Lasnik 1993; Bošković 1997; Martin 
2001, a.o.). Another line of research aims to reduce control to raising (and hence to A-
movement, see Hornstein 1999; Boeckx and Hornstein 2003, 2004, 2006; Bowers 2008; 
Hornstein and Polinsky 2010, a.o.). Further still, a number of authors have defended the 
view that controlled infinitives constitute bare VPs, lacking any sort of covert subject (PRO 
or otherwise) (Bresnan 1978; Bach 1979; Chierchia 1984; Dowty 1985, a.o.); this 
hypothesis has seen some recent revitalisation in the form of radical restructuring accounts 
of control (Wurmbrand 1998, 2001) as well as accounts invoking a mono-clausal analysis 
of obligatory control constructions (Cinque 2006; Fukuda 2007; Grano 2012, 2015).1 
 One of the main objectives of the present study is to evaluate contemporary control 
theory in light of novel data concerning the effects of obligatory control into non-canonical 
complement types. In particular, we will look at the behaviour of obligatory control 
                                                 
1 For a proper historical and contemporary overview of the various control frameworks conceived within the 
generative research programme, see Landau (2013). 
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predicates in environments involving direct object DPs. By way of illustration, consider 
the data in (2) involving the nominalised counterparts of the non-finite complements in (1). 
Here we find that, while the expected obligatory control relation obtains in (2a), example 
(2b) shows no control. 
 
(2) a.  Johni began [PROi/*j/*ARB the examination of the patient].  
 b.  Maryi demanded [PROi/j/ARB the investigation of the suspect].  
 
The pattern in (2) presents a non-trivial puzzle for any account of obligatory control which 
derives the interpretative control relation in (1a) and (1b) uniformly. That is, if both begin 
and demand establish subject control into non-finite clauses in the same manner, then we 
should expect that they will either establish or restrict control in nominal complement 
environments in an equally similar manner. 
 While the observation that obligatory control predicates show some variation as to 
whether or not they enforce obligatory control into direct object DPs is not entirely new 
(cf. Alba-Salas 2006), we will make the novel proposal that the variation exhibited in (2) 
correlates systematically with the robust empirical divide between exhaustive control 
(henceforth EC) and partial control (PC) identified and defended in a series of works by 
Landau (1999, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, et seq.). Landau’s distinction is primarily a 
typological distinction between two classes of obligatory control: (i) EC, which establishes 
a strict one-to-one identity relation, and (ii) PC, in which the controller-controllee relation 
corresponds to a proper subset relation. Among its many empirical motivations, we note 
that whether a verb enforces EC or permits PC is recoverable from its lexical semantic 
category. As such, we present our initial motivation for the present study in examples (3) 
and (4), which show the significant interaction between the EC/PC divide and the 
manifestation of obligatory control in direct object DPs. 
 
(3)   Exhaustive Control Predicates  
 a.  Johni began [PROi/*j/*ARB the examination of the patient].  
 b.  Maryi managed [PROi/*j/*ARB the investigation of the suspect]. 
 c.  The governmenti tried [PROi/*j/*ARB the abolition of workers’ rights]. 
(4)   Partial Control Predicates  
 a.  Johni demanded [PROi/j/ARB the examination of the patient].  
 b.  Maryi imagined [PROi/j/ARB the investigation of the suspect]. 
 c.  The governmenti regretted [PROi/j/ARB the abolition of workers’ rights]. 
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If correct, the correlation between the EC/PC split and the presence/absence of control in 
nominal complements suggests that whatever mechanism is responsible for EC in clausal 
complement environments is transparent regarding the syntactic category of the 
complement. In the same vein, this potential correlation suggests that the grammatical 
derivation of PC is tied to something specific in the non-finite, bi-clausal environment 
present in this example. Crucially, the variation between (1) and (2) is in line with 
contemporary argumentation in the relevant literature that EC and PC are derived via 
different grammatical properties or processes (cf. Wurmbrand 2002; Pearson 2013; Grano 
2015; Landau 2015, a.o.). 
 There are a number of critical implications this correlation has for both control 
theory as well as for any working theory of derivational nominalisation. As previously 
mentioned, the manifestation of EC in both non-finite clauses and nominalisations 
motivates an account of EC predicates that is independent from the syntactic category of 
the complement. Pre-theoretically, this implication calls into question control analyses 
which rely on a uniform CP structure of non-finite embedded clauses (e.g., Chomsky 1981; 
Chomsky and Lasnik 1993) as well as those which key EC to a particular set of features 
housed on an embedded Tense projection (e.g., Landau 2004). Furthermore, the availability 
of EC in nominal complements suggests that the control predicate is a lexical verb, thereby 
presenting a non-trivial problem for mono-clausal accounts which treat EC predicates as 
functional auxiliaries in the matrix left-periphery (Fukuda 2007; Grano 2012, 2015). 
 Concerning nominalisation theory, the availability of EC in derived nominals 
suggests that whatever mechanism derives EC in the clausal domain is also present within 
the noun phrase. Thus, the internal composition of derived nominalisations becomes critical 
to the formulation and evaluation of any theory of exhaustive control. Can the internal 
structure of a de-verbal nominalisation be construed as containing a PRO subject? If so, 
does the underlying nominalised predicate assert the same thematic relation of its PRO 
subject that we find in the corresponding verbal construction? What is the role of argument- 
and event-structure within the nominalisation in determining the manifestation of an EC 
relation with the selecting predicate? 
 As its primary contribution to the ongoing discussion on control, this thesis aims to 
provide a unified analysis of EC which can adequately explain the manifestation of EC in 
both infinitival and nominal complement environments. In the course of developing this 
analysis, we will discover that the interpretative EC relation and its associated effects must 
be an inherent property of the selecting predicate. As such, our proposal will seek to analyse 
exhaustive control as a phenomenon determined directly by the lexical semantics of the 
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control predicate. Furthermore, we will find that the observable control patterns in nominal 
complement environments suggest that the relationship between argument-structure and 
event-structure in the nominal domain is less isomorphic than is argued in many 
contemporary nominalisation theories. As such, we will present an independent argument 
for a framework of derivational nominalisation based on semantic compositionality and 
widespread argument optionality. 
 
1.2. Theoretical assumptions 
 
Before we begin in earnest, it would be useful to establish the theoretical framework in 
which this thesis will be couched. First, we will adopt a relatively simplistic type-theoretic 
extensional semantics, as popularised by Montague (1970, 1974) and used extensively in 
contemporary generative linguistic inquiry (see especially Heim and Kratzer 1998). In 
particular, we will assume the primitive semantic types in (5), as well as the semantic 
denotation domains in (6). 
 
(5)   Semantic Types 
 a.  e, v, i and t are semantic types.  
 b.  If σ and τ are semantic types, then 〈σ,τ〉 is a semantic type. 
 c.  Nothing else is a semantic type. 
 
(6)   Semantic Denotation Domains 
 a.  De = the set of individuals 
 b.  Dv = the set of eventualities 
 c.  Di = the set of time intervals 
 d.  Dt = {0, 1} 
 e.  For any semantic types σ and τ, D〈σ,τ〉 is the set of all function from Dσ to Dτ 
 
To clarify, our inventory of semantic types includes individuals (type e) and truth values 
(type t), as well as their associated denotation domains (De and Dt). Furthermore, we 
include events in our inventory of semantic types (type v) and its associated domain (Dv), 
following the Neo-Davidsonian tradition of event-semantic analysis (cf. Davidson 1967; 
Parsons 1990, a.o.). Likewise, our inventory contains time intervals (type i) and its 
associated domain (Di), following recent work into the semantics of tense and aspect (cf. 
Pancheva and Stechow 2004). Finally, we provide definitions for recursive composition of 
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both primitive semantic types, as well as for the domains of semantic denotation (see (5b) 
and (6e), respectively). Note that we omitted world variables within our inventory of types; 
we leave discussion of intentional semantics and possible-worlds for chapter 6. 
 Next, we will assume a relatively standard framework of structural computation, 
such that the combination of syntactic heads and phrases is driven primarily by rules of 
type-driven semantic composition. The nature and application of these compositional 
methods will be, in part, the focus of our investigation into control across complement 
types. That is, how does one provide a unified analysis of the compositional behaviour of 
a single phenomenon that seems to be transparent regarding the syntactic structure – and 
presumably the semantic denotation – of its complement? The following constitutes an 
exhaustive inventory of all compositional definitions that we will make use of in the course 
of this dissertation in order to address this question.  
 
(7)   Functional Application (FA) 
   Let α be a branching node with daughters β and γ; if ⟦β⟧ is a function of type 
〈σ,τ〉 and ⟦γ⟧ is of type 〈σ〉, then ⟦α⟧ = ⟦β⟧(⟦γ⟧). 
 
(8)   Predicate Modification (PM) 
   Let α be a branching node with daughters β and γ; if ⟦β⟧ and ⟦γ⟧ are both 
functions of type 〈σ,τ〉, then ⟦α⟧ = λx ∈ Dσ.⟦β⟧(x) ∧ ⟦γ⟧(x). 
 
(9)   Restrict  
   Let α be a branching node with daughters β and γ; if ⟦β⟧ is a function of type 
〈ρ,〈σ,τ〉〉 and ⟦γ⟧ is of type 〈ρ,τ〉, then ⟦α⟧ = λy ∈ Dρ.λx ∈ Dσ.⟦β⟧(y)(x) ∧ 
⟦γ⟧(y). 
   (Chung and Ladusaw 2004) 
 
In addition to the compositional methods in (7-9), we will on occasion invoke a method of 
predicate saturation known as Existential Closure (in the sense of Heim 1982). Much like 
Chung and Ladusaw (2004), we will assume that this rule may apply as an implicit unary 
operation on a (potentially non-terminal) syntactic node, as defined in (10). Our motivation 
for this assumption is primarily one of convenience; the assertion of existential closure as 
an implicit operation avoids the need for an additional functional head that has little or no 
morphosyntactic correlate. Note that this definition of existential closure is distinct from 
the existential quantification that may be borne on certain functional nodes (such as the 
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existential closure of the event variable at Aspect).  
 
(10)   Existential Closure (EC) 
   Let α be a potentially non-terminal syntactic node; if ⟦α⟧ is a function of type 
〈σ,τ〉, then EC(⟦α⟧) = ∃x ∈ Dσ[⟦α⟧(x) = 1]. 
 
Next, throughout this dissertation we will have need to speak about the specific semantic 
relations that hold between individuals and events. To this end, we will employ the term 
thematic relation, in the sense of Parsons (1990), Dowty (1991). In particular, this work 
will take the traditional view that the logical component of the grammar makes available a 
limited inventory of thematic relations that generalise across argument positions of 
different predicates (i.e., Agent, Theme, Beneficiary, Goal, Experiencer, etc., see 
Jackendoff 1972). Similarly, we will assume that these thematic relations may be 
introduced into the logical denotation of any given structure by either a lexical item (such 
as a verb) or by a dedicated functional syntactic head. We will make no attempt to reduce 
or isolate the precise members of the set of thematic relations. 
 An important clarification must be made between thematic relations and so-called 
theta roles, which feature prevalently in generative syntactic discussion (cf. Chomsky 
1981, 1995). The nature of theta roles was of particular interest in the early formulations of 
the government and binding theory, which established the theta-criterion as a means of 
predictably constraining the possible utterances a grammar could generate (see especially 
Chomsky 1981; Haegeman 1994). While the precise relation between a thematic relation 
and its corresponding theta role is a matter of some controversy, it is common practice for 
many authors to distinguish the purely semantic thematic relations from the purely syntactic 
theta roles (for recent discussion, see Carnie 2006; Champollion 2010). Given that the 
formal distinction between these two categories has no bearing on the present investigation, 
we will use the appropriate thematic designation (e.g., Theme) to refer to both the relevant 
syntactic and semantic relation interchangeably. 
 In terms of underlying verbal and clausal architecture, we adopt a (relatively) 
agnostic perspective within this study. Our analyses and formulae will be presented in the 
notational tradition of Neo-Davidsonian event-semantics (in the sense of Parsons 1990), 
though we will adopt a partially lexicalist view such that the verb introduces its internal 
arguments directly. However, we note that this thesis could be adapted with minimal effort 
to the more radical interpretation of the Neo-Davidsonian hypothesis such that that all 
arguments are introduced externally to the lexical verb by dedicated functional structure 
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(cf. Borer 2005a, 2005b, a.o.). Furthermore, this dissertation omits any formal discussion 
of the nature of category-neutral roots (as are often manipulated within the Distributed 
Morphology framework (Halle and Marantz 1993; Marantz 1997, 2001)); again, the work 
that follows could easily be adapted to such a framework with minimal alterations. 
 One particular assumption is worth special attention, as it is featured prominently 
in this work: Kratzer’s (1996) Voice hypothesis. Like Chomsky’s (1995) ‘little v’ 
hypothesis, Kratzer proposed that the external arguments of (at least some) verbs are not 
encoded in the lexical semantics of a given predicate, but are rather introduced in the 
specifier position of a particular functional head in the extended verbal projection (namely, 
Voice). We will make no explicit attempt to motivate any one view of Voice, but rather 
will assume the characterisation of Voice such that it is a non-eventive functional head that 
relates the external argument to the verbal complex and checks accusative case (for related 
discussion, see Borer 1994, 2005b; Ramchand 2008; Harley 2009, a.o.).  
 Our motivation for adopting the Voice hypothesis is not based on necessity; like 
many of the assumptions discussed above, the argumentation presented throughout this 
dissertation would be unaffected if we assumed that external arguments are encoded 
directly within the lexical semantics of verbs. Instead, the Voice hypothesis constitutes 
something of a thought experiment for our purposes. To clarify, in section 1.1 we alluded 
to the notion that the present study will seek to establish exhaustive control as an inherent 
semantic property of EC predicates. However, we contend that appealing to lexical 
semantics to account for control runs the risk of merely restating the observable control 
relation within the predicate’s denotation. That is, one might be tempted to provide a 
semantic denotation for the verb manage such that it explicitly links its subject to the 
implicit subject position of whatever is managed. While functional, this account would lack 
generality, in that each subject control predicate would need to specify an identical lexical 
semantic relation. Critically, the Voice hypothesis removes this temptation entirely; in 
terms of our previous example, the subject of manage would not be specified in its lexical 
semantics, and as such could not be manipulated within the denotation. Instead, the 
assumption that external arguments are absent from the lexical semantics of verbs will force 
us to evaluate alternative means by which a subject control relation could be inherently 
established. In a sense, the account that follows is reductionist in nature, as we will attempt 
to reduce the observable EC relation in certain subject control predicates to a combination 
of independently motivated principles of the grammar. 
 One final consideration before we begin in earnest comes in the form of a 
terminological ambiguity in the control literature. In section 1.1 we introduced Landau’s 
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(1999, 2000) empirical distinction between EC and PC, which constitute two distinct 
species of obligatory control (OC) in Landau’s system. OC may likewise be distinguished 
from non-obligatory control (NOC), which governs the possible control of an embedded 
PRO subject in various infinitival adjuncts (see Landau 2013 for a recent survey of the 
OC/NOC literature). Critically, Landau’s categorisation of both EC and PC as OC contrasts 
with the approach taken by Wurmbrand (2001, 2002), who classifies EC as OC and PC as 
a type of NOC. Given that the present work largely adopts Wurmbrand’s ‘division of 
labour’ hypothesis (see section 3.5), we will likewise broadly adopt Wurmbrand’s 
terminological perspective, such that EC = OC and PC = NOC. Furthermore, note that 
throughout this thesis, our discussion of ‘obligatory control’ and its manifestation concerns 
only the presence or absence of an obligatory thematic dependency, independent of any 
assumptions regarding a syntactic PRO and its attributes. 
 
1.3. Structure of the dissertation 
 
The remainder of this thesis consists of six chapters, organised in the following manner. In 
chapter 2 we provide an overview of the EC/PC distinction and its relevant correlates, as 
discussed in Landau (1999, 2000, 2004, et seq.). We then provide a series of data which 
motivate the hypothesis that EC exists into derived nominal complements in the same 
manner as it does into non-finite clausal complements, while PC does not. Furthermore, we 
will show that whether or not EC is established into the nominal complement is keyed 
directly to whether or not the nominalisation is compositionally derived from a verbal 
predicate, and not to the realisation of overt argument-structure within the nominal. This 
chapter will conclude with three key generalisations that any account of control into 
nominals must account for. 
 Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive evaluation of many contemporary analyses of 
control in light of the asymmetrical control pattern observed in chapter 2. In particular, we 
find that purely syntactic analyses of the EC/PC divide under-generate in the domain of 
nominal control. That is, PRO-based accounts (such as Williams 1980; Sag and Pollard 
1991; Landau 2004; van Urk 2011, a.o.) as well as the MTC (Hornstein 1999; Boeckx and 
Hornstein 2003, a.o.) correctly predict the lack of control in PC predicate constructions, 
but fail to predict the manifestation of EC in those same environments. Likewise, we find 
that the purely semantic approach to control defended in Culicover and Jackendoff (2001, 
2005, 2006) over-generates in the environment of nominal complements; they correctly 
predict the observable EC relation, but fail to predict the lack of control in PC predicate 
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constructions. Finally, we review the proposal by Wurmbrand (2002) such that the EC/PC 
distinction corresponds to a semantic/syntactic division of labour. We conclude that, with 
adequate assumptions regarding the internal composition of derived nominals, this account 
provides the most natural explanation of the asymmetrical control pattern observed in 
nominal complements. 
 Chapter 4 establishes an analysis of English deverbal nominalisation that is in line 
with the assumptions made of nominal composition in chapter 3. Namely, we defend the 
hypothesis that arguments are always optional in derived nominalisations (contra 
Grimshaw 1990). To this end, we present a series of diagnostic data which show that 
nominalisations compositionally built from verbal bases pattern uniformly regardless of 
whether they realise an internal argument. Furthermore, we provide independent data 
which show that of-marked arguments in deverbal nominalisations are not ‘true’ verbal 
arguments, in that they fail to exhibit a number of diagnostic behaviours typically 
associated with the direct objects of verbs. We then present a formal account of English 
deverbal nominalisation which follows in spirit the analysis of Adger (2012), such that of-
arguments may be optionally realised within a nominal applicative structure. 
 In chapter 5 we present a formal analysis of English EC predicates of the aspectual 
sub-type which uniformly accounts for EC and its associated effects in both nominal and 
infinitival complement environments. To begin, we establish that aspectual predicates are 
(anti-)causative in nature (cf. Pustejovsky and Bouillon 1995). We subsequently provide a 
radically simplified lexical semantic analysis of aspectual predicates which draws on 
general principles of classical mereology (Krifka 1989, 1992; Champollion and Krifka 
2016), as well as recent semantic work by Piñango and Deo (2016). Furthermore, we show 
that when combined with variable methods of semantic composition, a single lexical entry 
can account for control into both nominal and clausal complement types. Finally, our 
account leverages a causative syntax following (Pylkkänen 2008) which provides some 
purchase on the raising/control ambiguity often attributed to aspectual predicates (see 
especially Perlmutter 1970). We establish EC and its associated effects as following from 
principles of direct causation (in the sense of Kratzer 2005), as well as from the necessarily 
small size of any non-finite complements. 
 Chapter 6 provides a formal account of the EC predicate try, which takes inspiration 
from recent theoretical work on the predicate explain and the explanans/explanandum 
distinction (cf. Pietroski 2000). In particular, we argue that try constructions involve two 
distinct components: an action and an intention (cf. Sharvit 2003; Grano 2011, 2017). 
However, unlike previous accounts, we propose that the action component is not an 
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aspectual component in the denotation of try, but is rather an individual Theme argument 
of the predicate. We motivate this view based on novel data concerning the 
entailment/presuppositional patterns of try in various complement environments. 
Furthermore, we establish the intentional component of try within the decompositional 
view of attitudes and intentions (Kratzer 2006; Moulton 2009), such that the intention 
associated with the event of trying is built into the non-finite complement itself. The result 
of this analysis is such that we attribute a relatively simplistic Neo-Davidsonian denotation 
to the try predicate itself, with much of the work being shifted to the syntactic environment 
in which it appears. 
 We conclude in chapter 7 with an overview of questions which have not been 
directly tackled by this thesis. Foremost among them is the status of PC predicates, and the 
structural nature of PC in clausal complement environments. To this end we note that 
Landau’s (2015) analysis of PC makes the correct predictions regarding the lack of PC into 
nominals, as it makes crucial use of the embedded clausal CP layer. Further, we address 
the nature of temporal orientation in nominal environments, and conclude that any analysis 
of PC which packages control and temporal properties together (i.e., Landau 2004; Pearson 
2013, 2016) makes the wrong predictions regarding nominal complements to PC verbs.  
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2. INTRODUCING NOMINAL COMPLEMENTS TO THE DISCUSSION ON 
CONTROL 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will establish the properties of apparent control relations in noun phrase 
complements to control predicates. The primary question to be answered is ‘do the 
empirical correlates of the EC/PC split – as they exist in the domain of clausal 
complementation – manifest in nominal complement constructions?’ We begin in section 
2.2 with an evaluation of previous analyses of control-like phenomena in nominal 
environments. Then in section 2.3 we provide an overview of the robust empirical 
correlations associated with the EC/PC divide. Having identified the key empirical trends, 
section 2.4 then investigates the pervasiveness of these trends in the novel environment of 
complex event nominal complementation. In section 2.5 this line of inquiry is extended to 
the domain of simple event nominal complements, and in 2.6 we consider some additional 
nominal categories. In section 2.7 I make explicit the key generalisations that emerge from 
this investigation and propose that any uniform theory of complement control should make 
accounting for these generalisations its primary objective. 
It should be noted that the judgments regarding the acceptability of the data 
presented in this chapter (and subsequent chapters) represent the informal linguistic 
intuitions of a limited set of native speaker correspondents. Our initial investigation and 
subsequent hypotheses are concerned entirely with the competence of the language user (in 
the sense of Chomsky 1965), and make no formal attempts to quantify the reported 
judgments to any empirically robust order of magnitude. Despite these limitations, this 
chapter will converge on a series of generalisations which adequately represent the intuitive 
linguistic knowledge of a native English speaker regarding the effects of obligatory control 
into certain classes of nouns. As such, this work constitutes only a first step, and it is 
imperative that the hypotheses and generalisations presented here be further scrutinised in 
future empirical/experimental work. 
 
2.1.1. A note on terminology 
 
Before we progress any further, a few words are in order regarding the terminology used 
throughout this chapter. First, the kinds of constructions under investigation in this chapter 
– and indeed, throughout this thesis – are specifically those involving control verbs with 
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nominal complements. For example, the utterance in (11) involves a canonical control verb 
followed by a DP direct object. 
 
(11)   [TP The doctoral student [VP promised [DP a thorough investigation of control]]] 
 
Note that this kind of construction is very different from control within nominals, which 
has been discussed in the literature at length (see a.o. Culicover and Jackendoff 2001; 
Boeckx and Hornstein 2003). Control within NP constructions, as illustrated in (12), 
involves embedded infinitival complements to nouns that are presumably derived from 
control verbs. 
 
(12)   [DP The doctoral student’s [NP promise [TP to investigate control thoroughly]]] 
 
While we may employ structures such as in (12) to test our hypotheses as we go on, our 
primary focus will be on constructions involving direct object DPs. For further discussion 
of control within nominals and the difficulties it raises, see Landau (2013:213-220). 
 Second, as a topic, control into nominals provides a unique cross-section between 
two highly controversial topics in generative grammar: control and nominalisation. As 
such, English nominalisation patterns will play a crucial role in understanding the 
behaviour of control predicates in the environment of direct object DPs. In order to avoid 
confusion, we will adopt the terminological conventions of Grimshaw (1990), which 
distinguishes between three types of nominalisation: (i) complex event nominals, (ii) 
simple event nominals and (iii) result nominals. 
 Complex event nominals (henceforth, CENs) are event denoting, and obligatorily 
project the internal argument of the corresponding verb, if available (see (13a)). Simple 
event nominals (henceforth, SENs) are likewise event denoting, but crucially cannot project 
argument structure (as in (13b)). Finally, result nominals (henceforth, RNs) are neither 
event denoting nor argument projecting, and their meaning is only idiosyncratically related 
to the underlying verb (13c). Event-denotation is distinguished by compatibility with the 
predicate take x hours. 
 
(13) a.  The examination of the patient took three hours. CEN 
 b.  The examination took three hours. SEN 
 c.  The examination was photocopied on green paper. RN 
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The aim of chapter 4 will be to critically evaluate Grimshaw’s typology, as well as the 
methodology of its associated diagnostics. Further, it will contest many of Grimshaw’s 
claims regarding argument optionality in the nominal domain. However, for the purposes 
of this initial fact-finding inquiry, the designations in (13) will be utilised wholesale when 
referring to the different possible DP complement types of control verbs. 
 
2.2. Previous observations 
 
2.2.1. Alba-Salas (2006) 
 
In Alba-Salas’ (2006) investigation of control effects into Romance nominals, the author 
distinguishes four separate groups of predicates based on whether or not they induce 
obligatory control into their complement. Of these four classes, two are concerned with 
verbs that can only take nominal complements: (i) verbs such as fer (make) and efectuar 
(do) that induce obligatory control effects into their NP complements (see (14a)), and (ii) 
verbs such as criticar (criticise) and esmentar (mention) which do not (see (14b)). 
 
(14) a.  La Mònica (li) farà [PROi/*j/*ARB una trucada (*del Pere) 
   the Monica (to.her) will.make  a call (of.the Pere) 
   a L’Eva.] 
   to the.Eva 
   ‘Monica will give Eva a call (*by/from Pere).’ 
 b.  El Pau esmentà [PROi/j/ARB una inversió de 300 euros 
   the Paul mentioned  an investment of 300 Euros 
   (de/per part de l’Ali)] 
   (of/by part of the.Ali) 
   ‘Paul mentioned a 300-euro investment (by Ali).’ 
   (CATALAN; adapted from (Landau 2013:210)) 
 
The remaining two classes of Romance predicates in Alba-Salas’ study involve those that 
can take both infinitival and nominal complements. Here, the author discovers that while 
some predicates will enforce obligatory control into both infinitival and nominal 
complements, others will only induce obligatory control into infinitives, leaving any 
nominal complements uncontrolled. The predicate classes are roughly as follows: (i) the 
començar class, which enforces obligatory control into both infinitives and nominals (see 
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(15a) employing the control predicate dedicar-se), and (ii) the prometre class, which 
enforces obligatory control into infinitives but not into nominals (see (15b)). 
 
(15) a.  L’Eva es dedica a [PROi/*j/*ARB la falsificació de passaports.] 
   the.Eva REF devotes to  the forgery of passports 
   ‘Eva forges passports (for a living).’ 
    
 b.  L’Evai ens va prometre [PROi/j/ARB una investigació de l’escandol 
   the.Eva to.us PST promise  an investigation of the.scandal 
   (per part del governj)] 
   (by part of.the government) 
   ‘Eva promised us an investigation of the scandal (by the government).’ 
   (CATALAN; Landau 2013:210) 
 
The author’s analysis of these facts is rooted in the conceptual-structure theory of control, 
as developed by Jackendoff and Culicover (2003). This system will be discussed at length 
in chapter 3; for now, it is enough to note that within this framework, obligatory control is 
keyed to action-denoting complements. In essence, any control predicate which encodes an 
action complement also lexically determines the controller by way of argument binding. In 
order to account for predicates of the type in (15b), Alba-Salas posits a lexical ambiguity: 
one lexical entry of prometre sub-categorises for infinitival complements and encodes 
obligatory control, while another lexical entry sub-categorises for DP complements and 
encodes no control (or non-obligatory control). 
 This analysis is criticised by Landau (2013) who notes that, empirically, the 
infinitival-nominal contrast cannot be reduced to the action-state contrast. Citing Giorgi 
and Longobardi (1991), Landau demonstrates that while the Italian verbs volere (want) and 
amare (love) both allow non-action complements (both infinitival and nominal), only the 
nominal counterparts permit non-obligatory control readings, as illustrated by the contrast 
in (16). Landau claims that such contrasts reveal an irreducible syntactic component to 
control. 
 
(16) a.  Socratei  voleva/amava anzitutto conoscere se stesso/*se stessi. 
   Socrates wanted/loved mainly to.know himself/*oneself 
   ‘Socrates mainly wanted/love to know himself/*oneself.’ 
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 b.  Socratei  voleva/amava anzitutto la conoscenza di se stesso/se stessi. 
   Socrates wanted/loved mainly the knowledge of himself/oneself 
   ‘Socrates mainly wanted/love the knowledge of himself/oneself.’ 
   ITALIAN 
 
It is worth mentioning here that both Alba-Salas and Landau fail to notice that the verbs of 
the començar group (exemplified in (15a)) roughly correspond to those predicates which 
enforce exhaustive control in clausal complement constructions. Similarly, the verbs of the 
prometre group (see (15b)) correspond to those predicates which permit partial control in 
clausal complement constructions. Thus, one of the great contributions of Alba-Salas’ 
(2006) study is the observation that EC predicates enforce obligatory control in both 
infinitival clauses and nominals, while PC predicates show no obligatory control effects 
into nominal complements. We will see later in this chapter that the same observations can 
be made for English control constructions, and will be a primary motivator for the control 
analysis formulated in this dissertation. 
 Finally, we note that Landau’s claim of an irreducible syntactic component, while 
correct to some extent, is too general. We will see in this thesis that while for some control 
predicates a particular syntactic configuration is key, others seem to be syntactically 
agnostic. We will argue that this contrast is systematic and predictable from general 
components of the grammar. 
 
2.2.2. Sichel (2010) 
 
In a recent examination of control effects in nominal environments, Sichel (2010) primarily 
examines constructions involving control within DPs (as in (12)). However, in doing so, 
the author makes a number of discoveries regarding the nature of the implicit subject of 
event nominalisations. Namely, Sichel finds that the interpretation of any implicit subjects 
inside the DP is coloured by the pragmatic force of the matrix predicate. For example, 
predicates such as maintain and stick to favour co-reference between the matrix subject and 
the implicit nominal subject (as in (17a)). In contrast, predicates such as criticise and agree 
with favour disjoint reference with the possessor DP in the matrix clause (see (17b)). 
Finally, predicates such as be committed to in (17c) show no particular biases, and permit 
both interpretations. We follow Landau (2013) in labelling the reference of the implicit 
nominal subject using pro. 
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(17) a.  [ John’si [ motherj ] ] maintained/stuck to [ proj/*i the refusal [ PROj/*i to 
jeopardise herselfj/*himselfi ] ] 
 b.  [ John’si [ motherj ] ] criticised/agreed with [ proi/*j the refusal [ PROi/*j to 
jeopardise himselfi/*herselfj ] ] 
 c.  [ John’si [ motherj ] ] was committed to [ proi/j the refusal [ PROi/j to jeopardise 
himselfi/herselfj ] ] 
 
Crucially, given that the interpretation of pro in these cases is biased by pragmatic 
influences, the preferred interpretation is defeasible in marked contexts. For example, while 
the predicate criticise above prefers disjoint reference, it is perfectly plausible to construct 
a context in which John’s mother criticises her own refusal to jeopardise herself (perhaps 
speaking retrospectively, after the full consequences of her refusal have been felt). 
This behaviour is strikingly different from the behaviour of these obligatory control 
predicates in clausal complement environments. As we see in (18), the implicit subject of 
gerundive complements may never obviate c-command so as to co-refer with a possessor 
DP. 
 
(18) a.  [ John’si [ motherj ] ] criticised/agreed with refusing [ PROj/*i to jeopardise 
herselfj/*himselfi ] ] 
 b.  [ John’si [ motherj ] ] was committed to refusing [ PROj/*i to jeopardise 
herselfj/*himself ] ] 
 
One immediate problem with Sichel’s account becomes apparent when we consider Alba-
Salas’ (2006) findings regarding the començar class of control predicates. This group of 
subject control verbs shows apparent obligatory control effects into both clausal and 
nominal complements. According to Sichel’s pro account of implicit nominal subjects, the 
relation that Alba-Salas interprets as obligatory control can at most be a strong pragmatic 
bias induced by the matrix verb. As such, we should be able to force a reading in which 
verbs of the començar class permit disjoint reference. Using the equivalent English 
predicate dedicate oneself to (see (15a) above), we find that co-reference between a 
possessor in the matrix clause and the implicit nominal subject is impossible in these 
contexts, as illustrated in (19a). Hence, the nominal constructions mirror the corresponding 
gerundive complement environment (19b). 
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(19) a.  [ John’si [ motherj ] ] dedicated herself to [ proj/*i the refusal to jeopardise 
herselfj/*himselfi ] ] 
 b.  [ John’si [ motherj ] ] dedicated herself to [ PROj/*i refusing to jeopardise 
herselfj/*himself ] ] 
 
Landau (2013) provides some further criticism of Sichel’s (2010) account. This criticism 
is aimed primarily at the typological motivation associated with licensing pro in a language 
without pro-drop, such as English. While the question is fair, it should be noted that 
Sichel’s account does not make any claims about pro directly. Instead, she employs the 
murky terminology of ‘implicit nominal subject’. While choosing to represent this implicit 
argument as pro is one potential strategy, there are a number of other possible solutions, 
such as lexical/semantic suppression of said argument (see a.o. Grimshaw 1990; Szabolcsi 
1992). 
 
2.3. The empirical correlates of EC/PC 
 
In Landau’s (1999, 2000) original classification of control predicates, PC is distinguished 
as a control relation in which the overt controller is a proper subset of the set of implicit 
controllees. This subset relation can be illustrated with examples such as those in (20). In 
example (20a), we see that the collective predicate gather does not accept a semantically 
singular subject. When embedded beneath the PC predicate want in (20b) however, gather 
is compatible with a singular controller. This observation suggests that the implicit subject 
of the embedded infinitive is semantically plural, despite the singularity of the overt subject 
of the matrix clause. Similarly, the modifier together requires a semantically plural subject 
in the modified clause, and as such its realisation in (20c) yields ungrammaticality. This is 
not the case when the modifier targets an infinitival clause embedded under a PC predicate, 
as in (20d), thereby providing further evidence for a semantically plural null subject. 
 
(20) a. * John gathered at 6. 
 b.  John wanted to gather at 6. 
 c.  John went to the cinema (*together). 
 d.  John wanted to go to the cinema (together). 
 
Note my use of the term semantically plural above; this notion is quite different from the 
notion of syntactic plurality. While the null subjects of infinitival clauses embedded 
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beneath PC predicates can be shown to express collectivity/semantic plurality (as in (20)), 
they do not express plurality in a way that is relevant to the syntax. Take for example the 
anaphor each other, which requires a syntactically plural antecedent. In example (21a) we 
see each other grammatically bound by a plural antecedent within the same clause. In (21b) 
we find the anaphor presumably bound by a syntactically plural null subject in the 
infinitive. However, the null subject in (21c) is unable to bind the syntactically plural 
anaphor, despite its ability to express semantic plurality (as in (20b,d)). 
 
(21) a.  John and Mary met each other. 
 b.  John and Mary wanted to meet each other. 
 c. * John wanted to meet each other. 
 
EC predicates, on the other hand, enforce a strict one-to-one identity relation between 
controller and controllee. As expected, collective predicates such as gather and together 
cause the derivation to crash when embedded beneath an EC verb such as manage with a 
singular external argument. 
 
(22) a. * John managed to gather at 6. 
 b. * John managed to go to the cinema together. 
 
Landau (1999, 2000) makes the critical observation that whether or not a predicate enforces 
EC or permits PC is entirely recoverable from the semantic class of the predicate. The 
following (non-exhaustive) list provides a cross-section of semantically classed predicates 
by control type (adapted from Landau 2000, 2013). 
 
(23) Exhaustive Control Predicates 
 a.  Implicative: dare, manage, forgetto, force, bother, 
rememberto, … 
 b.  Aspectual: begin, start, finish, continue, resume, … 
 c.  Modal: have, need, may, should, must, … 
 d.  Non-implicative: try 
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(24) Partial Control Predicates 
 a.  Factive: glad, sad, regret, dislike, hate, loathe, sorry, 
… 
 b.  Propositional: believe, think, suppose, imagine, say, claim, 
assert, … 
 c.  Desiderative: want, prefer, yearn, arrange, hope, afraid, 
refuse, agree, plan, aspire, offer, decide, 
mean, intend, resolve, strive, demand, 
promise, … 
 d.  Interrogative: wonder, ask, find out, interrogate, inquire, 
contemplate, deliberate, guess, grasp, 
understand, know, unclear, … 
 
This division of predicates into those which obligatorily enforce EC and those which permit 
PC has been linked to a number of robust empirical correlates. For our purposes, two such 
correlates will be the focus of the remainder of this section. The first concerns the presence 
of (in)dependent tense in the embedded infinitive. Specifically, it has been argued that PC 
predicates allow an independent temporal modifier in the embedded clause, while EC 
predicates do not (Landau 1999, 2000, 2004). The second correlation concerns the 
possibility of an overt embedded subject in the complement clause. In this case, PC 
predicates permit overt DP subjects in non-control contexts, while EC predicates do not 
(Grano 2012, 2015). 
 Further empirical correlates of the EC/PC divide include the generalisation that EC 
predicates allow restructuring, while PC predicates do not (in those languages which 
exhibit restructuring phenomena, cf. Wurmbrand 1998, 2001; Landau 2000; Barrie 2004; 
Cinque 2006; Grano 2012, 2015), as well as the generalisation that PC predicates may 
select tensed, finite complement clauses, while EC predicates may not (Grano 2015). The 
latter is closely related – though not identical – to the possibility of overt embedded 
subjects, as we will see in section 2.3.2. For the purposes of our investigation into 
controlled NP complements, these correlations will be put aside for now, as any theoretical 
account must be integrally linked to the structure of the left-periphery of infinitival clauses. 
 
2.3.1. Tense (in)dependence 
 
Tense independence in the complement clause surfaces as a ‘tense mismatch’ between the 
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matrix and embedded clauses (Stowell 1982; Landau 2000). In example (25) I demonstrate 
a tense mismatch, in which the embedded clause permits a temporal modifier that conflicts 
with a temporal modifier in the matrix clause. I provide the tense mismatch generalisation 
in (26). 
 
(25)   Yesterday, Mary planned to leave the city tomorrow. 
 
(26)   Tense (in)dependence generalisation 
   PC predicates permit tense mismatch between the matrix clause and the 
embedded clause; EC predicates do not. 
 
In order to demonstrate this correlation, the examples in (27) consist of PC predicates of 
each semantic type. In each case, a tense mismatch between the matrix and embedded 
clauses is licensed. Conversely, we find that the EC predicates in (28) become 
ungrammatical with the introduction of a conflicting temporal modifier in the embedded 
clause. 
 
(27)   PC Predicates 
 a.  Yesterday, John demanded to go to the gym (tomorrow). desiderative 
 b.  Yesterday, John wondered whether to go to the gym 
(tomorrow). 
interrogative 
 c.  Today, John regretted going to the gym (yesterday). factive 
 d.  Today, John claimed to have gone to the gym (yesterday). propositional 
 
(28)   EC Predicates 
 a.  Yesterday, John managed to go to the gym (*tomorrow). implicative 
 b.  Yesterday, John began to go to the gym (*tomorrow). aspectual 
 c.  Yesterday, John had to go to the gym (*tomorrow). modal 
 d.  Yesterday, John tried to go to the gym (*tomorrow). try 
 
This generalisation regarding tense can be extended to locational displacement. PC 
predicates – which permit tense mismatch – will also permit locational displacement of the 
embedded event. That is, the matrix event and the embedded event need not occur at the 
same location (as illustrated in (29)). This is not true of EC predicates, which require that 
the matrix and embedded event occur at the same location (as in (30)). 
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(29)   PC Predicates 
 a.  In London, John demanded to go to the gym (in New 
York). 
desiderative 
 b.  In London, John wondered whether to go to the gym (in 
New York). 
interrogative 
 c.  In London, John regretted going to the gym (in New York). factive 
 d.  In London, John claimed to have gone to the gym (in New 
York). 
propositional 
 
(30)   EC Predicates 
 a.  In London, John managed to go to the gym (*in New 
York). 
implicative 
 b.  In London, John began to go to the gym (*in New York). aspectual 
 c.  In London, John had to go to the gym (*in New York). modal 
 d.  In London, John tried to go to the gym (*in New York). try 
 
While all PC predicates permit tense mismatching – as per the generalisation in (26) – they 
are not uniform in how this tense mismatching is realised. We may in fact split those 
predicates which permit tense mismatch into sub-groups dependent on the obligatory 
temporal orientation of their infinitival complements. For example, some PC predicates are 
future-oriented, in that they require posteriority of the embedded event; any conflicting 
temporal modifier in the embedded clause must place the embedded event after the matrix 
event in time (cf. Landau 2000, et seq.; Grano 2012, 2015). The desiderative class of PC 
predicates constitutes one such group of future-oriented verbs. As we see in (31a), the 
desiderative verb demand permits a conflicting temporal modifier in the embedded clause 
which places the embedded event temporally posterior to the matrix event. However, that 
same verb bars any conflicting temporal modifiers which place the embedded event prior 
to the matrix event in time, as illustrated in (31b). 
 
(31) a.  Yesterday, John demanded to leave tomorrow. 
 b. * Today, John demanded to leave last week. 
 
Similarly, past-oriented PC predicates – such as the factive verbs regret and dislike – only 
license conflicting temporal modifiers which yield anteriority of the embedded event. That 
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is, the embedded event must be interpreted as occurring prior to the event named in the 
matrix clause. 
 
(32) a.  Today, John regretted leaving the city last week. 
 b. * Today, John regretted leaving the city tomorrow. 
 
2.3.2. Overt embedded subjects 
 
An overt embedded subject refers to any overt lexical DP appearing in subject position of 
the embedded clause, whether finite or non-finite (in the case of ECM subjects), as 
demonstrated in (33). I provide the overt embedded subjects generalisation in (34). 
 
(33) a.  Mary hoped that Bill would leave the city. finite complement 
 b.  Mary hoped for Bill to leave the city. ECM 
 
(34)   Overt embedded subjects generalisation 
   PC predicates permit overt embedded subjects in the embedded clause; EC 
predicates do not. 
 
Grano (2012, 2015) proposes that the portion of this generalisation which concerns itself 
with PC predicates follows trivially from the ability of a PC predicate to select a finite 
complement. Whether or not this is the case, it is true that PC predicates permit overt 
embedded subjects in either finite complement constructions or ECM constructions (or 
both). 
 
(35) a.  Mary arranged for Bill to leave the city. desiderative 
 b.  Mary wondered whether Bill would leave the city. interrogative 
 c.  Mary was sorry that Bill had left the city. factive 
 d.  Mary believed that Bill had left the city. propositional 
 
On the other hand, EC predicates are wholly incapable of taking overt embedded subjects, 
even in ECM constructions (with or without the help of for (Grano 2012, 2015)). 
 
(36) a. * Mary managed (for) Bill to leave the city. implicative 
 b. * Mary continued (for) Bill to leave the city. aspectual 
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 c. * Mary had (for) Bill to leave the city. modal 
 d. * Mary tried (for) Bill to leave the city. try 
 
Grano (2012) further extends this generalisation to an observation made in Landau (2004) 
concerning Balkan subjunctives. Specifically, Landau identifies two separate types of 
subjunctives in Greek: (i) the C(ontrol)-Subjunctive, which requires a control relation 
between the matrix clause and subjunctive clause (see (37a)), and (ii) the F(ree)-
Subjunctive, in which the embedded referent is free, and may be overt or covert (37b). 
 
(37) a.  O Yanis tolmise na figi (*o Kostas) 
   The  Yanis dared PRT leave the Kostas 
   ‘Yanis dared (*for Kostas) to leave.’ 
 
 b.  O Yanis elpizi na figi (o Kostas) 
   The  Yanis hoped PRT leave the Kostas 
   ‘Yanis1 hoped that he1/2/Kostas will leave.’ 
   GREEK 
(Grano 2012:33-34) 
 
Landau (2004) makes the generalisation that PC predicates take F-subjunctives, while EC 
predicates take C-subjunctives exclusively. While both types of subjunctive clause are 
finite, only F-subjunctives allow overt embedded subjects. Thus, the overt embedded 
subjects generalisation is upheld in a language in which the embedded clause is always 
finite. This observation suggests that the ban on overt embedded subjects in EC 
constructions (and, subsequently, the allowance of overt embedded subjects in PC 
constructions) is not tied to clausal structure and is therefore of extreme interest to our 
investigation into non-clausal, nominal complement constructions. 
 
2.4. Control into complex event nominals 
 
Having outlined the relevant empirical correlates of the EC/PC split, we are now in a 
position to determine whether or not these correlations exist in the domain of nominal 
complementation. In this section we will target specifically those NPs which are event-
denoting, and which can independently host arguments (complex event nominals, in the 
sense of Grimshaw 1990). For the sake of brevity, I adopt here the acronym CEN to 
 34 
describe complex event nominalisations.  
 Note also that the term ‘PRO’ is employed below and throughout the remainder of 
the chapter. I employ this term here as a purely notational tool, and make no assumptions 
concerning the presence of a null syntactic element within infinitival or NP complements. 
The issue of PRO in controlled complements will be taken up in later chapters. 
 
2.4.1. Probing for control into CENs 
 
Before we diagnose the extent to which the correlates of EC/PC exist in controlled CEN 
complement constructions, we must first determine whether or not the relations of control 
observed in the clausal domain are replicated in the nominal domain. 
 We find immediately that PC predicates do not enforce any observable control 
relation when selecting a CEN complement. Examples (38a,c,e), involving PC predicates 
of varying semantic classes, show no control into the selected CEN complement. Compare 
these data to examples (38b,d,f), which demonstrate the typical partial control relation to 
which these predicates give rise in infinitival or gerundive complement environments. 
 
(38) a.  Johni {wanted/demanded/planned} [ PROi/j/ARB the inspection 
of the factory. ] 
desiderative 
 b.  Johni {wanted/demanded/planned} [ PROi+/*j/*ARB to inspect 
the factory. ] 
 
 c.  Johni {hated/regretted/disliked} [ PROi/j/ARB the inspection of 
the factory. ] 
factive 
 d.  Johni {hated/regretted/disliked} [ PROi+/*j/*ARB inspecting the 
factory. ] 
 
 e.  Johni {imagined/denied} [ PROi/j/ARB the inspection of the 
factory. ] 
propositional 
 f.  Johni {imagined/denied} [ PROi+/*j/*arb inspecting the factory. ]  
 
Turning now to EC predicates, we find that those predicates of the aspectual and 
implicative subtype which may take nominal arguments directly enforce an obligatory 
control relation into CEN complements, as demonstrated in (39a,c). Compare these 
examples with those in (39b,d), which illustrate the typical obligatory control relation that 
these predicates enforce into infinitival complements. 
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(39) a.  Johni {began/resumed} [ PROi/*j/*ARB the inspection of the 
factory. ] 
aspectual 
 b.  Johni {began/resumed} [ PROi/*j/*ARB inspecting the factory. ]  
 c.  Johni managed [ PROi/*j/*ARB the inspection of the factory. ] implicative 
 d.  Johni managed [ PROi/*j/*ARB to inspect the factory. ]  
 
Likewise, the verb try enforces an obligatory control relation in both infinitival and nominal 
complement environments, as illustrated in (40). However, there is a significant shift in 
meaning in examples involving try. Namely, in its clausal complement instantiation, try 
does not entail the completion of the event named in the infinitival clause (see (41a)). When 
the complement is a CEN, however, try does entail that the event named in the nominal has 
been completed (41b).  
 
(40) a.  The governmenti tried [ PROi/*j/*ARB the abolition of workers’ 
rights. ] 
try 
 b.  The governmenti tried [ PROi/*j/*ARB to abolish workers’ rights. ]  
 
(41) a.  The government tried to abolish workers’ rights, but they didn’t actually abolish 
workers’ rights. 
 b. * The government tried the abolition of workers’ rights, but they didn’t actually 
abolish workers’ rights. 
 
The issue of try’s entailment patterns across complement domains will be taken up in 
chapter 6. For now, it is enough to acknowledge that, despite any shift in meaning, both 
nominal- and infinitival-selecting variants of try enforce a control reading in which the 
subject of try is obligatorily interpreted as the implicit subject of the embedded event. 
 Next, we must determine whether the interpretative control effects observed in (39) 
and (40) above are indeed exhaustive in nature. To this end, we observe first that the 
collective modifier together is independently licensed in CENs. This holds true of CENs in 
subject position (see (42a)), as well as in object position under a non-control predicate 
(42b). 
 
(42) a.  [ An examination of this patient together ] is required. 
 b.  The doctor recommended [ the examination of this patient together. ] 
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As we know, collective modifiers such as together are uniformly barred in EC 
constructions, due to the strict one-to-one identity relation they enforce. Thus, if the 
observed control relations in (39) and (40) are indeed exhaustive, then we predict that 
together modifiers will not be licensed in these constructions. This prediction is borne out; 
the EC predicates in (43) are incompatible with a together modifier in the CEN 
complement. 
 
(43) a.  John began the examination of this patient (*together). aspectual 
 b.  John managed the examination of this patient (*together). implicative 
 c.  The president tried the abolition of workers’ rights 
(*together). 
try 
 
We may therefore conclude that constructions involving an EC predicate and a CEN 
complement involve the same exhaustive, one-to-one control relation that we find in 
corresponding clausal constructions. 
 In sum, PC predicates show no obligatory control relation into CENs, while EC 
predicates of the aspectual and implicative subtypes – as well as the verb try – do enforce 
an obligatory control relation. In the latter cases, this control relation is the same strict, one-
to-one relation observed in infinitival constructions. Note that we have omitted in this 
section discussion on EC predicates of the modal subtype. This omission is due primarily 
to the incompatibility between most modal predicates and direct object NPs (e.g., *John 
was able the inspection of the factory). Given that our investigation targets specifically 
those predicates which demonstrate infinitival and nominal complement variants, we put 
modal predicates aside for the remainder of this thesis.2 
 
2.4.2. Tense (in)dependence in CENs 
 
In this section, we will demonstrate the extent to which the tense (in)dependence correlation 
generalises to the domain of nominal complementation. We note first that CENs may 
generally license a temporal modifier within the DP, and that this modifier may conflict 
with another overt modifier in the surrounding clause, as illustrated in (44). 
 
                                                 
2 See Wurmbrand 1999; Hacquard 2010; Grano 2012, 2015, a.o. for pertinent discussion regarding modal 
predicates. 
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(44) a.  [ The examination of this patient yesterday ] was re-evaluated today. 
 b.  Yesterday, the doctor recommended [ the examination of this patient together 
tomorrow. ] 
 
We have seen in section 2.4.1 that EC predicates enforce exhaustive control into CEN 
complements. Based on the generalisation governing (in)dependent tense (see (26) above), 
we predict that these predicates will enforce simultaneity between the matrix event and the 
event named by the CEN. This prediction is borne out: the examples in (45) demonstrate 
that a tense mismatch gives rise to ungrammaticality in EC constructions, in both infinitival 
and nominal complementation environments. 
 
(45) a.  Yesterday, John {began/resumed} the inspection of the factory 
(*tomorrow/*the day before). 
aspectual 
 b.  Yesterday, John {began/resumed} inspecting the factory 
(*tomorrow/*the day before). 
 
 c.  Yesterday, John managed the inspection of the factory 
(*tomorrow/*the day before). 
implicative 
 d.  Yesterday, John managed to inspect the factory 
(*tomorrow/*the day before). 
 
 e.  Yesterday, the government tried the abolition of workers’ 
rights (*tomorrow/*the day before). 
try 
 f.  Yesterday, the government tried to abolish workers’ rights 
(*tomorrow/*the day before). 
 
 
Grano (2012) notes that the verb claim, while classified as a PC predicate, also requires 
simultaneity when it selects a stative complement (see (46)). As we see in (47), CENs may 
likewise be compositionally derived from stative adjectival roots (see Borer (2003) for 
further discussion). As demonstrated in (47d), claim may select a de-adjectival CEN so 
long as the CEN remains indefinite. 
 
(46)   Today, Mary claimed to be happy (*last week). 
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(47) a.  John is aware of the issues. 
 b.  John’s awareness of the issues. 
 c.  John claimed to be aware of the issues. 
 d.  John claimed {*the/some/∅} awareness of the issues. 
 
In these CEN complement environments, claim requires the same simultaneity that we find 
in stative clausal complement constructions. 
 
(48) a.  Today, John claimed to be aware of the issues (*last week). 
 b.  Today, John claimed some awareness of the issues (*last week). 
 c.  Today, Mary claimed to be satisfied with the results (*last week). 
 d.  Today, Mary claimed some satisfaction with the results (*last week). 
 
The reader should note that there is a licit interpretation for the conflicting embedded 
temporal modifier in the examples above: one in which the modifier takes scope over the 
adjective’s internal argument alone (e.g., Today, John claimed to be aware of last week’s 
issues). This reading persists in claim constructions across stative complement types. 
Moving on to PC predicates, we saw earlier that PC predicates do not enforce any 
interpretable control relation into CEN complements. However, the following data show 
that, despite the lack of observable control effects, PC verbs permit tense mismatch in their 
NP complements. In fact, the tense mismatch that we find in CEN complement 
constructions entirely mirrors the temporal orientation of the corresponding clausal 
complement constructions. Recall that future-oriented control predicates require 
posteriority of the embedded event in relation to the matrix event. The following data 
demonstrate that those PC predicates which express future-orientation and permit a future-
oriented temporal modifier in the infinitival complement also do so in CEN complement 
constructions (see (49a,b)). Crucially, past-oriented temporal modifiers are uniformly 
barred across both complement types (49c,d). 
 
(49) a.  Yesterday, John {wanted/demanded/planned} the inspection 
of the factory (tomorrow). 
desiderative 
 b.  Yesterday, John {wanted/demanded/planned} to inspect the 
factory (tomorrow). 
 
 c.  Yesterday, John {wanted/demanded/planned} the inspection 
of the factory (*the day before). 
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 d.  Yesterday, John {wanted/demanded/planned} to inspect the 
factory (*the day before). 
 
 
Further, those PC predicates which express past-orientation and permit past-oriented 
temporal modifiers in the complement clause do so as well in CEN complement 
constructions (as in (50a,b)). Future-oriented temporal modifiers are uniformly barred in 
those same environments (50c,d). Note that our investigation of past-oriented PC predicates 
in these constructions is necessarily constrained to gerund-selecting factive verbs. The vast 
majority of past-oriented predicates are adjectival (Grano 2015), and cannot support a 
direct object. However, Pires (2007) convincingly demonstrates that gerundive 
complements to factive PC verbs are indeed clausal. Thus, for our purposes, gerund-
selecting factive verbs will suffice to illustrate the necessary comparison between clausal 
and non-clausal complement environments. 
 
(50) a.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} the inspection of the 
factory (yesterday). 
factive 
 b.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} inspecting the factory 
(yesterday). 
 
 c.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} the inspection of the 
factory (*tomorrow). 
 
 d.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} inspecting the factory 
(*tomorrow). 
 
 
As an aside, note that claim also requires past-orientation when it selects an eventive clausal 
complement (e.g., John claimed to have left). However, in this instantiation, claim also 
requires overt perfective morphology in the complement (Grano 2015). Since aspectual 
morphology is unavailable in English noun phrases, we put this variant of claim aside. 
 In sum, the temporal properties of EC/PC predicates in CEN complement 
constructions are identical to those in clausal complement constructions, regardless of 
whether any control relation is realised. 
 
2.4.3. Overt embedded subjects in CENs 
 
Since at least Grimshaw (1990), we know that CENs may realise the Agent of the 
underlying event as a genitive prenominal argument (see (51a)) or in a by-phrase adjunct 
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(see (51b)). Note that unlike what we find in its verbal counterpart, the projection of an 
Agent with the CEN is entirely optional (as in (51c-e)). 
 
(51) a.  The barbarians’ destruction of Rome … 
 b.  The destruction of Rome by the barbarians … 
 c.  The destruction of Rome … 
 d.  The barbarians destroyed Rome. 
 e. * Destroyed Rome. 
 
It is debatable as to whether the optional Agent is a possessor which may optionally be 
interpreted as Agent (Marantz 1997; Alexiadou 1999, 2001) or a true external argument in 
the most relevant sense (Borer 2003). In either case, its optional presence provides an 
opportunity to test the overt embedded subjects generalisation within the domain of 
nominal complement control. As a point of departure, the examples in (52) demonstrate 
that overt embedded subjects are generally available in CENs when the nominal is in object 
position. 
 
(52) a.  The doctor observed [ the nurse’s examination of the patient. ] 
 b.  The doctor observed [ the examination of the patient by the nurse. ] 
 c.  The teacher critiqued [ John’s demonstration of the facts. ] 
 d.  The teacher critiqued [ the demonstration of the facts by John. ] 
 
The data in (53) show that PC predicates permit overt subjects in CEN complements as 
well, either as prenominal genitive subjects (see (53a,c,e)) or within a by-phrase adjunct 
(53b,d,f). This observation is not surprising: given the lack of control in these constructions, 
these environments are equivalent to those in (52) as far as overt embedded subjects are 
concerned. 
 
(53) a.  The public {wanted/demanded} the council’s immediate 
investigation of the suspect. 
desiderative 
 b.  The public {wanted/demanded} the immediate investigation 
of the suspect by the council. 
 
 c.  The committee {hated/regretted/disliked} Congress’ passing 
of discriminatory legislation. 
 
factive 
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 d.  The committee {hated/regretted/disliked} the passing of 
discriminatory legislation by Congress. 
 
 e.  The president denied his wife’s negotiation of back-door 
deals. 
propositional 
 f.  The president denied the negotiation of back-door deals by 
his wife. 
 
 
Moving on to EC predicate constructions, we find that the overt embedded subjects 
generalisation is upheld in the nominal domain. The data in (54) demonstrate that Agent-
naming by-phrase adjuncts are uniformly barred in CEN complements of EC verbs. 
 
(54) a.  The public {began/continued} the immediate investigation of 
the suspect (*by the council). 
aspectual 
 b.  The committee managed the passing of discriminatory 
legislation (*by Congress). 
implicative 
 c.  The president tried the negotiation of back-door deals (*by his 
wife). 
try 
 
At first glance, embedded genitive subjects also seem to fall in line with the generalisation 
that EC predicates bar overt embedded subjects. The data in (55) show that the projection 
of such as argument within a CEN complement results in ungrammaticality under any 
reading in which it is interpreted as Agent. 
 
(55) a.  The public began {the/*the council’s} immediate 
investigation of the suspect. 
aspectual 
(the council = Agent) 
 b.  The committee managed {the/*Congress’} passing of 
discriminatory legislation. 
implicative 
(Congress = Agent) 
 c.  The president tried {the/*his wife’s} negotiation of back-
door deals. 
try 
(his wife = Agent) 
 
Apparent counterexamples to this claim all have the characteristic that the genitive DP 
names an entity which stands in an abstract possession relation with the event named by 
the CEN. For example, consider a context in which the President’s advisors have come up 
with a detailed plan for a city-wide evacuation, and have drafted a detailed, step-by-step 
guide on how the President could implement their plan. In this case, the utterance in (56a) 
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is licit, with his advisors interpreted as abstract possessors rather than as Agents. Note that 
the utterance in (56b) remains illicit in this context, as expected on any account of by-phrase 
adjuncts which attribute to them an obligatory agentive interpretation.  
 
(56) a.  The president began his advisor’s evacuation of the city. aspectual 
 b. * The president began the evacuation of the city by his advisor.  
 
This phenomenon is systematic across EC predicate types, and dependent only on the 
interpretation of the prenominal genitive as an abstract possessor/beneficiary rather than an 
Agent. 
 To summarise, the generalisation that PC predicates permit overt embedded 
subjects in their complements while EC predicates do not is upheld in the domain of 
nominal complementation. The fact that PC predicates permit an overt Agent in either the 
prenominal genitive position or as a by-phrase follows trivially from their lack of any 
obligatory control relation in this environment. On the other hand, EC predicates uniformly 
bar any Agent-naming by-phrase adjuncts, as well as any genitive DPs which are 
interpreted as Agents. Finally, as expected if this pattern holds in full generality, EC 
predicates permit a genitive DP possessor in CEN complements iff the genitive names an 
abstract possessor or beneficiary of the event denoted by the nominal. 
 
2.5. Control into simple event nominals 
 
Having demonstrated above the extent to which the effects of the EC/PC divide apply to 
CEN complements, we turn now to constructions involving eventive NP complements 
which cannot host arguments. In this section we investigate whether our observations 
concerning control into CENs can be generalised to control into SEN complement 
constructions. We must therefore assess (i) whether EC predicates enforce exhaustive 
control into SENs while PC predicates show no control in these environments, and (ii) 
whether the temporal orientation and tense properties of clausal complement constructions 
are retained in constructions involving SENs/RNs. For the sake of simplicity, we will only 
consider here those SENs that are clearly and morphologically derived from verbs (i.e., 
inspection, investigation, collection, etc.). The issue of event-denoting NPs with no verbal 
base will be discussed in section 2.6. Note also that, unlike CEN complements, SENs 
provide no method of testing the overt embedded subjects generalisation prima facie, given 
their deficient nature (see section 2.1.1), and as such that correlation will not be tested in 
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this environment. 
 
2.5.1. Probing for control into SENs 
 
In this section we will discuss only those nominals that are compositionally derived from 
verbs, but do not project internal arguments (thus rendering them SENs in Grimshaw’s 
(1990) typology). Recall that – by Grimshaw’s classification – any nominalisation that does 
not project an internal argument is necessarily ambiguous between an SEN and RN reading. 
Thus, we need to ensure that no RN reading is available in our testing. To this end, we 
follow Moulton (2014) in assuming that SENs but not RNs are compatible with event 
modifiers such as frequent or constant (though this view will be challenged in chapter 4). 
Note also that true clausal counterparts are impossible for these examples: argument 
optionality is much more constrained in the verbal domain. We therefore provide the same 
infinitival examples that we gave in section 2.4.1 for useful comparison of interpretation. 
 With all this in mind, we find that PC predicates show no control effects into SEN 
complements, as illustrated in (57). Note that in each example involving an SEN below 
(examples (57a,c,e)), the ‘frequent inspector’ need not be co-referential with the subject of 
the PC verb. This observation is expected, given the behaviour of PC predicates in the 
domain of CEN complement constructions. 
 
(57) a.  Johni {wanted/demanded/planned} [ PROi/j/ARB the frequent 
inspection. ] 
desiderative 
 b.  Johni {wanted/demanded/planned} [ PROi+/*j/*ARB to inspect 
the factory frequently. ] 
 
 c.  Johni {hated/regretted/disliked} [ PROi/j/ARB the frequent 
inspection. ] 
factive 
 d.  Johni {hated/regretted/disliked} [ PROi+/*j/*ARB inspecting the 
factory frequently. ] 
 
 e.  Johni {imagined/denied} [ PROi/j/ARB the frequent inspection. ] propositional 
 f.  Johni {imagined/denied} [ PROi+/*j/*arb inspecting the factory 
frequently. ] 
 
 
Furthermore, although SENs are argued to be incapable of projecting an agentive subject 
in the prenominal possessor position (Grimshaw 1990; Alexiadou 2001; Fu, Roeper, and 
Borer 2001; Borer 2003, 2005a), we note that implicit arguments may still be 
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referenced/asserted in relative clauses (e.g., the inspection which was carried out by Bill). 
The examples in (58) demonstrate that a relative clause adjoined to the SEN may name an 
implicit Agent which differs from the matrix subject.  
 
(58) a.  John demanded the inspection (which would be carried out 
by Bill). 
desiderative 
 b.  John regretted the inspection (which was carried out by Bill). factive 
 c.  John imagined the inspection (which was carried out by Bill). propositional 
 
EC predicates, on the other hand, do enforce an obligatory control relation into SEN 
complements, as shown in (59). The event modifier frequent is once again employed in 
order to block any potential result reading. 
 
(59) a.  Johni {began/resumed} [ PROi/*j/*ARB the frequent inspection. ] aspectual 
 b.  Johni {began/resumed} [ PROi/*j/*ARB inspecting the factory 
frequently. ] 
 
 c.  Johni managed [ PROi/*j/*ARB the frequent inspection. ] implicative 
 d.  Johni managed [ PROi/*j/*ARB to inspect the factory. ]  
 
Likewise, relative clauses which name the underlying Agent of the SEN complement are 
barred in EC constructions, as demonstrated in (60). This behaviour contrasts directly with 
the behaviour of relative clauses in PC complement environments (see (58)) and suggests 
that an obligatory control relation is (at least interpretatively) active in EC predicate + SEN 
constructions. 
 
(60) a.  John began the inspection (*which was carried out by Bill). aspectual 
 b.  John managed the inspection (*which was carried out by 
Bill). 
implicative 
 
Furthermore, the EC predicate try behaves identically in the environment of 
compositionally derived SENs as it does in the environment of CEN complements. In 
example (61), we find that the implicit subject of the SEN complement is obligatorily 
controlled by the subject of try. In order to make the intended reading of (61a) more salient, 
we provide an optional rationale clause modifying the matrix VP.  
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(61) a.  The companyi tried [ PROi/*j/*ARB the/an inspection ] (in order 
to ensure a quality product.) 
aspectual 
 b.  The companyi tried [ PROi/*j/*ARB to inspect the factory ] (in 
order to ensure a quality product.) 
 
 
Note that the entailment pattern in (61a) is different from that in (61b). Just as was observed 
in CEN complement constructions, (61a) entails that the event denoted by the SEN 
(namely, an inspecting event) was completed. Conversely, completion of the event denoted 
by the infinitive in (61b) is not entailed. 
 Finally, we find in (62) that any agent-naming relative clauses adjoined to the SEN 
complement of try once again give rise to ungrammaticality, thereby providing further 
evidence that the interpretative control effect associated with try in the clausal domain is 
present here as well. 
 
(62)   John tried {the/an} inspection (*which was carried out by 
Bill). 
try 
 
Finally, we may demonstrate the same principle of strict one-to-one identity found in EC 
clausal constructions obtains in SEN complement environments. First, in example (63) we 
find that together modifiers are generally available in SENs, in both subject and object 
positions. In (64a), we demonstrate that SENs selected by PC predicates may likewise 
license a together modifier within the SEN. Then in example (64b), we see that SEN 
complements to EC predicates are predictably incompatible with the modifier together. 
 
(63) a.  [ An inspection together ] would be preferable. 
 b.  I would prefer [ an inspection together. ] 
 
(64) a.  John promised [ {the/an} inspection (together). ] desiderative 
 b.  John managed [ {the/an} inspection (*together). ] implicative 
 
In sum, we see the same EC/PC relations in SEN complement constructions as we do in 
CEN complement constructions. That is, PC predicates show no control into SENs, while 
EC predicate enforce exhaustive control into those same complements. 
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2.5.2. Temporal orientation in SENs 
 
Moving on to the temporal properties of SEN constructions, we first note that SENs are 
independently capable of taking a temporal modifier within the NP (see (65a)), and that 
these modifiers may conflict with any temporal modifiers in the matrix clause (as in (65b)). 
 
(65) a.  [ An inspection tomorrow ] would be preferable. 
 b.  This afternoon I set up [ an inspection tomorrow. ] 
 
Beginning with those predicates which enforce simultaneity, the following data show that 
all EC predicates which can take direct objects uniformly bar any conflicting temporal 
modifier within the SEN (as in (66a,c,e)). Once again, this behaviour mirrors that of clausal 
EC constructions (see (66b,d,f)). 
 
(66) a.  Yesterday, John {began/continued} the inspection 
(*tomorrow/*the day before). 
aspectual 
 b.  Yesterday, John {began/continued} to inspect the factory 
(*tomorrow/*the day before). 
 
 c.  Yesterday, John managed the inspection (*tomorrow/*the day 
before). 
implicative 
 d.  Yesterday, John managed to inspect the factory 
(*tomorrow/*the day before). 
 
 e.  Yesterday, John tried an inspection (*tomorrow/*the day 
before). 
try 
 f.  Yesterday, John tried to inspect the factory (*tomorrow/*the 
day before). 
 
 
Similarly, those predicates which require posteriority, and permit future-oriented temporal 
modifiers in clausal and CEN complement constructions, do so as well in SEN complement 
environments (as in (67a,b)). Crucially, for these predicates, past-oriented temporal 
modifiers are likewise banned across complement types (67c,d). 
 
(67) a.  Yesterday, John {wanted/demanded/planned} the inspection 
(tomorrow). 
desiderative 
 b.  Yesterday, John {wanted/demanded/planned} to inspect the  
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factory (tomorrow). 
 c.  Yesterday, John {wanted/demanded/planned} the inspection 
(*the day before). 
 
 d.  Yesterday, John {wanted/demanded/planned} to inspect the 
factory (*the day before). 
 
 
Finally, those control predicates which require anteriority and permit past-oriented 
temporal modifiers in clausal and CEN environments also allow them in SEN 
complements. Again, for these verbs, future-oriented temporal modifiers are banned across 
complement domains. 
 
(68) a.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} the inspection 
(yesterday). 
factive 
 b.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} inspecting the factory 
(yesterday). 
 
 c.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} the inspection 
(*tomorrow). 
 
 d.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} inspecting the factory 
(*tomorrow). 
 
 
Overall, the temporal orientation of a control predicate is retained in SEN complement 
constructions, regardless of presence or absence of control. 
 
2.6. On RNs, conversions and light verb constructions 
 
Unlike nominals such as inspection or investigation, there is a subset of English event-
denoting NPs that offer no apparent evidence of a derivational process of nominalisation. 
Some of these nouns are thought to involve a process of conversion or zero-derivation 
(Lieber 1992; Don 1993; Beard 1995). Others are generally referential in nature, and take 
on systematic eventive interpretation only in so-called ‘light verb constructions’ (see a. o. 
(Grimshaw and Mester 1988; Kearns 1988; Butt 2010)). Finally, some acquire certain 
event-like meaning components idiosyncratically (Grimshaw’s (1990) RNs, Borer’s (2003) 
R-nominals) but never compositionally. In this section we will consider these classes of 
nominals and assess their behaviour in the presence of EC and PC predicates. 
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2.6.1. Grimshaw’s RNs 
 
We note first that all the SENs discussed in the previous section are systematically 
ambiguous between SEN and RN. As we see in example (69a), the SEN reading can be 
disambiguated by enforcing an eventive context with predicates such as take x hours. 
Moreover, in (69b) we see that an RN reading may be disambiguated by enforcing a 
suitably non-eventive context, employing predicates such as x is on the table (Grimshaw 
1990). 
 
(69) a.  The examination took three hours. SEN 
 b.  The examination was on the table. RN 
 
One potentially significant observation comes from the fact that ambiguous nominals of 
the sort in (69) remain ambiguous when selected by PC predicates. For example, the 
desiderative verb demand in (70a) may yield an interpretation such as in (70b) in which the 
examination is read as an event. Likewise, it may yield an interpretation as in (70c), in 
which the examination is understood to be a non-eventive, referential entity. 
 
(70) a.  John demanded the examination. 
 b.  ⇒ John demanded that the examination occur. 
 c.  ⇒ John demanded that he possess the examination. 
 
However, when an ambiguous nominal such as examination is selected by an EC predicate, 
the resulting possible interpretations are very different. For example, using the implicative 
EC verb manage, we find that the simple construction in (71) has only one interpretation. 
That is, the nominal complement is disambiguated; it can only have an SEN reading (as in 
(71b)). A non-eventive RN reading of the nominal complement is unavailable (see (71c)). 
 
(71) a.  John managed the examination. 
 b.  ⇒ John managed to perform the examination. 
 c.  ⇏ John managed to possess the examination. 
 
The situation with aspectual EC predicates differs from implicatives: some aspectual 
predicates such as begin permit both SEN and RN readings of ambiguous nominal 
complements. However, the RN reading necessarily involves coercion, and is particular to 
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these specific environments. For example, the begin construction in (72a) most readily 
yields an SEN interpretation of the selected nominal (as in (72b)). As we see in (72c), an 
RN reading is available as well, though it necessarily involves coercion of the object into a 
structured individual (for pertinent discussion on aspectual coercion, see Piñango and Deo 
2016). Any attempt to interpret the nominal as an RN outside of this coerced reading is 
impossible, as in (72d). 
 
(72) a.  John began the examination. 
 b.  ⇒ John began to perform the examination. 
 c.  ⇒ John began to complete the examination (form). 
 d.  ⇏ John began to possess the examination (form). 
 
Of course, not all event-denoting nominals have verbal bases. Nouns such as trip or indeed 
event are both event-denoting, in the sense that they are compatible with predicates such as 
take x time, as illustrated in (73). While these nouns constitute SENs in Grimshaw’s (1990) 
system, Borer (2003, 2014) labels them as R-nominals.3  
 
(73) a.  The trip took three months. 
 b.  The event lasted for two weeks. 
 
Critically, when selected by EC predicates, these event-denoting noun phrases behave 
drastically different from the SENs discussed in section 2.5 above. To illustrate, consider 
the examples in (74), once again involving the implicative EC verb manage. As we see in 
(74b,c), the subject of manage may be interpreted as either the agent of a recital event, or 
rather as a bystander/observer (if, for example, the performance was difficult to sit 
through).  
 
(74) a.  John managed the recital. 
 b.  ⇒ John managed to perform the recital. 
 c.  ⇒ John managed to sit through the recital. 
 
This observation stands in stark contrast with those made of morphologically de-verbal 
                                                 
3 For Borer, any nominal that does not project its internal argument is necessarily an R-nominal, including 
those that are overtly derived from verbal bases. One of the core objectives of chapter 4 will be to refute this 
claim, and to provide a more fine-grained analysis of non-argument-projecting English nominals. 
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SEN complement constructions, in which the interpretation of the subject of manage was 
fixed within the nominal event. This observation will be critical to the compositional 
approach to English nominalisation put forward in chapter 4. 
 
2.6.2. Conversion/zero-derivation 
 
Like RNs, conversions seem to constitute a very heterogenous class within the English 
nominal system. For the purposes of this thesis, we will abstract away from the 
morphological principles that constrain conversion/zero-derivation, though for pertinent 
discussion see a.o. Lieber (1992, 2004); Don (1993, 2004), and Ackema and Neeleman 
(2004). We will begin instead with the observation from (Harley 2009) that conversion 
does not rule out the possibility of CEN formation. Consider the handful of examples in 
(75), each of which involves a zero-derived nominalisation, and in each case an internal of-
argument is present and the event modifier frequent is licensed. 
 
(75) a.  The frequent rape of women in Darfur … 
 b.  The frequent repair of the motorcycle … 
 c.  The frequent murder of journalists … 
 d.  The frequent capture of illegal immigrants … 
 e.  The frequent defeat of the Korean forces … 
 f.  The frequent practice of good brushing habits … 
 g.  The frequent meltdown of the reactor … 
   (adapted from Harley 2009:340) 
 
In chapter 4 we will consider examples such as these in greater detail, as well as the 
relevance of event modification as a diagnostic. However, compatibility with an internal 
of-argument corresponding to the internal argument of a verbal counterpart renders these 
types of event-denoting conversions applicable for testing control phenomena in nominal 
complement environments. To this end, we begin with the observation that – just as in CEN 
and SEN complement constructions – PC predicates show no obligatory control into 
conversion nominals. 
 
(76) a.  Johni {wanted/demanded/planned} [ PROi/j/ARB the defeat of 
the Korean forces. ] 
 
desiderative 
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 b.  Johni {wanted/demanded/planned} [ PROi+/*j/*ARB to defeat the 
Korean forces. ] 
 
 c.  Johni {hated/regretted/disliked} [ PROi/j/ARB the defeat of the 
Korean forces. ] 
factive 
 d.  Johni {hated/regretted/disliked} [ PROi+/*j/*ARB defeating the 
Korean forces. ] 
 
 e.  Johni {imagined/denied} [ PROi/j/ARB the defeat of the Korean 
forces. ] 
propositional 
 f.  Johni {imagined/denied} [ PROi+/*j/*arb defeating the Korean 
forces. ] 
 
 
In contrast, we find that EC predicates do in fact enforce an obligatory control interpretation 
into these conversion nominals, as illustrated in (77). That is, in (77a,c) John is obligatorily 
interpreted as the Agent of the defeating event named in the nominal. 
 
(77) a.  Johni {began/continued} [ PROi/*j/*ARB the defeat of the 
Korean forces. ] 
aspectual 
 b.  Johni {began/continued} [ PROi/*j/*ARB to defeat the Korean 
forces. ] 
 
 c.  Johni managed [ PROi/*j/*ARB the defeat of the Korean forces. ] implicative 
 d.  Johni managed [ PROi/*j/*ARB to defeat the Korean forces. ]  
 
The same pattern applies to those conversions that license only so-called ‘oblique’ 
arguments (in the sense of (Radford 1988), see also (Moore and Perlmutter 2000; 
Sigurḥsson 2002) for discussion on oblique or ‘quirky’ subjects). For example, verbs like 
look cannot take an argument directly, but may do so with the help of prepositions or 
particles, as illustrated in (78a,b).4 We find that, in cases of zero-derived nominalisation, 
these same predicates may realise their oblique arguments within the noun phrase (see 
(78c,d)). 
 
(78) a.  John carefully looked *(at) the documents. 
 b.  Mary recently journeyed *(to) Nebraska. 
                                                 
4 Note that there is an instantiation of look in which a direct object may be taken, e.g., the actor looked the 
part. Given that the actor in this example is not actually the one doing any looking, we set this example aside 
as idiomatic and unrepresentative of the predicate’s core grammatical properties. 
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 c.  John’s careful look (at the documents) … 
 d.  Mary’s recent journey (to Nebraska) … 
 
Furthermore, we find that the observations made thus far concerning EC/PC relations into 
nominal complements hold too in these environments. As we see in (79), PC predicates 
such as desideratives do not enforce any relation of control into conversion nominals such 
as journey. On the other hand, EC predicates do enforce an exhaustive control relation in 
these contexts (see (80)). 
 
(79) a.  Johni {wanted/demanded/planned} [ PROi/j/ARB the journey to 
Nebraska. ] 
desiderative 
 b.  Johni {wanted/demanded/planned} [ PROi+/*j/*ARB to journey 
to Nebraska. ] 
 
 
(80) a.  Johni managed [ PROi/*j/*ARB the journey to Nebraska. ] implicative 
 b.  Johni managed [ PROi/*j/*ARB to journey to Nebraska. ]  
 
Next, with both of-argument projecting conversions as well as conversion that take oblique 
arguments, the temporal properties of the selecting control predicate are maintained. For 
example, simultaneous EC predicates enforce simultaneity into both types of conversion 
nominal complement. 
 
(81) a.  Yesterday, John {began/continued} the defeat of the Korean 
forces (*tomorrow/*the day before). 
aspectual 
 b.  Yesterday, John {began/continued} the journey to Nebraska 
(*tomorrow/*the day before). 
 
 c.  Yesterday, John managed the defeat of the Korean forces 
(*tomorrow/*the day before). 
implicative 
 d.  Yesterday, John managed the journey to Nebraska 
(*tomorrow/*the day before).  
 
 
Using our desiderative class of PC predicates, we can likewise construct examples that 
demonstrate that future-oriented predicates enforce future-orientation in conversion 
complement constructions. As we see in (82a,b), future-oriented temporal modifiers are 
licensed in these environments, while past-oriented modifiers are blocked (see (82c,d)). 
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(82) a.  Yesterday, John {demanded/planned} the defeat of the 
Korean forces (tomorrow). 
desiderative 
 b.  Yesterday, John {demanded/planned} the journey to 
Nebraska (tomorrow). 
 
 c.  Yesterday, John {demanded/planned} the defeat of the 
Korean forces (*the day before). 
 
 d.  Yesterday, John {demanded/planned} the journey to 
Nebraska (*the day before). 
 
 
Furthermore, as illustrated in (83), we find that past-orientation is also maintained in these 
conversion complement environments by those predicates that require it in the clausal 
domain (in this case, factives). Specifically, we see in (83a,b) that conflicting past-oriented 
modifiers are licensed within the conversion nominal. Compare this observation with the 
examples in (83c,d), in which a conflicting future-oriented temporal modifier results in 
ungrammaticality. 
 
(83) a.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} the defeat of the 
Korean forces (yesterday). 
factive 
 b.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} the journey to 
Nebraska (yesterday). 
 
 c.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} the defeat of the 
Korean forces (*tomorrow). 
 
 d.  Today, John {hated/regretted/disliked} the journey to 
Nebraska (*tomorrow). 
 
 
Lastly, given that by Grimshaw’s (1990) classification the presence of an of-argument 
obligatorily renders the nominal a CEN, the conversion nominals in (75) provide us with 
another opportunity to test the overt embedded subjects correlation in the nominal domain. 
As we saw with derivationally transparent CENs in section 2.4.3, CEN complements to PC 
predicates will permit overt interpretative Agents within the CEN, in both prenominal 
genitive position and in a by-phrase adjunct. Conversely, CEN complements to EC 
predicates do not, though they do permit abstract possessors/beneficiaries in that 
prenominal slot. To begin, we note in (84) that these of-argument projecting conversion 
nominals may indeed take an Agent as either a prenominal genitive (see (84a,b)), or as a 
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by-phrase (84c,d). 
 
(84) a.  The regime’s deliberate murder of journalists … 
 b.  The border patrol’s deliberate capture of illegal immigrants … 
 c.  The deliberate murder of journalists by the regime … 
 d.  The deliberate capture of illegal immigrants by the border patrol … 
 
When selected by a PC predicate such as those in the factive class, we find that overt Agents 
are still available in these same positions within the conversion nominal. 
 
(85) a.  The government regretted the regime’s deliberate murder of 
journalists. 
factive 
 b.  The petitioners disliked the border patrol’s deliberate capture 
of illegal immigrants. 
 
 c.  The government regretted the deliberate murder of journalists 
by the regime. 
 
 d.  The petitioners disliked the deliberate capture of illegal 
immigrants by the border patrol. 
 
 
When selected by an EC predicate, on the other hand, overt Agents become ill-formed 
within the conversion nominal complement. As we see in (86a,b), by-phrases that name an 
Agent are systematically barred in this environment. Likewise, any prenominal genitive 
interpreted as an Agent gives rise to ungrammaticality (see (86c,d)). Note here that the 
expected alternative interpretation for prenominal genitives (either as abstract possessor or 
beneficiary) is present in these contexts. 
 
(86) a.  The government began the deliberate murder of journalists 
(*by the regime). 
aspectual 
 b.  The petitioners began the deliberate capture of illegal 
immigrants (*by the border patrol). 
 
 c. # The government began the regime’s murder of journalists.  
 d. # The petitioners began the border patrol’s capture of 
immigrants. 
 
 
Thus, the observations made about CENs and SENs in section 2.4 and 2.5 apply wholesale 
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to conversion nominal complements. This includes both those which project an of-
argument, as well as those which take so-called oblique arguments. 
 
2.6.3. Light verb nouns 
 
Unlike the RNs and conversions discussed above, the term light verb noun (henceforth 
LVN) is particular to a nominal appearing in a particular syntactic frame, namely a light 
verb construction (cf. Grimshaw and Mester 1988; Kearns 1988; Butt 2010, a.o.). The 
examples below provide a basic overview of light verb constructions in English, involving 
the light verbs give, do, have and take. 
 
(87) a.  Mary gave the dog a bath. 
 b.  John did a dance. 
 c.  Bill had a coffee. 
 d.  Susan took a shower. 
 
The LVNs involved in these constructions are once again varied in nature: some constitute 
potential conversion nominals, such as dance and shower, while others are clearly nominal 
in nature, such as bath and coffee. However, each LVN inherits an eventive interpretation 
when selected as an argument of a light verb. 
 There are some similarities between LVNs and the nominal complements of control 
predicates. For instance, in each case in (87) the overt subject of the light verb is interpreted 
as the implicit subject of the event denoted by the LVN. For instance, Mary in (87a) is both 
the giver and the bather. It is this observation that motivated Bruening’s (2015) control 
analysis of light verb constructions. Furthermore, while temporal modifiers are indeed 
possible inside LVNs (as illustrated by (88)), we find that within the context of a light verb 
construction, LVNs are prohibited from including any conflicting temporal modifiers (see 
(89)). This restriction to simultaneity puts light verbs potentially in line with EC predicates. 
 
(88) a.  Today I desire [DP a hot bath tomorrow. ] 
 b.  [DP A dance on Friday ] caused my back to go out on Saturday. 
 
(89) a.  Today, Mary gave the dog a bath (*tomorrow/*the day before). 
 b.  Today, John did a dance (*tomorrow/*the day before). 
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However, it is unclear whether the nature of LVNs falls under the scope of the current 
project. Recall that we are interested primarily in the properties of obligatory control 
predicates in the domain of nominal complementation. While light verbs and light verb 
constructions certainly share some prima facie control-like properties with bona fide 
obligatory control verbs, there is little evidence to suggest they are conventional control 
predicates (but cf. Bruening 2015). Furthermore, any investigations of LVNs seems to be 
conceptually constrained to light verb constructions specifically. That is, once an LVN is 
removed from a light verb construction, does it cease to be an LVN? Are LVNs special and 
distinct from other event-denoting nouns, or can an LVN remain just as ‘eventive’ in other, 
non-light verb related contexts? A cursory examination of so-called LVNs in control verb 
constructions seems to suggest that a coerced eventive interpretation may be more generally 
available to even the most referential noun (e.g., John managed a quick coffee before work). 
 The nature of light verbs and LVNs, both in English and cross-linguistically, is a 
topic meriting its own dissertation. As such, our investigation and subsequent theoretical 
formulations will not take light verbs and LVNs into consideration.  
 
2.7. Key generalisations 
 
Considering the data presented in this section regarding the effects of EC/PC into nominal 
complements, we may first generalise that the effects of EC/PC, as they apply in the domain 
of nominal control, apply identically to both CEN and SEN complements. That is, the 
effects of EC/PC (excluding the realisation or restriction of embedded genitive subjects) 
apply regardless of the argument projecting capabilities of the nominal complement. 
Additionally, we saw that event-denotation was not enough to induce an obligatory control 
relation. Instead, the event denoted by the nominal had to be inherited from an underlying 
verbal base. 
 The data converge to yield three key generalisations concerning control into NPs 
and the EC/PC divide. 
 
(90)   Control into NP generalisation 
   Exhaustive control predicates enforce exhaustive control into de-verbal, 
eventive NP complements; partial control predicates show no control into NP 
complements. 
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(91)   Temporal orientation in NP 
   The temporal properties of NP complements mirror those of the corresponding 
clausal complement, and temporal orientation (where applicable) is identical 
across these complements. 
 
(92)   Overt nominal subjects under control 
   Complex event nominal complements to PC predicates may project an Agent 
either as a genitive prenominal argument or in a by-phrase adjunct; complex 
event nominal complements to EC predicates may not project an Agent in either 
position, though they may name an abstract possessor in the genitive 
prenominal position. 
 
The generalisations in (90) through (92) constitute empirical correlates of the EC/PC divide 
in the nominal domain, and thus motivate an analysis in which control into NPs is the same 
phenomenon as control into clauses. The remainder of this thesis will explore to what extent 
current theories of control – either in their present state or through some suitable extension 
– can account for the generalisations above. In addition, novel analyses will be advanced, 
specifically for aspectual predicates and the verb try. The overarching goal in addressing 
these issues should be a theory of control which uniformly derives the correct control/tense 
properties across complement types. 
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3. THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Having demonstrated in chapter 2 the extent to which the EC/PC split exists in the domain 
of nominal complements, this chapter will be primarily focused on examining a number of 
contemporary control theories with this new data in mind. Specifically, we seek to 
determine which models of control can best account for the control into NP generalisation, 
and which models are weakened by it. 
 In section 3.2 we begin by considering those models in which relations of control 
are derived via movement. These approaches include the Movement Theory of Control 
(henceforth, the MTC) (Hornstein 1999; Boeckx and Hornstein 2003, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; 
Hornstein and Polinsky 2010), as well as Grano’s (2012, 2015) hybrid account of 
exhaustive and partial control. In 3.3 we consider the distribution of PRO in the nominal 
system, and any difficulties a PRO-based account might face in explaining the 
generalisations made in chapter 2. Section 3.4 considers purely semantic approaches to 
control and the application of such approaches to the phenomenon of NP control. In each 
of the above cases, we find that these models of control either over- or under-generate with 
regards to control into nominal complements. In section 3.5 we explore the proposal in 
Wurmband (2002), in which exhaustive and partial control correspond to a split between 
semantic and syntactic mechanisms, respectively. We conclude here that, given certain 
assumptions regarding the eventivity of English nominalisations, Wurmbrand’s proposal 
predicts the control into NP generalisation in toto. We conclude in section 3.6. 
 
3.2. Movement-based theories of control 
 
3.2.1. The MTC 
 
In its more-or-less standard variant, the MTC does away with the θ-criterion (in the sense 
of Chomsky 1982) and derives both raising and control phenomena via a single operation: 
A-movement (Hornstein and Polinsky 2010). Utilising Chomsky’s (1993) copy theory of 
movement, the examples in (20) demonstrate the main claim of the MTC. 
 
(93) a.  John seemed [ John to kiss Mary. ] 
 b.  John tried [ John to kiss Mary. ] 
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The verb seem in (20a) is a canonical raising verb, and does not assign a θ-role to its subject. 
Hence, John in (20a) is only ever a kisser. In (20b), however, John is both a trier and a 
kisser, seemingly receiving a θ-role from both the matrix and embedded predicate. 
 Turning now to control into NP constructions, we find that an A-chain relation 
between a matrix subject and a prenominal genitive is unmotivated in English in view of 
two independent properties of the English grammar: (i) the inability of the English DP to 
project a determiner and a possessor simultaneously, and (ii) the lack of licit ‘possessor-
raising’ constructions in English. As illustrated in (94), the English DP may project either 
a determiner (94a) or a genitive DP (94b). However, projecting both simultaneously results 
in a derivational crash, as we see in (94c).  
 
(94) a.  John asked to borrow [DP {the/a} book. ] 
 b.  John asked to borrow [DP Mary’s book. ] 
 c. * John asked to borrow [DP {Mary/Mary’s} the book. ] 
 
The fact that determiners and possessors are in complementary distribution in English is 
not a new observation (see a.o. Abney 1987).  
 The second factor concerns the lack of possessor-raising in English. Deal (2013a, 
2013b) convincingly demonstrates that external possession in languages such as Nez Perce 
is derived by A-movement, with the possessor unable to receive case within the DP (see 
(95a)). Similarly, Deal (2013b) proposes that external possession construction in German 
of the type in (95b) instantiate a kind of control relation between the affected dative 
argument (der Nachbarin) and the implicit possessor of the object. For Deal, this control 
relation is derived via the MTC, with the possessor moving from the DP internal genitive 
θ-position, and into the affected argument position, receiving an additional θ-role. 
 
(95) a.  pro ‘e-ex-ney-se-∅ tewlike-nei [DP ti saq'is.] 
   pro 3OBJ-see-μ-IMPERF-PRES tree-OBJ  shadow.NOM 
   ‘I see the tree’s shadow.’ 
   (NEZ PERCE: Deal 2013b) 
 b.  Tim hat der Nachbarini  [DP ti das Auto] gewaschen. 
   Tim has the neighbour.DAT.FEM  the car washed 
   ‘Tim washed the neighbour’s car.’ 
   (GERMAN: Lee-Schoenfeld 2006) 
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Unlike the possessor constructions in (95), Deal argues that English possessors must be 
assigned (genitive) case within the DP. Thus, an English external possession construction 
involving A-movement of a prenominal possessor to a case position is impossible (see 
(96a)). Instead, the only possible external possession construction in English involves base-
generated binding (as in (96b)). 
 
(96) a. * Tim washed the neighbouri [DP ti the car. ] 
 b.  The neighbouri asked Tim to wash [DP heri car. ] 
 
The observations made in examples (94-96) suggest that the prenominal genitive possessor 
position within the English DP is not a licit launching site for A-movement.  
Returning now to our control into NP generalisation, the MTC prima facie predicts 
that neither EC nor PC will obtain into nominal complements, contra the data in chapter 2. 
Example (97) illustrates that in order to derive the licit EC construction in (97a), any 
movement-based theory of control would have to posit the structure in (97b) as its starting 
point, with the determiner and possessor occurring simultaneously prior to movement. 
Likewise, the derivation of the structure in (97a) must employ a kind of possessor raising, 
a mechanism otherwise unattested in English. 
 
(97) a.  John managed [DP the inspection of the factory. ] 
 b. # managed [DP John the inspection of the factory. ] 
 
However, while the observations in (94-97) do not support a movement-based approach to 
control into NP, they do not rule one out entirely. It is entirely possible that the construction 
exemplified in (97) constitutes the single syntactic environment in English in which 
determiner/possessor complementarity may be obviated, and in which A-movement of a 
possessor to a matrix case position is employed. Even in this possible world, the MTC must 
contend with the lack of any salient possessor interpretation of the matrix subject in control 
into NP constructions. One of the core tenets of the MTC is the removal of the θ-criterion, 
such that a single argument may have more than a single θ-role (recall our example in 
(20b)). Note also that, unlike their corresponding verbs, the subject of English deverbal 
nominalisations need not be interpreted as an Agent (Kratzer 1996, contra Grimshaw 
1990). For example, Maria and Anna in example (98) are compatible with both agentive 
interpretations as well as something like a beneficiary interpretation (in which Maria and 
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Anna are attending two separate reading events). 
 
(98)   Maria’s reading of Pride and Prejudice received better reviews than Anna’s. 
   (Kratzer 1996:128) 
 
We should expect, then, that if control into NP is derived via movement, that these different 
θ-marking possibilities will be reflected in the final interpretation of the matrix subject. For 
example, Maria in (99a) should be compatible with two distinct interpretations: (i) an 
interpretation in which she is the agent of a begin event and the agent of a reading event, 
and (ii) an interpretation in which she is the agent of a begin event and the beneficiary of a 
reading event. However, this latter interpretation is unavailable. 
 
(99) a.  Maria began the reading of Pride and Prejudice. 
 b.  ⇒ Maria began to carry out the reading of Pride and Prejudice. 
 c.  ⇏ Maria began to attend the reading of Pride and Prejudice. 
 
In sum, there is sufficient reason to suggest that the prenominal genitive possessor position 
in English is resistant to extraction via A-movement. Furthermore, a movement-based 
theory of control does not accurately reflect the interpretative possibilities of control into 
NP constructions. It is therefore the case that the MTC under-generates in the environment 
of control into nominal complements: it correctly predicts the lack of PC in these 
environments but fails to predict the manifestation of EC in those same environments.  
 
3.2.2. Grano (2015) 
 
Grano’s (2012, 2015) model of EC also exploits A-movement, and runs into the same issues 
discussed in section 3.2.1 concerning the MTC. However, for Grano, EC structures do not 
involve two verbal lexical projections, but instead instantiate a mono-clausal structure in 
which the control predicate is a functional head within the inflectional layer of the clause. 
 Rooted within the framework of the cartography project (Cinque 2006), Grano’s 
proposal maintains that an EC predicate is a functional head within IP, and that the 
‘embedded’ clausal complement is indeed the matrix predicate. As exemplified in (100), 
the vP internal subject moves across this functional head to receive Nominative case, 
thereby deriving the correct surface order. Here, we abstract away from the specific 
inflectional projection in which the EC predicate appears, and use instead the label FP. 
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(100)   Johni [FP managed [vP ti to eat the soup. ]] 
 
The main motivation for this analysis comes from the following empirical observations: (i) 
EC predicates cannot select tensed complements, (ii) EC complements may not take an 
overt embedded subject, and (iii) EC predicates (generally) restructure in languages which 
allow restructuring. 
 However, given our control into NP generalisation, the presence of EC in nominal 
complement constructions presents a non-trivial problem for this model beyond even the 
issues with proposing A-movement out of prenominal genitive positions. Specifically, 
Grano’s approach to EC would seem to necessitate the stipulation that all EC predicates 
can also be realised as lexical verbs. After all, when an EC predicate controls into an NP, 
it must presumably select that NP in a head-complement relation. This behaviour is not 
typical of modal or auxiliary heads of the extended inflectional projection. Therefore, in 
order to account for the obligatory EC we see in NP complement constructions, Grano’s 
model must maintain that EC predicates are systematically lexically ambiguous. In the 
environment of non-finite verbal complements, they manifest as functional heads in IP, and 
the interpretative control relation is derived via A-movement (as in (101a)). In the 
environment of NP complements, they manifest as lexical verbs in VP, in which case the 
control relation must be derived by some other mechanism (perhaps with a controlled PRO 
subject, see (101b)). 
 
(101) a.  Billi [FP began [vP ti to inspect the factory. ]] 
 b.  Billi [vP began [DP PROi the inspection of the factory. ]] 
 
The added complexity of such an approach renders Grano’s model less attractive in 
deriving control effects uniformly across complement types. 
 
3.3. Control and PRO 
 
In this section we will consider those models which exploit the null anaphor PRO as a 
primary component in the derivation of control. These include binding theories of control 
(Manzini 1983; Lebeaux 1984; Sag and Pollard 1991, a.o.), some predicational accounts of 
OC (Williams 1980, 1987; Clark 1990) as well as Agree-based frameworks (Landau 2000, 
2004, 2006, 2008; Sundaresan and McFadden 2009; van Urk 2011, a.o.). While each of the 
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frameworks above is considerably different than the others – and indeed, each shows great 
variation from author to author – they all count PRO as a necessary component in the 
derivation of OC. As such, we will not be comparing the efficacy of each control model 
individually in the domain of nominal complementation. Rather, our goal will be to 
determine whether a PRO-based theory of control can correctly predict the empirical 
asymmetry between EC and PC in these novel environments. 
 
3.3.1. The PRO in DP 
 
The presence of a bona fide null anaphoric PRO within the DP is a contentious issue among 
control scholars. Williams (1982, 1985) presents a number of arguments militating against 
an analysis of the English noun phrase that includes a controlled PRO. First, Williams notes 
that apparent control relations may be realised differently in NP complements than in more 
canonical control complements, such as gerunds. For example, as we see in (102a,b) 
gerundive PRO must be controlled by the matrix subject. Thus, in the case of (102b) the 
only reading available is the highly suspicious interpretation in which the subject you is 
understood to be desiccating. This is not the case for NP PRO, which may be controlled by 
either a subject or an object (102c,d). 
 
(102) a.  The leavesi should not be bothered [ while PROi desiccating. ] 
 b. # Youi should not bother the leavesj [ while PROi/*j desiccating. ] 
 c.  The leavesi should not be bothered [ during PROi desiccation. ] 
 d.  Youi should not bother the leavesj [ during PROi/j desiccation. ] 
 
Williams furthermore points to cases of apparent control by an NP PRO to illustrate the 
problems with an NP PRO analysis. For example, in (103) we understand that the implicit 
attempter argument is simultaneously the leaver argument of the infinitival complement. 
This might be naturally accounted for by positing control of the infinitival PRO by an 
arbitrary PRO in prenominal position. 
 
(103)   Any PROi attempt [ PROi to leave ] … 
 
Williams points out that the interpretation of the infinitival subject remains constant even 
as the prenominal position of the NP attempt is filled by modifiers such as yesterday (as in 
(104a)). Furthermore, control of the infinitive is not tied to any one syntactic configuration; 
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the attempter and leaver are always co-referential, regardless of whether or not the 
attempter is implicit (104b), explicit in prenominal position (104c) or explicit in a by-phrase 
adjunct (104d). 
 
(104) a.  Yesterday’s attempt to leave … 
 b.  Any attempt to leave … 
 c.  Their attempt to leave … 
 d.  Yesterday’s attempt by them to leave … 
 
Williams extends these observations to cases of apparent principle C violations. For 
example, Ross (1969) argues explicitly for a PRO in the prenominal position in the English 
NP based on the obligatory disjointed reference between the implicit realiser (denoted by 
PRO) and John in example (105). Given principle C of the binding theory (Chomsky 1981, 
1982, 1986), disjoint reference is accounted for by positing a PRO in the NP specifier 
position.  
 
(105)   The PROi/*j realisation that Johnj was unpopular upset himi/j/k. 
 
Again, Williams points to similar observations of disjoint reference in cases in which the 
prenominal possessor position is filled, as in (106). In this case, PRO cannot be responsible 
for the observable principle C-like effect, such that John and the implicit subject of 
realisation (notated with relevant subscripts attached to the nominal itself) cannot be the 
same entity. 
 
(106)   Yesterday’s realisationi/*j that Johnj was unpopular upset himi/j/k. 
 
The relevance of these data are rightly questioned in Landau (2013), in which the author 
invokes Roeper’s (1993) observations that the presence of a prenominal genitive modifier 
does not rule out the presence of a prenominal genitive argument. As we see in (107), the 
presence of a temporal modifier in the prenominal genitive position does not preclude the 
presence of the prenominal genitive argument man. This observation opens up the 
possibility that (106) contains a covert argumental PRO alongside the prenominal temporal 
modifier. 
 
(107)   One man’s week’s work is another man’s year’s achievement. 
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Despite the objections raised in Williams (1985), there are a number of empirically robust 
observations that point to the presence of a syntactic PRO within the DP. For example, it 
is well known that secondary predicates require overt syntactic DP arguments in order to 
be saturated; implicit arguments cannot saturate secondary predicates, as in (108a,b) (see 
a.o. Chomsky 1986; Safir 1987; Landau 2010). However, Safir (1987) observes that 
secondary predicates are licensed within the DP of derivationally deverbal English 
nominalisations, thereby suggesting the presence of a PRO argument within the nominal 
(see (108c,d)). 
 
(108) a.  The dog ate *(the meat) raw. 
 b. * Dinner was served angry at the guests. 
 c.  [ PRO discussion of these issues stoned ] rarely produces satisfactory results. 
 d.  [ PRO inspection of the factory drunk ] is rarely thorough. 
 
Furthermore, Landau (2013) provides an argument for the presence of PRO in DP from 
phi-feature agreement in Hebrew nominalisations. Consider the example in (109). 
Interpretatively, we find that the overt subject of the first sentence is co-referent with the 
implicit agent of the nominalised subject in sentence two. We note also that the conjoined 
nominal predicates as partners and as adversaries show plural, feminine agreement. 
Landau argues that, since the two items occur across a sentence boundary, and are split by 
the phi-feature-bearing DP Yosi, this is not a case of direct agreement. Nor can it be 
explained by appealing to default agreement, which is masculine in Hebrew. Therefore, a 
syntactic PRO subject within the nominal constitutes the only plausible trigger for 
agreement (on the assumption that PRO is controlled via NOC by the matrix subject the 
women). 
 
(109)  ha-našimi ta'anu še-Yosi to'e. [PROi  ha-avoda ke-šutafot 
   the women claimed that-Yosi wrong.  the-work as-partners.PL.FEM 
   ve-lo ke-yerivot] rak kidma et ha-proyekt. 
   and-not as-adversaries.PL.FEM only advanced ACC the project 
   ‘The women claimed that Yosi was wrong. Working as partners rather than as 
adversaries only advanced the project.’ 
 
Finally, Landau (2013) also contends that nominalisations – like controlled clauses – 
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provide a method for salvaging weak crossover (WCO) violations. Higginbotham (1980) 
observed that pronouns contained in subject clauses exhibit weak crossover, but only if the 
subject of said clause is a lexical DP (as in examples (110a,b)). If the subject is instead a 
PRO, WCO is seemingly repaired (see (110c,d)). Higginbotham classified this 
phenomenon as ‘PRO-gate’, in that the covert PRO subject provides a gateway through 
which the matrix QP can bind the pronoun within the subject clause. 
 
(110) a. ?? [ Mary’s seeing hisi father ] pleased every boyi. 
 b. ?? [ Theiri getting letters from theiri sweethearts ] is important for [ many of the 
soldiers. ]i 
 c.  [ PROi seeing hisi father ] pleased every boyi. 
 d.  [ PROi getting letters from theiri sweethearts ] is important for [ many of the 
soldiers. ]i 
 
The interaction between PRO and WCO is still not entirely understood, and likewise falls 
beyond the scope of this thesis.5 However, the crucial observation is that PRO and WCO 
are invariably linked, in that only PRO may obviate WCO violations. Landau (2013) 
contends that, just like gerundive subject clauses (as in (111a)), deverbal nominalisation 
subjects containing a bound pronoun do not give rise to WCO effects (see (111b)). This 
observation provides further support for the hypothesis that the English DP may house a 
PRO. 
 
(111) a.  [ PROi knowing hisi limitations ] would help every linguisti. 
 b.  [ PROi knowledge of hisi limitations ] would help every linguisti. 
 
Thus, while there are some challenges to the hypothesis, there are strong empirical 
motivations for positing a PRO subject within (at least some) English DPs. 
 
3.3.2. Problems for PRO-based models in NP control 
 
All potential counterexamples to a PRO (or pro) subject within the English DP 
notwithstanding, a PRO-based account of OC faces a number of non-trivial conceptual 
problems when faced with the control into NP generalisation.  
First, on a binding analysis of OC (cf. Manzini 1983), it is unclear why verbs such 
                                                 
5 For further discussion, see (Brody 1984; Safir 1984, 1996, 2004; Jaeggli and Safir 1989). 
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as begin or manage would retain an OC relation into an event-denoting DP while verbs 
such as promise or demand would not. Consider the simplified OC structure in (112), in 
which the matrix subject John binds the null anaphoric PRO of the embedded TP. 
 
(112)   Johni managed [TP PROi/*j to inspect the factory. ] 
 
Given that manage is one verb that does enforce OC into its nominal complements, it is 
conceivable that the same PRO-binding relation is at work here too, as in (113a). The 
question then is why other OC predicates such as promise do not enforce OC in those same 
environments (see (113b)). 
 
(113) a.  Johni managed [DP PROi/*j the inspection of the factory. ] 
 b.  Johni promised [DP PROi/j the inspection of the factory. ] 
 
We contend that the alternation in (113) is incomprehensible if we appeal to the notion of 
PRO alone. If PRO does appear in the prenominal position of DP, then we predict the 
binding relation in (113a) but cannot account for the lack of one in (113b) prima facie. 
Likewise, If DP does not constitute a licit environment for PRO in the sense of Williams 
(1985), then (113b) is expected but (113a) is mysterious. 
 The situation becomes murkier once we consider the overt nominal subjects 
generalisation from chapter 2. That is, any PRO-based account of control in the domain of 
nominal complementation must contend with the fact that obligatorily controlled DPs may 
yet project a prenominal genitive argument. As we see in (114), when embedded under the 
EC verb begin, the prenominal genitive is interpreted as either an abstract possessor or 
beneficiary; crucially, an agent interpretation is unavailable. 
 
(114) a.  The president began [DP Congress’ evacuation of the city. ] 
 b.  ⇒ The president began to carry out the evacuation of the city which was 
planned by Congress. 
 
Recall that one reason to reject Williams’ (1985) argumentation against a PRO in DP was 
due to Roeper’s (1993) observation that prenominal modifiers do not rule out prenominal 
arguments (see (107)). The phenomenon in (114) reveals that, in order for PRO to be a 
critical ingredient to control in nominal complements, we require two separate prenominal 
argument positions within the event-denoting noun phrase. Further still, this would likely 
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require a non-local control or predication relation ‘through’ the overt prenominal possessor. 
To illustrate, consider the trees in (115,116) below. We assume for now that inspection is 
a noun head that takes a PP argument (the argumentation would be identical on a VP 
approach to nominalisation).  We furthermore assume that the non-possessive PRO subject 
inhabits some functional projection FP, which is likely an NP specifier or some species of 
DP functional layer. As we see in (115), if PRO occurs below the prenominal genitive, then 
any binding relation between PRO and the matrix subject the president must occur across 
the overt DP specifier. If instead PRO occurs above the overt genitive, then we must 
account for an apparent predication relation across the overt DP possessor, as in (116). 
 
(115)   TP       
          
  
       
  DP VP      
  Presidenti       
         
   V DP     
   begin      
         
    DP FP    
    Congress’     
           
     PROi NP   
         
           
      N PP  
      evacuation   
           
        of the city  
           
           
 
(116)   TP       
          
  
       
  DP VP      
  Presidenti       
         
   V FP     
   begin      
         
    PRO DP    
          
           
     Congress’ NP   
         
           
      N PP  
      evacuation   
           
        of the city  
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Given the strict local environments that generally constrain both predication relations and 
anaphoric binding phenomena, the above hypotheses are untenable. While there do exist 
some control variants that may obviate the typical locality constraints (e.g., split control, 
cf. Landau 2003), EC predicates such as begin uniformly prohibit these types of non-local 
control. 
 The structures in (115,116) present another more fundamental question regarding 
the nature of subjects in nominalisations. Namely, what is the relationship between de-
verbal nouns and apparent thematic subjects? Though some authors argue that prenominal 
genitives of de-verbal nominalisations constitute bona fide external arguments in the verbal 
sense (see e.g. Borer 2003), there is good reason to suspect that the relation between the 
nominal and prenominal genitive is not equivalent to the corresponding subject-verb 
relation. Marantz (1997) and Alexiadou (2001) argue that the prenominal genitive position 
is sensitive to the ‘possessive nexus’. That is, while the interpretation of the prenominal 
possessor is determined by a multitude of factors (including context and 
encyclopaedic/world knowledge), it is not mediated by any strict syntactic or semantic 
functional relation between the subject and the nominal itself.  
Likewise, Kratzer (1996) observes that the interpretation of the prenominal genitive is 
not restricted to only those available to verbal external arguments. As illustrated in (98) 
above, possessive or benefactive readings are generally available to the genitive subjects 
of so-called OF-ing gerundive nominalisations. This observation is entirely in line with our 
discovery concerning overt genitive subjects in exhaustive control constructions. These 
interpretative possibilities make a PRO account of control into NP difficult to conceive; the 
binding of prenominal PRO should by hypothesis make available both agentive and 
benefactive interpretations. That is, if control into NP involves the binding of a PRO subject 
in the ‘possessive nexus’ of the nominal in question, we predict a semantic ambiguity such 
that PRO may be interpreted as an agent (117b) or as a benefactor (117c). This is, of course, 
not the case, as the interpretation in (117c) is impossible in this environment. 
 
(117) a.  Johni managed [ PROi the inspection of the factory ]. 
 b.  John managed to carry out the inspection of the factory. 
 c. # John managed to have someone else carry out the inspection of the factory. 
 
Given that the possible interpretations of the prenominal possessor in deverbal 
nominalisations do not correspond to the possible interpretations available to the controller, 
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a PRO-based analysis of control in this environment cannot be maintained without further 
stipulation. 
 
3.4. Control as a semantic phenomenon 
 
In a series of works, Jackendoff and Culicover (2003; Culicover and Jackendoff 2005, 
2006) defend a model of control in which the control relation is determined not 
syntactically, but semantically at the level of Conceptual Structure. Their model assumes 
the non-existence of the null pronoun PRO. 
 Briefly summarising, Jackendoff and Culicover’s (henceforth, J&C) account argues 
that the ‘unique’ (or ‘obligatory’) control relation is registered at Conceptual Structure by 
means of a semantic primitive predicate encoded in the control verb’s lexical 
representation. A given control primitive, such as INTEND or OBLIGE will, by hypothesis, 
bind the implicit actor of the embedded predicate to an appropriate explicit controller 
argument, where ‘appropriate’ is determined by whether the primitive encodes subject- or 
object-control. Motivation for this approach comes from two empirical generalisations: (i) 
predicates that select actional complements require obligatory control, and (ii) the unique 
controller is determined by the thematic roles assigned by the predicate to its arguments, 
varying with the semantic class of the predicate (Culicover and Jackendoff 2005). 
 Actional events are taken to be a subset of ‘situational’ events, and differ from ‘non-
actions’ in that the former are by default interpreted as voluntary when the subject is 
animate. The distinction of action vs. non-action is detectable by the what x did was 
diagnostic (see (118)). Likewise, the distinction of voluntary vs. involuntary can be seen 
with the use of the imperative, as well as modification by the adverbials voluntarily or on 
purpose, as demonstrated in example (119). 
 
(118) a.  Actions 
   What Roberta did was run the race/read a book/think about physics. 
 b.  Non-actions 
   What Roberta did was ?grow taller/*strike Sammy as smart/*realise it was 
raining. 
   (Culicover and Jackendoff 2005) 
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(119) Voluntary actions 
 a.  Run the race! 
   Roberta ran the race voluntarily. 
 b.  Be quiet! 
   Roberta was quiet voluntarily. 
 c.  Be examined by a doctor! 
   Roberta was examined by a doctor voluntarily. 
 Non-actions 
 d. * Grow taller! 
  * Roberta grew taller voluntarily. 
 e. * Strike Sammy as smart! 
  * Roberta struck Sammy as smart voluntarily. 
 f. * Realise it’s raining! 
  * Roberta realised it was raining voluntarily. 
   (Culicover and Jackendoff 2005) 
 
With the distinction between actions and non-actions in mind, J&C make the generalisation 
that those predicates which enforce obligatory control require an actional complement. This 
generalisation is demonstrated in (120), with the control predicates promise and persuade 
both allowing actional complements and excluding non-actional complements. A second 
source of evidence comes from the examples in (121), where predicates such as tell, shout 
and call alternate complement types. J&C note that when these predicates select 
about+gerundive complements – which constitute situational non-actions (Culicover and 
Jackendoff 2005) – they do not instantiate obligatory control (see (121a)). Contrast this 
with the example in (121b), in which the infinitival complement constitutes an actional 
complement, and instantiates obligatory control. Note that the use of PRO in (121) is for 
expository convenience only: J&C’s account is necessarily PRO-less. 
 
(120) a.  John promised (Bill) to run the race/*to grow taller. 
 b.  John promised (Bill) to be quiet/*to strike Mary as smart. 
 c.  John persuaded Bill to be examined by a doctor/*to realise it was raining. 
 
(121) a.  Fredi told/shouted to/called to Louisej about PROi/j/i+j/ARB running the 
race/growing taller. 
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 b.  Fredi told/shouted to/called to Louisej PROj/*i/*i+j/*arb to run the race/*to strike 
Sammy as smart. 
   (Culicover and Jackendoff 2005:432) 
 
For J&C, the sensitivity of obligatory control to the semantic properties of the complement 
(action vs. non-action, voluntary vs. non-voluntary) suggests that OC relations are semantic 
rather than syntactic. 
 The second generalisation made by J&C concerns the manner in which the OC 
controller is determined. Specifically, they argue that the controller in OC constructions is 
determined by the thematic role it receives from its predicate, rather that its syntactic 
position. To demonstrate, the authors offer the following examples using the verbs order 
and promise. Examples (122a) and (123a) demonstrate that in neutral word order, order 
designates its Recipient as its unique OC controller, while promise designates as its 
controller an Agent. Examples (122b-e, 123b-e) show that this holds true across DP and 
sentence boundaries, regardless of the syntactic position of the controller. 
 
(122) a.  Johni order Susanj PROj/*i to take care of herself/*himself. 
 b.  The order to Susanj from Johni PROj/*i to take care of herself/*himself. 
 c.  Johni gave Susanj some kind of order PROj/*i to take care of herself/*himself. 
 d.  Susanj got from Johni some kind of order PROj/*i to take care of herself/*himself. 
 e.  A: Susan got an order from John. 
   B: What was it? 
   A: I think it was to take care of herself/*himself. 
 
(123) a.  Johni promised Susanj PROi/*j to take care of himself/*herself. 
 b.  The promise to Susanj from Johni PROi/*j to take care of himself/*herself. 
 c.  Johni gave Susanj some kind of promise PROi/*j to take care of himself/*herself. 
 d.  Susanj got from Johni some kind of promise PROi/*j to take care of 
himself/*herself. 
 e.  A: Susan got a promise from John. 
   B: What was it? 
   A: I think it was to take care of himself/*herself. 
   (adapted from (Culicover and Jackendoff 2005:434)) 
 
The authors note that the wide variation in the syntactic position of the unique OC controller 
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in examples (122,123) suggest that OC is not determined by syntactic position, but instead 
by thematic role. That is, in each iteration of order in example (122), Susan is always 
interpreted as Recipient and is likewise always the OC controller, despite the argument’s 
distance from the predicate or its actional complement. J&C thus adopt the solution that it 
is this thematic role which carries the OC specification. 
 To this end, J&C propose a model of control in which a controlled actional VP with 
a single unsaturated argument – designated x ACT – is selected by a primitive semantic 
control predicate at the level of Conceptual Structure. The semantic predicate binds the 
unsaturated argument of the embedded action to its thematic participant designated for OC, 
resulting in the persistent control relation we see in the examples above. The unique OC 
controller will differ from one semantic primitive to the next (Jackendoff and Culicover 
2003; Culicover and Jackendoff 2005, 2006). One such semantic primitive is INTEND, 
which encompasses predicates such as intend, decide (‘come to intend’) and persuade 
(‘cause to come to intend’). In each case, the thematic participant interpreted as bearing 
intention will be designated for OC. The basic notation for the OC relation enforced by the 
verb intend is given in example (124). Xa denotes the thematic argument of intend which 
bears intention toward the embedded action [ a ACT ], and which is bound to the single 
argument of the actional complement. 
 
(124)   Xa INTEND [ a ACT ] 
 
As a consequence of the semantic binding between the intender and the sole argument of 
the actional complement, any predicate which contains this semantic primitive will realise 
this unique OC relation. 
 Given that our concerns are limited to the application of J&C’s control framework 
in the domain of controlled nominals, we will disregard the more general counterexamples 
to their semantic model (but cf. Landau 2013:134-136) for empirical evidence against 
correlating OC with actional complements). Turning instead to controlled nominal 
complements, we must first note that J&C’s analysis treats only controlled VPs and says 
nothing about the actional qualities of eventive NP complements. We therefore must first 
determine if NP complements fit the criteria for ‘actions’, rather than ‘non-actions’. Since 
the what X did was diagnostic is VP specific, we will instead look at whether modification 
of prenominal adjectives such as voluntary or deliberate proves acceptable. As 
demonstrated in (125), those CENs derived from verbs denoting actions or non-action 
retain their voluntary and involuntary qualities, respectively. 
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(125) Voluntary actions 
 a.  Roberta’s voluntary completion of the race. 
 b.  Roberta’s voluntary silencing of the racket. 
 c.  The doctor’s voluntary examination of Roberta. 
   
 Non-actions 
 d. * Roberta’s voluntary growth. 
 e. * Roberta’s voluntary striking of Sammy as smart. 
 f. * The doctor’s voluntary realisation that it was raining. 
 
We may then assume that CENs that are derived from actional VPs are represented by 
actional primitives at the level of Conceptual Structure (e.g., x ACT). 
 Looking first at EC predicates, we see that J&C’s model of semantic control 
correctly predicts the persistence of EC in eventive NP complement constructions. For 
J&C, EC predicates such as intransitive dare constitute the ‘execution of an intention’ 
(Culicover and Jackendoff 2005:462).6 We may extend this line of reasoning to other 
implicative verbs such as manage, as well as aspectual predicates like begin, which we 
know also take eventive NP complements. The examples in (126a-d) demonstrate that 
assuming an INTEND primitive in the meaning of manage and begin makes correct 
predictions: John controls the implicit argument of the actional complement regardless of 
syntactic position. The novel examples in (126a-g) show that this control relation persists 
in actional NP complements. 
 
(126) a.  Johni {managed/began} PROi/*j/*ARB to express himself/*oneself. 
 b.  John’si {managing/beginning} PROi/*j/*ARB to express himself/*oneself 
(impressed Mary). 
 c.  Maryj was impressed by Johni for {managing/beginning} PROi/*j/*ARB to express 
himself/*herself. 
 d.  Johni impressed Maryj by {managing/beginning} PROi/*j/*ARB to express 
himself/*herself. 
 e.  Johni {managed/began} PROi*j/*ARB the expression of himself/*oneself. 
                                                 
6 J&C label the predicate dare as intransitive when it appears as a subject control verb with no embedded 
ECM subject, e.g. John dared to read the note. This categorisation presumably differs from ‘transitive’ dare, 
involving object control and the realisation of an ECM subject in the embedded clause, e.g. John dared Mary 
to read the note. 
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 f.  Maryj was impressed by Johni for {managing/beginning} PROi/*j/*ARB the 
expression of himself/*herself. 
 g.  Johni impressed Maryj by {managing/beginning} PROi/*j/*ARB the expression of 
himself/*herself. 
 
However, when we turn to PC predicates, the results are not as expected. Given that 
eventive NPs may denote actions (see (125)), and that the semantic binding relation 
responsible for OC is retained in NP complement environments with EC predicates such 
as manage and begin, J&C’s approach incorrectly predicts the persistence of PC into 
actional NP complements. For example, the verb plan does not obligatorily control into 
eventive NP complements (127e-g), despite being a predicate of intention and thus, by 
hypothesis, containing the semantic primitive INTEND as part of its meaning. 
 
(127) a.  Johni planned PROi/*j/*ARB to express himself/*oneself. 
 b.  John’si plan PROi/*j/*ARB to express himself/*oneself (impressed Mary). 
 c.  Maryj was impressed by Johni for planning PROi/*j/*ARB to express 
himself/*herself. 
 d.  Johni impressed Maryj by planning PROi/*j/*ARB to express himself/*herself. 
 e.  Johni planned PROi/j/ARB the expression of himself/oneself. 
 f.  Maryj was impressed by Johni for planning PROi/j/ARB the expression of 
himself/herself/oneself. 
 g.  Johni impressed Maryj by planning PROi/j/ARB the expression of 
himself/herself/oneself. 
 
Following work by Searle (1995), as well as Clark’s (H. H. Clark 1996) concept of ‘joint 
activity’, J&C hypothesise that PC results when an individual holds an intention regarding 
a joint activity named in the complement (Culicover and Jackendoff 2005). The exact 
mechanism for the PC interpretation is left unspecified, though it is suggested to be a kind 
of coercion. It is unclear as to why PC should be unavailable in NP complement 
constructions: NP complements can be actional and can host a unique OC relation. In order 
to rescue J&C’s control model, we must stipulate that the coercive element responsible for 
the ‘intention toward a joint activity’ conceptual representation is unavailable in NP 
complement constructions. Of course, such a stipulation would amount to an 
acknowledgement that (partial) control results not just from semantic factors at the level of 
Conceptual Structure, but from certain syntactic factors as well (e.g., the categorical status 
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of the actional complement). 
 In sum, J&C offer a model of control which derives the unique OC relation by 
purely semantic means. Their approach proposes that OC is tied to a predicate’s semantic 
primitive, and is licensed by (one of) the predicate’s thematic participants specified for OC. 
The binding of the OC relation to thematic roles predicts that control will obtain in a wide 
variety of syntactic configurations. Thus, J&C correctly predict the enforced EC relation 
that we see into eventive NP complements. However, their semantic model over-generates 
regarding PC predicates: J&C’s model predicts the manifestation of OC between PC 
predicates and action-denoting NP complements, contra the control into NP generalisation. 
In order to recover from this shortcoming, J&C’s control theory would require some 
stipulation allocating at least some of the work to the syntax (in the case of PC predicate 
constructions), thereby undermining the fundamental goals of a purely semantic account. 
 
3.5. Dividing the labour between syntax and semantics 
 
Having considered both purely syntactic approaches to control, as well as purely semantic 
approaches, we see that control into nominals is a matter of over- or under-generation for 
many theories. Movement-based approaches such as the MTC prima facie predict a lack of 
both EC and PC into nominal complements. PRO-based models of control will vary on 
whether they over- or under-generate, depending on one’s assumptions regarding PRO in 
NP. In contrast, J&C’s (2005, 2006) control model consistently over-generates in the 
environment of nominal complements, predicting the presence of PC (at least without 
further stipulation). 
 This section will examine Wurmbrand’s (2002) re-evaluation of the OC/NOC 
divide, in which the former is enforced by the lexical semantics of the predicate, while the 
latter results from the distribution of PRO and its interpretation in various syntactic 
environments. Crucially, Wurmbrand cuts the data differently from the authors previously 
discussed. For her, those predicates which instantiate a fixed, predetermined controller-
controllee relation in all possible instantiations constitute the class of OC predicates. 
Conversely, those predicates whose controller varies between instances belong to the 
category NOC. Thus, EC predicates are OC, while PC predicates are NOC in this 
framework. We may thus reword Wurmbrand’s (2002) hypothesis as it applies to the 
EC/PC split as follows. 
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(128)   Wurmbrand’s division of labour 
   Exhaustive control is lexically encoded in the selecting predicate as a unique 
controller-controllee relation. Partial control is the interpretative result of the 
distribution of PRO and the syntactic environments in which it occurs. 
 
In this section we will also consider the observations of Stiebels (2007), whose typological 
survey of cross-linguistic complement control will lay the foundation upon which our 
proposal is built. 
 
3.5.1. Motivating a syntactic/semantic split 
 
The main motivation for Wurmbrand’s proposal comes from the variation she observes in 
the structure of the EC infinitival complement. Specifically, Wurmbrand (2002) 
demonstrates that EC infinitival complements may or may not contain a syntactic subject 
(PRO). Crucially, in either case, the EC relation is still present. This variation in the status 
of the infinitive can be observed in (i) restructuring effects and long A-movement, (ii) the 
binding properties of German infinitives, and (iii) the interpretation of it-anaphora. 
 Restructuring effects (Rizzi 1978, 1982; see also Aissen and Perlmutter 1983 on 
'clause union') manifest as seemingly monoclausal phenomena in biclausal environments. 
Furthermore, those predicates which permit restructuring roughly correspond to the class 
of predicates which enforce exhaustive control (Wurmbrand 1998, 2001, 2002; Landau 
2000; Barrie 2004; Cinque 2006; Grano 2012, 2015, a.o.). One example of the effects of 
restructuring is what is known as the long passive in German, illustrated in (129). In both 
the passive (129a) and the unaccusative (129b) examples, the embedded object raises to the 
subject position of the matrix clause to receive nominative case under agreement with the 
auxiliary.7 Crucially, passivisation of the matrix predicate causes the apparent loss of 
structural (accusative) case in the embedded clause. 
 
(129) a.  Der Lastwagen und der Traktor wurden/*wurde zu reparieren versucht. 
   [the truck and the tractor]-NOM were/*was to repair tried 
   ‘They tried to repair the truck and the tractor.’ 
 
                                                 
7 As Wurmbrand points out, manage is an unaccusative predicate in German, in that it requires the auxiliary 
be in the perfective. 
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 b.  Der Brief und der Bericht sind/*ist mir auf Anhieb 
   [the letter and the report]-NOM are/*is me-DAT straightaway 
   zu entziffen  gelungen. 
   to decipher managed 
   ‘I managed straightaway to decipher the letter and the report.’ 
   (Wurmbrand 2002: 9) 
 
Long-passivisation of the sort in (129) is limited to a small set of restructuring predicates. 
As demonstrated in (130), it fails with infinitival constructions involving predicates such 
as plan. 
 
(130) a. * dass  der Traktor zu reparieren geplant wurde. 
   that the tractor-NOM to repair planned was 
   ‘that they planned to repair the tractor.’ 
 b. * dass  die Traktoren zu reparieren geplant wurden. 
   that the tractors-NOM to repair planned was 
   ‘that they planned to repair the tractors.’ 
 
Wurmbrand (2002) proposes that many of the questions raised by examples (129) and (130) 
can be answered by assuming that the restructuring infinitival complement is smaller than 
a clause. (This follows the VP-approach to restructuring infinitives; see Wurmbrand 1998). 
First, structural case is unavailable for the embedded object in (129a,b), suggesting the lack 
of any case checking position in the extended verbal projection of the infinitival clause. 
Next, the questions of why the embedded (null) subject does not block long A-movement 
in (129) and why the same long A-movement is impossible in (130) are answered by 
assuming that the latter infinitives contain an embedded PRO subject, while the former do 
not. Thus, Wurmbrand pursues an approach in which a restructuring infinitival complement 
projects up to VP (as in (131a)). Conversely, non-restructuring infinitives may be bigger 
(vP, TP, CP, etc.). The ungrammaticality of (130a,b) therefore results from the infelicitous 
A-movement of the embedded object across the null embedded subject, as well as the 
nominative case assignment of the already structurally case-marked embedded object (as 
shown in (131b)). 
 
(131) a.  [TP der Traktori-NOM [VP [VP ti [V zu reparieren ] ] versucht ] wurde ]  
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 b. * [TP der Traktori-NOM [VP [TP/vP PRO [VP ti-ACC [V zu reparieren ] ] geplant ]    
wurde ]  
 
Wurmbrand concludes, based on the above observations and the requirement that 
restructuring predicates instantiate obligatory exhaustive control, that restructuring effects 
entail EC. However, this correlation is crucially one-way; EC does not entail restructuring. 
For example, recall that, in (129), long-passivisation of a restructuring predicate causes the 
loss of structural case in the embedded clause. Given this observation, we might predict 
that structural case is never available within the embedded clause of a restructuring 
predicate. However, Wurmbrand demonstrates that accusative case is indeed available to 
the object of an infinitival complement to a restructuring predicate, in both passive (132a) 
and unaccusative (132b) contexts. Note that in both examples, agreement between matrix 
T and the embedded object is no longer enforced. 
 
(132) a.  dass versucht wurde/*wurden den Traktor und den Lastwagen zu reparieren 
   that tried was/*were [the tractor and the truck]-ACC to repair 
   ‘that they tried to repair the tractor and the truck.’ 
 b.  dass es ihm gelungen ist/*sind den Traktor und den Lastwagen 
   that it him managed is/*are [the tractor and the truck]-ACC 
   zu reparieren 
   to repair 
   ‘that he managed to repair the tractor and the truck.’ 
   (Wurmbrand 2002:12) 
 
Based on this observation, Wurmbrand makes the claim that restructuring predicates are 
systematically ambiguous: either (i) verbs such as try and manage are restructuring 
predicates, and combine with a bare VP, or (ii) verbs such as try and manage are non-
restructuring, and combine with a vP (or bigger) complement (Wurmbrand 2002). 
 To further support this claim, Wurmbrand turns to scrambling effects: in German, 
only restructuring infinitives permit the (non-focus) scrambling of an argument from the 
infinitive. In example (133a), den Traktor is scrambled from the extraposed restructuring 
infinitive. On the other hand, a non-restructuring predicate such as bedauert in (133b) does 
not permit the same scrambling operation, as illustrated in (133c). 
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(133) a.  dass Hans den Traktor versucht hat zu reparieren 
   that John the tractor-ACC tried has to repair 
   ‘that John (has) tried to repair the tractor.’ 
 
 b.  dass Hans bedauert hat den Traktor reparieren zu müssen 
   that John regretted has the tractor-ACC repair to must 
   ‘that John (has) regretted having to repair the tractor.’ 
 
 c. * dass Hans den Traktor bedauert hat reparieren zu müssen 
   that John the tractor-ACC regretted has repair to must 
   ‘that John (has) regretted having to repair the tractor.’ 
   (Wurmbrand 2002:12) 
 
Turning back to the examples in (132), we see in (134) that attempting to scramble the 
embedded ACC-marked argument out of these infinitives results in ungrammaticality. This 
derivational crash is accounted for straightforwardly if we assume, as Wurmbrand does, 
that predicates such as try are ambiguous concerning the syntactic status of their selected 
infinitive.  
 
(134) a. * dass den Traktor versucht wurde zu reparieren 
   that the tractor-ACC tried was to repair 
   ‘that they tried to repair the tractor.’ 
 b. * dass (es) ihm den Traktor gelungen ist zu reparieren 
   that  (it) him the tractor-ACC managed is to repair 
   ‘that he managed to repair the tractor.’ 
   (Wurmbrand 2002:12) 
 
Thus, a one-way correlation between exhaustive control and restructuring is motivated. 
Specifically, scrambling effects in German demonstrate that the infinitival complement to 
EC predicates such as try is not always transparent, and may instead behave like a non-
restructuring infinitive. 
 Moving on to German binding effects, Wurmbrand notes that a [+PRO] account of 
restructuring infinitives makes different predictions than a [-PRO] account concerning the 
binding of reflexive anaphora in German. Specifically, the [+PRO] account assumes that 
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an embedded anaphor is bound locally by the embedded null subject PRO, which stands in 
a control relation with the matrix subject (as in (135b)). On the other hand, the [-PRO] 
account assumes that the embedded anaphor is bound directly by the matrix subject (as in 
(135c)). 
 
(135) a.  weil der Hans sich zu rasieren versuchte. 
   since the John SELF to shave tried 
   ‘since John tried to shave himself.’ 
 b.  since John [PROi SELFi to shave] tried [+PRO] 
 c.  since Johni [ SELFi to shave] tried [-PRO] 
 
As a preliminary, we see in (136b) that reflexive anaphora cannot be bound by the implicit 
argument of a passive. Contrasting this observation with the licit embedded reflexive 
anaphora in the impersonal passive constructions in (137) serves to illustrate that an 
embedded null subject (e.g., PRO) can indeed bind a reflexive in German non-restructuring 
infinitives. Note that the acceptability of (137c) confirms that, in non-restructuring 
contexts, even EC predicates may select an infinitive with an embedded null subject. 
 
(136) a.  Fredericki hat sichi ein Haus gekauft. 
   Frederic has SELF a house bought 
   ‘Frederic bought himself a house.’ 
 b. * Ein Haus wurde (*sich) gekauft. 
   a house was (*SELF) bought 
   ‘A house was bought (*oneself).’ 
 
(137) a.  Es wurde beschlossen [ PROi sichi  den Fisch mit Streifen vorzustellen] 
   it was decided  PRO SELF the fish with stripes-ACC to-imagine 
   ‘They decided to imagine what the fish would look like with stripes.’ 
 b.  Es war notwendig [ PROi sichi einen Wagen zu kaufen] 
   it was necessary  PRO SELF a car-ACC to buy 
   ‘It was necessary to buy oneself a car.’ 
 c.  Es wurde versucht [ PROi sichi den Fisch mit Streifen  vorzustellen] 
   it was tried  PRO SELF the fish with stripes-ACC to-imagine 
   ‘People tried to imagine what the fish would look like with stripes.’ 
   (Wurmbrand 2002:15) 
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Given the contrast between (136b) and (137), and assuming the lack of an embedded PRO 
subject in restructuring infinitives (see (131a)), we are now in a position to understand the 
infelicity of the examples in (138). The inherently reflexive predicate sich vorstellen in 
(138a) completely resists restructuring. In the same vein, the addition of a benefactive 
anaphor in (138b) causes the otherwise licit derivation to crash. 
 
(138) a. * weil (sich) der Fisch (sich) vorzustellen versucht wurde. 
   since (SELF) the fish-NOM (SELF) to-imagine tried was 
   ‘since somebody tried to recall the image of the fish.’ 
 b.  weil (*sich) der Turm (*sich) zu bauen versucht wurde. 
   since (*SELF) the tower-NOM (*SELF) to build tried was 
   ‘since somebody tried to build (*himself) the tower.’ 
   (Wurmbrand 2002:15) 
 
Given the acceptability of (137c) above, the facts in (138) should be attributed to the lack 
of any binder for the anaphora within the embedded restructuring complement, thus 
providing further evidence for Wurmbrand’s claim that restructuring infinitives lack a PRO 
subject. 
 Finally, following Chierchia (1984), Wurmbrand demonstrates the semantic nature 
of EC through it-anaphora and the strict or sloppy identity readings they yield. The reader 
should note that a strict reading refers to the subject of the elided clause being interpreted 
as the subject of the antecedent clause (see (139b)). A sloppy reading results when the 
subject of the elided clause is interpreted instead as the subject of the matrix predicate that 
selects it (see (139a)). 
 
(139)   Ezio likes fooling around, but his wife Mimi doesn’t like it at all. 
 a.  it: Mimi fooling around sloppy reading 
 b.  it: Ezio fooling around strict reading 
 
Chierchia observes that the above ambiguity disappears when the it-anaphor appears under 
a predicate such as begin (an EC predicate). In this case, only the sloppy reading is 
available. 
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(140)   Ezio began playing violin for fun, and Nando began it out of lust. 
 a.  it: Nando playing sloppy reading 
 b. * it: Ezio playing strict reading 
 
Wurmbrand (2002) observes that the same asymmetry can be observed in German. 
Furthermore, she notes that the status of the antecedent clause is irrelevant in deriving the 
strict or sloppy reading. The table below (adapted from Wurmbrand 2002:21) shows that 
whether or not an it-anaphor permits a strict reading or not is determined solely by the 
control-type of the selecting predicate.8 
 
(141)   Antecedent ‘it’ strict sloppy Example 
   Non-Exhaustive Control Non-Exhaustive Control + + (142a) 
   Exhaustive Control Non-Exhaustive Control + + (142b) 
   Non-Exhaustive Control Exhaustive Control - + (142c) 
   Exhaustive Control Exhaustive Control - + (142d) 
 
The examples in (142) demonstrate the generalisations given in table (141). In (142a) and 
(142b), both strict and sloppy readings are available for the it-anaphor under the non-EC 
predicate announce, despite the variation in the control properties of the antecedent clause. 
On the other hand, (142c) and (142d) permit only a sloppy reading of the it-anaphor under 
the EC predicates dare and try, again despite variation in the antecedent. 
 
(142) a.  Hans beschloß zu heiraten [nachdem Peter es angekündigt hatte.] 
   John decided to get-married [after Peter it announced had.] 
   ‘John decided to get married after Peter had announced that he, Peter, would get 
married.’ 
   ‘John decided to get married after Peter had announced that John would get 
married.’ 
  b.  Hans wagte zu heiraten [nachdem Peter es angekündigt hatte.] 
   John dared to get-married [after Peter it announced had.] 
   ‘John dared to get married after Peter had announced that he, Peter, would get 
married.’ 
   ‘John dared to get married after Peter had announced that John would get 
married.’ 
                                                 
8 To avoid terminological confusion, Wurmbrand’s table has been adapted to distinguish between those 
predicates which enforce exhaustive control, and those that do not. 
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 c.  Hans beschloß zu heiraten [nachdem Peter es gewagt hatte.] 
   John decided to get-married [after Peter it dared had.] 
   ‘John decided to get married after Peter had dared to get married.’ 
  * ‘John decided to get married after Peter had dared that John would get married.’ 
 d.  Hans wagte zu heiraten [nachdem Peter es versucht hatte.] 
   John dared to get-married [after Peter it tried had.] 
   ‘John dared to get married after Peter had tried to get married.’ 
  * ‘John dared to get married after Peter had tried that John would get married.’ 
   (Wurmbrand 2002:21) 
 
Having demonstrated that the distinction between non-EC (e.g., PC) and EC correlates with 
the possibility or impossibility of a strict identity reading, respectively, Wurmbrand shows 
that an it-anaphor selected by an EC predicate need not represent a subject-less VP. Recall 
that the inherently reflexive German predicate sich vorstellen cannot occur within an 
exhaustively controlled restructuring infinitive (see (138a)). In (143a), Wurmbrand (2002) 
following Grewendorf (1984, 1988) shows that the German dative cannot bind an anaphor. 
Assuming both of these conditions apply in (143b), we now have indirect evidence of a 
null subject within the elided clause. If the infinitive did not contain a PRO subject to bind 
the anaphor sich, we would predict ungrammaticality, since the dative der Maria cannot 
bind anaphora, and the reflexive predicate sich vorstellen cannot occur in subject-less VPs. 
 
(143) a.  weil der Hansh der Mariam sichh/*m auf dem Photo zeigte. 
   since the Johnh-NOM the Mariam-DAT SELFh/*m in the picture showed. 
   ‘since John showed Mary himself/*herself in the picture.’ 
 
 b.  Peter hat beschlossen [sich den Fisch mit Streifen vorzustellen] 
   Peter has decided [SELF the fish with stripes-ACC to-imagine 
   nachdem es Der Maria gelungen ist. 
   after it the Maria-DAT managed is 
   ‘Peter decided to imagine what the fish would look like with stripes after Mary 
managed to imagine what the fish would look like with stripes.’ 
   (Wurmbrand 2002:23) 
 
In sum, Wurmbrand (2002) presents evidence that the syntactic status of the EC 
complement clause is variable in nature. Specifically, we have seen that restructuring 
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complements, which require EC, are best analysed as subject-less VPs. Further evidence 
for the subject-less VP analysis of German restructuring clauses comes from the binding 
patterns in long-passives. Finally, Wurmbrand demonstrates that whether or not an it-
anaphor allows a strict reading is keyed directly to the control type of the selecting 
predicate. Specifically, EC predicates only allow a sloppy reading, while PC predicates 
permit both strict and sloppy readings. Crucially, in those cases involving EC predicates, 
the it-anaphor may be bigger than a subject-less VP. 
 
3.5.2. The syntactic/semantic division and control into NP 
 
We saw in sections 3.2 and 3.3 that purely syntactic accounts to control under-generate in 
the domain of NP control: the obligatory presence of EC into NP complements is 
unexpected given the lack of clausal structure. Similarly, in section 3.4 we saw that a purely 
semantic approach to control over-generates in this same environment: there is no 
principled reason that EC but not PC predicates should enforce OC in nominal 
complements if both EC and PC involve some form of thematic/semantic binding. In this 
section, we will assess to what extent Wurmbrand’s (2002) hybrid approach to EC/PC can 
account for the control into NP generalisation, repeated below as (90). 
 
(144)   Control into NP  
   Exhaustive control predicates enforce exhaustive control into de-verbal, 
eventive NP complements; partial control predicates show no obligatory control 
into NP complements. 
 
Having reviewed the empirical basis for Wurmbrand’s model of control, we are now in a 
position to determine what predictions a mixed model makes (if any) concerning control 
into non-canonical complements, such as NPs. Recall that the variable nature of the 
syntactic structure of EC complements supports a semantic approach to EC. In contrast, the 
lack of syntactic variability in PC complements (e.g., no restructuring) lends itself to a 
syntactic approach to PC. With these points in mind, Wurmbrand’s model makes the 
following predictions regarding the uniform control of complements. 
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(145)   Wurmbrand’s predictions for uniform complement control  
   Exhaustive control – a phenomenon derived by the lexical semantics of the 
selecting predicate – will obtain into any complement, so long as that 
complement is eventive in the relevant sense9; Partial control – a phenomenon 
resulting from PRO occurring in specific syntactic environments – will not 
obtain into any complement lacking the necessary syntactic structure. 
 
Before we assess the veracity of the predictions in (145) within the domain of NP control, 
a few clarifying remarks are necessary concerning the ‘eventivity’ of noun phrases and the 
syntactic structure of the English DP. 
 As previously mentioned in chapter 2, Grimshaw’s (1990) original classification 
divides nominals into those which can support argument-structure (complex event 
nominals) and those which cannot (simple event and result nominals). Since this 
distinction, the literature has produced two primary methods for accounting for this 
distinction: (i) the ‘event-based’ approach (Grimshaw 1990; Alexiadou and Grimshaw 
2008), in which eventivity is lexically encoded in an argument-structure-preserving 
nominal affix, and (ii) the ‘VP-analysis’ (Borer 1993, 2003, 2012; Fu 1994; Hazout 1995; 
Alexiadou 2001), in which the eventivity and argument-projecting capability of a derived 
nominal is the direct result of verbal material present beneath the nominalising affix. 
 The event-based approach follows Higginbotham (1985) and Di Sciullo and 
Williams (1987) in assuming that all nouns possess an open, non-thematic argument 
position R. By ‘non-thematic’, we mean that R is never the complement to a head, and there 
is no sense in which R is a theme or an agent. It is this R role which is bound by a referent 
(146a), and which denies the eventivity and argument-projecting properties of simple event 
and result nominals (146b). 
 
(146) a.  Dog(R)  
 b.  Run(R) 
 
To account for the argument-projecting properties of complex event nominals, Grimshaw 
(1990) posits an alternative external argument Ev, lexically encoded in nominalising affixes 
such as -ing or -ation. This Ev argument designates the event itself, and preserves the 
argument structure of the underlying verb. The event-based derivation of a complex event 
nominal is illustrated in (147). The lexical entry of the base verb observe in (147a) includes 
                                                 
9 The precise nature of EC complements will be discussed at length in chapters 5 and 6.  
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the lexical category V, as well as the transitive argument structure of the predicate. In 
(147b), we see that the affix -ing carries the lexical category N, as well as the argument-
preserving Ev role. Finally, in (147c) the merging of the verb with the nominalising head 
projects N, and the external argument Ev preserves the argument structure specified in the 
lexical entry of the underlying verb observe. 
 
(147) a.  Observe [V] ( x ( y ))  
 b.  -ing [N] ( Ev ) 
 c.  Observing [N] ( Ev ( x ( y ))) 
 
In sum, the eventivity of CENs under the event-based approach is directly keyed to the 
presence of a specific Ev argument on the nominalising affix. The non-eventive nature of 
SENs/RNs is due simply to the fact that, despite any underlying verbal base, they take a 
referential R role and thus typically behave like purely referential nouns. 
 The ‘VP-analysis’ to CENs differs from the above approach, in that the argument-
projecting properties of the nominal are argued to be a direct reflection of verbal functional 
structure within the nominal itself. It is important to note that, for these approaches, event 
structure is often decomposed in the syntax, so that syntactic structure corresponding to the 
verbal projection is event structure. Thus, the eventivity of CENs is likewise derived from 
the presence of verbal material. Alexiadou (2001) extends this approach, arguing for the 
presence of an AspP beneath the nominalising affix of CENs. Likewise, Borer (2003) posits 
the presence of an entire ‘event complex’ beneath the nominaliser, so that both the internal 
and external arguments of a de-verbal (or de-adjectival) nominalisation are proper 
arguments of a lexically projected VP. 
 The strongest evidence supporting the presence of at least a VP within a CEN comes 
from (i) the possibility of VP-modifying adverbs within these nominals, and (ii) the ability 
of CENs to serve as antecedents to do so anaphora. The reader should note that the 
following data are contentious at best (cf. Ackema and Neeleman 2004), and do not lend 
themselves entirely to cross-linguistic trends. Firstly, though the adverbs in (148) might 
seem strange to a native English speaker, there is a clear contrast between their acceptability 
and the acceptability of VP-modifying adverbials in SEN/RN constructions (see (149)) (Fu, 
Roeper, and Borer 2001). 
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(148) a.  While the removal of evidence purposefully is a crime, the removal of evidence 
unintentionally is not.  
 b. ? His explanation of the problem thoroughly to the tenants did not prevent a riot. 
 c.  His transformation into a werewolf so rapidly was unnerving. 
 
(149) a. * His version of the accident thoroughly to the tenants did not prevent a riot.  
 b. * His metamorphosis into a werewolf so rapidly was unnerving. 
 
Further, we see in (150) that, while VP-modifying adverbials are licit in these constructions, 
sentential adverbial modification is impossible. This observation serves to suggest that, 
though the presence of a VP may be warranted within a CEN, the present of clausal 
structure (i.e., CP, IP, etc.) is not. 
 
(150) a.  She explained the problem thoroughly to the tenants. 
 b.  Her explanation of the problem thoroughly to the tenants … 
 c. * She explained the problem presumably to the tenants. 
 d. * Her explanation of the problem presumably to the tenants … 
 
Secondly, CENs may serve as the antecedent to do so anaphora, while SENs and RNs may 
not, as illustrated in (152). As a preliminary, the examples in (151) serve to demonstrate 
that do so must replace the entire VP, and not just the individual Vo (Fu, Roeper, & Borer 
2001). 
 
(151) a.  He removed the garbage yesterday, and I did so too.  
 b.  He removed the garbage yesterday, and I did so today. 
 c. * He removed the garbage yesterday, and I did so the recycling. 
 
(152) a.  Sam’s destruction of his documents this morning was preceded by Bill’s doing 
so last night.  
 b. * Sam’s version of the event and Bill’s doing so were so surprising. 
 
Further, Ru, Roeper & Borer (2001) again demonstrate that CENs likely lack clausal 
structure. Following Déchaine (1994), the authors assume that bare do is dominated by a 
Tense projection. Thus, if CENs do indeed contain IP, we predict that they may act as 
antecedent to bare do. The contrast between (153a) and (153b) demonstrates that this is not 
the case. 
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(153) a.  The Airforce’s destruction of the city with bombs and the Navy’s doing so too 
made the headlines.  
 b. * The Airforce’s destruction of the city with bombs and the Navy’s doing too 
made the headlines. 
 
In sum, the (marginal) availability of VP-modifying adverbials and the ability of CENs to 
act as antecedents to do so provide evidence of potential verbal material beneath the 
nominalising element. For a proponent of the VP-analysis, the presence of a VP (or more) 
provides a natural explanation to the projection of arguments within the NP. Likewise, the 
mandatory eventivity of CENs is explained if one assumes that verbal structure corresponds 
to event structure. We make no endorsements of either method in this section, though both 
will be rejected in chapter 4. Instead, we note that, while the event-based approach and the 
VP-analysis utilise different machinery, they both converge on the same conclusion: SENs 
and RNs lack the mechanism responsible for the eventivity of CENs, and thus are 
structurally equivalent to canonical referential nouns. 
 Based on this brief overview of nominalisation, we may further refine the 
predictions that Wurmbrand’s theory of control would make in the nominal domain, 
assuming the principles of nominal derivation we have just reviewed. 
 
(154)   Wurmbrand’s predictions for NP complement control (version 1)  
   Exhaustive control – a phenomenon derived by the lexical semantics of the 
selecting predicate – will obtain into CENs, but not SENs nor RNs; Partial 
control – a phenomenon resulting from specific syntactic relations – will not 
obtain into an NP complement. 
 
Breaking down the predictions in (154), we note first that the event-based approach makes 
no explicit mention of the syntactic structure of nominals, and in the VP-analysis we see 
evidence to suggest the lack of clausal structure in nominalisations. For these reasons, and 
assuming that PC is tied to the clausal structure of the clausal left-periphery, we predict the 
lack of PC into NP complements of any variety. Likewise, while both approaches derive 
eventivity in CENs in different fashions, they agree on the lack of both event- and 
argument-structure in SENs and RNs. Assuming that by ‘eventivity’ we mean (minimally) 
the presence of implicit thematic information from which arguments may be projected, we 
predict that EC will obtain into only CENs, and that EC will not manifest in either SENs 
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or RNs. 
 Immediately, we notice a problem with these predictions. Namely, we saw in 
chapter 2 that the effects of exhaustive control apply equally to both CENs and SENs. 
While the precise nature of SENs will be fully investigated in chapter 4, we assert that a 
semantic control relation requires minimally an event variable (in the Neo-Davidsonian 
sense) in order to recover implicit thematic participants. We therefore hypothesise – contra 
both the event-based approach and the VP-analysis – that a nominalisation may be eventive 
in the relevant sense without the capacity to support argument structure, (see (155)). On 
this hypothesis, the predictions from Wurmbrand’s control theory in the nominal domain 
become quite different, as illustrated in (156). 
 
(155)   Hypothesis of general eventivity in derived nominalisations  
   The capacity for a derivational nominalisation to denote a structured event is 
independent of the realisation of any arguments within the nominalisation. 
 
(156)   Wurmbrand’s predictions for NP complement control (version 2)  
   Exhaustive control – a phenomenon derived by the lexical semantics of the 
selecting predicate – will obtain into any eventive nominal complement (CENs 
and SENs, but not RNs); Partial control – a phenomenon resulting from specific 
syntactic relations – will not obtain into an NP complement. 
 
The predictions made by Wurmbrand’s model concerning the control properties of partial 
control predicates remain unchanged. However, if SENs are assumed to be structurally 
event-denoting in an equivalent manner to CENs, Wurmbrand’s model then correctly 
predicts the control into NP generalisation from chapter 2. In sum, a model of control in 
which EC is derived semantically and PC is derived syntactically provides the best account 
of control into nominals. However, it requires the concession that SENs and CENs, while 
different in their argument-projecting properties, are identical in their eventive properties. 
 Of course, it may be more attractive to invoke some kind of coercion operation in 
order to account for the eventivity and subsequent control phenomena we have observed in 
SEN environments, thereby preserving the ‘uniqueness’ of CENs. However, we have 
already seen in chapter 2 that the control phenomena observed in SEN environments 
mirrors those observed in CEN environments, and is quite different to the coercive readings 
found with non-eventive RN complements. Furthermore, utilising Wurmbrand’s (2002) it-
anaphora diagnostic (see (141,142) above), we see that the possible identity readings of 
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CEN-denoting it-anaphora are identical to those of SEN-denoting it-anaphora. Recall that, 
according to the table in (141), it-anaphora selected by EC predicates will only ever permit 
sloppy readings, regardless of the control-type of the antecedent. Thus, we predict that 
nominal-denoting it-anaphora will only permit sloppy identity readings when selected by 
an EC predicate, so long as that nominal is eventive (either a CEN or SEN). This prediction 
is borne out in (157,158). 
 
(157) a.  John regretted the inspection of the factory after Bill 
demanded it. 
no identity 
 b.  John managed the inspection of the factory after Bill 
demanded it. 
strict identity only 
 c.  John regretted the inspection of the factory after Bill 
began it. 
sloppy identity only 
 d.  John managed the inspection of the factory after Bill 
began it. 
sloppy identity only 
 
(158) a.  John regretted the recent journey to Nebraska after Bill 
demanded it. 
no identity 
 b.  John managed the recent journey to Nebraska after 
Bill demanded it. 
strict identity only 
 c.  John regretted the recent journey to Nebraska after Bill 
began it. 
sloppy identity only 
 d.  John managed the recent journey to Nebraska after 
Bill began it. 
sloppy identity only 
 
In examples (157a,158a), in which both verbs are PC predicates, there are no salient 
identity readings. This result is expected, given the fact that the phenomena of strict and 
sloppy identity are inherently keyed to the presence of a control relation. Examples 
(157b,158b), with an EC predicate in the antecedent and a PC predicate selecting the it-
anaphor, lend themselves only to a strict identity reading. Again, this result is unsurprising: 
the only available control relation is between John and the implicit subject of the 
antecedent. The crucial examples in (157c,d,158c,d) demonstrate that, as predicted, an 
exhaustively controlled nominal-denoting it-anaphor will permit only a sloppy identity 
reading. This generalisation obtains regardless of the control-type of the antecedent, and 
despite the availability of strict readings in (157b) and (158b). Critically, the it-anaphora 
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in (157) – denoting CENs – and the it-anaphora in (158) – denoting SENs – behave 
identically in these environments. These observations support the hypothesis that whatever 
enforces EC does not distinguish between CENs and SENs. The equivalence of CENs and 
SENs will be the focus of chapter 4, which will provide evidence to support this hypothesis 
independent of control phenomena in the nominal domain. 
 The systematic nature of the identity readings in (157) and (158), as well as the 
systematically shared control properties discussed in chapter 2, suggest that analysing 
control into CENs as proper control and control into SENs as a kind of coercion is the less 
attractive option. Instead, these shared properties merit a shared analysis. We are presented 
with the following choices: either (i) control into CENs and control into SENs are both 
instances of the broader phenomenon of control, which we also see into clauses, or (ii) 
control into CENs and control into SENs are both cases of coercion, in which case they 
should be analysed as involving a quasi-control phenomenon that is distinct from control 
into clauses. Given that the qualities typical of EC into clauses are also observed in 
exhaustively controlled NPs, option (i) must constitute the null hypothesis and will 
therefore be considered the primary position to be elaborated in later chapters. 
 
3.5.3. Inherent vs. structural control 
 
In her typological survey of cross-linguistic complement control, Stiebels (2007) 
distinguishes between two types of obligatory control: inherent control and structural 
control. Inherent control refers to an obligatory control relation that is enforced by the 
lexical semantics of the control predicate. On the other hand, structural control refers to 
any control relation that is induced by the control complement itself. Verbs of inherent 
control will enforce OC in any environment in which they may appear. Conversely, verbs 
that participate in structural control do not themselves enforce any control reading, and 
subsequently may also appear in many non-OC environments. 
 The parallels between Stiebels’ work and that of Wurmbrand (2002) are numerous. 
For one, the variable nature of restructuring complements follows naturally from an 
‘inherent control’ analysis of restructuring predicates (and indeed, this is precisely the tack 
taken by Wurmbrand). Further, the notion of ‘structural control’ is similar in spirit to 
Wurmbrand’s ‘PRO’ analysis of non-EC control constructions. However, Stiebels’ 
observations reveal that the nature of structural control and control-complements is cross-
linguistically varied, and may not lend itself to a simple PRO analysis. 
 Beginning with the status of control-complements, Stiebels identifies two 
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categories of complements that cross-linguistically occur in control constructions: (i) 
control-inducing, and (ii) control-neutral. Control-inducing structures involve the obvious 
infinitival clauses that have been the predominant focus of control theory since its 
inception. However, cross-linguistically, a number of non-infinitival complement types 
also induce control in all instantiations. For example, Mandarin Chinese lacks the finite-
infinite distinction, and control is marked by the lack of an overt pronoun. We find that the 
subordinate clause in (159a) induces a control reading; the matrix predicate biaoshi is 
equally compatible with non-control contexts, as we see in (159b). 
 
(159) a.  Dahuai  biaoshi [PROi/*j wufa canjia zhe-ge-huodong] 
   Dahua mean  cannot participate this-CL-activity 
   ‘Dahua meant not to be able to take part in this activity.’ 
 b.  Dahuai  biaoshi [tai/j wufa canjia zhe-ge-huodong] 
   Dahua mean 3SG cannot participate this-CL-activity 
   ‘Dahua meant that he cannot participate in this activity.’ 
   (MANDARIN: Stiebels 2007:29) 
 
Further, Stiebels observes that some overtly finite clauses may likewise be control-
inducing, as evidenced by data from Q’eqchi’ (a Mayan language).10 In example (160a), 
we see that a finite complement clause without an overt complementiser induces obligatory 
control between the matrix and embedded subjects. Furthermore, the addition of an overt 
complementiser naq in (160b) triggers a non-control reading. 
 
(160) a.  n-inw-aj [t-in-xik sa' li k'ayil] 
   PRES-1SG.E-want FUT-1SG.N-go inside the market 
   ‘I want to go to the market.’ 
 b.  ta-cu-aj [naq t-at-xik] 
   TMP-1.E-want COMP.DS FUT-2.N-go 
   ‘I want you to go.’ 
   (Q’EQCHI’: Stiebels 2007:36) 
 
Of course, finite complements do not generally show control, as we see in English finite 
                                                 
10 Given the arguably modal nature of syntactic future (see Wurmbrand 2014), it is entirely possible that these 
Q’eqchi’ tokens involve an embedded clause that is smaller than a CP/TP, with a comparatively low spell-
out of finiteness (see also Todorović and Wurmbrand 2015). 
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complement clauses. Likewise, Balkan languages show a variety of finite subjunctive 
clauses in both control and non-control environments. For example, the Albanian finite 
subjunctive clause in example (161a) does not require a control reading. However, that 
same complement clause does tolerate OC, as we see in example (161b). By Stiebels’ own 
definition, Albanian subjunctives are ‘control-neutral’ in this sense. 
 
(161) a.  Njeriui deshi [ta PROi/j vjedhë pulën] 
   man wanted.3SG COMP  steal.3SG.SUBJ chicken 
   ‘the man wanted (him) to steal the chicken.’ 
 b.  Gruajai e detyroi njeriunj [ta PROj/*i vjedhë pulën] 
   woman PRO forced man.ACC COMP  steal.3SG.SUBJ chicken 
   ‘the woman forced the man to steal the chicken.’ 
   (ALBANIAN: Noonan 1985:67) 
 
Most relevant to our purposes is the cross-linguistic status of nominal complements. 
Stiebels finds that, barring a few exceptions, nominalised complements are cross-
linguistically control-neutral. That is, while they will tolerate an OC relation, they will not 
induce one themselves. This is most readily demonstrated in Turkish, a language which 
exploits nominalisation and so-called ‘mixed categories’ to a far greater extent than 
English. As we see in (162a,b), non-control constructions are readily available with event-
denoting nominal complements. Likewise, Turkish nominalisations tolerate OC from those 
predicates which enforce it, as illustrated in (162c,d). Note that in these cases, any nominal 
subject is marked with genitive case, while any other arguments appearing within the 
nominal are marked with verbal structural case. 
 
 
(162) a.  (ben) [Ahmed-in öl-düğ-ün]-ü duy-du-m 
   I Ahmed-GEN die-NOML-3SG.P-ACC hear-PAST-1SG 
   ‘I heard that Ahmed died.’ 
 b.  (ben) [Ahmed-in öl-me-sin]-den kork-uyor-du-m 
   I Ahmed-GEN die-NOML-3SG.P-ABL fear-PROG-PAST-1SG 
   ‘I was afraid that Ahmed would die.’ 
 c.  lütfen [ _ pencere-yi aç-mağ]-i unut-ma! 
   please  window-ACC open-NOML-ACC forget-NEG 
   ‘Please don’t forget to open the window.’ 
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 d.  (ben) Ahmed-i [ _ kaç- mağ]-a zorla-di-m 
   I Ahmed-ACC  flee-NOML-DAT force-PAST-1SG 
   ‘I forced Ahmed to flee.’ 
   (TURKISH: Kornfilt 1997) 
 
Separate from the classification of complement-types, Stiebels identifies a distinction 
between inherent control and structural control. As discussed above, inherent control is 
borne by the lexical information of a particular control predicate. Structural control, on the 
other hand, results from complementation by a control-inducing complement. Stiebels 
provides the table in (163) to summarise the possible cross-linguistic classes of control 
constructions. Note that the [± control] denotation illustrates whether a control reading is 
enforced despite the fact that the complement is control-neutral. 
 
(163)   Predicate Type Complement Type 
    Control-inducing Control-neutral 
   Strong inherent control ✓  
   Weak inherent control ✓ ✓[+control] 
   Structural control ✓ ✓[-control] 
   Marked inherent control  ✓[+control] 
   Non-control  ✓[-control] 
   (Stiebels 2007:39) 
 
Thus, if we make the hypothesis that English EC predicates belong to the class of weak 
inherent control predicates, Stiebels’ typology predicts the control into NP generalisation. 
That is, EC predicates are compatible with both control-inducing complements (e.g., 
infinitival clauses) as well as control-neutral complements (e.g., nominalisations), but 
enforces a control reading in the latter regardless. Likewise, PC predicates such as promise 
or demand are best characterised by the class of structural control predicates. That is, they 
only show an obligatory control reading in control-inducing environments; control-neutral 
complementation will yield no control. 
 The notion that weak inherent control predicates enforce a control reading into 
control-neutral complements is not confined to English. For example, in (164a) we see that 
the German control predicate auffordern (‘ask/request’) is compatible with nominal 
complements (with the help of the preposition zu (‘to’), and subsequently enforces an object 
control relation in this environment. The non-control reading in (164b) is predictably 
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ungrammatical. 
 
(164) a.  Sie haben ihni zum PROi/*j Verzicht auf das Mandat 
   they have him to.the  renunciation on the mandate 
   aufgefordert 
   asked 
   ‘they have asked him to renounce his mandate.’ 
 
 b. * Sie haben ihn zu Marias Verzicht auf das Mandat 
   they have him to Mary’s renunciation on the mandate 
   aufgefordert 
   asked 
   ‘they have asked him that Mary renounces her mandate.’ 
   (Stiebels 2007:41) 
 
The ubiquity of weak inherent control predicates contrasts sharply with those of strong 
inherent control: those predicates which only ever select control-inducing complements. 
Among these are Polish control predicates such as przestać (‘quit’), spróbować (‘try’) and 
zdołać (‘manage’), all of which are only compatible with control-inducing infinitival 
complements (Słodowicz 2006). Among this class of control predicates may also be many 
English object control verbs, such as force and dare. Unlike EC subject control predicates, 
the object control verbs in (165) reject nominal complementation. 
 
(165) a.  John forced Bill to inspect the factory. 
 b. * John forced Bill (of/for/about/…) the inspection of the factory. 
 c.  Mary dared Dr. Brown to examine the patient. 
 d. * Mary dared Dr. Brown (of/for/about/…) the examination of the patient. 
 
Ultimately, an analysis of the strong inherent character of object control predicates in 
English is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is conceivable that a relatively simple 
semantic constraint may be responsible. For example, the lexical entry in (166a) may 
readily describe the object control predicate force, with (166b) representing an adequate (if 
overly simplified) denotation of the utterance in (165a). In this case, force selects an 
individual and a property of individuals and relates the two (assuming a property view of 
infinitives, see Pearson 2012). On the assumption that nominalisations do not denote 
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properties of individuals, the pattern in (165) is accounted for. 
 
(166) a.  λP〈e,vt〉.λy.λx.λe. force(e) ∧ Agent(e) = x ∧ Theme(e) = y ∧ P(y) 
 b.  ∃e[ force(e) ∧  Agent(e) = J ∧ Theme(e) = B ∧ ⟦inspect the factory⟧(B) ] 
 
Marked inherent control predicates constitute the final category of ‘inherent’ control 
predicates. These predicates are unique in enforcing a lexical control relation, but being 
incompatible with control-inducing complements. For example, although Hungarian does 
have an independently control-inducing infinitival clause, Stiebels shows that some 
inherent control predicates in Hungarian (i.e., meg-kér (‘ask’), meg-győz (‘convince’)) 
select only control-neutral subjunctives, as illustrated in (167). Note that in these case, 
obligatory control is still enforced into the finite complement clause. 
 
(167)   Jánosi meg-győz-te Mariá-tj [hogy PROj/*i/*k men-jen/ 
   J PV-convince-
PAST.3SG 
M COMP  go-3SG.SUBJ/ 
   *men-ni vel-e] 
   go-INF with-3SG 
   ‘János convinced Mary to go with him.’ 
   (Stiebels 2007:42) 
 
Although finite complementation and control are in complementary distribution in English, 
there may be some evidence of marked inherent control involving English nominal 
complements. Specifically, predicates such as perform and carry out seem to enforce a 
control-like reading, in which the performer is understood to be the agent of whatever is 
being performed. However, these predicates may only select nominal complements; 
perform and carry out are both incompatible with control-inducing infinitival 
complements. 
In terms of structural control predicates, it is useful to note that the obligatory 
control relation in these constructions is driven primarily (if not entirely) by the nature of 
the complement. That is, the term ‘structural control predicate’ merely picks out those 
predicates which are compatible with control-inducing complements, and does not indicate 
any semantic or syntactic force on the part of the predicate itself that yields or contributes 
to a control reading. As Stiebels demonstrates, structural control constructions are more 
common cross-linguistically, and are subject to more cross-linguistic variation than either 
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variety of inherent control. For instance, while Polish factive predicates may not take 
control-inducing infinitival clauses (Słodowicz 2006), German factives readily license 
modalised infinitival complements. 
In terms of English PC predicates, we know that verbs such as promise and demand 
are equally compatible with control-inducing infinitival clauses as they are with control-
neutral finite clauses or nominal complements; in the latter cases, no control reading is 
enforced. This variety in the complementation facts makes a unified lexical entry 
notoriously difficult to pin down for these predicates: encoding a propositional argument 
bars composition with any referential (e.g., nominal) arguments, and vice versa. The 
alternative method of proposing a suite of lexical entries for each and every complement 
type (i.e., promiseinfinitive, promisegerund, promisenominal, etc.) is equally unattractive, given 
the temporal orientation in NP generalisation of chapter 2. While the nature of structural 
control is ultimately beyond the scope of this thesis, it is conceivable that future research 
might pursue the hypothesis that PC verbs are in fact intransitive predicates that are 
compositionally compatible with a wide range of complements, including control-inducing 
infinitives. Such an analysis may provide some purchase on the complementation facts of 
(attitudinal) PC predicates, while retaining a unified account of their temporal properties 
across complement domains. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
Given the empirical generalisations asserted in chapter 2, we began this chapter with the 
intention of isolating the most natural account for the control properties observed in the 
environment of nominal complementation. We saw in sections 3.2 and 3.3 that (some) 
purely syntactic accounts of obligatory control fail to predict the control into NP 
generalisation. Movement-based theories of control under-generate in this novel 
environment, given the lack of motivation for A-movement out of the English prenominal 
genitive position. Likewise, without further stipulation, PRO-based models of control 
either predict both EC and PC into nominals, or neither. Likewise, the binding of a PRO 
within the DP is challenged by the overt nominal subjects under control generalisation. 
That is, any PRO binding would presumably have to occur across an overt DP possessor. 
Furthermore, in section 3.4 we saw that the purely semantic control model of Culicover 
and Jackendoff (2005, 2006) faced similar difficulties. In this case, their semantic model 
over-generates without further stipulation: there is no prima facie reason why the semantic 
binding that enforces EC into nominal complements would not be active in PC predicates. 
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 We then considered the notion that the EC/PC distinction correlates with a 
semantic/syntactic division of labour, respectively. This was the view defended explicitly 
in Wurmbrand (2002) on the back of German restructuring and binding data. Given the 
appropriate assumptions regarding the event-denoting properties of English 
nominalisations, we discerned that Wurmbrand’s model accurately predicts the distribution 
of control in the nominal domain, as noted by the control into NP generalisation. That is, 
EC as a semantic phenomenon is predicted to manifest in any appropriately eventive 
complement, regardless of syntactic status. PC, on the other hand, will only be enforced in 
the appropriate syntactic environment (for Wurmbrand, this was keyed to the distribution 
of PRO in the clausal left-periphery). 
 Similar in spirit to Wurmbrand (2002), Stiebels (2007) provides a preliminary 
typology of complement control across a variety of languages. She identifies two types of 
control phenomena: (i) inherent control and (ii) structural control. Furthermore, Stiebels 
distinguishes between two types of controlled complements: (i) control-inducing 
complements, and (ii) control-neutral complements. Inherent control predicates are such 
that they will enforce control into any complement, even if it is control-neutral. This class 
of predicate corresponds to our EC class of predicates, which enforce EC in both clauses 
and nominals. Structural control, on the other hand, results from the complementation of a 
control-inducing complement; structural control predicates will not enforce control in 
control-neutral complements. Thus, if nominals are control-neutral, Stiebels’ typology 
correctly predicts the control into NP generalisation.  
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4. NOMINALISATION 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will investigate the underlying composition of English de-verbal 
nominalisations, in order to construct formal syntactic/semantic accounts of control into 
said nominals in subsequent chapters. We saw in chapter 2 that CEN and SEN complements 
to control predicates behave strikingly similar, despite apparent differences in their 
composition. As such, our focus in this chapter will be to explore the hypothesis that SENs 
and CENs are compositionally equivalent. Furthermore, we will strive to defend this 
hypothesis and any subsequent formal analyses with evidence independent from the 
generalisations made in chapter 2. 
 In section 4.2 we provide some theoretical preliminaries regarding English de-
verbal nominalisation, specifically regarding the differentiation between CENs and SENs. 
In 4.3 we provide an alternative look at the empirical generalisations that feature 
prominently in nominalisation theory. We will see that many of the supposed differences 
between CENs and SENs largely disappear when viewed from a different perspective. Then 
in section 4.4 we construct a working, event-based formalisation of English de-verbal 
nominalisation based on work by Adger (2012). We conclude in section 4.5. 
 
4.2. Theoretical background 
 
The precise underpinnings of nominalisation phenomena in English have been subject to 
much scrutiny within the generative tradition since at least (Chomsky 1970). For Chomsky, 
a lexical item is categorically neutral, and thus may be inserted into different syntactic 
environments while retaining critical lexical information (such as a theta-grid, in the case 
of predicates). This hypothesis was later restated in the form of Distributed Morphology 
(Halle and Marantz 1993; Marantz 1997). The syntactic structure of the DP in its more 
verb-like iterations was likewise the subject of Abney’s (1987) seminal work. However, it 
is Grimshaw’s (1990) nominal typology that has defined nominalisation theory for nearly 
three decades, and as such will be our jumping off point. 
 
4.2.1. Grimshaw’s typology 
 
As outlined previously, Grimshaw (1990) distinguishes between three types of English de-
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verbal nominalisation: (i) CENs, which denote events and project arguments, as in (20a), 
(ii) SENs, which denote events but do not project arguments (20b), and (iii) RNs which are 
neither event-denoting nor argument-projecting (20c).  
 
(168) a.  The examination of the patient (took three hours). CEN 
 b.  The examination (took three hours). SEN 
 c.  The examination (was photocopied in green ink). RN 
 
Grimshaw’s framework stands in stark opposition to much of the previous nominalisation 
scholarship, which largely operated under the assumption that arguments are always 
optional inside the noun phrase (cf. Anderson 1983; Higginbotham 1983; Dowty 1989). 
Rather, Grimshaw argues that this perceived optionality is due to a robust ambiguity 
between the nominal categories in (20). However, the arguments themselves are never truly 
‘optional’; if a nominal is a CEN, the internal argument is obligatory, whereas if a nominal 
is an SEN or an RN, the internal argument is impossible. 
 To motivate this typology, Grimshaw observes a number of diagnostics that are 
meant to disambiguate the obligatorily argument-projecting CENs from the non-argument-
taking SENs/RNs. The table in (169), adapted from Borer 2014, serves to summarise the 
generally accepted syntactic properties that distinguish CENs on the one hand from 
SENs/RNs on the other. 
 
(169)   CENs SENs/RNs 
 a.  Internal argument obligatory All complement optional 
 b.  Agent-oriented modifiers No agent-oriented modifiers 
 c.  Event modifiers No event modifiers 
 d.  Subjects are arguments Subjects are adjuncts 
 e.  by-phrases are arguments; in Hebrew, 
select al-yedey 
by-phrases are adjuncts; in Hebrew, 
select šel me’et 
 f.  Implicit argument control No implicit argument control 
 g.  Aktionsart modification No aktionsart modification 
 
The criterion that CENs but not SENs/RNs take an obligatory internal argument is captured 
in (169a) and provides the basis for disambiguation of the nominal system. Namely, any 
instantiation of a CEN-like property (e.g., the presence of an agent-oriented modifier) will 
entail the presence of underlying argument structure, and thus will render ungrammatical 
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any omission of the internal argument. Beginning with (169b) and (169c), Grimshaw found 
that only CENs will permit agent-oriented modification, as well as event-modification. For 
example, we see in (170) that while a CEN will readily accept the agent-oriented modifier 
deliberate, SENs and RNs do not. The same is true of the event-modifier constant in 
example (171). 
 
(170) a.  The (deliberate) examination of the patient took three hours. CEN 
 b.  The (*deliberate) examination took three hours. SEN 
 c.  The (*deliberate) examination was photocopied in green ink. RN 
 
(171) a.  The (constant) examination of the patient took three hours. CEN 
 b.  The (*constant) examination took three hours. SEN 
 c.  The (*constant) examination was photocopied in green ink. RN 
 
Furthermore, as stated in (169d) above, Grimshaw argued that prenominal genitive 
arguments of CENs are obligatorily interpreted as external arguments of the underlying 
verbal event (e.g., as agent; cf. Kratzer 1996 for counter-examples). Furthermore, she noted 
that the prenominal genitives of corresponding SENs and RNs are barred from this same 
interpretation. To illustrate, consider the CEN in (172a), in which the instructor is 
interpreted as an agent of examination. We find that the SEN construction in (172b) rejects 
an agentive interpretation in that same prenominal, as does the RN construction in (172c). 
Note that there are of course licit alternative interpretations for the prenominal genitives in 
(172b,c), but these are largely orthogonal to Grimshaw’s claims.11 
 
(172) a.  The instructor’s examination of the patient took three hours. CEN 
 b. * The instructor’s examination took three hours. SEN 
 c. * The instructor’s examination was photocopied in green ink. RN 
 
Similarly, according to Grimshaw, agent-naming by-phrases are only possible in CEN 
constructions; as illustrated in (173), the lack of argument structure in SEN/RN 
constructions results in ungrammaticality. Note that agent-naming by-phrase adjuncts 
                                                 
11 In section 4.3 we will return to these alternative interpretations of the prenominal argument, and argue that 
their presence here confounds Grimshaw’s typology. We will instead contend that – in SENs specifically – 
the possible interpretations of the prenominal genitive are entirely predictable from the event-structure of the 
underlying verbal predicate. 
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contrast sharply with by-phrases denoting authorship. Although English does not 
differentiate morphologically between agent- and author-denoting by-phrases, other 
languages such as Hebrew do. As expected, Hebrew CENs take agent-denoting by-phrases 
(headed by al-yedey), while SENs/RNs may license only author-denoting ones (headed by 
šel me’et) (Borer 2003).  
 
(173) a.  The examination of the patient by the doctor (took three hours). CEN 
 b. * The examination by the doctor (took three hours). SEN 
 c. * The examination by the doctor (was photocopied … ). RN 
 
Moving on, (169f) notes that – like verbal passives – only nominalisations with argument 
structure may control into an infinitival purpose clause, as illustrated in (174a,b). Note that 
Grimshaw followed Williams (1985) and Lasnik (1988) in assuming that infinitival 
adjuncts to passives could be controlled by the matrix event (hence the term ‘event 
control’). We find in (174c,d) that non-argument-projecting nominals may not take these 
same purpose clause adjuncts. For Grimshaw, this pattern followed if CENs alone denote 
events ‘in the relevant sense’ (Grimshaw 1990:58), a notion that is equally compatible with 
VP approaches on the assumption that verbal structure is synonymous with event structure. 
 
(174) a.  The book was translated (in order) to make it more widely 
available. 
passive 
 b.  The translation of the book (in order) to make it more widely 
available. 
CEN 
 c. * The translation (in order) to make the book more widely 
available. 
SEN 
 d. * The exam (in order) to assess aptitude. RN 
 
Finally, the ability for a nominalisation to license aktionsart modifiers (as in (169g)) 
constitutes perhaps the strongest evidence for the underlying argument-structure of CENs. 
As we see in (175a,b), unambiguous (AS-projecting) CENs license aktionsart modifiers, 
and (critically) the (a)telic properties of the de-verbal CEN mirror those of the underlying 
verbal predicate. Unambiguous RNs, on the other hand, may never license aktionsart 
modifiers (see (175c,d)). 
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(175) a.  The doctor observed the patient for several weeks/*in several 
weeks. 
Verb 
 b.  The observation of the patient for several weeks/*in several 
weeks. 
CEN 
 c. * The exam/trip/race in several days/for several days. RN 
 
Thus, Grimshaw’s suite of disambiguating diagnostics converge on a picture of English de-
verbal nominalisation such that CENs are derivationally unique. That is, CENs but not 
SENs/RNs are compositionally derived from the base verb in some fashion that preserves 
the argument-structure of the underlying predicate. This preserved argument structure is 
subsequently complicit in the nominal’s ability to license grammatical features, such as 
agent-oriented modifiers and implicit argument control.  The implication, then, is that SENs 
and RNs are more or less equivalent in their lack of eventivity, given the empirical pattern 
in (169). As we will see in 4.2.2, this generalisation is at the heart of the majority of 
contemporary theories of nominalisation, such that CENs are always compositionally 
unique in some theory-dependent fashion, as opposed to SENs and RNs, which are 
generally analysed as being common referential NPs. 
 
4.2.2. AS-centric approaches to nominalisation 
 
In this section, we will consider a number of previous accounts of English de-verbal 
nominalisation that may be best described as AS-centric (or argument-structure-centric). 
That is, the approaches below consider the presence or absence of argument structure 
within the nominalisation to be the defining characteristic in the nominal derivation. This 
perspective contrasts with that of nominalisation approaches which may be considered E-
centric (or event-centric), the nature of which will be discussed in section 4.3. Note that, in 
this section, we will focus primarily on the derivational contrasts between unambiguous 
CEN and RN nominalisations; SENs and their place in the literature will be taken up again 
in section 4.2.3.  
 Grimshaw’s (1990) account constitutes the first explicitly AS-centric approach to 
English de-verbal nominalisation, following her typology of the nominal system and its 
inherent ambiguity. As briefly discussed in chapter 3, Grimshaw assigns to unambiguous 
RNs the same level of complexity as unambiguous referential NPs. Thus, potentially 
ambiguous RNs such as examination and assignment are semantically equivalent to 
unambiguously referential NPs, such as dog and window. To this end, Grimshaw invokes 
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the inherently nominal external argument R (cf. Higginbotham 1985). Unlike typical 
verbal/event arguments, there is no sense in which R is a theme, experiencer, goal, agent, 
etc., but rather its interpretation will be idiosyncratically determined depending on a 
number of factors, including the nominal and the nominalising affix.  
CENs, on the other hand, do not invoke the R argument in Grimshaw’s system. 
Rather, nominals that have event structure may take the eventive external argument Ev 
instead, which is crucially argument-structure preserving, and yields an event 
interpretation. In Grimshaw’s system, Ev is borne on a nominalising affix such as -(a)tion 
and -ment. Furthermore, Grimshaw accounts for the ambiguity in the nominal system by 
asserting a systematic lexical ambiguity in many English nominal affixes. That is, the affix 
-(a)tion is ambiguous between Ev and R, and thus de-verbal nominalisations derived via -
(a)tion are ambiguous between event and non-event readings. 
It is useful to note here that, for Grimshaw, argument structure involves the 
interaction between a predicate’s thematic properties and its aspectual properties. In 
relation to the former, Grimshaw assumes the thematic hierarchy in (176) in order to 
represent argument structure as prominence relations among event participants of a given 
predicate. 
 
(176)   ( Agent ( Experiencer ( Goal/Source/Location ( Theme )))) 
   (Grimshaw 1990:8) 
 
As to the aspectual properties of a predicate’s argument structure, Grimshaw assumes that 
each predicate is associated with a decompositional event structure in the lexicon. For 
example, Grimshaw proposes that the verb construct is associated with an event structure 
that decomposes into (i) an activity in which some subject x participates in a constructing-
activity, and (ii) a resulting state in which some object y is created (as illustrated in (115), 
from (Grimshaw 1990:26)). 
 
(177)   event       
          
  
       
  activity state      
 
Given that a decompositional event structure of the sort in (115) is a necessary condition 
for argument structure in Grimshaw’s analysis, it follows that any nominal lacking event 
structure will also lack argument structure. 
 Alexiadou (2001) may be considered an explicit defence of the AS-centric view 
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from the perspective of the VP-approach to nominalisation (see chapter 3). For Alexiadou, 
the syntactic structure instantiated in (178) represents the maximum possible functional 
structure permissible in nominalisations cross-linguistically (cf. Alexiadou et al. 
2008:528). Note that, for Alexiadou (2001), VoiceP does not differentiate between 
Kratzer’s (1996) external argument-introducing Voice projection and the structural case-
assigning vP of (Chomsky 1995).12 LP corresponds roughly to the root phrase (√P) featured 
prominently in the framework of distributed morphology (DM), and Aspect is responsible 
for valuing accusative (structural) case. 
 
(178)   DP       
          
  
       
  Do FP (NumP/AgrP)     
         
         
   AP AspectP     
         
         
    Aspect VoiceP    
         
           
     Voice LP   
         
           
      L DP  
         
           
 
Alexiadou argues that so-called -ing nominalisations (also called POSS-ing gerunds) 
instantiate (nearly) the full structure given in (178). For example, the structure in (179) 
below provides an adequate representation for the gerundive construction Caesar’s 
destroying the city. The DP complement the city is assigned structural accusative case by 
the affix-bearing aspectual head, and AspectP merges directly with DP (thus explaining the 
incompatibility of adjectival modifiers). Note that, for the sake of simplicity, we abstract 
away from the genitive subject.  
  
                                                 
12 See (Harley 2009) for some recent discussion on the tension between vP and VoiceP in the domain of 
nominalisation. 
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(179)   DP       
          
  
       
  Do AspectP      
    
 
     
         
   Aspect VoiceP     
   -ing  
 
    
         
    Voice LP    
         
           
    L DP   
    √DESTROY the city   
           
 
Nominalisations headed by -(a)tion, on the other hand, do not assign accusative case to 
their internal complements, and they are compatible with adjectival modification. Thus, 
the nominal structure in (180) contains a NumP and lacks AspectP. Note that Alexiadou 
assumes that the Voice head in these constructions is eventive but passivized (viz. it does 
not license an external argument). 
 
(180)   DP       
          
  
       
  Do NumP      
    
 
     
         
   Numo VoiceP     
     
 
    
         
    Voice LP    
    [+ev, -subj]     
           
    L DP   
    √DESTROY the city   
           
 
Crucially, the complement of the lexical root is only licensed in the eventive environment 
created by the extended verbal projection (in this case, a Voice head valued for [+ev]). 
Thus, like Grimshaw, the event-denotation and argument-projecting properties of CENs 
are packaged in tandem. However, whereas Grimshaw utilised an Ev argument, Alexiadou 
appeals to actual verbal event material beneath the nominalising affix. 
Perhaps the strongest form of the AS-centric approach to nominalisation is 
encapsulated in a series of works by Borer (2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2012, 2014), who defends 
the hypothesis that the root of a nominalisation (or indeed, any phrase) is itself 
grammatically meaningless: a non-structured package of phonological information and 
some amount of encyclopaedic/real-world knowledge. Like Alexiadou, Borer assumes that 
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the same event/argument-denoting syntactic structure found in the verbal domain is 
responsible for the event/argument-denoting properties of de-verbal and de-adjectival CEN 
nominalisations. Unlike Alexiadou, however, Borer’s account is couched in the XS-model 
of grammar developed in (Borer 2005a, 2005b). 
Within Borer’s XS-model, functional projections termed ‘categorial functors’ 
(henceforth, C-functors) are responsible for partitioning syntactic structure into 
constituents (Borer 2014:80). Concretely, a C-functor CX[Y] projects category X and defines 
its complement as equivalent to Y. By way of illustration, consider the examples in (181). 
The C-functor CN[V] – which, in English, may spell out as a nominalising affix such as -
ation, -ment, etc. – projects N and defines its complement as V-equivalent (C=V). CN[V] 
then merges with some node M, which may itself be a C-functor (as in (181a)), or a 
category-neutral root (181b). Note that the C-functor CV[A] follows the same principles: it 
projects V and defines its complement as A-equivalent. 
 
(181) a.   CN[V]       
          
  
       
  CN[V] CV[A] (=V)      
  -ation  
 
     
         
   CV[A] [C=A √REAL]     
   -ise  
 
    
         
         
     
 
    
         
 b.   CN[V]       
          
  
       
  CN[V] [C=V √FORM]      
  -ation  
 
     
         
 
This notion of defining a complement as C-equivalent has two distinct effects in the syntax. 
First, as in (181a), the complement of CN[V] is itself a C-functor, projecting V. Thus, V-
equivalence is trivial in this example – it becomes a matter of category checking. In (181b), 
however, the complement of CN[V] is a category-neutral root, and thus it is defined as being 
V-equivalent by virtue of merging with CN[V].
13 By hypothesis, then, example (182) is 
                                                 
13 In this respect, C-functors may look similar to the functional categorisers v, n, a, etc., found in the DM 
literature (cf. Halle and Marantz 1993; Marantz 1997, 2001). However, Borer’s XS-model is crucially 
different, in that non-categorical phrases (e.g., √Ps) are impossible, and category is determined by virtue of 
merge, rather than by the nature of some (often covert) categoriser.  
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ungrammatical due to the conflict between the V-selecting C-functor CN[V] and the A-
projecting C-functor CA[V].  
 
(182)  *  CN[V]       
          
  
       
  CN[V] CA[V] (≠V)      
    
 
     
         
   CA[V] [C=A √REACT]     
   -ive  
 
    
         
 
As well as C-functors, Borer’s XS-model distinguishes semantic S-functors, which are 
primarily implicated in the valuing of functional nodes within an extended projection (ExP 
segments). As an example, consider the following extended projection denotation: 
D∈{Ex[N]}. Here, D is an ExP segment that will be valued by an S-functor (e.g., THE), 
and is a member of the set of ExP segments that collectively define their complement as N-
equivalent (Borer 2014). This set of ExP segments will also include functional categories 
such as NUM or CL (classifier), and thus we may assert NUM∈{Ex[N]} and CL∈{Ex[N]}.  
 Additionally, the extended projection consists of the C-core: the domain of C-
labelled nodes dominated by the functional ExP sequence. The only obligatory part of a C-
core is a C-equivalent root, though each instantiation of a C-functor constitutes a C-core, 
with the highest iteration defined as the maximal C-core (Borer 2014, ex. 31). 
 
(183)   C-coreDEF 
 a.  α is a C-core iff α is C-equivalent and there is a β such that β is contained in α 
and β is a root, and for all x such that α dominates x and x dominates β, x is C-
equivalent 
 b.  α is maximal iff there is no γ such that γ is C-equivalent and γ immediately 
dominates α 
   (Trivially, recall that all instances of C are C-equivalent) 
 
Finally, along with category-defining C-functors and semantic S-functors, Borer’s XS-
model employs category neutral roots in the derivation of words and phrases. However, 
unlike other systems of grammar which leverage roots, Borer is explicit in assigning them 
the role of pure phonological indices. That is, roots do not have content, nor do they 
contribute any syntactic/semantic information to the derivation. Note that the nature of 
‘content’ is distinctly extra-linguistic in Borer’s framework; it consists of encyclopaedic 
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knowledge and does not inform the grammar. Content, in this sense, contrasts with 
semantic S-functors, which contribute formal semantic meaning to a given structure. 
 With the fundamentals of the XS-model in mind, consider the derivation of the R-
nominal government in (184). The C-functor CN[V] projects the category N and defines its 
complement – the root GOVERN – as V-equivalent (C=V). The derivation yields a 
maximal C-core projecting N, which may subsequently combine with segments of the 
extended nominal projection (e.g., members of the set ExP[N]). 
 
(184)    CN[V]       
          
  
       
  CN[V] [C=V √GOVERN]     
  -ment  
 
     
         
 
Moving on to more complex nominalisation constructions, we see in (185) that the CEN 
government (as in the constant government of unruly citizens) involves the same category-
neutral root, as well as the same maximal C-core (CN[V]). However, the derivation of the 
nominal now includes a number of segments from the extended verbal projection. 
Specifically, Borer’s analysis of CENs includes beneath the nominal C-functor the internal-
argument introducing segment Y∈{Ex[V]} and the segment X∈{Ex[V]}, which introduces 
the event argument, as well as (potentially) an external argument. Borer argues that it is the 
presence of these verbal segments that uniquely characterises the derivation of CENs, and 
thus accounts for their behaviour regarding Grimshaw’s diagnostics in (169). 
 
(185)    CN[V]       
          
  
       
  CN[V] X∈{Ex[V]}      
  -ment  
 
     
         
   (ARG) Y∈{Ex[V]}     
     
 
    
         
    (ARG) [C=V √GOVERN]    
      
 
    
        
 
Note that in both the RN construction in (184) and the CEN in (185), the underlying root 
is identical in that both are rendered V-equivalent. The primary difference, then, lies in the 
manner in which those roots are render V-equivalent. In the case of the RN, the root is 
defined as V-equivalent by merging with the nominal C-functor CN[V]. Conversely, the root 
of the CEN construction is made V-equivalent by virtue of combining with segments of the 
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extended verbal projection. 
 
4.2.3. SENs and AS-centricity 
 
Unlike CENs, SEN constructions inhabit an awkward place in most AS-centric approaches 
to de-verbal nominalisation. On the one hand, they denote (potentially) dynamic events and 
have a comparable meaning to their CEN counterparts. On the other, they may not take 
overt arguments, and are alleged to have the grammatical behaviour of RNs or canonical 
referential noun phrases. 
 In Grimshaw (1990), SENs are treated – both implicitly and explicitly – as 
comparable to RNs, as far as their syntactic/semantic properties are concerned. Recall that 
Grimshaw’s account hinged on the alternation between two possible external arguments in 
the noun phrase: Ev and R. According to Grimshaw, only CENs have the external argument 
Ev, which enforces an event reading and preserves the argument structure of the underlying 
verbal base. SENs and RNs both have the distinctly nominal argument R, the interpretation 
of which is decidedly freer than Ev. Thus, SENs are functionally no different from 
uncontroversial referential entities, the only interpretable difference being that they refer to 
an event. 
 SENs are treated similarly in Alexiadou (2001). Recall that, for Alexiadou, CENs 
are derived from category-neutral root phrases (LPs, see (178-180) above). In CEN 
contexts, these LPs select their internal arguments directly, however it is the distinctly 
verbal environment in which these LPs appear that licenses internal argument projection. 
Namely, CENs in this system include a Voice projection that is [+event]. Conversely, 
Alexiadou provides the structure in (186) for RNs, and by implication SENs. Note that, in 
this structure, there is no verbal projection, and the category-neutral LP is selected directly 
by the nominal projection Num. 
 
(186)    DP       
          
  
       
  Do NumP      
    
 
     
         
   Num LP     
     
 
    
         
 
Borer (2003) provides the most explicit categorisation of SENs as functionally equivalent 
to RNs. Working from Grimshaw’s three-way categorical split between CENs, SENs and 
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RNs, Borer proposes that only two nominal categories are necessary: (i) AS-nominals, 
which are those nominalisations that project argument structure, and (ii) R-nominals, which 
are those that do not. The R-nominal category is heterogenous, in that it includes not only 
morphologically complex SENs and RNs, but also simplex event-denoting NPs such as trip 
or event. 
 Consider derivationally complex R-nominals (e.g., those that are ambiguous 
between AS- and R-nominal). We have already seen in (184) above a potential treatment 
for the SEN government in Borer’s XS-model. In (187), I provide a hypothetical structure 
of the R-nominal nominalisation in Borer’s framework (abstracting away from any 
morphological complexity within nominal). In either case, the nominal C-functor CN[V] 
merges with a V-equivalent complement, but no segments of the extended verbal projection 
are present. 
 
(187)    CN[V]       
          
  
       
  CN[V] CV[N]      
  -ation  
 
     
         
   CV[N] [C=N √NOMINAL]     
   -ise  
 
    
         
 
It is critical to note that the R-nominal structure in (187) will permit either an RN 
interpretation (e.g., the nominalisation is written on the board) or an SEN interpretation 
(e.g., that nominalisation took several minutes); there is nothing in the syntax to enforce 
one or the other.14 
 Thus, in those approaches to derivational nominalisation for which argument 
structure is the critical ingredient, SENs are often given the same treatment as RNs. Both 
are considered ‘purely nominal’, in the sense that SENs and RNs only ever implicate the 
same functional structure as canonical referential nouns. On the assumption that argument 
structure and event structure are isomorphic (cf. Borer 2005a, 2005b; Ramchand 2008; 
Pylkkänen 2008, a.o.), it follows that SENs do not constitute structured events in any 
grammatically relevant sense. This logical consequence will be challenged in the following 
section. 
 
                                                 
14 The same is implicitly true of the RN structure in (186). 
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4.3. Motivating an E-centric framework15 
 
Having discussed the theoretical tenets of an AS-centric approach to nominalisation, this 
section will explore the notion of an Event-centric (henceforth, E-centric) approach to the 
same problem. By ‘E-centric’, we mean an analysis of nominalisation in which nominal 
type is keyed to the presence or absence of an underlying grammatically active event. In 
order to motivate an E-centric analysis, we will demonstrate that – contra Grimshaw (1990) 
and much subsequent work – CENs and SENs in fact pattern together regarding a range of 
diagnostics.  
In section 4.3.1 we will discuss the nature of agent-oriented modification and event 
modification in the nominal domain, and will conclude that neither diagnostic successfully 
isolates derivational nominalisations from referential nouns. Then in 4.3.2 we will revisit 
the remaining diagnostics utilised by Grimshaw (1990), and will show that CENs and SENs 
behave uniformly. Section 4.3.3 will focus on the aktionsart properties of English 
nominalisations, and in section 4.3.5 we will admit another diagnostic to Grimshaw’s suite 
of tests: compositionality of meaning. 
 
4.3.1. Problematic diagnostics 
 
Before discussing the ways in which SENs and CENs pattern uniformly, it must be pointed 
out that a number of Grimshaw’s (1990) diagnostics fail to isolate compositionally derived 
nominalisations from otherwise referential noun phrases in coerced event interpretations. 
Specifically, the distribution of agent-oriented modifiers (169b) and event modifiers (169c) 
is far more general than Grimshaw’s typology implies. First, consider the event modifiers 
frequent and constant; example (188) (see (171) above) once again illustrates Grimshaw’s 
observation that while CENs will license these event modifiers, SENs and RNs will not. 
 
(188) a.  The (constant) examination of the patient took three hours. CEN 
 b.  The (*constant) examination took three hours. SEN 
 c.  The (*constant) examination was photocopied in green ink. RN 
 
This generalisation is challenged by Moulton (2014), who observes that SENs 
systematically disobey the pattern in (188) as long as a pragmatically viable interpretation 
                                                 
15 For a number of observations largely in line with the observations presented here, see (Alexiadou 2009; 
Lieber 2016) 
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is available (see (189)). This potential counter-example was already noted by Grimshaw 
(1990:178, fn. 1) but left unaddressed. 
 
(189) a.  The constant construction next door will bother me. 
 b.  More frequent demonstration is required. 
 c.  Frequent change is necessary if you want your organisation to stay competitive. 
 
On the basis of (189), Moulton pursues an analysis in which CENs and SENs share an 
underlying event structure (in his case, an event variable in the Davidsonian sense). Indeed, 
this is similar to the analysis which we will develop in section 4.4. However, once we move 
beyond the scope of derived nominals, we find that the observations in (189) are in fact 
misleading; event modifiers do not differentiate between derived CEN/SEN constructions 
and canonically referential nouns coerced into an eventive interpretation. As illustrated in 
(189), the referential nouns noise, problem, mistake, and infidelity will license event 
modifiers in certain contexts. Note also that in each case the modified noun phrase is 
singular, despite Grimshaw’s (1990) claim that non-event-denoting nominals must be 
plural in order to license event modifiers. 
 
(190) a.  This constant noise will be the death of me. 
 b.  This frequent mistake may cost the company millions. 
 c.  The constant problem in Bill’s marriage is his frequent infidelity. 
 
Furthermore, we find that the same observations hold true of the agent-oriented modifier 
deliberate in the nominal domain. In example (191) (see also (170) above) we provide 
Grimshaw’s observations concerning the disambiguating properties of agent-oriented 
modifiers. Then in (192) we refute this observation; just as was the case with SENs in (189) 
above, SENs may license agent-oriented modifiers so long as a plausible interpretation is 
available. 
 
(191) a.  The (deliberate) examination of the patient took three hours. CEN 
 b.  The (*deliberate) examination took three hours. SEN 
 c.  The (*deliberate) examination was photocopied in green ink. RN 
 
(192) a.  The deliberate examination revealed previously unnoticed anomalies. 
 b.  Years of deliberate humiliation are at the root of Howard’s commitment issues. 
 c.  Deliberate provocation often leads to heartache. 
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Once again, this seems to provide some evidence that SENs actually pattern like CENs, 
despite the general consensus in the literature. However, just as was the case with event 
modifiers, we once again find that the distribution of agent-oriented modifiers extends 
beyond derived nominalisations, as illustrated in (193). In each case, the use of deliberate 
forces an agentive interpretation of some relevant event participant. Critically, we interpret 
this participant in relation to an event that has no explicit verbal source (e.g., Mary’s 
deliberate mistake = the mistake that Mary made deliberately). 
 
(193) a.  Mary’s deliberate mistake may cost this company millions. 
 b.  The problem in Bill’s marriage is his deliberate infidelity. 
 c.  John’s deliberate racket keeps the whole neighbourhood up at night. 
 
Ultimately, a formal analysis of event and agent-oriented modifiers is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, the observations above suggest that modifiers like frequent and 
deliberate contribute more semantic force to any given nominal structure than is usually 
assumed. Perhaps they are themselves coercive, in that a referential nominal such as 
infidelity is coerced into some salient eventive interpretation by virtue of composition with 
the modifier. 
 It is clear, however, that the claim that these modifiers are diagnostic of some 
unique compositional eventivity is problematic: event and agent-oriented modification is 
not limited to CENs, nor is it limited to compositionally derived nominalisations. Of course, 
there are a number of theoretical escape hatches through which we might rescue 
Grimshaw’s generalisations. For example, we may argue that the event modified in the case 
of CENs is crucially different from the ‘event’ modified in the case of SENs and non-
derived noun phrases. However, without any clear empirical distinction between the two 
types of modification, there is little motivation for such a stipulation. 
 
4.3.2. Reframing the empirical landscape 
 
Having put aside the event and agent-oriented modification diagnostics as unreliable, this 
section will consider the remaining tests that motivate Grimshaw’s typology (aside from 
aktionsart modification). Immediately, we notice that the extensive distribution of agent-
oriented modifiers in the nominal domain obscures the subjects are arguments diagnostic 
listed in (169d). Consider the paradigm in (194), in which the status of the prenominal 
genitive is assumed to correlate with the availability of the agent-oriented modifier 
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deliberate. From this perspective, it appears that SENs and RNs pattern together. 
 
(194) a.  The doctor’s (deliberate) examination of the patient took three 
hours. 
CEN 
 b.  The doctor’s (*deliberate) examination took three hours. SEN 
 c.  The doctor’s (*deliberate) examination was photocopied in 
green ink. 
RN 
 
However, if deliberate is as widely available in the English noun phrase as is suggested by 
the examples in (193), then its appearance in (194a) cannot be considered evidence for a 
‘true’ external argument in CEN constructions. Instead, (194a) simply demonstrates that 
CENs follow the general pattern in which event-denoting NPs license agent-oriented 
modification, regardless of internal composition. Likewise, the unavailability of deliberate 
in the RN construction in (194c) is equally predictable: given the hypothesis that agent-
oriented modifiers either enforce or are compatible with only an event interpretation, the 
distinctly referential reading of the RN will be incompatible. The real mystery, then, is why 
the event-denoting SEN in example (194b) does not permit the agent-oriented modifier, 
despite its otherwise general availability in event-denoting noun phrases. 
 Here we pursue a solution such that the ungrammaticality of deliberate in (194b) is 
due not to the impossibility of prenominal arguments in SEN constructions, but rather to 
the fact that the most salient interpretation of the doctor in (194b) is as the internal argument 
(e.g., the theme) of the nominal event. To this end, we appeal to Smirnova’s (2015) 
classification of nominal type by semantic category (see also Levin 1993). For Smirnova, 
de-verbal nominalisations fall into three distinct semantic classes, based on the semantic 
class of the underlying predicate: (i) patient-dominant nominals, which encode their 
internal argument most prominently, (ii) agent-dominant nominals, which encode their 
external argument most prominently, and (iii) shared-dominant nominals, which do not 
distinguish between internal and external arguments by means of prominence. The table in 
(195) – adapted from Smirnova (2015) – provides a non-exhaustive cross-section of 
nominalisations by semantic class. 
 
(195) a.  Patient-dominant nominalisations 
   Change-of-state: corrosion, diffusion, disintegration, explosion; Amuse: 
alienation, consolation, humiliation, satisfaction; Murder: assassination, 
elimination, execution; Destroy: annihilation, demolition, destruction; Banish: 
extradiction, removal; Appoint: adoption; Begin: termination; … 
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 b.  Agent-dominant nominalisations 
   Admire: admiration, appreciation, fear, hatred, resentment; Correspond: 
collision, competition, cooperation; Inherently Directed Motion: ascent, 
descent, entry; Avoid: evasion, avoidance; Chase: chase, pursuit; Conjecture: 
assertion, suspicion; Say: proclamation, suggestion; … 
 c.  Shared-dominant nominalisations 
   Characterise: certification, characterisation, description, identification; Sight: 
examination, inspection, investigation, observation; Judgement: celebration, 
compensation, punishment; Assessment: analysis, assessment, evaluation; … 
 
Thus, the nominalisation destruction belongs to Smirnova’s patient-dominant class, and by 
hypothesis encodes its internal argument more prominently than any other. In line with this, 
the prenominal genitive in (196) is obligatorily interpreted as the theme of a destroy-event; 
the ungrammaticality of deliberate may be analysed as the attribution of intentionality to 
the internal argument of a change-of-state predicate. 
 
(196)   The barbarians’ (*deliberate) destruction (took three hours). 
 
Conversely, nominals such as ascent and pursuit are, in Smirnova’s framework, agent-
dominant nominalisations, and as such will most prominently make an agentive 
interpretation available to any prenominal genitive arguments. We therefore predict that 
agent-oriented modifiers will be perfectly acceptable in these environments; we see in (197) 
that this prediction is borne out. 
 
(197) a.  The climber’s (deliberate) ascent (took three days).  
 b.  The detective’s (deliberate) pursuit (lasted for three hours). 
 
Finally, nominalisations such as inspection, desertion and indeed examination belong to 
Smirnova’s shared-dominant class; by hypothesis, these nominals will not make one 
particular interpretation more salient than the other in the prenominal genitive position. As 
illustrated in (198), a suitable context allows the prenominal possessor of a shared-
dominant nominalisation to be assigned an agentive interpretation. Subsequently, the 
agent-oriented modifier deliberate is licensed in this distinctly SEN environment. 
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(198) a.  The doctor’s (deliberate) examination revealed previously unnoticed anomalies.  
 b.  The manager’s (deliberate) inspection revealed a web of lies and misconduct. 
 c.  The soldier’s (deliberate) desertion occurred late last night. 
 
Consider now the contrast between (194b) and (198): SENs derived from shared-dominant 
predicates present a predictable ambiguity concerning the interpretation of their prenominal 
genitive argument. Furthermore, this ambiguity correlates with the (un)availability of 
agent-oriented modification, a feature that we have observed previously to be generally 
available to event-denoting nouns. 
 Moving on to by-phrases inside nominalisations (see (169e)), recall that English 
does not exhibit any morphological differences between by-phrases that name agents and 
those that name authors. On the other hand, languages such as Spanish, Hebrew and 
Brazilian Portuguese show a clear morphological distinction between the two types of 
prepositional phrase. Borer (2003) notes that, for these languages, agentive by is obligatory 
in AS-nominal constructions (viz. CENs), and that only authorship by is available to R-
nominals (viz. SENs and RNs). As illustrated in (199a), Brazilian Portuguese CENs behave 
as expected: the agent-naming preposition pelo (por + o) is obligatory in this environment. 
Likewise, the non-eventive referential noun in (199b) may only license the author-naming 
preposition de. 
 
(199) a.  O exame do homem pelo/*de médico 
   The examination of.3SG.MASC man by/*of doctor 
   ‘The examination of the patient by the doctor …’ 
 
 b.  O  livro de/*pelo Chomsky 
   The book of/*by Chomsky 
   ‘The book by Chomsky …’ 
 
However, the attribution of agent-naming by to CENs and authorship by to all SENs and 
RNs is too simplistic. The examples in (200) demonstrate that any SEN in Brazilian 
Portuguese that is compositionally derived from an underlying verbal predicate obligatorily 
takes the agent-naming preposition pelo, contra the generalisation in (169e). Furthermore, 
authorship PPs are entirely unavailable in this environment, as any appearance of de yields 
an internal argument interpretation (hence, de is marked with # rather than * below). 
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(200) a.  O exame pelo/#de médico … 
   The examination by/#of doctor  
   ‘The examination by the doctor …’ 
 b.  A investigação pelo/#de ministério público … 
   The investigation by/#of ministry public 
   ‘The investigation by the public ministry …’ 
 c.  Destruição pelo/#de alcoolismo …  
   Destruction by/#of alcoholism  
   ‘Destruction by alcoholism …’ 
 
Finally, the implicit argument control diagnostic (169f) provides another opportunity to 
highlight the similarities between CENs and SENs. Example (201) illustrates the generally 
accepted paradigm, in which CENs are unique in licensing infinitival purpose clause 
adjuncts within the nominal.  
 
(201) a.  The examination of the patient (in order to better understand 
the rare disease) took three hours. 
CEN 
 b.  The examination (*in order to better understand the rare 
disease) took three hours. 
SEN 
 c.  The examination (*in order to better understand the rare 
disease) was photocopied in green ink. 
RN 
 
However, as shown in (202), it is entirely possible to construct examples in which a 
compositionally derived nominalisation may license a purpose clause without projecting 
an internal argument. Crucially, as with CEN constructions, the interpretation of the 
purpose clause adjunct is tied to the goals of the nominal event, rather than to the verbal 
event of the matrix clause. For example, to renovate the old Parson’s estate in (202a) 
denotes the intentions of some subject relative to the construction event, and not to the 
bothering event. 
 
(202) a.  The ongoing construction next door (in order to renovate the old Parson’s 
estate) is bothering me.  
 b.  Years of deliberate humiliation (in order to punish him for an extra marital 
affair) are at the root of Howard's commitment issues. 
 
 120 
Furthermore, infinitival purpose clause adjuncts of the type in (202) are not generally 
available within the nominal system. As we see in (203), event-denotation is not enough to 
license implicit argument control. Note, the nominals below are those same nominals which 
were observed to license event and agent-oriented modification in section 4.3.1. 
 
(203) a.  Mary's deliberate mistake (*in order to take the company down) backfired.  
 b.  Bill's frequent infidelity (*in order to sabotage his marriage) is a major issue. 
 
In sum, SEN constructions that are overtly compositional pattern together with CENs 
regarding the nature of potential by-phrase adjuncts, as well as in their ability to license 
implicit argument control. Furthermore, the interpretation of any prenominal genitive 
argument appearing in compositional SENs is systematically predictable from the semantic 
class of the underlying predicate. 
 
4.3.3. A new take on aktionsart in the nominal domain 
 
At first glance, the distribution of (telic) aktionsart modifiers within the nominal domain 
does seem to isolate CENs from all other nominal types. As we see in (204), these modifiers 
are only licensed in the presence of a realised internal argument within the nominalisation 
(Grimshaw 1990). 
 
(204) a.  The examination of the patient (in five minutes) ... CEN 
 b.  The examination (*in five minutes) occurred at 10:00. SEN 
 c.  The examination (*in five minutes) was photocopied ... RN 
 
While the judgements in (204) are clear and uncontroversial, it is unclear what these 
judgements reveal about the internal composition of the nominalisations in question. 
Recent research into telicity (cf. Kratzer 2004; Ramchand 2008; Travis 2010) keys telic 
aktionsart modification to the presence or absence of culmination in the event in question. 
For many verbal predicates, the presence of an internal argument is a necessary condition 
for measuring out the event, and subsequently in valuing its telicity (see Tenny 1987, 1994). 
Predicates such as examine and interpret in examples (205a,b) are cases in point. Critically, 
without the internal argument, the event in question cannot achieve culmination, and as 
such telic aktionsart modification becomes unacceptable. We illustrate this latter 
observation with the generic constructions in (205c,d). 
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(205) a.  The doctor examined the patient (in five minutes).  
 b.  The students interpreted the poem (in three hours). 
 c.  Doctors often examine (*in five minutes). 
 d.  Students often interpret (*in three hours). 
 
Despite the observation that examine and interpret in (205c,d) do not license aktionsart 
modifiers, it would be negligent to assume outright that the verb examine in its active 
instantiation is compositionally distinct from the verb examine in its generic instantiation. 
Rather, the most natural route would be to link the variation in telicity to the variation in 
the syntactic environment in which the verb appears. Consider now the examples in (206); 
these nominalisations pattern uniformly with their verbal counterparts in (205) regarding 
telicity. The simplest account of these observations attributes the incompatibility of telic 
aktionsart modification in (205c,d) and (206c,d) to the same underlying cause: the lack of 
culmination in their predicative expressions.  
 
(206) a.  The doctor's examination of the patient (in five minutes).  
 b.  The students' interpretation of the poem (in three hours). 
 c.  The doctor's examination (*in five minutes). 
 d.  The students' interpretation (*in three hours). 
 
In fact, rather than supporting the view that CENs and SENs are distinguished by the 
presence/absence of an encoded event/event structure, the combined pattern in (205) and 
(206) can be most elegantly captured from the perspective that both CENs and SENs are 
compositionally derived from the same structured event. That is, the aktionsart-related 
properties of the nominalisation mirror those of the corresponding verbal predicate in both 
argument-projecting and argument-omitting contexts. Furthermore, there is no way to 
capture this pattern if SENs are always underlyingly referential; the pattern above would 
have to be analysed as coincidental. 
 The hypothesis that telic aktionsart modification is tied to culmination rather than 
to some distinctly verbal syntactic frame predicts that telic aktionsart modification will also 
be licensed in SENs derived from predicates that are specified for culmination inherently. 
The verb ascend appears to be such a predicate, in that telic aktionsart modifiers are 
licensed in both transitive and intransitive/generic constructions. 
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(207) a.  The group ascended the mountain (in three weeks). 
 b.  The group ascended (in three weeks). 
 c.  This group often ascends (in three weeks). 
 
Predictably, this wider availability of telic aktionsart modification in the verbal domain is 
mirrored in the nominal domain: both argument-projecting and argument-omitting 
instantiations of ascent may take a telic aktionsart modifier, as illustrated in (208). 
 
(208) a.  The group's ascent of the mountain (in three weeks) ... 
 b.  The group's ascent (in three weeks) ... 
 
Of course, the observations in (207) and (208) are equally amenable to an AS-centric 
account, given that ascend is underlyingly intransitive and thus appears in an intransitive 
syntactic frame. Thus, the AS-centric account would consider both of the nominalisations 
in (208) to be CENs: the CEN in (208a) involves an optional (applicative) verbal argument, 
while the CEN in (208b) is derived from the base intransitive argument structure of the 
verb ascend. Unfortunately, this strategy fails to account for the nominal constructions in 
(209), which involve the apparent licensing of telic aktionsart modifiers by nominals 
derived from arguably transitive verbs. 
 
(209) a.  The burglar's entry (in a matter of seconds) took the home-owner by surprise. 
 b.  This contestant's domination (in a matter of seconds) left every other participant 
demoralised. 
 
Unlike telic aktionsart modifiers, atelicity is not generally assumed to be tied to any one 
argument of the event in question. For example, Kratzer (2004) suggests that 'true' atelicity 
is borne by the atelic verb stem.16 Abstracting away from any one particular analysis of 
atelicity and atelic durative modifiers, the examples in (210) suggest that atelic aktionsart 
modification may in fact be more generally available to compositionally derived SENs than 
Grimshaw (1990) would lead one to believe. 
 
 
                                                 
16 For Kratzer, the telic interpretation is borne by virtue of the verb stem merging with an accusative case-
checking verbal functional head; atelic verb stems are altogether incompatible with this functional projection 
and must find alternative methods to check the structural case of any direct objects. 
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(210) a.  Observation for three to six weeks is standard procedure for any post-op 
patients. 
 b.  This investigation for three long months has been nothing short of a disaster.  
 
While integral to our understanding of derivational nominalisation, atelic aktionsart 
modification within the nominal domain will not receive a formal analysis within this 
dissertation. However, we will provide in section 4.4 an account of the puzzle presented by 
telic aktionsart modification in this section (see examples (205-209)), and will seek to 
provide a foundation upon which a full characterisation of atelic/durative modifiers in the 
nominal domain may be formalised. 
 
4.3.4. Summary 
 
Over the course of this chapter, we have employed the terminology 'compositionally 
derived' to describe SENs that are overtly derived from some verbal base (e.g., observation 
from observe). This term is meant to contrast with those SENs that may refer to events of 
some sort, but arguably have no predicative verbal base (i.e., event, trip, etc.). Recall that 
it is the view of the AS-centric approach to nominalisation that, in non-argument-projecting 
contexts, SENs are no different than RNs or otherwise canonical referential nouns 
regardless of their underlying root or internal composition. In the case of (Borer 2003, et 
seq.), compositionally derived SENs, non-compositional SENs and referential RNs all 
belong to the R-nominal category.  
 However, in the above sections we have seen some evidence to suggest that Borer's 
R-nominal category – and indeed Grimshaw’s (1990) category of SEN – may require a 
more fine-grained approach. Consider the table in (211), which summarises our findings 
from section 4.3.1-4.3.3. Note that, while some of the diagnostics remain unchanged from 
Grimshaw’s original typology, a number of tests have been explicitly reformed. First, we 
have altered the subjects as arguments diagnostic, based on the wide distribution of agent-
oriented modifiers in the nominal domain. We instead found that the interpretation of the 
prenominal subject in both SEN and CEN constructions is predictable from the semantic 
class of the underlying predicate. Furthermore, we found that SENs and CENs both 
systematically mirror their verbal counterpart in their (in)ability to license telic aktionsart 
modifiers, given varying culmination conditions. 
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(211)   Coerced 
DPs 
SENs CENs 
 a.  Event modification ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 b.  Agent-oriented modification ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 c.  Predictable prenominal interpretative effects  ✓ ✓ 
 d.  by-phrase adjuncts express agency  ✓ ✓ 
 e.  Compatibility with purpose clause adjuncts  ✓ ✓ 
 f.  Aktionsart predictable from verbal base  ✓ ✓ 
 
There is, of course, a glaring issue with this characterisation of nominal types: the label 
SEN in the table above is far too broad. According to Grimshaw’s (1990) typology and 
much subsequent work, SENs encompass not only event-denoting compositional 
nominalisations such as examination and inspection, but also non-derived NPs that refer to 
events, such as event and trip. However, we have only considered the former type of 
nominal in the above sections. When we examine the behaviour of non-derived event-
denoting NPs, we find that in all cases they act like our ‘coerced DPs’ category. That is, 
they will license the event and agent-oriented modification that we find generally 
throughout the English nominal system, but do not successfully participate in rest of the 
diagnostics. For example, in (212) we see that the nominal event may take an event modifier 
(as in (212a)) or an agent-oriented modifier (212b) but is incompatible with a purpose 
clause adjunct (212c). Furthermore, the interpretation of the genitive subject Sarah in 
(213a) is not predictable; the prenominal subject may refer to an event orchestrator, 
attendee, observer, or a range of other interpretations (see (213b-d)). 
 
(212) a.  The frequent event will start a bit late this week. 
 b.  Breaking plates at a Greek wedding is a deliberate and satisfying event.  
 c.  This event (*in order to break some plates) is never going to work. 
 
(213) a.  Sarah’s event lasted for three hours. 
 b.  ⇒ Sarah orchestrated an event that lasted three hours. 
 c.  ⇒ Sarah attended an event that lasted three hours. 
 d.  ⇒ Sarah watched on TV an event that lasted three hours. 
 
As such, we provide the amended table in (214), which now distinguishes between those 
nominalisations that are composed from events (SENCOMP) and those nominalisations which 
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simply refer to events, without any underlying verbal base (SENREF). Immediately, we find 
that compositionality defines two distinct natural classes of event-nominalisation.  
 
(214)   Non-compositional  Compositional  
   Coerced 
DPs 
SENREF SENCOMP CENs 
 a.  Event modification ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 b.  Agent-oriented modification ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 c.  Predictable prenominal 
interpretative effects 
  ✓ ✓ 
 d.  by-phrase adjuncts express 
agency 
  ✓ ✓ 
 e.  Compatibility with purpose 
clause adjuncts 
  ✓ ✓ 
 f.  Aktionsart predictable from 
verbal base 
  ✓ ✓ 
 
Note that we have thus far avoided discussing the obligatory internal arguments diagnostic 
from our characterisation. In fact, given the empirical summary in (214), it is the case that 
the only thing distinguishing CENs from SENsCOMP is the notion that the former obligatorily 
take an internal argument. However, the obligatory nature of this internal argument is tied 
to the disambiguating nature of Grimshaw’s suite of diagnostics; without a hard empirical 
divide between CENs and SENsCOMP, there is little motivation for a type of de-verbal 
nominalisation that obligatorily projects its argument structure. Instead, if we collapse our 
event nominal categories into either non-compositional or compositional as in (215), we 
may restate the CEN/SEN distinction as a matter of argument optionality (see (215g)). 
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(215)   Non-compositional event 
NP 
Compositional event 
nominalisation 
 a.  Event modification ✓ ✓ 
 b.  Agent-oriented modification ✓ ✓ 
 c.  Predictable prenominal 
interpretative effects 
 ✓ 
 d.  by-phrase adjuncts express 
agency 
 ✓ 
 e.  Compatibility with purpose 
clause adjuncts 
 ✓ 
 f.  Aktionsart predictable from 
verbal base 
 ✓ 
 g.  Event arguments optional  ✓ 
 
This notion of argument optionality in the nominal domain is in line with recent proposals 
by Vinokurova (2005) and Reuland (2011), who observe the systematic optionality of 
arguments in event nominalisations in a number of languages. Likewise, the paradigm 
above is entirely in line with the recent corpora studies of (Grimm and McNally 2013, 
2015), which find no empirical evidence for a distinction between CEN and SEN. In section 
4.4 we will attempt to formulate a formal analysis of English event nominalisation which 
captures the generalisations in (215), based on work by Adger (2012). 
 
4.3.5. A note on compositionality 
 
Before moving on, it will be useful to define compositionality as it applies to event-
denoting nominalisations. For our purposes, we will follow the notions of compositional 
meaning/content laid out in (Borer 2014; see also Marantz 2001). For Borer, a nominal may 
be considered compositional iff the meaning of the nominal itself may be computed from 
the meaning of its individual parts.17 Take, for example, the event nominalisation 
transformation, as in (216a). Here, we say that transformation is compositional, such that 
its meaning may be discerned from the semantic denotations of the verb transform and the 
                                                 
17 By compute, we mean that the semantic denotation of the resulting word may be incrementally recovered 
from the semantic denotation of each morpheme within the word. Given that we are concerned entirely with 
processes of de-verbal or de-adjectival nominalisation, we set aside the issue of compounds. 
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affix -ation (see (216b)). 
 
(216) a.  The transformation of the field by the linguist … 
 b.  =  ⟦-ation⟧ + ⟦√TRANSFORM⟧ 
 
Alternatively, the RN transformation in (217a) cannot be defined as compositional, since 
its meaning may not be computed from the meaning of its parts. Instead, it refers to a 
particular generative operation. For Borer, these types of nominals are assigned content as 
a single unit. 
 
(217) a.  The passive transformation is a hotly contested topic. 
 b. * =  ⟦-ation⟧ + ⟦√TRANSFORM⟧ 
 
Borer (2014) asserts the following generalisations regarding the availability of 
compositional and non-compositional meanings in nominalisations. 
 
(218) a.  Non-compositional content → no eventuality interpretation 
 b.  Eventuality interpretation → compositional content 
 
Put plainly, non-compositional meanings will never yield the kind of structured event 
interpretation that may give way to argument projection, aktionsart modification, and the 
suite of grammatical behaviours summarised in section 4.3.4. Contrastively, structured 
events will always give rise to compositional meaning. 
Recall now that, for Borer, any SEN construction – that is, any nominalisation 
without the projection of argument structure – is necessarily an R-nominal: it does not 
denote a structured event. Thus, SENs with compositional meaning occupy a tenuous place 
in Borer’s framework: their meaning is compositional in nature, but they do not express a 
structured eventuality such that any and all event arguments are obligatorily realised. Borer 
notes that, given the ambiguity between AS- and R-nominal status, it is expected that 
nominals such as transformation would yield both compositional and non-compositional 
meanings. Furthermore, it is implied that R-nominals may alternate freely between 
compositional and non-compositional meanings.  
It is this latter implication that presents a non-trivial problem for the claim we made 
in section 4.3.4 that event nominalisations are distinguished by whether or not their 
meaning is compositional. That is, if the R-nominal transformation may truly alternate 
 128 
between both compositional and non-compositional meanings, then our characterisation of 
nominal categories is far too constrained. However, this does not seem to be the case; as 
illustrated in (219), the realisation of any behaviour from the compositional side of (215) 
enforces a compositional meaning of transformation. The same is true of the ambiguous 
nominalisations proclamation (see (220)) and temptation (221). Note that, as expected, 
these generalisation hold despite the lack of argument structure in the nominal. 
 
(219) a.  A transformation in order to grow the company was recommended. 
 b.  = the act of transforming 
 c.  ≠ the generative operation 
 
(220) a.  The constant proclamation by the reverend quickly became stale. 
 b.  = the act of proclaiming 
 c.  ≠ what the reverend said 
 
(221) a.  Deliberate temptation in order to discern the true believers … 
 b.  = the act of tempting 
 c.  ≠ the instrument of temptation (e.g., alcohol is a real temptation for some) 
 
Given these observations, our characterisation of nominal types in (215) predicts Borer’s 
generalisations in (218) prima facie, without needing to rely on any stipulative rules on 
meaning-assignment and/or functional material within the nominal. 
 The final hurdle for our characterisation of event nominals comes from Grimshaw’s 
original observations; why don’t the SENs in section 4.2.1 exhibit the behaviour we have 
come to expect from compositionally derived event nominals? To illustrate, consider the 
examples in (222): the CEN licenses a purpose clause adjunct, and the RN predictably does 
not. However, given what we have seen in section 4.3.2, the ungrammaticality of the SEN 
in (222) is unexpected. 
 
(222) a.  The examination of the patient (in order to make a diagnosis) 
took three hours. 
CEN 
 b.  The examination (*in order to make a diagnosis) took three 
hours. 
SEN 
 c.  The examination (*in order to make a diagnosis) was 
photocopied in green ink. 
RN 
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We would like to suggest that the perceived ungrammaticality of (222b) is linked to the 
distinction between episodic and generic interpretations. Consider, for example, the pattern 
in (223) involving the verb read. When this predicate occurs in its transitive episodic 
aspect, it may realise an infinitival purpose clause adjunct (as in (223a)). In contrast, in the 
predicate’s intransitive episodic instantiation, the realisation of a purpose clause adjunct 
causes severe degradation (see (223b)). Crucially, we see in (223c) that the purpose clause 
adjunct becomes perfectly grammatical in the intransitive environment, so long as the 
utterance gives rise to a generic interpretation. 
 
(223) a.  Yesterday, John read a book (in order to diagnose his patient). 
 b.  Yesterday, John read (??/*in order to diagnose his patient). 
 c.  John often reads (in order to diagnose his patients). 
 
We propose that the episodic/generic distinction in the verbal domain has a direct analogue 
in the nominal domain in the form of the mass/count distinction, which is itself conditioned 
by the (in)definiteness of the derived noun (cf. Harley 2009). We note first that the 
ungrammatical SEN in (222b) includes the definite determiner, which enforces a mass 
reading of the nominal. If mass-denotation is akin to episodic interpretation, then the 
infelicity of a purpose clause adjunct is expected in the absence of an internal argument 
(see intransitive read in (223b)). In contrast, any compositionally derived event 
nominalisation selected by an indefinite determiner will constitute a count-noun, which is 
(by hypothesis) the nominal counterpart to a generic VP. As such, given the availability of 
a purpose clause in (223c), we predict that indefinite SENs will be similarly compatible 
with infinitival purpose clause adjuncts. This prediction is borne out in (224). 
 
(224) a.  An examination of the patient (in order to make a diagnosis) is 
highly recommended. 
CEN 
 b.  An examination (in order to make a diagnosis) is highly 
recommended. 
SEN 
 c.  An examination (*in order to make a diagnosis) will be 
photocopied in green ink. 
RN 
 
A similar suggestion is made by Harley (2009), who suggests that the mass/count 
distinction may be the underlying condition which determines whether an argument is 
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obligatory or not in a derived nominal. Furthermore, it may be possible to formally establish 
some semantic uniformity between the episodic/generic distinction and the mass/count 
distinction from the perspective of the mereological distinction between divisive and 
quantised reference (cf. Champollion and Krifka 2016). For expository reasons, we put 
(in)definiteness and its contribution to nominal argument structure aside for future research. 
 
4.4. An event-based analysis of English nominalisation 
 
Having motivated an E-centric perspective of English de-verbal nominalisation, this 
section will provide an analysis along the lines of Adger (2012). In section 4.4.1 we will 
analyse the syntax of event nominalisations, assuming the optionality of nominal 
arguments discussed in section 4.3.4, as well as a number of independent grammatical 
properties. Then in section 4.4.2 we will provide a compositional semantics for English 
event nominalisations. Finally, in section 4.4.3 we return to the diagnostics discussed in 4.3 
in order to make explicit their syntactic/semantic interactions with our event 
nominalisations. 
 
4.4.1. The syntax of nominalisation 
 
For our analysis of English event nominalisation, we follow Adger (2012) in assuming that 
nouns are never relational, and as such that any arguments within the nominal must be 
introduced by relational functional structure. To this end, we take the structure in (225) as 
our starting point, which includes some functional projection FP that introduces the 
nominal’s of-argument. 
 
(225)    NP/FP       
          
  
       
  NP FP      
  examination  
 
     
         
   F DP     
   of  
 
    
         
   D NP    
   the 
 
patient    
         
 
The structure in (225) is markedly different to the general structure assumed in the AS-
centric literature on nominalisation. Most blatantly, while the AS-centric approach assumes 
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an obligatory argument-predicate relation comparable to that of the verbal domain, the 
structure in (225) constitutes either (i) an adjunction construction, or (ii) an applicative 
construction in which the nominalisation appears as the specifier of the relational projection 
FP. We provide a toy AS-centric analysis of nominalisation in (226) in order to draw 
explicit comparisons. 
 
(226)    NP       
          
  
       
  N VP      
  -ation  
 
     
         
   V DP     
   examine  
 
    
         
   D NP    
   (of) the 
 
patient    
         
 
We argue that a number of crucial observations motivate the structure in (225) over the 
verbal structure in (226), including (i) the loss of idiosyncratic expression in nominal of-
arguments, (ii) the incompatibility between of-arguments and depictive secondary 
predicates, and (iii) the interpretative effects of coordination of nominal of-arguments. 
 Beginning with (i), we observe in (227) that verbs and their internal arguments may 
yield a variety of idiosyncratic interpretations that vary wildly from each other, with no 
apparent systematicity (Marantz 1984).  
 
(227) a.  John killed a man. 
 b.  John killed the audience. 
 c.  John killed the conversation. 
 d.  John killed his drink. 
 
It is observed by Punske (2012) that nominal gerunds do not share this idiosyncratic 
behaviour with their verbal counterparts. For example, while the verbal structure in (228) 
is ambiguous between a literal and idiosyncratic reading, only the literal interpretation is 
available to the nominal gerund construction in (229) (cf. Punske 2012:54-55). 
 
(228) a.  John killed the audience. 
 b.  ⇒ John is a mass murderer. 
 c.  ⇒ John is a talented comedian. 
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(229) a.  John’s killing of the audience led to an eventual sitcom. 
 b.  ⇒ John is a mass murderer, and they made a sitcom about his dark exploits. 
 c.  ⇏ John is a talented comedian, and he landed a gig on a sitcom. 
 
On the assumption that this kind of idiosyncratic meaning is borne from the close 
syntactic/semantic relationship between a verb and its internal argument, it follows that the 
same idiosyncratic relation does not occur in non-object relations (cf. Kratzer 1996 
concerning subject-verb relations). Given the contrast between (228) and (229), Punske 
argues that the of-arguments in nominal gerundive constructions are not ‘true’ internal 
arguments, but rather adjunct PPs. 
 We contend that this same phenomenon occurs in compositionally derived 
nominalisations as well. That is, contra Punske 2012, derived nominalisations also block 
all idiosyncratic interpretations of their of-argument that are otherwise available between 
the corresponding verb and its internal argument.18 For example, consider the verbal and 
nominal constructions in (230-232), involving murder, adoption, and creation.19 We find 
that, in the verbal domain, the predicates are all compatible with idiosyncratic 
arguments/interpretations. However, those same interpretations are barred in the nominal 
domain. 
 
(230) a.  John murdered his stepfather. 
 b.  John’s murder of his stepfather … 
 c.  John murdered that hamburger. 
 d. * John’s murder of that hamburger … 
 
(231) a.  Mary adopted a child. 
 b.  Mary’s adoption of a child … 
 c.  Mary adopted a low profile (in order to avoid detection). 
 d. * Mary’s adoption of a low profile (in order to avoid detection) … 
                                                 
18 Punske (2012) makes the claim that, unlike nominal gerunds, derivational nominalisations are based on the 
roots of verbs which do not give rise to idiosyncratic/idiomatic interpretation. We show in (230-232) that this 
claim is patently false. 
19 While murder and similar event-denoting nominals show no outward signs of morphological derivation, it 
has been observed that they may project nominal argument structure and require a compositional analysis (cf. 
Harley 2009). 
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(232) a.  Bill created a chair. 
 b.  Bill’s creation of a chair … 
 c.  Bill created a scene/a stink/an uproar. 
 d. * Bill’s creation of a scene/a stink/an uproar … 
 
Furthermore, some verbs such as redeem and suggest are idiosyncratically compatible with 
inherent reflexivity; they exhibit a particular idiosyncratic meaning in the environment of 
a reflexive anaphoric direct object. In (233-234) we see that these reflexive interpretations, 
much like the idiosyncratic interpretations in (230-232) above, disappear when the 
predicates undergo the nominalisation process. 
 
(233) a.  John redeemed the movie voucher. 
 b.  John’s redemption of the movie voucher … 
 c.  John redeemed himself. 
 d. * John’s redemption of himself … 
 
(234) a.  John suggested a new idea. 
 b.  John’s suggestion of a new idea … 
 c.  The idea (practically) suggested itself. 
 d. * The idea’s (practical) suggestion of itself … 
  
Moving on to (ii), we note that while depictive secondary predicates are compatible with 
direct objects within the VP, they are incompatible with DPs inside PPs, as well as DPs in 
indirect object/applicative contexts (cf. Williams 1980; Baker 1997; Pylkkänen 2002, 
2008). Thus, the potential nominal structures in (225) and (226) make different predictions 
regarding the realisation of secondary depictive predicates within the nominal domain. 
Namely, the AS-centric approach in (226) predicts that depictives will be generally 
available, given the verb-complement relation instantiated by argument-projecting 
nominalisations. Conversely, our novel structure in (225) predicts that depictives will be 
incompatible with the of-argument, assuming that FP is either a prepositional adjunct or a 
relational applicative projection. As illustrated in (235-236), depictive secondary predicates 
may not be predicated of the nominal of-argument, providing further support for our non-
VP structure. 
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(235) a.  John examined the patient drunk. 
 b.  John examined the patient drunk. 
 c.  John’s examination of the patient drunk … 
 d. * John’s examination of the patient drunk … 
 
(236) a.  John inspected the meat hungry. 
 b.  John inspected the meat raw. 
 c.  John’s inspection of the meat hungry … 
 d. * John’s inspection of the meat raw … 
 
Finally, the novel structure in (225) and the AS-centric structure in (226) make different 
predictions regarding the possible coordination constructions available inside the 
nominalisation. According to the AS-centric approach, of is considered an overt spell-out 
of structural case within the NP, and therefore does not constitute its own functional layer. 
Contrastively, in (225) of occupies some functional head F and takes as its complement the 
DP argument. Thus, while the AS-centric approach predicts a singular location for 
argument coordination in the nominalisation (namely at DP), our novel analysis predicts 
two, DP and FP, as illustrated in (237) and (238) below. Note that we assume in (237) the 
‘Last Resort’ hypothesis of Harley (2009) such that of is inserted as a post-syntactic 
disassociated morpheme, in order to satisfy a relevant well-formedness condition on 
nominal construction.20 
 
(237)    NP       
          
  
       
  N VP      
  -ation  
 
     
         
   V (of)-DP     
   examine  
 
    
         
   and    
    DP   DP   
         
  
      
   the patient   the student   
  
      
 
  
                                                 
20 See (Punske 2012) for the hypothesis that of undergoes P-incorporation into the predicative head of the 
derived nominalisation. 
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(238) a.   NP/FP       
          
  
       
  NP FP      
  examination  
 
     
         
   F DP     
   of  
 
    
         
   and    
    DP   DP   
         
  
      
   the patient   the student   
  
      
 
 
 b.   NP/FP      
          
  
       
  NP  FP     
  examination  
 
     
         
    and     
    FP   FP   
         
  
      
  F DP F DP  
  of   of    
           
    the patient   the student 
        
 
We observe in (239a,b) below that both structures in (238) are available in English. This 
observation does not prima facie rule out a VP analysis of event nominalisations, however; 
a proponent of the AS-centric view could conceivable employ a kind of gapping 
mechanism within the nominal derivation. Assuming gapping to be an instantiation of ‘low’ 
vP or VP coordination (in the sense of (Johnson 2009)), a structure such as that in (240) is 
one possible representation of coordination that seems to target nominal of. Note that, in 
this case, it is necessary to posit across-the-board head movement of the two verbs examine 
to the single nominal functional head. 
 
(239) a.  The barbarians’ destruction of Rome and Pompeii. 
 b.  The barbarians’ destruction of Rome and of Pompeii. 
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(240)    NP      
          
  
       
  N  VP     
  -ation  
 
     
         
    and     
    VP   VP   
         
  
      
  V DP V DP  
  examine   examine    
           
    (of) the patient   (of) the student 
        
 
However, the structure in (240) predicts that the complements within the conjoined VPs 
will only be constrained by the corresponding complementation possibilities observed in 
the verbal domain. For example, we note that many predicates are compatible with both 
DP and CP complements, such as suggestion and explanation. As we see in (241), such 
predicates permit coordination of non-matching complement types (e.g., DP and CP). Thus, 
if coordination of nominal of-arguments is in fact VP coordination plus gapping, we should 
expect that one conjunct may realise an of-marked DP while the other realises a CP. This 
is not the case; we see in (242) that coordination of an of-marked DP object with a that-
clause CP results in a highly marked/ungrammatical utterance. 
 
(241) a.  John suggested a new idea, and that Frank should be fired. 
 b.  Mary explained the problem, and that there wasn’t much time left. 
 
(242) a. ? John’s suggestion of a new idea and that Frank should be fired … 
 b. * Mary’s explanation of the problem and that there wasn’t much time left … 
 
Before moving on, we should consider the case of adverbial modification within the noun 
phrase. As discussed in Fu, Roeper, and Borer 2001, argument-projecting event 
nominalisations may license adverbial VP modifiers within the NP, as in (243) (see also 
chapter 3). While some of the examples in (243) are marked, there is a clear contrast 
between them and the sentential modifiers in (244). The authors argue that this pattern 
motivates an analysis of compositionally derived nominals, such that they include a 
functional VP layer, but not a TP (where sentential adverbials are assumed to adjoin). If 
this pattern does indeed hold, then it poses a non-trivial problem for the distinctly nominal 
analysis of event nominalisation pursued here.  
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(243) a. ? His explanation of the problem thoroughly to the tenants … 
 b. ? Protection of children completely from bad influence … 
 c.  Jane’s resignation so suddenly … 
 d.  His transformation into a werewolf so rapidly … 
 
(244) a. * His explanation of the problem presumably to the tenants … 
 b. * Protection of children unfortunately from bad influence … 
 
However, aside from the fact that the judgements in (243) have been contested, there are a 
number of issues with the nature of these adverbial modifiers. First, we note that the results 
of the adverbial modification diagnostics discussed in Fu, Roeper, and Borer (2001) are 
confounded by the inclusion of so in many of the examples. As we see in (245), adverbial 
phrases beginning with so are markedly better than bare adverbials in non-compositional, 
non-argument-projecting NP contexts. 
 
(245) a. ? John’s business trip so suddenly (made his wife suspicious). 
 b. * John’s business trip suddenly (made his wife suspicious). 
 c. ? Mary’s mistake so deliberately (may have bankrupted the company). 
 d. * Mary’s mistake deliberately (may have bankrupted the company). 
 e.  Bill’s infidelity so continuously (will certainly cost him his marriage). 
 f. * Bill’s infidelity continuously (will certainly cost him his marriage). 
 
Furthermore, to the extent that bare adverbial modifiers are acceptable in the nominal 
domain, they are acceptable with all compositional event nominals regardless of argument 
status. As illustrated in (246), it is possible to construct examples in which a bare adverbial 
modifier may appear with a non-argument-projecting event nominalisation. While these 
examples are far from perfect, they do show the necessary contrast with the sentential 
modifiers in (247). 
 
(246) a. ? Demonstration thoroughly in order to promote workplace safety … 
 b. ? The examination completely by Dr. Wilcox  … 
 c. ? The criminal’s evasion expertly … 
 d. ? Transformation rapidly should be avoided… 
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(247) a. * Demonstration presumably in order to promote workplace safety … 
 b. * Transformation unfortunately should be avoided … 
 
As such, any account of potential adverbial modification in the nominal domain must 
acknowledge that the role of argument structure to the distribution of adverbial modifiers 
is minimal. 
This concludes the introduction and motivation of a non-verbal syntax for 
argument-projecting event nominalisations. In the following section, we will formalise how 
these pieces of syntax compose semantically and will show that the uniform behaviour of 
all compositional event nominalisations is systematically predictable. 
 
4.4.2. Composing meaning in the nominal domain 
 
Having determined an appropriate syntactic structure for event nominalisations in section 
4.4.1, we turn now to matters of semantic composition. To that end, we note two separate 
aspects of event nominalisation that require an adequate explanation: (i) the 
compositionally eventive nature of the No, and (ii) the relational nature of FP.  
We take as our starting point the generalisation given in Borer (2014) concerning 
the requisite that any complex event nominal (AS-nominal) must embed an attested, bona 
fide verbal predicate. For Borer, this only applies to event nominalisations bearing 
argument structure, but we may extend this generalisation to all compositional event 
nominalisations regardless of argument-bearing properties. We furthermore adopt 
Moulton’s (2014) denotation of the nominalising affix, given in (248). Note that, for 
Moulton, this is but one of three ambiguous varieties of nominal affixes available in the 
nominal system. We will attempt to generalise it across all types of compositional event 
nominals. 
 
(248)   ⟦𝑛-ation⟧  =  λP〈e,vt〉.λe.∃x [P(e) ∧ Theme(e, x)]  
 
The nominal affix in (248) is a function from properties of individuals to properties of 
events (semantic type 〈e,vt〉, 〈v,t〉). Thus, when combined with a transitive verbal predicate 
such as construct, the affix will return the set of all construct events, and the internal 
argument will be made implicit by virtue of existential closure. To illustrate, we provide a 
preliminary derivation of the compositional event nominal construction in (249) below. 
Note, we abstract away from the notion of category-neutral roots; construct is inserted into 
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the derivation as a verb, thus trivially satisfying Borer’s generalisation that compositional 
event nominals embed attested verbs. This analysis is compatible with a framework 
employing category-neutral roots, on the assumption that roots are mere phonological 
indices. 
 
(249)   nP,  λe.∃x [construct(e) ∧ Theme(e, x)]   
    
 
     
         
   n-ation  V, construct    
  λP〈e,vt〉.λe.∃x [P(e, x)] λx.λe. construct(e) ∧  Theme(e, x)   
           
 
In fact, the generalisation that a compositional event nominal must embed an attested verb 
is entirely explained by the nature of the nominal affix. That is, while non-verbal event-
denoting nominals such as vision or metamorphosis may arguably encode an event variable 
in the Davidsonian sense (though that will not be our analysis of such NPs), there is no 
sense in which they are relational; they do not encode an argument variable. Thus, 
composition between the nominal affix in (248) and a non-verbal event predicate results in 
a type mismatch, as illustrated in (250): the nominal element n expects a predicate of type 
〈e,vt〉 but instead receives a predicate of type 〈v,t〉. 
 
(250)  *  nP    
    
 
     
         
   n-ation  vision    
  λP〈e,vt〉.λe.∃x [P(e, x)] λe. vision(e)   
           
 
Assigning the nominal affix the semantic denotation in (248) also provides some purchase 
on the question of why the vast majority of derived compositional event nominals come 
from transitive or unaccusative base predicates. While event nominalisations like ascent 
and descent are arguably unergative, they are generally analysed as entailing a scalar 
change-of-state of their subjects, thereby perhaps making them more amenable to an 
unaccusative analysis (for related discussion, cf. Beavers and Koontz-Garboden 2012, 
2015; Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2013). Likewise, while nominal gerunds (i.e., dancing, 
climbing, crying, grumbling) may be productively built from unergative roots, they are 
often assumed to require a separate analysis from derived nominalisations (cf. Punske 
2012), and therefore do not inform our analysis.  
In fact, only a handful of predicates present potential counter-examples to our 
analysis of the nominal affix, including those listed in (Harley 2009, ex. 15) as well as the 
 140 
involuntary bodily function nominals urination and defecation.  The fact that the underlying 
verbal predicates urinate and defecate are obligatorily intransitive presents a non-trivial 
problem to our denotation of n in (248). That is, the semantic denotation of these predicates 
is presumably incompatible with the nominal affix for the same reason that vision was 
incompatible in example (250); there is no internal argument for the existential quantifier 
to bind. However, although these nominals have the outward appearance of compositional 
event nominals, we observe in (251) that they exhibit none of the defining correlative 
properties. 
 
(251) a.  John defecated in order to play a prank on his boss. 
 b. * John’s defecation in order to play a prank on his boss … 
 c.  Bill urinated for a very long time. 
 d. * Bill’s urination for a very long time … 
 
We therefore contend that the predicates urinate and defecate, as well as other unergatives 
that display complex morphology of this sort, never undergo compositional event 
nominalisation. However, they may presumably enter the derivation as RNs and 
subsequently be coerced into an event interpretation. Before moving on, it is useful to note 
that the behaviour observed in (251) is equally mysterious from the AS-centric perspective, 
on the default assumption that unergative argument structure may feed nominal derivation. 
 What about more complex nominal structures, such as nominalisation? First, we 
will assume that nominal is itself simplex (despite obvious internal complexity) and enters 
the derivation as a property of individuals. We will furthermore assume (following Harley 
2009) that the verbalising affix -ise is one possible spell-out of a polysemous verbal 
functional head. For our purposes, we will assign v-ise the toy denotation in (252), following 
(Moulton 2014).  
 
(252)   ⟦𝑣-ise⟧  =  λP〈e,t〉.λx.λe. e is an event of making x P 
 
Thus, the derivation of nominalisation will proceed as in (253): the verbal element 
combines with the property denoted by nominal, rendering a causative verbal event with a 
single internal argument. Subsequently, combination with the nominal affix will 
existentially close the internal argument position, rendering the noun a predicate of 
nominalising event. 
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(253)   nP, λe.∃x [e is an event of making x nominal] 
    
 
     
         
   n-ation  vP    
  λP〈e,vt〉.λe.∃x [P(e, x)]    
           
     v-ise   nominal  
  
  λP〈e,t〉.λx.λe. e is an event 
 of making x P 
 λx. nominal(x)  
           
 
While our analysis of nominal derivation shares much with Moulton (2014), our analyses 
diverge on the derivation of argument-bearing event nominals. For Moulton, these invoke 
a separate nominal affix that does not close the internal argument position; essentially, his 
analysis is a restatement of Grimshaw’s (1990) three-way ambiguity in the domain of 
functional nominal heads. Instead, we will pursue an analysis in which the nominal 
structures in (249) and (253) are implicated in both argument-projecting as well as 
argument-omitting constructions. 
 We therefore adopt Adger’s (2012) position that seemingly relational nouns are not, 
in fact, relational; any semantic relation between the noun and some argument must be 
mediated by functional structure.21 For Adger, event nominal roots are only ever predicates 
of events (type 〈v,t〉), and thus the relation between the event nominalisation and the of-
argument may be mediated by a thematic functional head similar to that which one might 
find in the verbal domain. However, we have already invoked a thematic Theme relation 
within the nominal itself, and as such we will require a different strategy in order to relate 
the of-argument to the nominal event. To this end, we appeal to den Dikken’s (2006) 
proposal that of is a spell out of the nominal copula, and assign it a specificational 
semantics, such that its nominal argument specifies the Theme of some event. We thus re-
define the functional projection F from section 4.4.1 as the nominal applicative head 
ApplNOM in the spirit of Pylkkänen (2002, 2008), and provide its denotation in (254). 
 
(254)   ⟦Appl
NOM
⟧  =  λy.λe.∃x [Theme(e, x) ∧ x = y]  
 
We assume the denotation in (255) for the definite determiner, as well as the definition of 
predicate modification in (256) (Heim and Kratzer 1998). We provide a prototypical 
composition between an event nominalisation and the specificational applicative projection 
in example (257). In this case, the ApplNOMP comes to denote the set of construction events 
with some object x, and x is specified as the building. 
                                                 
21 See den Dikken (2006) for a related analysis concerning pseudo-partitive constructions. 
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(255)   ⟦the⟧  =  λP〈e,t〉: ∃! x[P(x)]. ιx[P(x)] 
 
(256)   If α is a branching node with daughters { β γ }, and ⟦β⟧, ⟦γ⟧  ∈ D〈v,t〉 (viz. are 
both predicate of events), then ⟦α⟧ =  λx. ⟦β⟧(x) ∧ ⟦γ⟧(x). 
 
(257)  ApplNOMP, λe.∃x[construct(e) ∧ Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[building(y)]  
    
 
     
         
   nP  ApplNOM'    
 λe.∃x[construct(e) ∧ Theme(e,x)]    
           
     ApplNOM   DP   
   λy.λe.∃x [Theme(e, x) ∧ x = y] ιy[building(y)] 
           
 
The effect of (257) is such that the building does not come to denote the bona fide internal 
argument of the nominal predicate. That is, the building never saturates a thematic 
argument position. Given our observations in section 4.4.1, this outcome is desirable; the 
of-argument and its nominal do not share the same thematic/idiosyncratic relationship that 
a direct object and its verb do (see in particular examples (230)-(234)). Under our analysis, 
the lack of idiosyncrasy is expected in the nominal domain, due to the increased degree of 
separation between the nominal and the of-DP.  
However, despite this increased separation, the resulting complex nominalisation is 
truth-conditionally equivalent to a construction in which the of-DP saturates a thematic 
position. That is, the event predicate denoted by ApplNOMP in (257) above can only 
truthfully apply to an event iff the Theme of that event is the building. Thus, the of-DP is 
obligatorily interpreted as the internal argument of the event nominalisation; this will 
provide some purchase on understanding the nature of aktionsart and culmination in event 
nominal constructions in the following section. Thus, assuming an eventive definite 
determiner as in (258)22, the semantics in (259) constitutes the complete denotation of the 
nominalisation the construction of the building. Specifically, the DP comes to denote the 
unique event of constructing some x, such that x is the building. 
 
(258)   ⟦the𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒⟧  =  λP〈v,t〉: ∃! e[P(e)]. ιe[P(e)] 
 
 
                                                 
22 This sort of eventive the is implicated in (Bruening 2013; Moulton 2014). 
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(259)   ⟦the construction of the building⟧  =  ιe.∃x[construct(e) ∧  
Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[building(y)]] 
 
Following on from our syntactic analysis of nominalisation in 4.4.1, we have given in this 
section a rough semantic outline of compositional event nominalisation that crucially does 
not rely on verbal structure. We have seen that the compositional interpretation is borne 
out of the nominal derivation independently of the projection of argument structure (namely 
by merge with a nominal functional affix). Furthermore, we have considered one method 
of allowing compositional event nominals to realise an argument without relying on verbal 
functional structure. In this case, we appealed to the applicative head ApplNOM, which takes 
a DP as its complement and relates it specificationally to the event nominalisation in its 
specifier. In the next section we will see how this analysis plays out regarding our 
diagnostic observations from section 4.3. 
 
4.4.3. The diagnostics in focus 
 
In this section we show that the diagnostic behaviour of compositional event 
nominalisations as outlined in the table in (260) follows naturally from our analysis in 
sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2. Given our proposal concerning the applicative nature of nominal of-
arguments, we may trivially put (260g) aside. 
 
(260)   Non-compositional event 
NP 
Compositional event 
nominalisation 
 a.  Event modification ✓ ✓ 
 b.  Agent-oriented modification ✓ ✓ 
 c.  Predictable prenominal 
interpretative effects 
 ✓ 
 d.  by-phrase adjuncts express 
agency 
 ✓ 
 e.  Compatibility with purpose 
clause adjuncts 
 ✓ 
 f.  Aktionsart predictable from 
verbal base 
 ✓ 
 g.  Event arguments optional  ✓ 
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Given that they are not isolated to compositionally derived event nominalisations, we may 
ignore the behaviours listed in (260a,b). Beginning with (260c), then, we note that the 
predictability of the prenominal genitive’s interpretation is expected on our account of 
compositional event nominals. If we adapt Higginbotham’s (1983) notion of the R relation 
to the environment of event nominalisations, we get something like the denotation in (261) 
for an eventive DP with a prenominal argument. 
 
(261)   ⟦DP𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒⟧  = ιe[NP(e) ∧ R(e, x)] 
 
The compositional event noun predicates the uniquely bound event variable in the usual 
manner, but R expresses an undefined relation between the event and some prenominal 
argument x. For Higginbotham, this R relation was contextually determined, such that in 
the environment of a possessive, R will spell out an ownership relation. It therefore follows 
that, in the case of compositional event nominalisations, the nature of the prenominal 
argument may be likewise context dependent (at least partly). For example, in chapter 2 (as 
well as section 4.3.4 of this chapter) we saw that the prenominal subject of event 
nominalisations may either be interpreted as an argument or as a possessor. We can account 
for this by proposing that this interpretative variability corresponds to an alternation in the 
spell out of the R predicate. Thus, in (262b) an ownership denoting R yields a possessor 
interpretation, while in (262c) an argument denoting R yields an argument interpretation. 
 
(262) a.  ⟦Congress' evacuation of the city⟧  = ιe[evacuate-the-city(e) ∧ R(e, Congress)] 
 b.  If R=ownership, then Poss(e, Congress) 
 c.  If R=argument, then Agent(e, Congress) 
 
However, the alternation in (262) was also observed in non-compositional event nominals 
(see examples (212,213) above), and therefore any variability between ownership and 
(perceived) argument status of the prenominal tells us little about the underlying derivation 
of the nominal. Instead, we found that compositional event nominals are unique in that the 
interpretation of any prenominal possessor – so long as an argumental interpretation is 
enforced – is predictable from the semantic class of the underlying verb. Recall that 
Smirnova (2015) distinguishes between agent-, patient- and shared-dominant nominal 
categories. If we utilise the notion of prominence (as in Grimshaw 1990), this behaviour is 
expected. For example, in the case of a patient-dominant nominalisation – such as 
destruction in (263) – any R role that instantiates an argument relation will obligatorily 
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realise a patient/theme, given the prominence of the patient/theme in the underlying 
representation of the predicate. 
 
(263)   ⟦the barbarians' destruction⟧  =  ιe[destruction(e) ∧ R(e, the-barbarians)] 
   (R=arg, barbarians=Theme) 
 
The opposite will hold true of agent-dominant nominals such as ascent, such that if R 
realises an argument, it will realise the Agent (being the most prominent). Note that nothing 
we have so far proposed hinges on the concept of hierarchical prominence; a suitable 
analysis could conceivably make use of a speaker’s encyclopaedic/real-world knowledge 
of a given predicate (in the sense of Marantz 1997; Harley and Noyer 1999). In this case, 
some kind of frequency-of-use effects would have to establish preference for one R 
interpretation over the other. We make no effort here to determine the most optimal analysis 
of R and its interpretation, but rather note that an underlying event variable in compositional 
event nominals provides a natural explanation for the recoverability of a predicate’s most 
salient participant. 
Moving on to (260d), we find that the argumental status of by-phrase adjuncts in 
the nominal domain is predictable on the assumption that by-phrases minimally require an 
open event variable (contra Bruening 2013). That is, we assign the preposition byAG the 
simplistic denotation in (264); the preposition selects a nominal argument and asserts that 
argument as the Agent of some event e. This flavour of by may seemingly be contrasted 
with author-denoting by, as in (265). 
 
(264)   ⟦𝑏𝑦AG⟧  =  λx.λe. Agent(e, x) 
 
(265)   ⟦𝑏𝑦AUTH⟧  =  λy.λx. Author(x, y) 
 
Agentive by will thus be compatible with any compositional event nominal, regardless of 
argument-structure. Consider the event nominalisation in (266), in which examination 
occurs without an of-argument. Here, byAG will recover the Agent of the event variable 
present in the underlying derivation of the noun, as in (267).  
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(266)     nP2     
          
  
       
   nP1 by the doctor   
    
 
     
         
   n V     
   -ation examine 
 
    
         
 
(267) a.  ⟦nP1⟧  =  λe.∃x[examine(e, x)] 
 b.  ⟦nP2⟧  =  λe.∃x[examine(e, x) ∧ Agent(e, ιy[doctor(y)])] 
 
The same is true of the more complex, argument-bearing event nominalisation in (268); 
here, the functional structure responsible for the internal of-argument has no bearing on the 
possibility of an agentive by-phrase (see (269)). 
 
(268)     ApplNOMP2     
          
  
       
   ApplNOMP1 by the doctor   
    
 
     
         
   nP ApplNOM'     
   examination      
         
    ApplNOM DP    
    of the patient    
           
 
(269) a.  ⟦Appl
NOM
′⟧  =  λe.∃x [Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[patient(y)]] 
 b.  ⟦Appl
NOM
P1⟧  =  λe.∃x[examine(e) ∧ Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[patient(y)]] 
 c.  ⟦Appl
NOM
P2⟧  =  λe.∃x[examine(e) ∧ Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[patient(y)] 
∧  Agent(e, ιz[doctor(z)])]  
 
Moving on to purpose clause adjuncts, we adopt a relatively standard Hintikkan semantics 
for our infinitives (cf. von Fintel and Heim 2011), but we follow Nissenbaum (2005) in 
relativising the goal expressed by the purpose clause to the volitional matrix event rather 
than to any one event participant. We take INT to represent the function from events e and 
worlds w to the set of worlds w’ compatible with the goals relative to event e (Stephenson 
2010a; Grano 2017a).23 Example (270) provides a preliminary denotation for purpose 
                                                 
23 The notion of goals or intentions relative to events rather than individuals will be discussed at length in 
chapter 6. 
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clauses relative to events. 
 
(270)   ⟦(in order) to P⟧w  =  λe. ∀w'∈ INT𝑒,𝑤: ∃e'[P(e') = 1 in w'] 
 
Stating goals as relative to events provides an avenue for understanding why purpose 
clauses are only compatible with compositional event nominalisations, and not with non-
compositional/result nouns. As illustrated in (271a), the purpose clause has an open event 
variable from which the set of compatible worlds may be determined. In (271b) we have 
the denotation for an argument-bearing event nominalisation, which also has an open event 
position. As such, the two phrases may combine via predicate modification, as in (271c). 
The entire nominal comes to denote the set of expression events such that artistic freedom 
is an argument, and in all worlds compatible with the goals of the expression event, PRO 
becomes famous. A suitable adjunct control theory will be required to link the subject of 
expression with the embedded PRO. 
 
(271) a.  ⟦(in order) to become famous⟧w  =  λe. ∀w'∈ INT𝑒,𝑤:  
∃e'[become-famous(e') = 1 in w' ∧ Agent(e') = PRO] 
 b.  ⟦expression of artistic freedom⟧w =  λe.∃x[express(e)  
∧ Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[artistic-freedom(y)]]  
 c.  ⟦expression of artistic freedom (in order) to become famous⟧w =  
λe.∃x[express(e) ∧ Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[artistic-freedom(y)] ∧ ∀w'∈ INT𝑒,𝑤: 
∃e'[become-famous(e') = 1 in w' ∧ Agent(e') = PRO]   
 
By hypothesis, non-compositional nominalisations are not derived from anything that 
contributes a Davidsonian event variable, despite any apparently eventive interpretations. 
Thus, their incompatibility with purpose clause adjuncts is expected on this account. 
 In order to adequately account for the telic properties of argument-bearing event 
nominalisations (as in (260f)) we adopt a version of Kratzer’s (2004) culminate predicate, 
and propose that – in the domain of compositional event nominalisation – the ApplNOM 
functional head is the locus of telicity.24 We may therefore invoke a telic version of ApplNOM 
which includes a culmination condition, as in (272).25  
                                                 
24 For additional discussion, see (Borer 2005b; Ramchand 2008; Travis 2010; Moulton 2014). 
25 The notion of ApplNOM as the location of culmination fits with contemporary analyses of verbal aktionsart 
(see above), such that structural case is often packaged together with a [+telic] syntactic feature that carries 
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(272)   ⟦Appl
NOM-TELIC
⟧  =  λy.λe.∃x [Theme(e, x) ∧ x = y  
∧ ∀z [z ≤ x → ∃e'[ e' ≤ e ∧ Theme(e',z)]] 
 
According to (272), the ApplNOM head asserts a Theme relation between an event e and an 
existentially quantified entity x, and includes the now familiar specificational relation 
between x and y. Furthermore, it asserts that for every z such that z is a sub-part of x, there 
is a sub-event e’ of e, such that z is an argument of e’. This denotation has the effect that x 
now measures out e overtly, such that every relevant part of x stands in an argument-
predicate relation with e. Furthermore, it provides an upper bound for the event e, thereby 
specifying the point of event culmination. For example, consider the nominalisation in 
(273); the applicative argument the factory provides the scale by which completion of the 
inspection event may be judged. 
 
(273)  ⟦inspection of the factory⟧
=  λe.∃x[inspect(e) ∧ Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[factory(y)]  
∧ ∀z [z ≤ x → ∃e'[ e' ≤ e ∧ Theme(e', z)]]] 
 
We therefore propose that telic aktionsart modifiers such as in five minutes carry a 
selectional restriction, such that the event they modify must contain a culmination condition 
of the sort in (273). As such, any nominalised verb compatible with a culmination condition 
will only license telic modifiers in the presence of ApplNOM, and subsequently in the 
presence of an of-DP. Note that this proposal runs contrary to the argument made in 
Moulton (2014), which proposes that telic modifiers are specifically licensed by a verbal 
functional aktionsart head. Keying the availability of such modifiers to a particular 
semantic condition rather than to one specific verbal layer allows us to generalise across 
categorial domains. It furthermore allows us to accurately predict the distribution of telic 
modifiers in nominals that do not realise of-arguments. That is, if the verb itself packages 
a culmination condition (e.g., in the case of ascend), then telic aktionsart modifiers will be 
available in corresponding event nominal constructions without the need for an ApplNOM 
head. 
 Thus, we have considered each of the diagnostics in (260) that isolate 
                                                 
the culmination condition (or with a quantisation parameter, in the case of (Borer 2005a, 2005b)). If we 
consider ApplNOM (and its spell-out of) to be an assigner of structural genitive case, then its role regarding 
telicity in eventive contexts is not surprising. 
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compositionally derived event nominalisation, and have demonstrated how our analysis 
may account for each one. In each case, the relevant diagnostic was found to be tied to the 
underlying event variable present in the nominal derivation, rather than to any specific 
verbal functional material. As such, we derived simultaneously the grammatical behaviours 
of both argument-projecting and argument-omitting event nominalisations. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have formulated a system of event nominalisation from which to address 
the control-like properties observed in the nominal domain in chapter 2. We began with a 
theoretical survey of contemporary nominalisation theory and determined that the majority 
of analyses are ‘AS-centric’: they rely on the presence/absence of argument structure within 
the noun to derive the nominal’s category and subsequent behaviours. We then observed a 
number of empirical issues with Grimshaw’s original typology and its subsequent 
instantiations. Specifically, it was found that the behaviour of compositionally derived 
simple event nominals renders a purely AS-centric approach to nominalisation untenable. 
We thus reformulated the nominal typology, such that compositionality – not argument 
structure – was at the heart of the nominalisation process. 
 We then proposed a syntax and semantics for English deverbal nominalisation that 
highlighted the importance of the nominal’s composition from an underlying event, as well 
as the optional nature of argument-projection in this domain. To the latter point, we defined 
an applicative nominal projection in line with Adger’s (2012) analysis of relational nouns, 
which borrowed a distinctively copular flavour from den Dikken’s (2006) account of 
pseudo-partitives. We found that this analysis adequately explained the behaviour of 
compositional event nominalisations in both argument-projecting and argument-omitting 
contexts. 
 The ideas put forward in this chapter are, admittedly, inadequate in explaining 
derivational nominalisation beyond the limited scope of the examples discussed above. 
Indeed, the number of questions that remain unanswered could themselves motivate an 
additional dissertation. What is the nature of durative/atelic PP modifiers, and how can we 
account for their distribution within event nominalisations? Is a nominal applicative 
projection of the type discussed above implicated in other, less event-oriented English NP 
constructions, or in event/non-event NP environments cross-linguistically? If 
compositionality is truly at the heart of nominal derivation, then where do nominals that 
have compositional morphology but non-compositional meaning fit in? For the sake of 
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keeping this thesis in focus, we must regrettably leave these questions behind. 
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5. INHERENT CONTROL: ASPECTUAL PREDICATES AND THE 
RAISING/CONTROL AMBIGUITY26 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will provide an adequate explanation for the uniform behaviour of 
aspectual control constructions in nominal and infinitival complement environments, as 
observed in chapter 2. To this end, we will utilise the compositional event nominalisation 
framework developed in chapter 4, and will furthermore take account of the so-called 
raising/control ambiguity that aspectual predicates exhibit (cf. Perlmutter 1970). Our 
primary goal will be to account for the three generalisations put forward in chapter 2 
(examples (90-92), repeated below) as they apply to aspectual exhaustive control 
predicates.   
 
(274)   Control into NP  
   Exhaustive control predicates enforce exhaustive control into de-verbal, 
eventive NP complements; partial control predicates show no control into NP 
complements. 
 
(275)   Temporal orientation in NP 
   The temporal properties of NP complements mirror those of the corresponding 
clausal complement, and temporal orientation (where applicable) is identical 
across these complements. 
 
(276)   Overt nominal subjects under control 
   Complex event nominal complements to PC predicates may project an Agent 
either as a genitive prenominal argument or in a by-phrase adjunct; complex 
event nominal complements to EC predicates may not project an Agent in 
either position, though they may name an abstract possessor in the genitive 
prenominal position. 
 
In section 5.2 we provide a brief historical overview of the raising/control ambiguity, with 
a particular focus on recent attempts to reduce both alternants to a single phenomenon. 
Then in 5.3 we take up Pustejovsky and Bouillon’s (1995) claim that the raising/control 
                                                 
26 This chapter is based partly on work carried out in collaboration with Gregor Williamson. 
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ambiguity can be reduced to the (anti-)causative alternation; we demonstrate that aspectual 
predicates behave like (anti-)causative predicates regarding all relevant diagnostics. In 
section 5.4 we provide a novel proposal for aspectual predicates that combines an (anti-
)causative syntax and a reduced semantic representation in the spirit of Piñango and Deo 
(2016). We see in section 5.5 that the proposal put forward correctly derives the 
generalisations in (274-276), and furthermore accounts for the availability of non-canonical 
(event/instrument-denoting) subjects in aspectual constructions. We conclude in section 
5.6. 
 
5.2. The raising/control ambiguity 
 
5.2.1. Perlmutter (1970) 
 
In his paper ‘The two verbs begin’, Perlmutter (1970) proposes that English aspectual 
predicates such as begin, continue and finish are ambiguous between raising and control 
instantiations. For Perlmutter, this meant that aspectual verbs could be either (i) intransitive 
verbs that select a clausal complement, thereby yielding a raising construction, or (ii) 
transitive verbs that trigger an Equi-NP Deletion transformation, thus yielding a control 
structure. 
 Perlmutter’s arguments for a raising analysis of aspectual predicates are robust, and 
generally demonstrate that the matrix subject occupies a non-thematic position. First, he 
observes that the aspectual predicate begin may take expletive or sentential subjects, as in 
(277). This is also true of the canonical raising predicate seem (see (278a)), but impossible 
with a typical control predicate, such as want (278b). 
 
(277) a.  That Mary was promoted began to annoy Bill. 
 b.  It began to rain. 
 c.  There began to be a commotion. 
 
(278) a.  That Mary was promoted seemed to annoy Bill. 
 b. * That Mary was promoted wanted to annoy Bill. 
 
Likewise, begin displays so-called active/passive synonymy. That is, the active construction 
in (279a) is synonymous with the construction involving a passivised embedded clause in 
(279b). Again, this observation is in line with the behaviour of canonical raising predicates 
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(280) and contrasts sharply with control predicates, which do not exhibit active/passive 
synonymy (see (281)). 
 
(279) a.  The clown began to annoy Joe. 
 b.  Joe began to be annoyed by the clown. 
 
(280) a.  The clown seemed to annoy Joe. 
 b.  Joe seemed to be annoyed by the clown. 
 
(281) a.  The clown wanted to annoy Joe. 
 b. # Joe wanted to be annoyed by the clown. 
 
The final diagnostic that supports a raising analysis of aspectual predicates concerns 
idiomatic expressions. Specifically, Perlmutter shows that idiom chunks in the subject 
position of aspectual verbs retain idiomatic meaning, as in (282). Once again, this is also 
true of canonical raising verbs (283a) and impossible in control constructions (283b). 
 
(282) a.  Heed began to be paid to urban problems. 
 b.  Headway began to be made toward a solution. 
 
(283) a.  Headway seemed to be made toward a solution. 
 b. * Headway wanted to be made toward a solution. 
 
Having motivated a raising analysis for the aspectual predicate begin, Perlmutter then 
singles out a number of constructions involving begin that are seemingly incompatible with 
a raising analysis. First, he points to the fact that aspectual predicates can, themselves, take 
NP objects (see (284a)). Furthermore, begin in such examples can undergo passivisation 
and therefore must have an external theta-role (see (284)). 
 
(284) a.  Sam began the job. 
 b.  The job was begun by Sam. 
 
Perlmutter notes that this conclusion is corroborated by the fact that begin may participate 
in agentive nominalisation formation. As we see in (285a), begin yields the agentive 
nominal beginner; an equivalent -er nominalisation is unavailable with typical raising verbs 
(285b). 
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(285) a.  Peter is a beginner. 
 b. * Peter is a seemer. 
 
Perlmutter also points to examples such as in (286) to motivate a control analysis of begin. 
In these utterances, we see that begin may be embedded under a subject- or object-control 
predicate. For Perlmutter, the grammaticality of these examples can only be understood if 
begin selects a thematic animate subject. Thus, begin in these examples cannot be a raising 
predicate.27 
 
(286) a.  I tried to begin to work. 
 b.  I forced Tom to begin to work. 
 
Furthermore, Perlmutter contended that aspectual predicates are compatible with the 
imperative form, as in (287a). We see in (287b) that typical raising verbs are ruled out in 
this environment, confirming that imperative formation requires an animate subject. 
 
(287) a.  Begin to work! 
 b. * Seem to work! 
 
The final diagnostics that Perlmutter appeals to in order to motivate a control analysis of 
aspectual verbs is the distribution of do so anaphora in begin constructions. Namely, when 
begin takes an animate subject, do so may replace begin in a coordination construction, as 
in (288a). However, in (288b) we find that when begin takes an inanimate subject, do so is 
no longer licensed. Perlmutter took these examples to be instantiations of control and 
raising, respectively. 
 
(288) a.  Warren tried to begin to work, and Jerry tried to do so too. 
 b. * Oil began to gush from the well, and water did so too. 
 
While the raising portion of Perlmutter’s argumentation remains virtually undisputed, there 
have been a number of issues raised concerning the motivation behind a control analysis of 
aspectual predicates. For example, Newmeyer (1975) notes that aspectual predicates are 
transparent in terms of selectional restrictions when embedded under control verbs, despite 
                                                 
27 Perlmutter’s assumptions here are based on the conditions under which Equi-NP Deletion may trigger.  
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Perlmutter’s assumption that such aspectual predicates must select an animate subject (see 
(286) above). Consider the examples in (289). We see in (289a,b) that remember may 
embed the aspectual predicate keep, and keep may likewise embed forget. However, we 
find in (289c) that remember may not embed forget. The critical example in (289d) 
demonstrates that, despite (289a,b), the ungrammaticality of (289c) is still present when 
keep intervenes between remember and forget, thus suggesting that keep is transparent in 
this environment (Newmeyer 1975:33-34).28 
 
(289) a.  I remembered to keep working. 
 b.  I kept forgetting what my mother told me. 
 c. * I remembered to forget what my mother told me. 
 d. * I remembered to keep forgetting what my mother told me. 
 
Fukuda (2007) furthermore notes that the usefulness of Perlmutter’s er-nominalisation 
diagnostic (see (285)) is questionable. Specifically, Fukuda points out that the most salient 
interpretation of beginner is not in line with a control analysis. That is, the most salient 
reading of John is a beginner is such that John is a novice at some particular trade/skill, not 
that he is someone who begins (something).29 Counter-examples such as these have 
motivated a number of alternative contemporary accounts of the raising/control ambiguity, 
such as ‘raising only’ analyses (see Hornstein 1999; Boeckx and Hornstein 2003, 2004 on 
the MTC). In the following section we will discuss one such alternative, in which aspectual 
predicate constructions are asserted to be invariably mono-clausal. 
 
5.2.2. The mono-clausal hypothesis 
 
As an alternative to the lexical ambiguity proposed in Perlmutter’s (1970) original work, 
Fukuda (2007) offers an analysis of the raising/control ambiguity in aspectual constructions 
that relies on variable syntactic positions in which the predicates may be inserted. 
Specifically, Fukuda argues that the raising/control ambiguity corresponds to the 
realisation of the aspectual predicate either above or below the projection that introduces 
the external argument. To illustrate, consider the structure in (290); according to Fukuda, 
                                                 
28 Fukuda (2007) generalises this claim across the class of aspectual predicates. For expository reasons, we 
cannot fully investigate the selectional transparency of all aspectual verbs, though we see in section 5.3 that 
keep is systematically unique in its behaviour compared to other aspectual predicates. 
29 Fukuda furthermore makes the stronger claim that other aspectual predicates fail to undergo er-
nominalisation entirely, noting continue and keep specifically.  
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any aspectual predicate realised at or above XP will be interpreted as raising. Likewise, any 
aspectual predicate realised at or below YP will be interpreted as control. We assume here 
that the external argument is introduced in the specifier of a non-eventive Voice projection 
(Kratzer 1996). 
 
(290)   XP        
           
  
        
  SpecXP X       
          
          
             X VoiceP      
          
          
    SpecVoiceP Voice'     
          
          
     Voice YP    
          
          
                    SpecYP  Y'   
           
          
       Y …  
 
 
Fukuda motivates this analysis based on the syntactic properties of aspectual constructions 
across several different languages, including German (Wurmbrand 2001), Japanese 
(Fukuda 2006) and Romance (Cinque 2003). Crucially, Fukuda’s hypothesis in (290) 
allows for significant variability in where the aspectual predicate is realised in both its 
raising and control instantiations. For example, Wurmbrand (2001) motivates an analysis 
of German aspectual predicates such that they may be realised as either the head of a lexical 
VP (yielding a control interpretation) or in a functional projection above (certain) modal 
projections (yielding a raising interpretation). To illustrate, consider first the examples in 
(291). We see in (291a) that the unambiguous raising verb scheinen cannot be embedded 
beneath a modal. Conversely, in (291b) we find that this same raising verb can itself embed 
a modal verb. 
 
(291) a. * Morgen dürfte/muß er die Stadt zu verlassen scheinen. 
   tomorrow might/must he the town to leave seem 
   ‘He will/might/must seem to be leaving the town tomorrow.’ 
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 b.  Sie schien zu Hause arbeiten zu müssen/können. 
   she seemed to home work to must/can 
   ‘She seemed to have to/be able to work at home.’ 
 
Conversely, predicates that show the raising/control ambiguity, including the German 
verbs versprechen (promise) and drohen (threaten), may be embedded beneath a modal 
predicate (as in (292)). However, in these environments, Wurmbrand argues that the 
interpretation of the predicate is unambiguously a control reading. This observation is 
expected on a structural account of the raising/control ambiguity; when an ambiguous verb 
is embedded beneath a modal it must be realised in its control location, on the assumption 
that the raising location is at or above the hierarchical level of modal predicates. 
 
(292)   Er  muß  ein guter  Vater zu werden versprechen/drohen. 
   He must a good father to become promise/threaten. 
   ‘He must promise/threaten to become a good father.’ 
 
Fukuda (2006) motivates a similar analysis of the raising/control ambiguity in Japanese 
aspectual predicates. However, for Fukuda, neither the raising nor the control instantiations 
of Japanese aspectual predicates occur as lexical verbal heads. Instead, aspectual ‘raising’ 
verbs occur in ‘High Aspect’, which projects above VoiceP, whereas aspectual ‘control’ 
verbs occur in ‘Low Aspect’, a functional projection that intervenes between the lexical VP 
and the non-eventive VoiceP. 
 In a similar vein, Grano (2012, 2015) promotes a framework of exhaustive control 
predicates such that aspectual predicates always occupy a functional layer above VP (in the 
spirit of Cinque 2006).30 Consider, for example, the toy derivation of Mary began to inspect 
the factory in (293), based on Grano’s mono-clausal analysis. We find that begin appears 
in an independent projection above the verbal subject (specifically in AspectINCEPTIVE), and 
Mary A-moves up to the specifier of TP. Crucially for Grano, (293) constitutes the 
underlying structure in both apparent raising and control instantiations of the aspectual 
verb. 
 
 
                                                 
30 Grano pursues a weaker version of Cinque’s ‘functional head’ hypothesis here, such that he maintains that 
aspectual predicates such as start are inherently lexical (in order to account for their DP-selecting aspect). As 
such, they are potentially ambiguous between a lexical V and a functional head in the inflectional layer of the 
clause. 
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(293)   TP       
          
  
       
    DP1  T      
  Mary  …      
     beginP     
  
             
        
    begin VoiceP    
         
         
     t1 Voice   
          
         
      Voice VP  
         
         
        
to inspect the 
factory 
 
 
Given that our interests in this thesis are primarily concerned with the behaviour of 
exhaustive control predicates in nominal complement environments, we will not pursue an 
in-depth analysis of the mono-clausal hypothesis. Most importantly, however, we note that 
for the mono-clausal hypothesis, any similarity between nominal and infinitival 
complement constructions is prima facie accidental. We will observe throughout this 
chapter that this is an undesirable consequence: the ambiguity between raising and control 
in infinitival environments has a natural parallel in the (anti-)causative alternation that may 
be observed in aspectual verb constructions in nominal complement environments. 
 
5.3. Aspectual verbs and the causative alternation 
 
In this section we explore the claims made in Pustejovsky and Bouillon (1995) that the 
causative alternation is at the heart of the raising/control ambiguity in aspectual predicates. 
Specifically, we will pursue the hypothesis that the aspectual transitivity alternation in 
example (294) is at its core an (anti-)causative alternation, of the sort found with simplex 
causative verbs such as break in (295). 
 
(294) a.  The official began the London marathon. 
 b.  The London marathon began. 
 
(295) a.  The boy broke the vase. 
 b.  The vase broke. 
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In section 5.3.1 we review the core empirical generalisations that characterise (anti-
)causative predicates. Then in 5.3.2 we confirm that, in all relevant cases, aspectual 
predicates conform to those generalisations. Note that in this section we will be primarily 
concerned with aspectual predicates in nominal complementation constructions; the 
underlying causative alternation will be generalised to the domain of infinitival 
complementation in section 5.4.3. 
 
5.3.1. The core empirical paradigm 
 
In order to isolate the distinctive qualities of the (anti-)causative alternation (as in (296a,b)), 
it will be useful to compare it with other types of transitivity alternations, such as the 
passive in (296b), and the generic middle construction in (296c). 
 
(296) a.  John broke the vase. (active) 
 b.  The vase broke. (anti-causative) 
 c.  The vase was broken. (passive) 
 d.  This vase breaks easily. (generic middle) 
 
Much of the investigation into the (anti-)causative alternation and its related transitivity 
alternations has been driven by the intuition that the intransitives in (296c,d) retain their 
external argument at some level of representation, while the anti-causative in (296b) does 
not. It has likewise been argued that a host of diagnostic tests support this intuition (cf. 
Manzini 1983; Roeper 1987; Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995; Reinhart 2000; Schäfer 
2008, a.o.). One such diagnostic is the ability of the intransitive to realise its subject overtly. 
For example, in the passive construction in (297a) we see that an implicit subject may 
optionally be realised in a by-phrase adjunct. The same is not true of anti-causatives; we 
see in (297b) that an agent-naming by-phrase is not licensed in this environment. 
 
(297) a.  The vase was broken (by John). (passive) 
 b.  The vase broke (*by John). (anti-causative) 
 
Furthermore, we find that passives differ from anti-causatives in that the former may take 
purpose clause adjuncts (as in (298a)), as well as agent-oriented adverbial modifiers (299a). 
We observe in (298b) and (299b) that these adjuncts are impossible in anti-causative 
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constructions.31 
 
(298) a.  The vase was broken [(in order) to erase any incriminating 
evidence]. 
(passive) 
 b. * The vase broke [(in order) to erase any incriminating 
evidence]. 
(anti-causative) 
 
(299) a.  The vase was broken (deliberately/on purpose). (passive) 
 b.  The vase broke (*deliberately/*on purpose). (anti-causative) 
 
Unlike passives, generic middle constructions pattern much like anti-causative 
constructions concerning the above diagnostics: they cannot license subject by-phrases, nor 
can they take purpose clause adjuncts. However, as we see in (300), both passives and 
middles may take small clause adjuncts, such as after-PPs. When these adjuncts are 
realised, the covert small clause subject (notated below as PRO) may be co-referential with 
the implicit subject of the matrix intransitive (Stroik 1992; Reinhart 2000). According to 
Reinhart, the availability of non-obligatory control in these environments is indicative of 
an implicit matrix subject. As illustrated in the examples below, a PRO subject in the small 
clause adjunct may be interpreted as the implicit breaker associated with the matrix 
causative. 
 
(300) a.  The vase will be broken [after PRObreaker chipping away at it]. (passive) 
 b.  This vase will break easily [after PRObreaker chipping away at 
it]. 
(generic middle) 
 
When we turn to anti-causative constructions, we find that this manner of co-reference is 
no longer possible. For example, we see in (301) that even when a small clause adjunct is 
licensed, its subject cannot co-refer with the implicit subject of the anti-causative verb; it 
must be interpreted arbitrarily. For the authors above, the unavailability of non-obligatory 
control here follows from the complete absent of a matrix agent, implicit or otherwise.32 
                                                 
31 Schäfer (2009) suggests that the availability of purpose clauses in passives is indicative of a control relation 
between the implicit subject of the passivised verb and a covert PRO subject in the infinitival adjunct, cf. 
(Williams 1985) for relevant criticisms. 
32 It should be noted that the example in (301) becomes highly degraded/ungrammatical with the realisation 
of a small clause adjunct in an episodic context (e.g., ??/*The vase broke after chipping away at it). While 
the necessity of genericity in licensing after-PPs in anti-causative constructions is mysterious, it is ultimately 
orthogonal to our present concerns. Instead, we note that – even in its generic form – the example in (301) 
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(301)  # Vases often break [after PRObreaker chipping away at them]. (anti-causative) 
 
The final diagnostic to consider is the availability of instrument with-PPs. As demonstrated 
in (302a,b), both passives and generic middle constructions license with-PP modifiers that 
name an instrument. On the other hand, instrument modifiers of this sort are barred in anti-
causative contexts, as in (302c). Like purpose clauses and agent-oriented modifiers, it has 
been argued that instrumental modifiers are only available in the presence of an implicit 
external argument, thus supporting the hypothesis that anti-causatives truly lack an external 
argument (cf. Hale and Keyser 1986). 
 
(302) a.  The vase was broken (with a hammer). (passive) 
 b.  This vase will break easily (with my new hammer). (generic middle) 
 c.  The vase broke (*with a hammer). (anti-causative) 
 
Intuitively, the surface subject of an anti-causative verb corresponds thematically to the 
surface object of its transitive (causative) counterpart. This intuition was famously captured 
in syntactic terms by Burzio (1981), who proposed that the surface word order in so-called 
unaccusative constructions is derived via movement of the object to subject position (as in 
(303a)). This underlying structure contrasts with the one attributed to so-called unergative 
intransitive constructions, in which the surface subject corresponds to the external 
argument of the verb (303b) (cf. Perlmutter 1978; Burzio 1986; Levin and Rappaport 
Hovav 1995, a.o.). 
 
(303) a.  Maryi fell ti (unaccusative) 
 b.  Mary danced. (unergative) 
 
This underlying structural difference correlates with a number of syntactic phenomena 
cross-linguistically, including perfect auxiliary selection. In the following section, we will 
consider the transitivity alternation found in aspectual predicate constructions, as 
exemplified in (294) above, and demonstrate that the set of properties associated with the 
(anti-)causative alternation is likewise present in aspectual environments. 
 
                                                 
constitutes a bona fide anti-causative (rather than a generic middle), based on its incompatibility with 
instrumental with-PPs (e.g., *Vases often break with a hammer/hammers). 
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5.3.2. Aspectual verbs are (anti-)causative 
 
Given our brief overview of the core empirical patterns associated with the (anti-)causative 
alternation, we are now in a position to determine whether the transitivity alternation in 
(294) (repeated below as (304)) is indeed (anti-)causative in nature. We will therefore take 
each diagnostic in succession and will examine the behaviour of DP-selecting aspectual 
predicates in both transitive and intransitive instantiations.33 We will demonstrate that the 
data below support the hypothesis that aspectual predicates are indeed (anti-)causative. 
 
(304) a.  The official began the London marathon. 
 b.  The London marathon began. 
 
To begin, we note that intransitive aspectual predicates pattern together with anti-causatives 
in being unable to license an overt external argument. For example, we see in (305) that 
while the passive in (305b) may take an agent-naming by-phrase adjunct, the intransitive 
in (305c) may not. We demonstrate in (306) that this pattern generalises systematically to 
other aspectual predicates, such as continue and stop.34 
 
(305) a.  The official began the London marathon. 
 b.  The London marathon was begun (by the official). 
 c.  The London marathon began (*by the official). 
 
(306) a.  The official continued/stopped the London marathon. 
 b.  The London marathon was continued/stopped (by the official). 
 c.  The London marathon continued/stopped (*by the official). 
 
Next, we see in (307) and (308) that intransitive aspectual predicates once again pattern 
with anti-causatives in their inability to license infinitival purpose clause adjuncts. Note 
that we include the optional in order here to block an argumental interpretation of the 
infinitive. 
 
                                                 
33 The question of whether DP objects of aspectual predicates always invoke coercion is a contentious issue, 
and one which falls outside the scope of this thesis. For preliminary discussion, see (B. H. Partee and Rooth 
1983; Klein and Sag 1985; Pustejovsky and Bouillon 1995). 
34 Though see discussion concerning the verb keep at the end of the section.  
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(307) a.  The London marathon was begun [(in order) to create a diversion]. 
 b. * The London marathon began [(in order) to create a diversion]. 
 
(308) a.  The London marathon was continued/stopped [(in order) to create a diversion]. 
 b. * The London marathon continued/stopped [(in order) to create a diversion]. 
 
Furthermore, like anti-causatives, aspectual intransitive predicates are unable to license 
agent-oriented modifiers, such as deliberately or on purpose. 
 
(309) a.  The London marathon was begun (deliberately/on purpose). 
 b. * The London marathon began (*deliberately/*on purpose). 
 
Intransitive aspectual predicates also do not permit co-reference between the null subject 
of an after-PP and in implicit matrix subject. This behaviour is again in line with that of 
anti-causatives, and contrasts with passives and middles (see examples (300,301) above). 
In order to facilitate a pragmatically felicitous interpretation, we employ the repetitive 
aspectual predicate restart in the examples in (310). We find that the passive and middle 
constructions (310a,b) permit an interpretation by which the PRO subject of the small 
clause adjunct is read as co-referent with the implicit subject of restart. Critically, this same 
interpretation is absent in the intransitive aspectual construction (310c); PRO must be 
interpreted arbitrarily. 
 
(310) a.  The marathon will be restarted [after PRO making some 
adjustments]. 
(passive) 
 b.  This marathon will restart easily [after PRO making some 
adjustments]. 
(generic middle) 
 c. # Marathons often restart [after PRO making some 
adjustments].  
(anti-causative) 
 
The final test to consider in diagnosing the presence of an implicit external argument is the 
availability of instrument with-PPs. Unlike our previous tests, aspectual intransitive 
constructions at first glance appear to pattern against anti-causatives in this regard; they 
may optionally take adjunct with-PPs that prima facie look like instruments. For instance, 
compare the typical (anti-)causative paradigm in (311) with the aspectual alternation in 
(312), in which both the passive and intransitive counterparts may realise a with-PP. 
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(311) a.  The vase was broken (with a hammer). 
 b.  The vase broke (*with a hammer). 
 
(312) a.  The marathon was begun (with a ceremony). 
 b.  The marathon began (with a ceremony). 
 
This apparent counter-example does not, however, generalise cleanly across the board. 
While the with-PP in (312b) is acceptable, the instrument with-PPs in (313) below are all 
either unacceptable or highly marked. 
 
(313) a.  The victim stopped her attacker’s advance (with a crowbar). 
 b.  The attacker’s advance stopped (*with a crowbar). 
 c.  The astronaut continued his journey (with secondary thrusters). 
 d.  The journey continued (*/??with secondary thrusters). 
 e.  The official began the marathon (with a flag). 
 f.  The marathon began (*/?? with a flag). 
 
We contend that the with-PP in (312b) does not denote an instrument, but rather is 
specificational in nature. Informally speaking, we will see in section 5.4.1 that aspectual 
predicates are best analysed as predicates that select event-denoting objects and introduce 
a sub-event of the selected event. The precise way in which the sub-event is related to the 
selected event will be entirely dependent on the aspectual predicate in question (e.g., begin 
introduces an initial sub-event, finish a final sub-event, etc.). We argue that the PP adjunct 
in (312b) specifies the content of the sub-event introduced by the aspectual verb. That is, a 
ceremony in (312b) does not name the instrument used to begin the marathon, but instead 
itself denotes the initial sub-event of the marathon. 
 The intuition guiding the notion of specificational with may be captured with 
appropriate paraphrases. For example, we find that the passive construction in (314a) is 
ambiguous between an instrumental interpretation (paraphrased in (314b)), and a 
specificational reading (314c). 
 
(314) a.  The London marathon was begun (with a ceremony). 
 b.  ⇒ A ceremony was used to begin the London 
marathon. 
(instrumental) 
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 c.  ⇒ The beginning of the London marathon consisted of 
a ceremony-event. 
(specificational) 
 
Furthermore, we see in (315) that the intransitive aspectual construction in (315a) does not 
permit the instrumental paraphrase in (315b). Instead, the only possible interpretation of 
the with-PP is as in the specificational reading (315c). Thus, despite initial observations, 
aspectual intransitive constructions pattern with anti-causatives in being unable to license 
a bona fide instrumental adjunct. 
 
(315) a.  The London marathon began (with a ceremony). 
 b.  ⇏ A ceremony was used to begin the London 
marathon. 
(instrumental) 
 c.  ⇒ The beginning of the London marathon consisted of 
a ceremony-event. 
(specificational) 
 
This account furthermore provides a natural explanation as to why the with-PPs in 
(313b,d,f) result in ungrammaticality/degradedness. In these cases, the content of the with-
PPs does not lend itself to the eventive interpretation necessary for specifying the relevant 
sub-event picked out by the aspectual predicate. Thus, while the aspectual intransitive in 
(316a) does not give rise to either the instrumental or specificational readings in (316b,c), 
an alternative specificational reading may be realised just in case the object inside the with-
PP is coerced into some relevant event (as in (316d)). 
 
(316) a.  The London marathon began (with a flag). 
 b.  ⇏ A flag was used to begin the London marathon. (instrumental) 
 c.  ⇏ The beginning of the London marathon consisted of 
a flag-event. 
(specificational) 
 d.  ⇒ The beginning of the London marathon consisted of 
a flag-waving-event. 
(coerced 
specificational) 
 
This phenomenon of specificational with is not limited to English aspectual constructions; 
Hungarian aspectual intransitives also exhibit specificational adjunction. For instance, the 
transitive aspectual construction in (317a) alternates with the intransitive in (317b). In the 
latter example, the adjunct must specify the nature of the initial sub-event of the surface 
subject, despite being marked with instrumental (INSTR-) case; it cannot be interpreted as 
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an instrument. 
 
(317) a.  Lengyelország  megszállása kezdte el a második világháborút 
   Poland invasion-POS started PRT the second world-war 
   ‘The invasion of Poland started the Second World War.’ 
 b.  A második világháború Lengyelország megszállásaval kezdödött  
   The second world-war Poland invasion-POS-INSTR started  
   ‘The Second World War started with the invasion of Poland.’ 
 
With the availability of (some) with-PPs independently accounted for, we find that the 
aspectual intransitive construction uniformly patterns with the anti-causative construction 
regarding the presence/absence of an implicit external argument. The above observations 
converge on the fact that aspectual predicates are indeed (anti-)causative, and thus predicts 
that aspectual intransitive constructions will be structurally unaccusative (as in (318)), 
rather than unergative. That is, the surface subject in aspectual intransitive constructions is 
in fact the internal argument of the predicate, with surface word order derived via 
movement. 
 
(318)   The London marathoni began ti 
 
The unaccusative nature of aspectual intransitives is supported by the fact that DP-selecting 
English aspectual predicates may realise dummy subjects in some cases, as illustrated in 
(319). This structure is likewise implicated by the auxiliary that Italian aspectual predicates 
combine with to form the perfect. As we see in (320), the Italian aspectual predicate iniziare 
must select the perfect auxiliary essere (to be), rather than avere (to have). This behaviour 
is typical of Italian unaccusatives/anti-causatives (see (321)), and alternates with 
unergatives, which must select avere (see (322)) (cf. Burzio 1986). 
 
(319) a.  There began a great commotion in the lobby. 
 b.  Thus ends the life of a great man. 
 
(320) a.  La festa è iniziata (intransitive aspectual) 
   The party AUX.BE.3sg begun  
 b. * La festa ha iniziata  
   The party AUX.HAVE.3sg begun  
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   ‘The party has begun.’  
 
(321) a.  La nave è affondata (unaccusative) 
   The ship AUX.BE.3sg sunk  
 b. * La nave ha affondata  
   The ship AUX.HAVE.3sg sunk  
   ‘The ship has sunk.’  
 
(322) a.  Maria ha cantato (unergative) 
   M. AUX.HAVE.3sg sang  
 b. * Maria è cantato  
   M. AUX.BE.3sg sang  
   ‘Maria has sung.’  
 
Before concluding, it must be noted that the aspectual predicate keep is markedly different 
from other aspectual verbs. As we see in (323), it conforms to all of Perlmutter’s (1970) 
diagnostics sensitive to an underlying raising structure: (i) it accepts sentential subjects, as 
in (323a), (ii) it shows synonymy between the active and passive counterparts in (323b,c), 
and (iii) idiom chunks in subject position retain their idiomatic interpretation (see (323d)). 
 
(323) a.  That Mary was promoted kept annoying Bill. 
 b.  The clown kept annoying Joe. 
 c.  Joe kept being annoyed by the clown. 
 d.  Headway kept being made toward a solution. 
 
However, unlike other aspectual predicates, keep is incapable of appearing in simple 
transitive constructions (see (324a)). Likewise, there is no intransitive variant of keep 
comparable to the anti-causatives observed with the predicates above (see (324b)).35 In fact, 
the only manner in which one may realise a direct object DP in the complement position of 
keep is in the presence of a secondary predicate, as illustrated in (325). 
 
(324) a. * The official kept the London marathon. 
 b. * The London marathon kept. 
                                                 
35 Note that transitive and intransitive instantiations of keep do exist in non-aspectual environments, as in 
John used to keep rabbits, or this cheese should keep (for months). Given that the current investigation 
concerns only the behaviour of aspectual predicates, we put these uses of the verb aside. 
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(325) a.  John kept the beer cold. 
 b.  The victim kept her attacker subdued. 
 c.  The official kept the London marathon running on schedule. 
 
As such, we contend that the behaviour of the predicate keep is varied enough from other 
verbs of the aspectual sub-type as to warrant its own separate analysis. While a full account 
of the predicate is beyond the scope of the present work, we refer the reader to Neeleman 
and van de Koot’s (2012) analysis, such that keep implicates a relation of maintenance 
rather than causation. 
In summary, we have motivated an (anti-)causative analysis of aspectual predicates, 
based primarily on the lack of implicit external argument in intransitive constructions. In 
the next section we will formalise our account of English aspectual verbs, in which the 
(anti-)causative flavour of these predicates will be implicated in deriving the raising/control 
ambiguity. 
 
5.4. A novel proposal for aspectual predicates 
 
In this section we will develop a concrete syntax and semantics for aspectual predicates 
that (i) captures the (anti-)causative nature of aspectual predicates, as discussed in section 
5.3, and (ii) accounts for the core properties of aspectual constructions, which generalise 
across infinitival and nominal complement environments (see chapter 2). To this end, we 
will employ our analysis of compositional nominalisation in English, as put forward in 
chapter 4. 
 We begin in section 5.4.1 by building a simplified, extensional event semantics for 
aspectual predicates, based primarily on the classical mereological framework of 
Champollion and Krifka (2016). Then in section 5.4.2 we demonstrate that by exploiting 
several independently motivated methods of semantic composition, we can account for 
nominal and infinitival complement constructions with a single lexical entry. Finally, in 
section 5.4.3 we adopt a syntactic analysis of the external argument such that the (anti-
)causative alternation in DP environments and the raising/control ambiguity in infinitival 
environments are simultaneously derived. 
 
5.4.1. A radically simplified semantics 
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Contemporary analyses of aspectual control predicates are primarily motivated by the 
behaviour of aspectual verbs in the environment of an infinitival complement.36 For 
example, the lexical entry for begin in (326) is adapted from Landau (2015), and is based 
on the semantics of the progressive (Condoravdi 2009). Abstracting away from the 
contribution of degree variables, this denotation is meant to capture the intuition that the 
aspectual predicate relates its subject to a property of individuals denoted by its infinitival 
complement. In the case of begin specifically, (326) asserts that some property P holds of 
individual x in both the actual world, as well as in some world that follows the normal 
course of events (the inertia world, w' ∈ INw). 
 
(326)  ⟦begin⟧w,g = λP〈d〈e,st〉〉.λd'.λx.λe'. P(d',x, e') = 1 in w ∧ Cause(x, e') in w ∧  
∃<e'',w', d''>[w' ∈ INw ∧ e' ⊂ e'' ∧ d' < d'' ], P(d'', x, e'') = 1 in w'.  
 
However, without further revision or stipulation, the lexical entry in (326) is entirely 
incompatible with eventive nominal complements. Specifically, the aspectual verb requires 
a property of individuals (type 〈e,vt〉) as its input, but we established in chapter 4 that event 
nominals denote events per se (type 〈v〉). In addressing this apparent type mismatch, we 
have the following three logical possibilities: (i) propose a separate, distinct lexical entry 
for all aspectual predicates in their DP-selecting aspect, (ii) exploit a type-shifting operation 
that converts event nominals of type 〈v〉 to properties of individuals (type 〈e,vt〉), thereby 
establishing (326) as a unified lexical entry, or (iii) propose an alternative unified lexical 
semantics that does not take as its input a property of individuals. 
 Immediately, we reject option (i) for its patent failure to capture the many 
commonalities between nominal and infinitival constructions, thus rendering these mere 
empirical accidents. Option (ii) fares somewhat better in this regard; coercive type-shifting 
of the nominal complement could hypothetically allow the nominal to enter into the same 
computation as an infinitival complement, thereby explaining the empirical similarities 
between the two complement types. Furthermore, an individual to property type-shifting 
operation has been independently motivated in the semantic literature. For example, 
Partee’s (1987) type-shifting function IDENT takes an individual of type 〈e〉 such as the 
king in (327a) and yields a property of individuals (type 〈e,t〉), as in (327b). 
 
(327) a.  John saw the king; ⟦the king⟧ = ιx [king(x)] 
 b.  John is the king; ⟦the king⟧ = λx. king(x) ∧ ∀y [king(y) → y = x] 
                                                 
36 See Piñango and Deo (2016) for a recent alternative based on coerced DP complements. 
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There are at least two non-trivial issues in appealing to this kind of type-shifting operation 
to derive the generalised properties of aspectual constructions. First, the relevant type-
shifting operation would have to possess the unprecedented ability to add a thematic 
participant that is not present in the underlying definite description of the nominal. By way 
of illustration, consider the compositional event nominal in (328a), which denotes the 
unique event of destroying Rome (type 〈v〉). Application of Partee’s IDENT function will 
yield a property of events (type 〈v,t〉) which may predictably predicate a nominal argument 
that describes an event, as in (328b). Crucially, this kind of type-shifting does not yield a 
property of being the destroyer of Rome. Thus, the oddity of the example in (328c) results 
from the ascription of a property of events to an individual. 
 
(328) a.  Nero watched the destruction of Rome; ⟦the destruction of Rome⟧ = 
ιe∃x [destroy(e) ∧ Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy [Rome(y)]] 
 b.  The event (that Nero watched) was the destruction of Rome. 
 c. ? Nero was the destruction of Rome. 
 
A second problem with appealing to type-shifting comes from the experimental literature 
concerned with the effects of coercion on linguistic processing. In general, it is often 
hypothesised that coercive mechanisms such as type-shifting operations incur higher real-
time processing costs by the listener/reader (cf. McElree et al. 2001; Pylkkänen and 
McElree 2006). However, Traxler et al. (2002) demonstrate that there is little to no 
evidence for invoking coercive type-shifting in environments involving aspectual 
predicates and event-denoting DP complements. Specifically, the authors found that 
aspectual sentences such as the boy started the fight did not incur any significant increase 
in processing times when compared to non-aspectual control sentences, such as the boy saw 
the fight. Conversely, aspectual sentences involving concrete/referential DP objects (such 
as the boy started the puzzle) were found to be significantly more difficult for the reader to 
process, compared to the corresponding controls (e.g., the boy saw the puzzle). The authors 
therefore argue that these observations suggest that no coercive type-shifting mechanism is 
required to compose aspectual predicates with event-denoting DP objects. 
 We will therefore pursue option (iii): we will define new lexical entries for 
aspectual predicates that do not require a property of individuals as their input. Following 
recent work by Piñango and Deo (2016), we couch our analysis of aspectual predicates 
within the framework of classical mereology (Krifka 1989, 1992, 1998; Champollion and 
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Krifka 2016). As in chapter 3, we adopt a Neo-Davidsonian event semantics such that a 
verb contains an open event argument position (Davidson 1967), as well as the Kratzerian 
Voice hypothesis (Kratzer 1996). Given our observations concerning event nominal 
complements to aspectual predicates, we take as our starting point the simplistic denotation 
in (329); begin introduces an event argument e and selects another event e' as its internal 
argument. 
 
(329)   ⟦begin⟧ = λe'.λe. begin(e, e')  
 
The lexical entry in (329) will return true iff event e and event e' stand in the relevant begin 
relation. This denotation provides some initial purchase on how event nominals might 
compose with aspectual predicates. However, in order to make explicit the nature of this 
begin relation, we need to define the notions of parthood (≤) and proper parthood (<) 
(Champollion and Krifka 2016), as in (330) and (331), respectively. 
 
(330)   Parthood 
   x ≤ y iff x ⨁ y = y where ⨁ is the two-place sum operation 
 
(331)   Proper Parthood 
   x < y iff x ≤  y ∧  ∃z[z ≤  y ∧ ¬(z ≤  x)] 
 
We furthermore define the overlap relation (⨂) as in (332). 
 
(332)   Overlap  
   x ⨂ y iff ∃z[z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y] 
 
Finally, we define relations of precedence (≺) as a strict linear order on the domain of 
temporal intervals (Di). Precedence is transitive (333a), irreflexive (333b), asymmetric 
(333c) and connected (333d). 
 
(333)   Precedence  
   for all x,y,z ∈ Di 
 a.  (x ≺ y ∧ y ≺ z) → x ≺ z 
 b.  x ⊀ x 
 c.  x ≺ y → y ⊀ x 
 d.  x ≠ y →(x ≺ y ∨ y ≺ x) 
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With these definitions in mind, we propose the revised entry for begin in (334). Now, the 
predicate relates event e and event e' by initial part relation <initial. Note that the temporal 
trace function τ returns the run-time of any event e (τ(e)). 
 
(334)   Begin 
   ⟦begin⟧ = λe'.λe. e <initial e' 
   where e <initial e' iff e < e' ∧ ∀e'' [e'' ≤ e' ∧ ¬ (e ⨂ e'') → τ(e) ≺ τ(e'')] 
 
The result is a relation between an initial sub-event e and the complement event e', such 
that e is a proper part of e', and for any other part e'' of e' that does not overlap the initial 
part e, the run-time of e precedes the run-time of e''. Ordering the event sub-parts of begin 
by event run-time has the desirable consequence that, with only minimal changes, the 
semantics in (334) may be extended to characterise the lexical meaning other aspectual 
predicates. For example, like begin, the aspectual verb finish intuitively picks out a sub-
part of its event complement. However, finish seems to pick out the final sub-part of the 
event in question, rather than the initial sub-part denoted by begin. We may thus define the 
≤final relation as in (335), such that all other sub-parts of the selected event are asserted to 
precede the finish event. We furthermore include the presupposition that the complement 
event had a beginning event. 
 
(335)   Finish 
   ⟦finish⟧ = λe'.λe. e <final e' 
   where e <final e' iff e < e' ∧ ∀e'' [e'' ≤ e' ∧ ¬ (e ⨂ e'') → τ(e'') ≺ τ(e)] 
   presupposes ∃e <initial e' 
 
We may likewise capture the semantic character of non-ordinal aspectual predicates, such 
as continue. To this end, we provide the lexical entry in (336), which asserts that the 
continue event simply picks out some sub-part of the complement event; it remains 
unspecified regarding event run-time. 
 
(336)   Continue 
   ⟦continue⟧ = λe'.λe. e <  e' 
   presupposes ∃e''[∃e'' <initial e' ∧ e'' ≠ e] 
 
In sum, representing aspectual predicates in terms of parthood relations between events 
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provides an intuitive schematic for characterising the unique content of each individual 
aspectual predicate. In the next section, we will see that the lexical semantic denotations 
developed thus far will provide a working model by which to account for both nominal and 
infinitival complementation in aspectual constructions.  
 
5.4.2. Exploiting variable composition 
 
Assuming the simplified aspectual denotations proposed in the previous section, 
composition between the aspectual predicate and its compositional event nominal 
complement becomes straightforward. For example, recall that in chapter 3 we provided a 
denotation such as that in (337a) for the non-argument-projecting compositional event 
nominal the inspection. Specifically, the compositionally derived noun phrase denotes the 
set of inspection events, and the definite determiner binds the event variable and returns 
the unique inspection event. Given that aspectual predicates select for events directly under 
our analysis, composition may proceed via functional application, as in (337b) (Heim and 
Kratzer 1998). 
 
(337) a.  ⟦the inspection⟧ = ιe'∃x [inspect(e') ∧ Theme(e', x)]  
 b.  ⟦begin the inspection⟧ = λe. e <initial ιe'∃x [inspect(e') ∧ Theme(e', x)] 
 
The same is true of compositional event nominals which realise an of-argument internally; 
the relation mediated by ApplNOM between the nominal head and the applicative argument 
does not change the final denotation of the eventive DP. 
 
(338) a.  ⟦the inspection of the factory⟧ = ιe'∃x [inspect(e') ∧ Theme(e', x)  
∧ x = ιy[factory(y)]]  
 b.  ⟦begin the inspection of the factory⟧ = λe. e <initial ιe'∃x [inspect(e')] 
∧ Theme(e', x) ∧ x = ιy[factory(y)]] 
 
One immediate and desirable consequence of this analysis is that (gerundive) 
nominalisation of the aspectual predicate itself correctly picks out the unique relevant sub-
event of any embedded event. To illustrate, consider the nominal gerund beginning in 
(339); the DP correctly comes to denote the unique initial sub-event of the unique 
inspection event. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the nominal gerund combines 
with its event complement in the same manner as its corresponding verb. 
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(339)   ⟦the beginning of the inspection of the factory⟧ = ιe. e <initial ιe'∃x  
[inspect(e')]∧ Theme(e', x) ∧ x = ιy[factory(y)]]  
 
However, while composition between the aspectual predicate and its event nominal 
complement may be more straightforward under this analysis, composition with infinitival 
complements has become less so. Indeed, we have entirely reversed the theoretical issue 
that we faced with event nominal complements in section 5.4.1: composition with 
infinitival properties of individuals (type 〈e,vt〉) results in an apparent type mismatch. Like 
we saw in the case of nominals, we could attempt to invoke some coercive type-shifting 
mechanism in order to rectify the mismatch and allow composition to proceed. Aside from 
being entirely ad hoc, such a type-shifting operation would have to possess the 
unprecedented characteristic of decreasing the predicate’s arity two-fold; it would have to 
yield an event per se from a function from individuals to functions from events to truth 
values. Instead, we argue that there is a natural, non-coercive method by which non-finite 
complements can combine with event-selecting aspectual predicates. To this end, we will 
exploit two independently motivated notions from two distinct corners of the generative 
literature: (i) the hypothesis that certain non-finite clauses are maximally verb phrases (VPs 
or vPs/VoicePs), and (ii) the compositional rule Restrict put forward by Chung and 
Ladusaw (2004). 
 In a series of works, Wurmbrand (1998, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2014) motivates the 
hypothesis that non-finite clausal complements are not structurally uniform, despite 
apparent surface similarities. Furthermore, Wurmbrand argues that the structural size of the 
infinitive depends largely on the nature of the embedding predicate, and that the observed 
syntactic variability is tied to the variable projection of Tense and Aspect within the non-
finite complement. Crucially for our purposes, the structure implicated by the tenseless 
infinitives embedded under aspectual predicates is comparatively small, being maximally 
projections of V or Voice.37 As such, we provide the type-theoretic compositions in (184) 
and (225) as the only two possible structures for tenseless infinitives under Wurmbrand’s 
system.38 In (184) we see that the infinitive is simply a lexical verb phrase (VP), which 
appears without a subject position; it is this structure that may be implicated in cross-
                                                 
37 For motivation on this point, see chapter 3 section 3.5, as well as (Di Sciullo and Williams 1987; 
Wurmbrand 2001; Cinque 2006, a.o.). 
38 We disregard here the possibility of variable flavours of the Voice head (i.e., active, passive, middle, 
causative, etc.). These different possible structures are orthogonal to the claim that any maximal projection 
up to VoiceP will be a predicate of events (type 〈v,t〉). 
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linguistic restructuring phenomena. In (225), on the other hand, the infinitive projects up 
to VoiceP, and includes a PRO subject. Critically, both the VP and VoiceP versions of the 
tenseless infinitive constitute predicates of events (type 〈v,t〉)  at their left most edge. 
 
(340)   Tenseless Infinitive (VP) 
    
    VP<v,t>       
          
  
       
  V<e,vt> DP<e>      
  (to) inspect the factory 
 
     
         
 
(341)   Tenseless Infinitive (VoiceP) 
   
    VoiceP<v,t>       
          
  
       
  PRO<e> Voice'<e,vt>      
    
 
     
         
   Voice<<v,t>,<e,vt>> VP<v,t>     
     
 
    
         
   V<e,vt> DP<e>    
   (to) inspect 
 
the factory    
         
 
As such, the semantic denotations in (342a) and (342b) provide logical forms for the 
infinitives in (184) and (225), respectively. We find that, in both cases, the infinitive 
contains an open event variable; (342a) denotes the set of inspection events whose theme 
is the factory, while (342b) denotes the set of inspection events whose theme is the factory 
and whose agent is some PRO. 
 
(342) a.  ⟦ to inspect the factory
VP
 ⟧ = λe. inspect(e) ∧ Theme(e, the factory) 
 b.  ⟦ PRO to inspect the factory
VoiceP
 ⟧ = λe. inspect(e) ∧ Theme(e, the factory)  
∧ Agent(e, PRO) 
 
Turning now to how these predicates of events compose with our aspectual verbs, we turn 
to the compositional method Restrict (Chung and Ladusaw 2004). We provide a definition 
of Restrict in (343) in terms of events. 
 
(343)   Restrict (eventive) 
   Let γ be a node, and {α, β} the set of its daughters such that if ⟦α⟧ is of type 
〈v,vt〉 and ⟦β⟧ is of type 〈v,t〉, then, ⟦γ⟧ = λe.λe'. [⟦α⟧(e)(e') ∧ ⟦β⟧(e)]. 
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Rather than saturating an open argument position, Restrict allows a predicate to restrict the 
denotation of an open argument position from its original domain to the sub-domain in 
which the restricting predicate holds. To illustrate, consider the composition of the 
aspectual predicate begin with the VoiceP infinitive to inspect the factory in (344). Here, 
the VP combines via Restrict, and as such shifts the denotation of the open event variable 
e' from the domain of events to the sub-domain of events that are inspection events, and 
whose theme argument is the factory (see (345)). 
 
(344)    VP<v,vt>       
          
  
       
  V<v,vt> VoiceP<v,t>      
  begin  
 
     
         
   PRO<e> Voice'<e,vt>     
     
 
    
         
   Voice<<v,t>,<e,vt>> VP<v,t>    
        
         
     V<e,vt> DP<e>   
     (to) inspect the factory   
          
 
(345)  ⟦(344)⟧ = λe'.λe. e <initial  e' ∧ inspect(e') ∧ Theme(e', the factory) 
 
In order to saturate the open event position that is now restricted by the infinitival predicate 
of events, we invoke a step of existential closure, in the sense of Heim (1982). For now, 
this step will remain implicit in the composition of the aspectual predicate and its non-finite 
complement by Restrict; we will discuss alternative methods of making this step explicit 
in 5.4.3. Thus, Restrict plus existential closure of the event argument yield the type-driven 
composition in (346), and the semantic denotation in (347). Note that (346) is identical to 
(344) save for the semantic type of the matrix VP. Note also that the denotation in (347) is 
functionally equivalent to the denotation in (338b) above, involving an event nominal 
complement. 
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(346)    VP<v,t>       
          
  
       
  V<v,vt> VoiceP<v,t>      
  begin  
 
     
         
   PRO<e> Voice'<e,vt>     
     
 
    
         
   Voice<<v,t>,<e,vt>> VP<v,t>    
        
         
     V<e,vt> DP<e>   
     (to) inspect the factory   
          
 
(347)  ⟦(346)⟧ = λe∃e' [e <initial  e' ∧ inspect(e') ∧ Theme(e', the factory)] 
 
We have thus provided a compositional semantic framework for aspectual predicates such 
that a single lexical entry is implicated in both nominal and infinitival complement 
environments. In the next section we will see that, by couching our lexical semantics in a 
standard (anti-)causative syntactic/semantic framework, we can derive both the (anti-
)causative alternation in DP-selecting constructions, as well as the raising/control 
ambiguity observed in infinitival complement environments. 
 
5.4.3. Putting it all together with an (anti-)causative syntax 
 
In sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 above we have provided a theoretical account of aspectual 
predicates which posits a single lexical entry across multiple complement domains. The 
final piece of the puzzle is to extend this analysis to capture both the (anti-)causative nature 
of aspectual verbs in a construction with a nominal complement, as well as the 
raising/control ambiguity in a construction with an infinitival complement. To this end, we 
will adopt an (anti-)causative framework that follows in spirit proposals by Pylkkänen 
(2002, 2008), Kratzer (2005), Alexiadou et al. (2006) and Schäfer (2008). 
 There are a number of ways in which we could incorporate a causative element into 
the syntax and/or semantics of our aspectual predicates. Following Levin and Rappaport 
Hovav (1995), we might assume that causative aspectual verbs are lexically transitive and 
derive the anti-causative counterpart via a process of de-transitivisation (see also 
(Chierchia 2004)). We could alternatively make the opposite assumption that (anti-
)causatives are inherently unaccusative, and that transitive causative instantiations of the 
predicate result from the syntactic projection of a causing event above the verbal root (see 
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(Ramchand 2008; Pylkkänen 2008) for analyses to this effect). Further still, we could 
invoke a thematic view of causation, such that a causative relation is mediated by a two-
place thematic Cause predicate that links an external argument with its verb (in the spirit 
of (Reinhart 2000; Neeleman and Van de Koot 2012)).  It is important to note here that the 
underlying nature of causation and its linguistic expression is largely orthogonal to the 
goals of this dissertation, and as such we will not attempt to argue in favour of one particular 
causative framework over another. Instead, we will adopt a model of causation with an 
established granularity, in order to make our conclusions as explicit as possible. We leave 
it to future research to ascertain the impact (if any) aspectual (anti-)causatives have on the 
(narrowly) linguistic semantics of causation. 
 The particular causative framework that we will begin with below follows in the 
spirit of Pylkkänen (2002, 2008), and asserts that both transitive and intransitive 
instantiations of (anti-)causative predicates are derived from a common base (in this case, 
a subject-less VP). We assume further that the causative variant involves the projection of 
a causative v head, which we label CAUSE and define in (348a), plus the projection of a 
typical agentive Voice projection (see (348b)). For the sake of simplicity, we will assume 
that the anti-causative lacks both CAUSE and Voice.39,40 
 
(348)  a.  ⟦CAUSE⟧ = λP<v,t>.λe.∃e'[P(e') ∧ Cause(e, e')] 
 b.  ⟦Voice[+AGENT]⟧ = λP<v,t>.λx.λe. P(e) ∧ Agent(e, x) 
 
To illustrate, consider the toy derivation of the simple lexical causative construction Mary 
broke the vase in (349). In its intransitive aspect (349a), the lexical VP never combines 
with CAUSE, nor does it combine with Voice, and thus no external argument is realised. 
The internal argument thus moves to the specifier of TP to receive nominative case. On the 
other hand, the transitive causative construction in (349b) invokes both CAUSE and 
Voice[+AGENT]. Note that we abstract away from the notion of result-states here.  
 
 
                                                 
39 This framework of causation necessarily requires the assumption of two distinct layers in the verbal 
extended projection: an eventive v layer and a non-eventive Voice layer (cf. Harley 2009). 
40 Alternative proposals involve the projection of a specifically unaccusative/anti-causative v head above the 
lexical VP that encodes a BECOME event (e.g., Pylkkänen 2002, 2008), as well as the claim that both 
causative and anti-causative variants include the projection of CAUSE (cf. Alexiadou et al. 2006; Schäfer 
2008). 
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(349) a.    TP<t>      
         
  
      
      DP1:<e>       T<e,t>     
     …     
          VP<v,t>   
the vase… 
            
       
    V<e,vt> t1:<e>.   
    break     
          
 
 
 b.         VoiceP<v,t>      
         
  
      
  DPe       Voice<e,vt>     
  Mary      
        
             Voice<vt,<e,vt>> CAUSE-P<v,t>    
   [+AGENT]     
        
          CAUSE<vt,vt>  VP<v,t>   
        
        
      break the vase   
 
(350)  a.  ⟦(349a)⟧ = ∃e∃e' [break(e') ∧ Theme(e, the vase)] 
 b.  ⟦(349b)⟧ = ∃e∃e' [break(e') ∧ Theme(e, the vase) ∧ Cause(e, e')  
∧ Agent(e, Mary)] 
 
For constructions involving aspectual predicates with compositional event nominal 
complements, we find that the above structures in (349a,b) can be employed wholesale. As 
illustrated in (115), the first event argument of begin is saturated by the definite 
compositional event nominal, thereby coming to denote the initial sub-event of an 
inspection event. Subsequently, the resulting predicate of events combines with the 
causative v layer CAUSE-P, which introduces the causing event of that initial sub-event. 
Finally, an agent-selecting Voice projection asserts Mary to be the agent of the causing 
event, as illustrated in the corresponding denotation in (352). 
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(351)         VoiceP<v,t>      
         
  
      
  DP<e>       Voice<e,vt>     
  Mary      
        
             Voice<vt,<e,vt>>      CAUSE-P<v,t>    
   [+AGENT]     
        
          CAUSE<vt,vt>  VP<v,t>   
        
        
     V<v,vt> DP<v>  
     begin 
the inspection of 
the factory 
 
          
 
(352)   ⟦(115)⟧ = λe∃e' [e' <initial  ιe''∃x[inspect(e'') ∧ Theme(e'', x)  
∧ x = ιy[factory(y)]] ∧ Cause(e, e') ∧ Agent(e, Mary)] 
 
The same VP structure is present in the unaccusative counterpart of the causative 
construction in (115). As we see in (353) below, the first open event argument of begin is 
saturated by functional application of the compositional event nominal. However, this time 
the VP does not combine with CAUSE-P, nor does it combine with a projection of Voice. 
Instead, no external argument is introduced, and the internal argument of begin moves to 
the specifier position of TP (presumably to receive nominative case). Note that this analysis 
does not preclude the projection of some specifically unaccusative/anti-causative flavour 
of Voice, so long as an external argument is not introduced (see (Schäfer 2009) for relevant 
discussion). Thus, the simplistic denotation of TP in (354) (abstracting away from the 
semantics of Tense and Aspect) asserts the existence of the initial sub-event of the unique 
inspection of the factory event.  
 
(353)     TP<t>      
         
  
      
      DP1:<v>       T<e,t>     
     …     
          VP<v,t>   
the inspection… 
            
       
    V<v,vt> t1:<v>.   
    begin     
          
 
 
(354)  ⟦(353)⟧ = ∃e [e <initial  ιe'∃x[inspect(e') ∧ Theme(e', x) ∧ x = ιy[factory(y)]]  
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Moving on to infinitival complement constructions, we note first that utterances such as 
Mary began to inspect the factory are, by hypothesis, systematically ambiguous between 
control and raising (see Perlmutter 1970). We propose that the anti-causative construction 
in (353) translates straightforwardly into a raising analysis in non-finite complement 
environments, as in (355, 356). Here, the first open event argument of begin is restricted 
by the complement Voice projection. The aspectual VP does not combine with CAUSE-P 
or VoiceP, and as such no external argument is introduced in the matrix clause. The external 
argument of the VoiceP complement (introduced by an embedded agentive Voice head) 
then obligatorily A-moves to the specifier of matrix TP to receive nominative case. 
 
(355)   TP<t>       
          
  
       
    DP1:<e>       T<e,t>      
  Mary  …      
          VP<v,t>    
  
             
        
    V<v,vt>        VoiceP<v,t>    
    begin     
         
     t1:<e>        Voice'<e,vt>   
         
         
      Voice<vt,<e,vt>> VP<v,t>  
       to inspect…  
         
 
(356)  ⟦(355)⟧ = ∃e∃e' [e <initial  e' ∧ inspect(e') ∧ Theme(e', the factory) 
∧ Agent(e', Mary)]   
 
On the other hand, we propose that a control analysis of begin can be adequately accounted 
for by invoking the causative variant of aspectual predicates in (115). The relation between 
the matrix aspectual verb and its non-finite complement is the same in (357) below as it is 
in the raising construction in (355) above: the embedded VoiceP restricts the sub-domain 
of the first open event argument to only inspect the factory events. Likewise, the aspectual 
VP combines with the same causative projection CAUSE-P. In the control case, however, 
an agentive subject is projected in the specifier of matrix VoiceP, and if embedded Voice 
is realised, it introduces a null PRO subject that is obligatorily co-referent with the matrix 
subject. 
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(357)         VoiceP<v,t>        
           
  
        
  DP<e>       Voice<e,vt>       
  Maryi        
          
             Voice<vt,<e,vt>>      CAUSE-P<v,t>      
   [+AGENT]       
          
          CAUSE<vt,vt>       VP<v,t>     
          
          
      V<v,vt>        VoiceP<v,t>    
     begin     
          
                   DP<e>       Voice'<e,vt>   
      PROi     
          
       Voice<vt,<e,vt>> VP<v,t>  
       [+AGENT]   
            
         
to inspect the 
factory 
 
 
It is important to note at this point that nothing in the semantics of begin precludes the 
predicate prima facie from participating in no-control/ECM constructions. That is, unlike 
previous accounts of aspectual control predicates, our semantic representation does not 
overtly assert or enforce any explicit relation between the matrix subject and the embedded 
VP. This is by design. In section 5.5.1 we will argue that the obligatory exhaustive control 
effects observed in aspectual constructions follow naturally from the principles of so-called 
‘direct’ causation. For now, we will simply assume that the relevant obligatory EC relation 
is instantiated in (357) above by virtue of PRO. 
 Before moving on, it would be useful to reconsider the mono-clausal approach to 
aspectual predicates (as discussed in 5.2.2) in light of our current analysis. Consider the toy 
mono-clausal derivation in (358) (adapted from (Grano 2012, 2015)); begin appears as an 
independent functional projection in the inflectional layer of the matrix clause, and the 
matrix subject originating in the specifier of VoiceP moves across it to TP. 
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(358)   TP       
          
  
       
    DP1  T      
  Mary  …      
     beginP     
  
             
        
    begin VoiceP    
         
         
     t1 Voice   
          
         
      Voice VP  
         
         
        to inspect…  
 
We contend that the (anti-)causative approach to aspectual  
predicates in (351-357) has one particular desirable consequence that the mono-clausal 
approach in (358) fails to capture without further stipulation. Specifically, our analysis 
adequately explains the properties of aspectual predicates irrespective of whether they 
select an infinitival or a nominal complement. That is, a single lexical entry can account 
for an aspectual predicate in both its DP-selecting aspect, as well as its infinitive-selecting 
counterpart. Furthermore, a single syntactic phenomenon is implicated in both the 
transitivity alternation in DP complement environments and the observed ambiguity 
between raising and control in infinitival complement constructions. For the mono-clausal 
view, aspectual verbs are not lexical verbs, and as such do not select nominal arguments. 
Thus, in order to capture the behaviour of aspectual predicates in nominal complement 
constructions, it would be necessary for the mono-clausal account to posit a systematic 
ambiguity in which an aspectual predicate is either (i) a lexical verb in the environment of 
a DP complement, or (ii) a functional head in the environment of a non-finite verbal 
complement. However, this strategy would result in system-wide redundancy, and would 
miss the generalisations noted throughout this chapter and in chapter 2. 
  Given the above analysis, aspectual predicates are like canonical raising predicates 
in that, in some instantiations, they are unaccusative: they do not take an external argument, 
and as such do not assign accusative case. However, they differ from canonical raising 
predicates in that they participate in the (anti-)causative alternation and may occur in 
transitive causative environments in which an external argument is projected, and 
accusative case is available. This relatively simple proposal goes a long way to accounting 
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for many of the syntactic observations concerning aspectual verbs in both DP and infinitival 
complement environments, and has a number of desirable corollaries which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
5.5. Further predictions of the proposal 
 
In this section we demonstrate the desirable effects associated with the proposal for 
aspectual predicates outlined in section 5.4. First in section 5.5.1 we argue that the effects 
of EC, as they exist in both the nominal and infinitival complement domains, follow 
naturally from principles of ‘direct’ causation. In 5.5.2 we show that this view of EC 
correctly derives the overt embedded subjects generalisation in both nominal objects and 
non-finite clauses. Then in section 5.5.3 we discuss the temporal properties of nominal and 
infinitival complements to aspectual predicates. Finally, in 5.5.4 we formalise the notion 
of specificational with, and furthermore provide an account for non-agentive subjects in 
transitive aspectual constructions.  
 
5.5.1. Control as direct causation 
 
There is a natural tension between the Kratzerian Voice hypothesis and the notion of 
inherent subject control. For the former, lexical verbs are by hypothesis dissociated both 
semantically and syntactically from the subjects that appear above them. For the latter, 
obligatory subject control is by some means encoded within the verb at the lexical level, 
and as such will be present in any of its possible instantiations. The question, then, is how 
do we encode inherent subject control into the lexical semantics of a verb when the subjects 
of verbs have been removed from their lexical semantics? The strategy pursued in this 
section will be to reduce the exhaustive control relation observed in aspectual constructions 
to an underlying property of the grammar. Specifically, we will appeal to the notion that 
simplex lexical causatives encode ‘direct’ causation (cf. Fodor 1970; Katz 1970; Bittner 
1999; Wolff 2003, a.o.). 
 The intuition behind the notion of direct causation is neatly captured in Katz’ (1970) 
‘Wild West Story’. Consider a scenario in which a sheriff brings his six-shooter to the local 
gunsmith for repairs, but the gunsmith’s repairs are inadequate. Later, the sheriff’s weapon 
jams in a gunfight, and the sheriff is shot dead. Katz notes that, while the gunsmith caused 
the sheriff’s death, it would be infelicitous to say that the gunsmith killed the sheriff (but 
cf. Neeleman and Van de Koot 2012). Further still, Martin and Shäfer (2014) point to 
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examples such as (359) and (360) to characterise the direct nature of causation in simplex 
causative predicates. The authors observe that (359) is true iff the psychologists directly 
manipulate the mouse; this utterance would be infelicitous in a context in which they coax 
the mouse to move by itself. Likewise, the possibility to deny (360a) and instead provide 
the ‘indirect’ causal chain in (360b) supports the hypothesis that simplex causatives and 
periphrastic causative constructions are truth-conditionally different. 
 
(359)   The psychologists moved the mouse into the other box. 
 
(360) a.  Did the psychologists move the mouse into the box? 
 b.  No, they put some cheese in it so that the mouse moved by itself. So, they made 
it move into the box. 
 
The alternation between direct and indirect causation is classically viewed as variable 
constraints on temporal adjacency. That is, simplex lexical causatives are argued to require 
temporal contiguity between their causing event and any subsequent events in the causal 
chain, thus yielding direct causation (cf. Fodor 1970; Katz 1970). This argument is 
supported prima facie by examples such as in (361a), in which simplex causatives fail to 
license independent temporal modification of the causing event. Periphrastic causatives are 
by hypothesis under no such constraint (361b). 
 
(361) a. * John killed Bill on Sunday by stabbing him on Saturday. 
 b.  John caused Bill to die on Sunday by stabbing him on Saturday. 
 
However, Neeleman and van de Koot (2012) correctly point out that temporal contiguity is 
not always maintained in simplex causative constructions. As we see in the examples in 
(362) (Neeleman and Van de Koot 2012, ex. 9), the subjects of simplex causatives can, in 
certain contexts, be related to the subsequent result-state through a non-trivial number of 
mediating events in the causal chain. It is evident in these scenarios that temporal adjacency 
is not required. 
 
(362) a.  A kind word with the manager will no doubt open the door. 
   you speak to the manager → manager speaks to the doorman → doorman opens the door 
 b.  Opening bus lanes to motorcycles will redden the streets with cyclists’ blood. 
   opening of bus lanes → increase of accidents → cyclists’ blood on London streets 
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 c.  Anglican church says overpopulation may break eighth commandment. 
   overpopulation → poverty → theft → theft breaks eighth commandment 
 
We furthermore submit the novel observation that aspectual (anti-)causatives are likewise 
compatible with the indirect causal chains exhibited in (362). That is, in (363) we find that 
aspectual causative predicates are conceptually compatible with non-contiguous chains of 
events. Note that we employ nominal complements below to avoid the possibility of a 
raising analysis. 
 
(363) a.  A kind word with the manager will no doubt end this performance of Macbeth. 
   you speak to the manager → manager speaks to performers → performers end performance  
 b.  Opening bus lanes to motorcycles will begin the slaughter of London cyclists. 
   opening of bus lanes → increase of accidents → cyclists begin to be slaughtered 
 
It is not our intention here to provide an account for the obviation of temporal adjacency in 
(362) and (363) above. We instead merely note that the fact that both simplex causatives 
and aspectual causatives exhibit the same obviation with non-agentive subjects suggests 
that the same phenomenon is at play in both constructions. 
 An alternative possibility would be to adopt a version of direct causation keyed to 
the agency of the causative subject relative to the causal chain (cf. Cruse 1972; Wunderlich 
1997 for preliminary discussion). This view is most explicitly argued for by Piñón (2001), 
who proposes the notion of Agent-Cause. As defined in (364), an individual x in event e is 
the agent-cause of event e' iff x is the agent of e and e causes e'. Furthermore, any other 
event e'' within the causal chain (between events e and e') are asserted to lack an 
independent agent. 
 
(364)   Agent-Cause(e, x, e') =def  Agent(e, x) ∧ Cause(e, e') ∧ ∀e''[Cause(e, e'')  
∧ (Cause(e'', e') ∨ e'' = e') → ¬∃y[Agent(e'', y)]]  
 
The effect of (364) is such that, if x is the agent of e, then for any event within the causal 
chain stemming from e, there can be no other agent. Returning again to Katz’ Wild West 
story, the infelicity of the gunsmith killed the sheriff in the appropriate context is, under 
Piñón’s framework, due to the intermediate agent of the shooting event that results in the 
sheriff’s death. That is, direct causation is ruled out in this scenario precisely because the 
gunsmith does not constitute a licit agent-cause. 
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 This view of direct causation is similarly problematic, however; Neeleman and van 
de Koot (2012) demonstrate that, given sufficient intentional force, the gunsmith can indeed 
constitute the subject of the lexical causative verb kill in the context of the Wild West story 
(contra Katz 1970). That is, in a scenario in which the gunsmith deliberately sabotages the 
sheriff’s gun, the sentence the gunsmith killed the sheriff can be felicitously employed to 
describe the complex causal chain such that the gunsmith is an agent of a sabotage event 
which causes a shooting event which results in the sheriff’s death. Crucially, the shooting 
event is conceptually free to assert an intermediate agent (e.g., the shooter), thereby 
violating Piñón’s notion of Agent-Cause. 
 For the purposes of this thesis, we will adopt the definitions of linguistic causation 
as proposed by Kratzer (2005). Following an observation from Ginet (1990), Kratzer 
distinguishes between events that cause and events of causing, such that the latter but not 
the former contain the caused event. To illustrate, consider a scenario in which Mary drinks 
all the water in Bill’s well, and as a result Bill’s teapot is empty (that is, there is simply no 
water with which to make tea). In this case, Mary drinking is an event that causes Bill’s 
teapot to be in an empty state. Conversely, consider a scenario in which Mary drinks all the 
tea in Bill’s teapot, and as a result Bill’s teapot is again empty. In this scenario, Mary 
drinking is an event of causing Bill’s teapot to be in an empty state. In order to formalise 
this distinction, Kratzer provides the following definitions in (365; Kratzer 2005, ex. 61). 
Note that we assume here the set of events E and a causal chain C, which is a convex sub-
set of E. Furthermore, we assume that the members of C are linearly ordered by causal 
dependence.41 An event in C is the maximal element of C iff that event does not cause any 
other events in C. Likewise, an event in C is the minimal element of C iff that event is not 
caused by any other event in C (Kratzer 2005: 28). 
 
(365) a.  Events of causing other events 
   An event e is an event of causing an event e' iff e is the sum of all the members 
of some causal chain C with maximal element e'. 
 b.  Events that cause other events 
   An event e is an event that causes an event e' iff e is the minimal element of 
some causal chain C with maximal element e'. 
 
For Kratzer, the kind of causation defined in (365a) is responsible for the so-called 
‘directness’ of certain causative structures; any thematic participant of an event of causing 
                                                 
41 See also (Lewis 1973) on counterfactual dependence. 
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will similarly bear that thematic relation in any sub-event within the extended causal chain. 
We assume here that this same kind of causation is encoded by the two-place Cause 
predicate introduced by the verbal causative head in simplex (and aspectual) causative 
constructions. That is, the event introduced by the CAUSE head is an event of causing, 
rather than an event that causes. 
 Before moving on, we need to make an explicit assumption regarding thematic two-
place predicates (i.e., Agent(e, x), Theme(e, x), Experiencer(e, x) etc.) and the relations 
they establish between events and individuals. Specifically, we will assume that a thematic 
participant x in event e is also a thematic participant in any relevant sub-events of e to the 
same capacity. This notion follows from the fact that thematic relations are sum 
homomorphisms with respect to the sum operation, as noted by Champollion (2010).42 
 
 
(366)   For any thematic role 𝜃, it holds that 𝜃(e ⨁ e') = 𝜃(e) ⨁ 𝜃(e')  
   (Champollion 2010: 33) 
 
Take as illustration the utterance John pushed the cart from the garage to the shed. 
Furthermore, assume that the event e (push the cart from the garage to the shed) consists 
of minimally two sub-events: (i) an event e' of pushing the cart from the garage to some 
halfway point, and (ii) an event e'' of pushing the cart from some halfway point to the shed. 
Given that events are the sum of their sub-events, it follows from (366) that if John is the 
agent of the sum e' ⨁ e'' in which he pushes the cart from the garage to the shed, then he 
is also the agent of the individual sub-events e' and e''. 
Armed with the principles above, we submit the definition in (367) as a working 
characterisation of obligatory exhaustive control as it exists in infinitival try constructions. 
Critically, the definition below reflects the notion that the observed exhaustive control 
relation is in fact an inherent semantic entailment based on the sum homomorphism of 
thematic roles in a causative environment. 
 
(367)   Exhaustive control as a causative entailment  
   For any two distinct events e and e' related by a semantic Cause predicate, such 
that e is an event of causing e', the Agent of e is necessarily the Agent of e'. 
 
                                                 
42 See (Kratzer 2003) for relevant criticism of this notion. 
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It should be noted that the definition in (367) describes a constraint regarding the thematic 
roles or thematic relations of two or more events, and is not concerned with theta roles (in 
the sense of Chomsky 1981). The correspondence between theta roles and thematic 
relations is a robust and controversial topic, and one which extends beyond the scope of 
the present work. For our purposes, it will suffice to hypothesise that a single theta position 
may be associated with more than one thematic role (see e.g. Parsons 1990); this is arguably 
the case when exhaustive control manifests into embedded unaccusatives (e.g., John began 
to fall), such that the embedded subject is interpreted as both an Agent and a Theme (for 
recent discussion on theta roles and their relation to thematic roles, see Carnie 2006; 
Champollion 2010).43 
 Consider now the type-driven derivation of aspectual control in (357), repeated 
below as (368), as well as its subsequent denotation in (369). The VoiceP comes to denote 
the set of events e such that e is an event of causing the initial sub-event e' of an inspection 
of the factory event e''. Mary is furthermore asserted as the Agent of the event of causing 
e. 
 
(368)         VoiceP<v,t>        
           
  
        
  DP<e>       Voice<e,vt>       
  Maryi        
          
             Voice<vt,<e,vt>>      CAUSE-P<v,t>      
   [+AGENT]       
          
          CAUSE<vt,vt>       VP<v,t>     
          
          
      V<v,vt>        VoiceP<v,t>    
     begin     
          
                   DP<e>       Voice'<e,vt>   
      PROi     
          
       Voice<vt,<e,vt>> VP<v,t>  
       [+AGENT]   
            
         
to inspect the 
factory 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Complementation of embedded unaccusatives is less of a contentious issue with aspectual predicates, given 
that they may instead instatiate an anti-causative ‘raising’ structure. However, the differentiation of theta 
roles and thematic relations will be necessary to account for all possible complement types available in try 
constructions in chapter 6. 
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(369)   ⟦(368)⟧ = λe∃e'∃e'' [Cause(e, e') ∧ Agent(e, Mary)  ∧ e' <initial  e'' ∧ inspect(e'')  
∧ Agent(e'', PRO) ∧ Theme(e'', the factory)]  
 
The notion that Cause establishes an event of causing rather than an event that causes 
provides immediate purchase on the derivation of exhaustive control in aspectual control 
constructions. Namely, the events e and e' in (369) above are related in such a way that e 
is the sum of all events in causal chain C, and e' is the maximal element of C. Put plainly, 
Cause establishes a parthood relation between e and e', such that e' ≤ e. Because the begin 
event is wholly contained within the event of causing, it is entailed that if Mary is the agent 
of e, then Mary is the agent of e' by virtue of the sum homomorphism of thematic roles (see 
(366)). Further still, the same is partly true of the embedded event e''. That is, due to the 
parthood relation instantiated between the begin event and its embedded event, part of the 
embedded event necessarily overlaps with the event of causing, of which Mary is the agent. 
The precise amount of e'' that is contained within e is determined by the event run-time of 
e', the initial sub-event of e''. As such, for any event e''' such that e''' ≤ e'' and the run-time 
of e''' is either equal to or within the bounds of the run-time of e', e''' ≤ e and Agent(e''', 
Mary). 
 As a consequence of this approach, we immediately derive the inherent nature of 
exhaustive control in aspectual constructions; the projection of an independent agent within 
the embedded event gives rise to a logical contradiction. Consider, for example, the illicit 
ECM construction in (370). We see in (371) that Mary is established as the agent of e and 
Bill as the agent of e''. The existentially quantified begin event e' is simultaneously a sub-
part of both e'' (by virtue of the lexical semantics of begin) and e (by virtue of Cause). Mary 
is the agent of e and all of its sub-events, including e'. Likewise, Bill is the agent of e'' and 
all of its sub-events, also including e'. A contradiction thus arises in which the begin event 
e' ends up with two distinct thematic agent arguments, thereby rendering the derivation 
uninterpretable.44 
  
                                                 
44 We assume here a principle of thematic uniqueness; see e.g. (Parsons 1990). 
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(370)  *        VoiceP<v,t>        
           
  
        
  DP<e>       Voice<e,vt>       
  Maryi        
          
             Voice<vt,<e,vt>>      CAUSE-P<v,t>      
   [+AGENT]       
          
          CAUSE<vt,vt>       VP<v,t>     
          
          
      V<v,vt>        VoiceP<v,t>    
     begin     
          
                   DP<e>       Voice'<e,vt>   
      Bill     
          
       Voice<vt,<e,vt>> VP<v,t>  
       [+AGENT]   
            
         
to inspect the 
factory 
 
 
(371)   ⟦(370)⟧ = λe∃e'∃e'' [Cause(e, e') 
∧ Agent(e, Mary)  ∧ e' <initial  e'' ∧ inspect(e'')  
∧ Agent(e'', Bill) ∧ Theme(e'', the factory)]  
 
Consequently, in order to avoid this contradiction, the only possible external argument of 
the embedded VoiceP in aspectual control constructions is a null pronoun PRO that is co-
referent with the matrix subject. It thus follows that the obligatory binding of any PRO 
subject in this environment will be truth conditionally vacuous (cf. Wurmbrand 2001, 
2002). Crucially, our analysis does not entail that Mary is the agent of the entirety of the 
embedded event, but only the relevant parts (as defined by the event run-time of the begin 
event). We will see in section 5.5.3 that this account provides a natural explanation for the 
entailment patterns of aspectual complements.  
 In sum, this section has attempted to reduce the inherent nature of exhaustive 
control in aspectual control constructions to principles of direct causation. The particular 
definition of direct causation adopted was that of Kratzer (2005), such that transitive 
aspectual constructions involve the projection of a Cause head that introduces an event of 
causing. The subsequent parthood relations established between the event of causing and 
the embedded event(s) provided an elegant solution to exhaustive control. By exploiting 
the fact that thematic relations are sum homomorphisms, we saw that any agent of the event 
of causing was entailed to be the agent of any of its sub-events, which included both the 
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begin event and any sub-events of the complement event that coincided with the event run-
time of the begin event. As such, the projection of an independent external argument in the 
complement clause gave rise to a logical contradiction in which the event introduced by 
begin selects two agents. Given that aspectual constructions involving compositional event 
nominal complements involve the same underlying semantics and causative syntax, we 
successfully derive the first half of the generalisation in (90). That is, exhaustive control is 
entailed in event nominal complements to aspectual control verbs due to the fact that any 
independent overt agents give rise to a logical contradiction. 
 
5.5.2. Overt embedded subjects 
 
As per our analysis of exhaustive control in 5.5.1, the overt embedded subjects 
generalisation (see (92)) follows trivially in both the clausal and nominal complement 
domains. Beginning with clausal complements, recall from chapter 2 that overt embedded 
subjects are barred in English EC constructions, even when exceptional case-marking for 
is realised, as illustrated in (372) below (Grano 2012, 2015). Likewise, the inability of an 
exhaustively controlled clause to project an independent subject transcends the role of 
finiteness; the exhaustively controlled Greek finite subjunctive in (37) becomes 
ungrammatical with the realisation of an embedded subject (Landau 2004). 
 
(372) a. * Mary managed (for) Bill to leave the city. implicative 
 b. * Mary continued (for) Bill to leave the city. aspectual 
 c. * Mary had (for) Bill to leave the city. modal 
 d. * Mary tried (for) Bill to leave the city. try 
 
(373)   O Yanis tolmise na figi (*o Kostas) 
   The  Yanis dared PRT leave the Kostas 
   ‘Yanis dared (*for Kostas) to leave.’ 
   GREEK 
   (Grano 2012:33-34) 
 
In the case of aspectual control predicates, we know from our ‘direct causation’ analysis in 
section 5.5.1 that an overt embedded subject in the complement clause is ruled out on 
semantic grounds. That is, even though the compatibility of our aspectual lexical semantics 
and embedded VoicePs leaves open the potential for an embedded subject in the specifier 
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of Voice, projection of an independent subject gives rise to a logical contradiction.45  
 Turning to compositional event nominal complements, we find that our account of 
aspectual control constructions accurately predicts the generalisation in (92), as it applies 
to EC predicates. Recall that compositional event nominal complements to aspectual EC 
predicates may not take agent-naming by-phrase adjuncts (see (374a,b)), nor may they 
realise an overt agent in the prenominal genitive position (374c). However, as in (374d), 
they may optionally realise a prenominal genitive that names a beneficiary/abstract 
possessor. 
 
(374) a.  The public began the immediate investigation of the suspect (*by the council). 
 b.  The committee continued the negotiation of trade deals (*by Congress).  
 c. * The president began his advisor’s evacuation of the city. 
   (advisor = Agent) 
 d.  The president began his advisor’s evacuation of the city. 
   (advisor = Beneficiary/Author/Possessor/ …) 
 
The behaviour of the by-phrase adjuncts in (374a,b) is expected, given our analysis of 
agent-naming by-phrases in chapter 4. We see in (264) that an agent-naming by-phrase 
minimally requires an event variable and asserts the agent of that event. The subsequent 
compositional event nominal in (268) can thus be assigned the series of semantic 
denotations in (269). 
 
(375)   ⟦𝑏𝑦AG⟧  =  λx.λe. Agent(e, x) 
  
(376)     ApplNOMP2     
          
  
       
   ApplNOMP1 by the doctor   
    
 
     
         
   nP ApplNOM'     
   examination      
         
    ApplNOM DP    
    of the patient    
                                                 
45 This assumes that a non-finite clausal complement that maximally projects to VoiceP is otherwise 
compatible with ECM in the relevant sense. Any account of ECM that relies on higher projections in the left-
periphery of the embedded clause will derive the overt embedded subjects generalisation trivially by 
structural means. 
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(377) a.  ⟦Appl
NOM
′⟧  =  λe.∃x [Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[patient(y)]] 
 b.  ⟦Appl
NOM
P1⟧  =  λe.∃x[examine(e) ∧ Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[patient(y)]] 
 c.  ⟦Appl
NOM
P2⟧  =  λe.∃x[examine(e) ∧ Theme(e, x) ∧ x = ιy[patient(y)] 
∧  Agent(e, ιz[doctor(z)])]  
 
Consider now the ungrammatical aspectual construction *The nurse began the examination 
of the patient by the doctor, and its logical form in (378). The utterance comes to denote an 
event of causing of which the nurse is the agent, and the maximal element of the event of 
causing is the initial sub-event of the unique examination of the patient event, of which the 
doctor is the agent. 
 
(378)  = ∃e∃e'∃e'' [Cause(e, e') ∧ Agent(e, nurse)  ∧ e' <initial  ιe''∃x[examine(e'')  
∧ Theme(e'', x) ∧ x = ιy[patient(y)] ∧ Agent(e'', doctor)]]  
 
Thus, the same logical contradiction that arises in clausal complement environments arises 
in the nominal domain as well. Specifically, given that Cause instantiates an event of 
causing, and as such e contains e', the nurse in (378) is necessarily the agent of e' by virtue 
of the fact that thematic relations are sum homomorphisms. Likewise, the parthood relation 
between e' and e'' is such that e'' contains e', and as such the doctor is also necessarily the 
agent of e' for the same reasons. The fact that e' thus has two distinct agents in the above 
example violates the principle of thematic uniqueness, thereby causing the derivation to 
crash. 
 A similar narrative can be constructed for the behaviour of prenominal genitives in 
compositional event nominal complements, as observed in (374c,d). Recall from chapter 4 
that our analysis of prenominal genitives made use of Higginbotham’s (1983) notion of the 
unspecified R relation. Specifically, we assumed that the interpretation of R is contextually 
determined, and that this interpretative variability corresponds with a variation in the spell-
out of the R predicate. In the environment of the compositional event nominal in (262a), R 
is by hypothesis ambiguous between an argumental and an ownership interpretation. If the 
interpretation is one of ownership, R will spell out the possessive Poss predicate, as in 
(262b). Likewise, in argumental interpretations, R will spell out the thematic Agent relation 
(262c). 
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(379) a.  ⟦His advisor's evacuation of the city⟧  
= ιe[evacuate-the-city(e) ∧ R(e, advisor)] 
 b.  If R=ownership, then Poss(e, advisor) 
 c.  If R=argument, then Agent(e, advisor) 
 
It immediately follows that, on any occasion in which R is spelled out as the thematic Agent 
relation, the expected contradiction arises in which the aspectual sub-event realises two 
distinct agent arguments. Furthermore, the ability of the prenominal possessor to licitly 
denote an abstract possessor or beneficiary follows naturally from an ownership 
interpretation of R. That is, in a context of ownership, R is spelled out as Poss. Given that 
Agent and Poss are two distinct thematic relations, no such contradiction arises.46 
Thus, the account of aspectual predicates proposed in section 5.4 combined with 
our analysis of exhaustive control in 5.5.1 yields without further stipulation the overt 
embedded subjects generalisation as it applies to aspectual EC predicates with clausal 
complements. Furthermore, we successfully derive the generalisation in (92), such that 
overt embedded agents are specifically barred in event nominal complements to aspectual 
EC predicates. In each case, it was found that an overt agent in the complement yields a 
logical contradiction, in which the principle of thematic uniqueness is violated. 
 
5.5.3. Temporal properties of infinitival and nominal complements 
 
Like the nature of exhaustive control, the obligatory simultaneity of clausal and nominal 
complements emerges naturally from our aspectual semantics. However, we will see that 
the way in which this property emerges in these variable environments is necessarily 
distinct. Beginning with non-finite complements, we adopt the relatively standard 
assumption that the role of aspect (encoded in the functional Aspect projection) is to 
existentially bind the event variable and relate the event run-time to a reference time t (type 
〈i〉, from the domain of time intervals Di; cf. Pancheva and Stechow 2004 and references 
cited therein). We furthermore adopt the semantics for perfective aspect as defined in 
(380).47 As such, perfective aspect encodes proper containment of the event time within the 
reference time, and as such entails event completion. Upon merging with an appropriate 
                                                 
46 We assume here that Poss may yield either an abstract possession/authorship interpretation or a beneficiary 
reading. An alternative analysis would hold that the beneficiary interpretation only arises in a benefactive 
context (e.g., if R(e, x) is spelled out as Beneficiary(e, x)). No contradiction arises under this account. 
47 For the sake of simplicity, we focus on perfective aspect rather than imperfective. 
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VoiceP, an AspectP encoding the perfective in (380) will come to denote a predicate of 
times (type 〈i,t〉). 
 
(380)   ⟦PERFECTIVE⟧ = λP〈v,t〉.λti. ∃e[P(e) ∧ τ(e) ⊂ t ] 
 
As a predicate of times, the denotation of any perfective AspectP is compositionally 
incompatible with our aspectual predicates; as per section 5.4.2, the open event argument 
of aspectual predicates may only be saturated by an event per se (type 〈v〉), or restricted by 
a predicate of events (type 〈v,t〉). We therefore predict that any functional auxiliaries that 
by hypothesis occur higher than Aspect (i.e., ProgressiveP, PerfectP, etc.) cannot be 
embedded beneath an aspectual predicate.48 We see in (381) that this prediction is borne 
out. 
 
(381) a. * John began to be running the London marathon. 
 b. * Mary continued to have inspected the factory. 
 
Furthermore, the tense mismatch generalisation (Landau 2000, 2004) follows naturally 
from the necessarily reduced size of the clausal complement. We assume that temporal 
modifiers such as yesterday restrict the reference time of a given predicate of times, as in 
(382) below. 
 
(382)   ⟦yesterday⟧ = λP〈i,t〉.λt. P(t) ∧ t ⊆ yesterday 
 
Recall that the nature of the aspectual predicate ensures that any non-finite complement 
will be maximally a projection of Voice (type 〈v,t〉), and as such will never denote a 
predicate of times. We therefore predict that the only predicate of times available to 
temporal modifiers such as yesterday in (382) is that of the matrix clause. Thus, the 
ungrammaticality of (383a) results from the contradiction that arises in (383b), in which 
two temporal modifiers restrict the matrix reference time to two mutually exclusive time 
intervals. 
 
 
                                                 
48 We assume here that the progressive auxiliary be occurs as a modal operator above the aspectual projection 
(in the sense of von Stechow 2009). 
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(383) a. * Yesterday, John began to run tomorrow. 
 b.  = λt. ∃e∃e'∃e''[Cause(e, e') ∧ Agent(e, John) ∧ e' <initial  e'' ∧ run(e'')  
∧ Agent(e'', PRO) ∧ τ(e) ⊂ t ∧ t ⊆ yesterday ∧ t ⊆ tomorrow] 
 
This analysis does not, however, extend wholesale to the domain of nominal 
complementation. That is, according to our analysis of compositional event 
nominalisations in chapter 4, nominals do not contain a projection of aspect, and thus 
should never permit independent temporal modification. This is of course not the case; 
event nominalisations are free to realise an independent temporal modifier in non-EC 
contexts (e.g., Today, John thought about the inspection of the factory last week). 
Furthermore, we observe in (384) that independent temporal modification is not isolated to 
event-denoting noun phrases (as in (384a)). We see in (384b,c) that purely referential 
nominals may likewise realise a post-nominal temporal modifier that conflicts with a 
temporal modifier outside the nominal (within the clause). 
 
(384) a.  [The inspection of the factory yesterday] got me fired today.  
 b.  [That slice of pizza last Friday] made me sick all Saturday. 
 c.  Today I remembered [the man yesterday].  
 
It is argued by Enç (1981, 1986) that the interpretation of noun phrases is temporally 
independent of the clause in which they appear. Enç furthermore proposes that – like verbs 
– nouns must be provided with temporal arguments. This proposal is adopted and expanded 
in a series of works by Lecarme (1996, 1999, 2004, et seq.) who argues that the nominal 
system makes available a time argument at a nominal equivalent to Tense, which is later 
closed off by a nominal temporal operator located in the DP layer.49  
 In order to avoid a prolonged investigation of a tangential issue, we will instead 
assume that the temporal properties of the DPs in (384) are introduced directly by the 
temporal modifier, or more accurately, the concealed relative clause in which the modifier 
occurs. Disregarding the precise derivation of relative clauses, we assume that (reduced) 
relative clauses minimally involve lambda-abstraction of an argument variable. 
Furthermore, we assume that any reduced relative involving the temporal modifier 
yesterday minimally contains a projection of Aspect. As such, we provide in (385) the 
                                                 
49 This is an oversimplification of a complex issue, and one that is largely orthogonal to the claims made here. 
Crucially, we will see that simultaneity is logically entailed irrespective of any one particular analysis of 
nominal temporal reference. 
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logical form of a reduced relative containing a temporal modifier in the environment of an 
event NP. Here, lambda-abstraction of an event variable renders the clause a predicate of 
events; this is in line with Heim and Kratzer’s (1998) claim that relative clauses denote 
predicates. Perfective aspect restricts the run-time of e to a proper subset of t, and the 
modifier subsequently restricts t to yesterday.50 
 
(385)  ⟦REL yesterday …⟧ = λe∃t [τ(e) ⊂ t ∧  t ⊆ yesterday] 
 
As a predicate of events, the temporal relative clause is free to combine with a 
compositional event NP by means of predicate modification. 
Consider now the examples in (386); the ungrammaticality of (386a) arises from a 
logical contradiction in (386b). That is, the event run-time of e is restricted to reference 
time t, while the event run-time of e'' is restricted to the existentially quantified time t' 
contained within the reduced relative. Further still, the temporal modifier yesterday restricts 
the reference time of matrix aspect t to the appropriate 24-hour period that constitutes 
yesterday. Likewise, the temporal modifier tomorrow restricts the reference time t' to the 
appropriate 24-hour period that constitutes tomorrow. Given that e' is a sub-event in both 
e and e'', a contradiction thus arises in which the run-time of e' is simultaneously restricted 
to both yesterday and tomorrow. Thus, the generalisation that nominal complements to 
aspectual EC predicates enforce simultaneity (see (275)) arises as an emergent property of 
our treatment of aspectual verbs (see also Wurmbrand 2014; Grano 2017 for similar 
conclusions). 
 
(386) a. * Yesterday, John began the examination of the patient tomorrow. 
 b.  = λt. ∃e∃e'[Cause(e, e') ∧ Agent(e, John) ∧ e' <initial  ιe''[examine(e'')  
∧ Theme(e'', x) ∧ x = ιy[patient(y)] ∧ ∃t'[τ(e'') ⊂ t' ∧ t' ⊆ tomorrow]]  
∧ τ(e) ⊂ t ∧ t ⊆ yesterday] 
 
Finally, we propose that the apparent imperfective properties of begin fall out of our 
analysis for free, without having to appeal to the semantics of the progressive (cf. 
Condoravdi 2009; Landau 2015). In (368), Mary is the agent of e and its sub-event e', and 
subsequently is the agent of any sub-events of e'' that coincide with the event run-time of 
                                                 
50 For various analyses regarding the internal composition of relative clauses, see (Chomsky 1965; Schachter 
1973; Vergnaud 1974; Heim 1987; Kayne 1994; Grosu and Landman 1998; Sauerland 1998; Bianchi 2000, 
among many others). 
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e'. The fact that the embedded non-finite complement cannot project above VoiceP ensures 
that the only event time that will be located relative to the reference time will be that of the 
event of causing, and its relevant sub-events (including the begin event e', see section 5.5.3 
for detailed discussion on this point). As such, we predict that the only parts of the 
embedded event e'' that will be entailed to completion will be those sub-events that coincide 
with the event run-time of the begin event. This prediction is borne out in (387); the 
aspectual construction in (387a) does not entail the completion of the embedded event in 
(387b). This same observation holds for aspectual predicates which pick out the final sub-
event of the embedded event (as in (388)), or some intermediate sub-event (389). These 
observations hold despite the fact that in each case the embedded predicate denotes a telic 
accomplishment (in the sense of (Vendler 1957)). 
 
(387) a.  Mary began to paint the wall. 
 b.  ⇏ Mary painted the wall. 
 
(388) a.  Mary stopped painting the wall. 
 b.  ⇏ Mary painted the wall. 
 
(389) a.  Mary continued painting the wall. 
 b.  ⇏ Mary painted the wall. 
 
One apparent counterexample to the above claim comes from the aspectual predicate finish, 
which does seem to entail the completion of the embedded event in question (e.g., Mary 
finished painting the wall = the wall is painted). We argue that the telic nature of finish 
constructions does not originate in the embedded infinitive, but instead comes from a 
[+telic] property encoded in the verb itself. This is most saliently demonstrated with 
embedded intransitive activity predicates. To illustrate, we see in (390a) that the intransitive 
activity verb sweep permits modification by the atelic aktionsart modifier for five minutes, 
but not the telic modifier in five minutes. This same paradigm is observed when we embed 
sweep beneath the aspectual predicate stop in (390b). However, when sweep is embedded 
under finish, the resulting construction is obligatorily telic (390c). 
 
(390) a.  John swept (for five minutes/*in five minutes). 
 b.  John stopped sweeping (for five minutes/*in five minutes). 
 c.  John finished sweeping (in five minutes/*for five minutes). 
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Critically, the aktionsart modifiers in (390b,c) do not modify the time of the embedded 
event, but instead modify the time of the sub-event picked out by the aspectual verb. For 
instance, the only interpretation available in (390b) is that the stopping lasted for five 
minutes, not the sweeping. Given the observations above, we contend that finish does not 
constitute a bona fide counterexample to our claim that aspectual predicates cannot entail 
the completion of their infinitival complement. Instead, finish carries a unique [+telic] 
property which forces a telic interpretation of the final sub-event of the selected event. 
Let us now reconsider Landau’s (2015) account of this same entailment pattern 
(326) (repeated below as (391)). The use of degree variables here ensures that, in all worlds 
w' ∈ INw – all possible worlds that follow the natural course of events from w – the 
embedded property may progress to a higher degree. In the scenario in (387), if Mary begins 
to paint the wall in w, then in all worlds w' that follow the natural course of events from w, 
Mary paints the wall to a greater degree in w'.  
 
(391)  ⟦begin⟧w,g = λP〈d〈e,st〉〉.λd'.λx.λe'. P(d',x, e') = 1 in w ∧ Cause(x, e') in w ∧  
∃<e'',w', d''>[w' ∈ INw ∧ e' ⊂ e'' ∧ d' < d'' ], P(d'', x, e'') = 1 in w'.  
 
The problem with Landau’s account here is that begin constructions are perfectly 
acceptable in a scenario in which some higher degree of the embedded property is rendered 
explicitly impossible. For example, consider a context in which Mary begins to paint a wall 
that has been previously layered with some magical paint repellent, and as such paint will 
never stick to this wall. Furthermore, assume that everyone including Mary knows this. 
According to (391), this scenario should minimally cause a level of degradation in the 
resulting begin construction, since the nature of a greater degree of painting the wall is 
difficult to conceive of if paint is unable to adhere to the wall in question. However, we see 
in (392) that begin constructions of this sort are completely unmarked, even when the 
impossibility of a greater degree is made overt.  
 
 
(392) a.  CONTEXT: Everyone knows that it is impossible to paint this wall. 
 b.  Mary began to paint the wall. 
 
One potential strategy with which to rescue the intentional view of aspectual predicates 
here is to assert that, in this particular scenario, it is indeed the natural course of events that 
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paint not adhere to the wall, given the state that the wall is in. As such, all possible worlds 
that follow the natural course of events from the actual world (w' ∈ INw) are those worlds 
in which the wall does not get painted. In this case, any notion of ‘greater degree’ of the 
wall being painted could presumably be valued relative to the impossibility of the task in 
these inertia worlds. However, this strategy must likewise contend with the apparent 
infelicity of the progressive form in this same scenario; we see below that the context in 
(393a) renders the progressive construction in (393b) marginal at best. 
 
(393) a.  CONTEXT: Everyone knows that it is impossible to paint this wall. 
 b. # Mary was painting the wall. 
 
In contrast, the purely extensional account of aspectual control verbs pursued in this chapter 
presents a natural explanation for the observations in (392). Namely, our account of begin 
singles out only those sub-events of the embedded event that coincide with the run-time of 
the initial sub-event introduced by begin. As such, the (im)possibility of future sub-events 
escapes the truth-conditional purview of the aspectual predicate. 
 In sum, the analysis of aspectual predicates pursued in this chapter adequately 
explains the aspectual and temporal properties of aspectual constructions across 
complement domains. We first showed that infinitival complements projecting up to and 
beyond AspectP were type-theoretically incompatible with our aspectual semantics. This 
observation made a number of correct predictions, including the fact that progressive and 
perfect morphology cannot be embedded beneath aspectual verbs. Furthermore, this notion 
provided a natural explanation for the simultaneity of infinitival complements to aspectual 
predicates; the only reference time available in such constructions is that of the matrix 
Aspect. A related but distinct account was required for nominal complements; we showed 
that any nominal reference time is likewise incompatible with independent temporal 
modifiers in the environment of an aspectual predicate. Finally, we provided a simple and 
effective solution to the apparent imperfective qualities of aspectual verbs. 
 
5.5.4. Eventive subjects and specificational with 
 
In this section we will briefly address transitive aspectual constructions which take non-
agentive subjects, such as that in (394). In this particular case, the subject of start is the 
compositional event nominalisation the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, which 
represents an event per se (type 〈v〉). 
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(394)   The assassination of Franz Ferdinand started the First World War. 
 
For Perlmutter (1970), the transitive aspect of aspectual predicates in which the verb selects 
a direct object DP is indicative of an underlying control analysis. By the same token, 
however, the absence of agency and animacy in the external argument is arguably 
indicative of an underlying raising analysis. Thus, the example in (394) presents a puzzling 
discrepancy in the empirical paradigm surrounding the raising/control ambiguity in 
aspectual constructions. 
 We propose that this apparent discrepancy disappears on the causative analysis of 
aspectual predicates developed in section 5.4. Specifically, we appeal to the uncontroversial 
empirical fact that there is no obligation for the external argument of a causative 
construction to be agentive/animate. For example, we see in (395a,b) that inanimate 
instruments constitute licit external arguments to simplex causative verbs. Likewise, while 
events per se are neither agentive nor animate, they too may be realised as external 
arguments of those same simplex causative predicates (as illustrated in (395c,d)).51 
 
(395) a.  The hammer broke the window. 
 b.  The sun melted the snow. 
 c.  The swinging of the hammer broke the window. 
 d.  The rising of the sun melted the snow. 
 
Cause-denoting eventive subjects are likewise attested in a number of non-English 
languages, including Brazilian Portuguese (396a) and Mandarin Chinese (396b). These 
examples can be accounted for straightforwardly on our analysis, so long as the eventive 
subject in question can be construed as a causer in the relevant sense. 
 
(396) a.  A disputa começou a guerra 
   The dispute began the war 
   ‘The dispute began the war.’ 
                                                 
51 Mechanically, we allow non-agentive, inanimate external arguments to be introduced above CAUSE-P by 
a Voice projection that is minimally [-AGENT, -ANIMATE]. Alternatively, we could posit a host of different 
Voice flavours, such as Voice[+INSTRUMENT] and Voice[+NATURAL-FORCE] (for the notion of ‘natural-force’, see (Piñón 
2001)). Given that our interest in non-agentive subjects is primarily pre-theoretical, we will avoid making 
any structural generalisations here (see also Reinhart 2000). 
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 b.  Guăngdăo hōngzhà jiéshùle dì èr cì shìjiè dàzhàn 
   Hiroshima bombing end-LE CARD 2 time world war 
   ‘The bombing of Hiroshima ended the second world war.’ 
 
Returning now to the notion of ‘specificational with’, compare the causative construction 
in (394) with the specificational constructions in (397). Recall that these data constitute 
apparent counter-examples to our claim that aspectual verbs are truly (anti-)causative, as 
per 5.3.2; simplex causative predicates cannot realise instrumental with-PPs. 
 
(397) a.  The investigation began with the inspection of the factory. 
 b.  The unveiling of the new hospital began with the ceremonial cutting of the 
ribbon. 
 
If these with-PP adjuncts overtly denote the external, instrumental causer of the 
corresponding anti-causative clause, then these examples pose a non-trivial problem to our 
(anti-)causative analysis of aspectual predicates. Thankfully, this is not the case; we can 
demonstrate that the with-PPs that appear in intransitive aspectual constructions do not 
realise the external/instrumental causer of the aspectual event. To illustrate, consider the 
context in (398a). In this scenario, example (398b) is judged as true; the assassination of 
Franz Ferdinand constitutes a licit causer in this context. However, example (398c) in 
which the assassination appears in a with-PP is judged as false in this same context. Finally, 
example (398d) is judged as true, with the with-PP adjunct now occupied by the declaration 
of war. 
 
(398) a.  CONTEXT: The Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on June 28th 1914. 
After escalating tension, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28th. 
 b.  The assassination of Franz Ferdinand started the First World War. (True) 
 c.  The First World War started with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. (False) 
 d.  The First World War started with the declaration of war by Austria-
Hungary. 
(True) 
 
In order to unpack these data, we need to understand relations between the First World War 
and the various other events described in this scenario. As mentioned above, the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand represents a potential causer, hence its realisation as the 
external argument of the transitive causative construction in (398a). On the other hand, the 
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declaration of war by Austria-Hungary does not intuitively describe a causer, but instead 
seems to explicit describe the nature of the initial sub-event of the First World War. 
 We therefore submit that these with-PPs are specificational in nature, rather than 
instrumental: they specify the aspectual sub-event in question. That is, the adjunct in 
example (398c) specifies the initial sub-event of the First World War event. The role of the 
with-PP then is to identify the initial sub-event with the event denoted by the declaration 
of war by Austria-Hungary. We provide a semantic denotation for specificational with in 
example (399a), while (399b) provides the denotation of the VP in (398c). 
 
(399) a.  ⟦withspec⟧ = λe'.λP⟨v,t⟩.λe. P(e) ∧ e = e' 
 b.  ⟦ [
VP 
[
VP
begin [
DP
WWI ] ] [
PP
with [
DP
the declaration of war by A-H ] ] ] ⟧  
= λe. e <initial  ιe'[WWI(e')] ∧ e = ιe''[declaration-of-war(e'')  
∧ Agent(e'') = A-H] 
 
The denotation of specificational with in (399a) provides immediate purchase on why 
(398c) is judged false. Given the context in (398a), we know that the First World War 
started on July 28th, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. We are also told that 
the assassination of Franz Ferdinand occurred a month earlier on June 28th. Example (398c) 
is therefore false due to the fact that the with-PP identifies the initial sub-event of the First 
World War with an event that occurred one month prior to its onset. 
 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have developed a theory of aspectual predicates that can account for the 
behaviour of aspectual verbs in both nominal and infinitival complement environments. 
We began by explicitly investigating the claim in (Pustejovsky and Bouillon 1995) that 
aspectual verbs are (anti-)causative, and concluded that the relevant diagnostics supported 
this hypothesis. We then pursued a radically simplified semantic analysis of aspectual 
predicates, such that a single lexical entry could account for both infinitival and nominal 
complementation. To this end, we proposed that aspectual predicates select for an event 
per se, and that infinitival complements combine via the compositional method Restrict. 
Finally, we demonstrated that, when combined with an (anti-)causative syntax, our 
framework could account for the raising/control ambiguity present in the domain of 
infinitival complements. 
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 The effects of our proposal were numerous. First, we derived the exhaustive control 
relation for free from the principle of direct causation. Specifically, we adopted the 
definition of direct causation from Kratzer (2005), and found that as a consequence of this 
definition, the agent of the matrix event was entailed as the agent of (the relevant sub-events 
of) the embedded event. We furthermore found that the overt embedded subjects 
generalisation followed naturally from our account in both the nominal and infinitival 
domains; any overt agent in the embedded event resulted in a logical contradiction. 
Similarly, we were able to account for the aspectual and temporal properties of both 
infinitival and nominal complements by virtue of our lexical semantics. Finally, we 
demonstrated that our (anti-)causative account made a number of unique and ultimately 
correct predictions regarding the nature of non-agentive subjects in transitive aspectual 
constructions, and furthermore provided a formalisation of a unique specificational with 
preposition. 
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6. INHERENT CONTROL: A DUALITY IN THE SEMANTICS OF TRY 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In chapter 5 we provided a uniform account of aspectual predicates in nominal and 
infinitival complement environments. This chapter will attempt to do the same for the 
exhaustive control predicate try. Specifically, we will offer a variation on recent semantic 
analyses of try such that the predicate encodes two separate internal arguments: an action 
and an intention.52 This distinction is based primarily on our observation in chapter 2 
concerning the entailment pattern of try in different complement environments, as 
exemplified in (400). In example (400a), we find that in the environment of a compositional 
event nominal complement, try entails its complement. Conversely, in (400b) we observe 
that try does not entail its complement if said complement is a non-finite clause. We will 
refer to these different readings as the action and intention reading, respectively. 
 
(400) a.  The government tried the abolition of workers’ rights. action 
   ⇒ The government abolished workers’ rights.  
 b.  The government tried to abolish workers’ rights. intention 
   ⇏ The government abolished workers’ rights.  
 
In section 6.2 we provide a brief overview of an arguably related phenomenon: the 
behaviour of the predicate explain and the so-called explanans vs. explanandum distinction. 
Then in section 6.3 we consider evidence for both an aspectual as well as an intentional 
component in the meaning of try, specifically in light of our observations concerning try in 
nominal complement constructions. Furthermore, we will discuss and ultimately dismiss a 
number of contemporary accounts of these observations, starting with Sharvit (2003). In 
section 6.4 we provide a novel analysis for try that accounts for the similarities of infinitival 
and nominal complement constructions, as well as the different entailment patterns 
exhibited in these environments. In 6.5 we demonstrate that the analysis put forward in 
section 6.4 correctly derives the key generalisations identified in chapter 2 in both nominal 
and infinitival environments. In section 6.7 we observe that our account has some desirable 
                                                 
52 Despite an overwhelming desire to invoke a system of cryptic Latinate taxonomy, we will instead continue 
the terminological tradition of Grano (2017a),who explicitly notes that the meaning of try contains both an 
action and intention component. However, our hypothesis will make the stronger claim that both of these 
components are realised as separate arguments of the predicate. 
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consequences concerning the empirical entailment patterns of gerundive complements to 
try, and we furthermore discuss some structural implication of this observation. We 
conclude in section 6.7. 
 
6.2. A (very) brief background on explain 
 
Before we present our analysis for try, it would be useful to discuss a separate but relevant 
diagnostic property of the predicate explain. It is observed in Pietroski (2000) that linguistic 
expressions involving the verb explain followed by a DP are truth-conditionally distinct 
from expressions involving explain followed by a propositional CP. Consider, for example, 
the data in (401); the CP complement example in (401a) does not entail the DP complement 
construction in (401b), and vice versa. Furthermore, we interpret the CP in (401a) as the 
content of the officer’s explanation. Conversely, the DP in (401b) denotes the thing for 
which the officer is providing an explanation (in this case, the content of his explanation 
may be that the sewers are flooding). We will refer to this property as the explanans vs. 
explanandum distinction.53 
 
(401) a.  The officer explained that the road was closed. explanans 
 b.  The officer explained the fact that the road was closed. explanandum 
 
For Pietroski, the observed distinction in (401) is indicative of an underlying variation in 
the thematic relation between the predicate and its argument. That is, Pietroski proposed 
that explain assigns a different thematic role to its complement, depending on the syntactic 
status of said complement. Employing a Neo-Davidsonian event semantics (cf. Parsons 
1990), Pietroski argued that propositional CPs such as that in (401a) stand in a CONTENT 
relation with the explain event, as in (402a). In contrast, DPs such as in (401b) combines 
as the THEME of explaining (see (402b)). 
 
(402) a.  ∃e [explain(e) ∧ Agent(e, officer) ∧ Content(e, that the road was closed)] 
 b.  ∃e [explain(e) ∧ Agent(e, officer) ∧ Theme(e, the fact that the road was closed)] 
 
A recent proposal by Elliot (2016) challenges Pietroski’s idiosyncratic account of explain, 
                                                 
53 The distinction between explanans vs. explanandum is a vast and widely debated topic in the relevant 
philosophy of science literature (cf. Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). Here we will limit ourselves to the 
relevance of the distinction in the scope of linguistic expression. 
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and instead argues that the distinction in (277) is part of a greater phenomenon of so-called 
‘substitution failures’ (see i.e., Prior 1971; King 2002; Pryor 2007, a.o.). Elliot provides an 
analysis such that propositional CPs are not true arguments of the predicate explain, but are 
rather predicate modifiers (in the sense of Heim and Kratzer 1998). This proposal builds 
off of recent work by Kratzer (2006) and Moulton (2009) which holds that that-CPs do not 
denote propositions, but instead denote properties of individuals with propositional content. 
Consider the denotation of the CP that the road is closed in (403). 
 
(403)  ⟦that the road is closed⟧ = λw.λx. CONT(w)(x) = λw'. road closed in w' 
  
The LF in (403) contains a function CONT which takes as its input a world argument w and 
an individual x, and returns the content of x in w as the proposition described in the 
embedded that-clause. One main motivator for the analysis in (403) comes from the ability 
of that-clauses to compose with proposition-denoting DPs, such as rumour in (404a) (cf. 
Moltmann 2013).54 As illustrated in (404b), composition between the propositional DP and 
the property-denoting CP may proceed via predicate modification (Elliott 2016, ex. 17, 18). 
 
(404) a.  ⟦rumour⟧ = λw.λx. rumourw(x) 
 b.  ⟦the rumour that the road is closed⟧ = λw.ιx [rumour(x) 
∧ CONT(w)(x) = λw'. road closed in w' 
 
Armed with the property view of that-clauses, Elliot provides an analysis of explain such 
that the explanans vs. explanandum distinction boils down to differing methods of semantic 
composition. Note that Elliot follows Lasersohn (1995) in assuming that events and 
individuals are both members of the domain of entities (De), and are therefore both type 
〈e〉. As such, the event variable introduced by explain now presents a licit target for 
predicate modification by the propositional CP, which denotes a property of individuals. 
We end up with the logical form in (405) for the explanans reading; the that-clause modifies 
the explain event and asserts its content as the proposition described by the CP. 
 
(405)   ⟦the officer explained that the road is closed⟧ =  
λw.∃e [explain(e) ∧ Agent(e, officer) ∧ CONT(w)(e) = λw'. road closed in w'] 
                                                 
54 Note that Elliot (2016) here assumes the intentional semantics of (von Fintel and Heim 2011), such that all 
predicates take a world argument which is realised by a pronominal world element. We abstract away from 
world pronouns here, as they have little bearing on Elliot’s account of explain. 
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Moving on to the explanandum, Elliot exploits the kind of composition observed above in 
(404), such that DP complements of explain are propositional in nature, and therefore may 
be modified by content-denoting CPs. As such, the logical form in (406) accounts for the 
explanandum reading, in which the CP expresses the content of the DP, and the DP 
subsequently combines as the Theme of the explaining event. 
 
(406)  ⟦the officer explained the fact that the road is closed⟧ =  
λw.∃e [explain(e) ∧ Agent(e, officer) ∧ Theme(e, ιx [fact(x)  
∧ CONT(w)(x) = λw'. road closed in w']] 
 
We have thus reviewed two different methods of explaining the complementation facts 
concerning the predicate explain. For Pietroski (2000) both CPs and DPs are semantic 
arguments of the predicate, and differ only in the thematic function which relates them to 
the explaining event. On the other hand, Elliot (2016) provides an analysis in which only 
DP complements constitute semantic arguments of the verb; CPs instead modify the 
underlying explaining event and express the content of said event.55 While the 
syntax/semantics of explain does not factor directly into our analysis, we will draw a 
number of similarities between the explanans vs. explanandum distinction and our semantic 
treatment of try. Furthermore, in section 6.4 we will consider two separate logical 
possibilities concerning the arguments of try: (i) the hypothesis that both the action and 
intention arguments of try are encoded in its lexical semantics, and (ii) the hypothesis that 
one or both of its arguments are introduced externally to the verb. Based on the behaviour 
of try in various complementation environments, we will ultimately reject (i) in favour of 
(ii). Specifically, we will argue that DP complements are encoded in the lexical semantics 
of try, while non-finite clauses merge by means of predicate modification. 
 
6.3. Previous analyses 
 
In this section we will consider in detail contemporary proposals in the syntactic/semantic 
literature that provide a treatment for the predicate try. In particular, we will focus on those 
analyses which recognise both the aspectual action element in the meaning of the verb, as 
well as its intentional component. To this end, we begin with Sharvit’s (2003) seminal 
                                                 
55 Note that I use the term ‘argument’ loosely here; for Elliot, all thematic participants in a given event are 
severed from the lexical semantics of the verb and must be introduced compositionally via external functional 
structure (see also Lohndal 2014). 
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paper on try, and proceed to a number of more recent accounts that follow in Sharvit’s 
tradition. 
 
6.3.1. Sharvit (2003) 
 
Prior to Sharvit’s influential work on the semantics of trying, it was largely assumed that 
try belonged to the same category of verb as canonical attitudinal predicates such as want 
and believe (see Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000). This characterisation was 
supported by the apparent availability of both an existential and non-existential reading of 
an embedded indefinite NP. Consider, for example, the behaviour of the attitudinal 
predicate want in (407a): this construction permits an existential reading, as in (407b), as 
well as a non-existential reading (see (407c)). 
 
(407) a.  John wanted to find a syntax book. 
 b.  Existential reading: 
   There was a syntax book x such that John’s desires would have been satisfied if 
he had found x. 
 c.  Non-existential reading: 
   John’s desires would have been satisfied if there had been a syntax book x such 
that John found x. 
   (Sharvit 2003:403) 
 
The possible continuations in (408) seem to support the availability of either reading. We 
see in (408a) that the pronoun it in the second conjunct refers back to the syntax book in 
the first, thereby supporting an existential reading. On the other hand, in (408b) we find 
that the existence of the syntax book may be explicitly denied (Sharvit 2003:404). 
 
(408) a.  John wanted to find a syntax book, but Susan hid it under the bed, so he didn’t 
find it. 
 b.  John wanted to find a syntax book, but there was no syntax book around. 
 
In the environment of this same embedded predicate, try behaves in an identical manner. 
Consider the availability of both existential and non-existential readings in (409), as well 
as the possible continuations in (410). In isolation, these data support the view that try and 
want belong to the same attitudinal category. 
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(409) a.  John tried to find a syntax book. 
 b.  Existential reading: 
   There was a syntax book x such that John’s attempts would have been successful 
if he had found x. 
 c.  Non-existential reading: 
   John’s attempts would have been successful if there had been a syntax book x 
such that John found x. 
 
(410) a.  John tried to find a syntax book, but Susan hid it under the bed, so he didn’t 
find it. 
 b.  John tried to find a syntax book, but there was no syntax book around. 
   (Sharvit 2003:404) 
 
However, Sharvit observed that, despite the similarities between want and try in (407-410), 
there are many predicates which force an existential reading of an indefinite NP when 
embedded under try. In contrast, the existential reading is never enforced in comparable 
want constructions. 
 
(411) a.  John wanted to cut a tomato, but it was too hard to cut. existential 
 b.  John wanted to cut a tomato, but there were no tomatoes to cut. non-existential 
 
(412) a.  John tried to cut a tomato, but it was too hard to cut. existential 
 b. # John tried to cut a tomato, but there were no tomatoes to cut. non-existential 
 
(413) a.  Mary tried to recover from an illness, but she couldn’t recover 
from it. 
existential 
 b. # Mary tried to recover from an illness, but she wasn’t sick. non-existential 
 
(414) a.  Bill tried to tear up a book, but it was too hard to tear (up). existential 
 b. # Bill tried to tear up a book, but there was no book to tear (up). non-existential 
   (Sharvit 2003:404-405) 
 
Sharvit asserts that this result is unexpected under a standard Hintikkan framework of 
propositional attitude (Hintikka 1962). Instead, Sharvit offers an analysis of try based on 
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the semantics of the progressive aspect, as proposed by Landman (1992). For Landman, a 
progressive utterance such as Mary was crossing the street specifies a relationship between 
an event in which Mary crosses the street and some ongoing event in the evaluation world. 
In order to express the nature of this relationship, Landman appeals to the notion of a 
continuation branch: given an ongoing event e in an evaluation world w, a continuation 
branch of e in w will provide the unique sequence of event-world pairs that show the 
plausible progression of e. The truth of a progressive utterance, then, may be valued based 
on whether or not the given continuation branch contains an event-world sequence that fits 
the relevant event description (e.g., if there is some event-world pair in which Mary 
successfully crosses the street). Sharvit modifies Landman’s account slightly, such that any 
given event e may have any number of continuation branches which may differ in their 
sensitivity to what may be considered realistic vs. non-realistic progressions of events. We 
provide Sharvit’s definition of a realistic continuation branch in (415) below (see also 
Grano 2011). 
 
(415)   A realistic continuation branch of e relative to w is a sequence 
〈〈e1, w1〉, … , 〈e𝑛, w𝑛〉〉 such that (a)-(d) hold: 
 a.  w1 = w, e1 = e, and for any m, em is an event in wm; 
 b.  if n > 1, then for any m such that n > m ≥ 1: (i) em is a proper stage of em+1; and 
(ii) there is an event in wm (Max-wm) which is the maximal event in wm of which 
e is a proper stage; 
 c.  for any m such that n > m ≥ 1, wm+1 is a reasonable option for e in w (i.e., there 
is a reasonable chance on the basis of what is internal to e in w that e continues 
in w as far as it does in wm+1) and: (i) if em is Max-wm, then wm+1 is a world 
maximally similar to wm where whatever interrupts Max-wm in wm doesn’t 
interrupt it in wm+1, and (ii) if em is not Max-wm, wm+1 = wm, and 
 d.  either there is not Max-wn, or: (i) en = Max-wn and (ii) there is no closest world 
to wn that has an event of which en is a proper stage that is a reasonable option 
for e in w. 
   (Sharvit 2003:412-413) 
 
Further, Sharvit leverages the definition of a realistic continuation branch in order to define 
the semantics of the progressive. As illustrated in (416), the progressive aspect PROG of 
an event e and property P is licensed just in case e is an ongoing event in the world, and 
there is an event e' within any realistic continuation branch of e such that P holds of e'. 
 213 
 
(416)   For any event e, property of events P, and world w, e ∈ PROG(w)(P) iff: 
 a.  e is an event in w; and 
 b.  for any realistic continuation branch C for e relative to w, there is an event e' and 
a world w' such that 〈e', w'〉 is in C and e' ∈ P(w'). 
   (Sharvit 2003:414) 
 
Sharvit’s proposal for the semantics of try differs from the progressive aspect in (416) in 
two critical ways. First, the author asserts that, unlike the progressive, try is significantly 
less sensitive to the realistic likelihood of any given continuation branch. As such, while 
Mary was swimming across the Atlantic Ocean is highly infelicitous due to the very small 
chance that Mary actually succeeds, the utterance Mary tried to swim across the Atlantic 
Ocean is far more acceptable. Second, Sharvit argues that try contains an attitudinal 
component, such that the predicate quantifies over the subject’s ‘success’ worlds (in the 
spirit of Heim 1992). With these factors in mind, consider Sharvit’s definition of try in 
(417). The extensional statement in (417a) is identical to that in (416a), thus ensuring that 
try instantiates an event in the actual world. However, (417b) differs from its progressive 
counterpart, such that try does not necessitate the use of realistic continuation branches, 
but rather admits those that are potentially non-realistic. Finally, the statement in (417c) 
instantiates quantification over the subject’s success worlds. 
 
(417)   For any event e, property of events P, individual a, and world w, 
e ∈ TRY(w)(P)(a) iff: 
 a.  e is an event in w; 
 b.  there is a (possibly non-realistic) continuation branch C of e relative to w 
(sufficiently similar to any realistic continuation branch of e relative to w) such 
that there is an event-world pair 〈e*, w*〉 in C such that e* ∈ P(w*); and 
 c.  for every w' compatible with what a believes in w: any world w'' maximally 
similar to w' such that there is a (possibly non-realistic) continuation branch C' 
of e relative to w'' (sufficiently similar to any realistic continuation branch of e 
relative to w'') and an event-world pair 〈e*, w*〉 in C' such that e* ∈ P(w*), is 
more successful to a in w relative to e than any w'' maximally similar to w' where 
there is no such continuation branch. 
   (Sharvit 2003:420-421) 
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Armed with this semantics, Sharvit offers an explanation for the (un)availability of non-
existential readings of embedded indefinites in try constructions (see (409-414)), based 
primarily on the underlying event structure of the embedded predicate. Take, for instance, 
the predicate cut a tomato; for Sharvit, this VP instantiates a transitive activity predicate 
which implicates a tomato, and ends with the tomato undergoing a particular change-of-
state (in this case, being cut). As such, for any event e which is a cutting a tomato event, 
there is no proper stage which does not involve a tomato. Given that the definition of a 
continuation branch makes crucial use of event-stages (see (415)), the unavailability of a 
non-existential reading is expected in this environment. In contrast, the underlying event 
structure of the predicate find a syntax book is arguably composed of an intransitive 
searching activity, as well as an eventuality in which a book is found. We may therefore 
conceptualise a proper stage of a find a syntax book event which does not implicate a book, 
and as such a non-existential reading does not conflict with the definition of a realistic 
continuation branch. 
 
6.3.2. Grano (2011) and Pearson (2012) 
 
In response to Sharvit’s (2003) semantic analysis of try, Grano (2011) observes a number 
of undesirable consequences of Sharvit’s continuation branch approach. First, Grano 
challenges the notion that the likelihood of the success of the embedded property factors 
into the semantic definition of try. Consider the statement in (417b): according to Sharvit, 
try invokes a possibly non-realistic continuation branch that is ‘sufficiently similar to any 
realistic continuation branch of e relative to w’. This notion is crucial to Sharvit’s definition, 
as it provides an explanation as to why Mary tried to cross the street is judged false in any 
case in which Mary does not put in a sufficient amount of effort (e.g., if Mary is sitting at 
home on the sofa).56 As such, while try will tolerate a higher degree of unrealistic 
probability, it must still be the case that the desired outcome is ‘sufficiently’ likely. 
 Grano (2011) asserts that this sensitivity to sufficient likelihood makes the wrong 
predictions concerning the felicity of try constructions in extremely unrealistic/unlikely 
scenarios. Consider, for example, a context in which John is involved in a car crash and 
becomes paralysed, unbeknownst to himself. Upon arrival, a medical examiner asks him to 
raise his arm. We see in this case that, while the progressive construction in (418a) is 
undeniably false, example (418b) involving try may be true, despite John’s physical 
                                                 
56 Sharvit notes that the point at which a possibly non-realistic continuation branch becomes ‘sufficiently 
similar’ to any related realistic continuation branches must be determined by context on a case by case basis. 
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inability to achieve the outcome described by the embedded infinitive. The same 
observations hold of the minimal pairs in (419,420); in each case, try is able to tolerate 
extremely unrealistic outcomes, while the progressive aspect is not. 
 
(418) a. # John was unknowingly paralysed and was raising his arm. 
 b.  John was unknowingly paralysed and tried to raise his arm. 
 
(419) a. # John was cutting a tomato with his mind. 
 b.  John tried to cut a tomato with his mind. 
 
(420) a. # John was making two plus two equal five. 
 b.  John tried to make two plus two equal five. 
   (Grano 2011:432) 
 
Grano’s second challenge to the continuation branch analysis of Sharvit (2003) comes from 
variation in entailment patterns in constructions involving incremental themes. For 
example, consider the minimal pairs in (421) and (422). In each case, we find that the 
progressive aspect entails some degree of integral change in the direct object, according to 
some relevant scale of measurement. Conversely, this change is not entailed in the 
corresponding try constructions. On the assumption that the progressive aspect and try both 
instantiate an event e that holds in w, this result is unexpected.57 
 
(421) a.  John was eating an apple. ⇒ part of the apple was consumed. 
 b.  John tried to eat an apple ⇏ part of the apple was consumed. 
 
(422) a.  John was raising his arm. ⇒ John’s arm moved upward. 
 b.  John tried to raise his arm ⇏ John’s arm moved upward. 
   (Grano 2011:433) 
 
Given that both try and the progressive aspect contain an identical extensional component, 
the minimal pairs in (418-422) intuitively highlight the inadequacy of the continuation 
branch approach to the semantics of try. In order to address these issues, Grano offers an 
                                                 
57 We abstract away here from the contribution of the attitudinal component of try; Grano’s observations 
concern only the entailments related to the extensional component of try, which is by definition identical to 
that of the progressive aspect (see examples (416a,417a) above). 
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analysis of try which marries two distinct linguistic hypotheses: (i) the hypothesis that 
eventualities are decomposed into different stages (see e.g., Parsons 1990; Smith 1991; 
Kamp and Reyle 1993; Caudal 2005), and (ii) Condoravdi’s (2009) semantic analysis of 
progressive aspect. 
 Beginning with (i), Grano assumes that any volitional eventuality may be 
decomposed into a number of distinct ‘stages’, which minimally include: (i) a preparatory 
stage, which occurs before the external onset of the event, (ii) an inner stage, which occurs 
after the external onset of the event, and (iii) an endpoint, which denotes event 
culmination.58 For Grano, the progressive aspect entails that the event in question has 
progressed to its inner stage; the event has been externalised, in the relevant sense. On the 
other hand, try entails that the embedded event progresses minimally to the preparatory 
stage (though it may also describe externalised eventualities). Grano motivates this view 
of try based on a tradition in the philosophical literature, such that try denotes a mental 
action (cf. Hornsby 1980; Searle 1983; Pietroski 2008). This pre-theoretical 
conceptualisation provides some purchase on the data in (418-422). Specifically, if the 
progressive aspect entails that the event in question has progressed to its inner stage, and 
has thus become externalised, it follows that any incremental themes will have begun their 
change-of-state along the relevant scale, as in (421a, 422a). Conversely, if try requires only 
that the event be in its preparatory stage, then we correctly predict the lack of any change-
of-state entailments in incremental theme constructions (421b, 422b). 
 Moving on to (ii), Grano employs a variation on Condoravdi’s (2009) semantics for 
the progressive aspect. Condoravdi’s definition of the progressive makes use of two critical 
concepts: (i) a degree semantics, in the spirit of Piñón (2008), and (ii) an ordering source 
in the sense of (Kratzer 1981). Concerning the former, Condoravdi assumes that an 
eventuality is realised to degree d, such that 0 ≤ d ≤ 1. For the latter, we adopt Kratzer’s 
argument that possible worlds may be ranked by an ordering source, based on the definition 
in (423).59 Condoravdi’s definition of the progressive follows in (424). 
 
(423)  u ≤o(w) v  ⟺ {p|p ∈ o(w) ∧ v ∈ p} ⊆ {p|p ∈ o(w) ∧ u ∈ p}  
   (Grano 2011:436, ex. 27) 
 
                                                 
58 Achievements, accomplishments and other change-of-state predicates will arguably include (minimally) 
an additional fourth stage, result state, which holds after the endpoint of the event. 
59 A possible world u is ranked higher than a possible world v relative to an ordering source o in world w iff 
the set of propositions in o(w) that are true in v is a subset of the set of propositions in o(w) that are true in u. 
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(424)   PROG(e, P) is true in w relative to c with contextual standard dc iff: 
 a.  Degree of realisation: for some d, P(w, e, d) and d ≥ dc, 
 b.  Ordering source: there are e', d' and w' such that e ⊂nf e', d ≤ d', w' ≤oi w,  
and P(w', e', d') 
   (Condoravdi 2009:14; Grano 2011:436) 
 
The statement in (424a) ensures that the progressive is only judged true iff event e is 
realised to some degree d in w such that P(w, e, d), and d exceeds a contextually determined 
threshold dc. In (424b) we observe Condoravdi’s use for Kratzer’s ordering source: the 
progressive is true iff there is an event-degree-world triple <e', d', w'>, such that e is a non-
final stage of e', d is less than or equal to degree d', and w' ranks higher than w according 
to some contextually determined ordering source oi (Grano 2011:436-437). 
 We provide Grano’s definition for try in (425) below; Grano’s semantics exploit 
Condoravdi’s analysis of the progressive with two critical alterations. First, we find that, 
rather than requiring a degree d to be realised to a greater degree than some contextually 
determined threshold dc, Grano proposes that try merely requires that d be realised to some 
degree greater than 0 (see (425a)). Second, while the progressive utilises a contextually 
determined ordering source, Grano argues that the ordering source employed in the 
semantics of try is determined by the subject’s intentions (as in (425b)). 
 
(425)   TRY(e, P, a) is true in w iff: 
 a.  Degree of realisation: for some d, P(w, e, d) and d ≥ 0, 
 b.  Ordering source: there are e', d' and w' such that e ⊂nf e', d ≤ d', w' ≤o𝑎 w,  
and P(w', e', d') 
   (where oa is an ordering source based on a’s intentions) 
   (Grano 2011:437, ex. 32) 
 
Grano’s semantics in (425) succeeds in accounting for both an action component and an 
intention component in try constructions. Realisation of P to some degree d that is greater 
than 0 ensures some action (even if that action remains preparatory in nature). Likewise, 
ranking w' higher than w according to an ordering source determined by the subject’s 
intentions provides a natural explanation for the intentional component of try. 
 However, unlike Sharvit’s (2003) account, Grano’s analysis does not predict the 
apparent infelicity of the non-existential readings of embedded indefinites; it is indeed 
possible that the preparatory/mental stage associated with a cutting a tomato event need 
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not involve an actual tomato. Grano argues that, contrary to Sharvit’s observations, the 
apparent unavailability of non-existential readings of indefinite NPs in the complement of 
try is in fact the result of a pragmatic implicature. That is, given the sentence John tried to 
cut a tomato, and on the assumption that John is of sound mind, we understand that John 
is performing some action with the intention of cutting a tomato, and as such the existence 
of a tomato is implied. Some support for Grano’s implicature-based argumentation comes 
from the ability to cancel said implicature, as in (426a). Compare this example with the 
progressive construction in (426b), in which an existential reading of the indefinite is truly 
entailed. 
 
(426) a.  John tried to cut a tomato, but he was hallucinating and there was no tomato to 
cut. 
 b. # John was cutting a tomato, but he was hallucinating and there was no tomato to 
cut. 
   (Grano 2011:439, ex. 38) 
 
Grano’s (2011) semantic analysis of try is adopted by Pearson (2012) to characterise a 
number of implicative predicates. For example, Pearson argues that manage may be defined 
using the same formula as in (425), with only minor modifications. In this case, manage 
requires that P be realised to completion (e.g., d = 1), and presupposes some amount of 
difficulty for the agent. 
 
(427)   manage(e, P, a) is only defined in a context c and a world w if in w there is 
some effort or difficulty involved in being the agent of e for a. 
   manage(e, P, a) is true in w iff: 
 a.  Degree of realisation: for some d, P(w, e, d) and d = 1, 
 b.  Ordering source: there are e', d' and w' such that e ⊂nf e', d ≤ d', w' ≤o𝑎 w,  
and P(w', e', d') 
   (where oa is an ordering source based on a’s intentions) 
   (Pearson 2012:407, ex. 141) 
 
Similarly, Pearson shows that avoid may receive a similar treatment, such that P is realised 
to degree d = 0 and the subject of avoid had no intention of realising P; in this case, the 
ordering source based on a’s intentions ranks w higher than any world in which P is realised 
to a degree greater than 0. 
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(428)   avoid(e, P, a) is true in w iff: 
 a.  Degree of realisation: for some d, P(w, e, d) and d = 0, 
 b.  Ordering source: there are e', d' and w' such that e ⊂nf e', d ≤ d', w ≤o𝑎 w',  
and P(w', e', d') 
   (where oa is an ordering source based on a’s intentions) 
   (Pearson 2012:408, ex. 142) 
 
While the semantic definitions provided for try in (425) as well as the implicatives in (427) 
and (428) adequately characterise the meaning of these various predicates in infinitival 
complementation environments, it must be noted that these various definitions provide no 
means of analysing these predicates in their DP-selecting aspects. 
 
6.3.3. Grano (2017a) 
 
Following Sharvit (2003) and Grano (2011), Grano (2017a) seeks to provide a cross-
linguistic account of try by utilising the familiar action and intention components, as well 
as a coercive causative component in non-control environments. Consider Grano’s 
semantic denotation of the sentence John tried to open the door in (429). Here, Grano 
borrows the function INT from Stephenson (2010), which takes an individual x and world 
w and returns the set of possible worlds compatible with x’s intentions in w. Furthermore, 
Grano assigns try a pseudo-aspectual component, borrowing the initial sub-event relation 
(<init) defined in Piñango and Deo (2016), and employed in chapter 5 of this thesis to 
characterise some aspectual predicates. 
 
(429)   ∃e [Ag(e, j) ∧ ∀w' ∈ INTj,w: ∃e' [e <init  e' ∧ open(e') ∧ Ag(e', j)  
∧ Th(e', d) in w']]  
 
In line with the assumptions of Grano (2011), Grano necessarily assumes here that <init 
relates an event to its initial mental action or preparatory stage; a different and distinct sub-
event relation would need to be defined to characterise a predicate such as begin, which 
arguably relates an event to its initial externalised or inner stage sub-part (see section 6.3.2 
for relevant discussion). The LF in (429) explicitly asserts that the agent of the embedded 
event is John, thereby yielding a control reading, and the aspectual semantics within the 
intentional component yields a necessarily simultaneous interpretation. 
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 However, Grano notes that this kind of analysis of try does not provide any clear 
path to characterising non-control instantiations of try, which are possible in some 
languages. Indeed, Grano notes that for some varieties of English, the predicate try permits 
non-control complements in the form of for-to clauses (as in (430)). Further still, we see in 
(431) that while the Hebrew predicate nisa (tried) requires simultaneity in control 
constructions (see (431a)), non-control constructions (such as in (431b)) are possible. In 
these latter cases, future-orientation of the embedded clause becomes marginally 
acceptable.60,61 
 
(430)   John tried for Bill to leave. 
 
(431) a.  Ha-yom Dani nisa [PRO liftoax et ha-delet (*maxar)]. 
   the-day Dani tried.3MS  open.INF ACC the-door (*tomorrow) 
   ‘Today, Dani tried to open the door (tomorrow).’ 
 b.  Ha-
yom 
Dani nisa [she-Moshe yiftax et ha-delet (%maxar)]. 
   the-day Dani tried.3MS that-Moshe open.3MS.FUT ACC the-door (%tomorrow) 
   ‘Today, Dani tried for Moshe to open the door (tomorrow).’ 
   (Grano 2017a:5-6) 
 
To start, Grano provides the semantic definition in (432) for try. Notice that, for Grano, try 
carries with it the presuppositional restriction that, for any embedded predicate P, any 
individual x that saturates P must be understood as the thematic agent of P.62  
  
                                                 
60 We utilise % to denote speaker variation, according to Grano (2017a). 
61 Grano further extends this generalisation to Spanish, observing that the predicate intendar exhibits both 
control and non-control instantiations, and permits future-orientation in the latter case. However, we contend 
that Spanish possesses an arguably closer cousin to English try in the predicate probar, and furthermore that 
intendar is better translated as intend, which allows both control and non-control constructions in English. 
We therefore omit the Spanish data here, and submit that further investigation is required to determine the 
relevant (non-)control properties of probar. 
62 Grano motivates this presuppositional restriction based on the infelicity of try constructions involving non-
agentive embedded predicates, e.g., #John tried to go through puberty. 
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(432)   TRY(P)(x)(e)(w) is defined iff … 
   ∀y∀e'∀w'[P(y)(e')(w') → Ag(e', y) in w'] 
   where defined, TRY(P)(x)(e)(w) = 1 iff … 
   Ag(e, x) ∧ ∀w' ∈ INTx,w: ∃e'[e <init  e' ∧ P(x)(e')(w')] 
 
This definition will trivially give us the subject-control use of try, as exemplified in (429) 
above but will fail to accommodate apparent non-control cases of try. That is, the English 
example in (430), for those speakers who accept it, appears to violate the presuppositional 
restriction defined in (432), since John is not understood as the agent of the embedded 
event. To account for these non-control constructions, Grano employs a coercive causative 
operator as defined in (433). This operator will take a relevant for-to clause and realise its 
causing event as well as the agent of that causing event.63 
 
(433)  ⟦Op
c
⟧ =  λPλxλeλw∃e'[Cause(e, e') ∧ Ag(e, x) ∧ P(x)(e')(w)] 
   (Grano 2017a:15, ex. 51) 
 
Consider now the example in (434), which provides the logical form of the non-finite 
clausal complement for Bill to leave combined with our causative operator in (433). The 
resulting infinitive denotes the property of individuals who are the agent of the causing 
event of the Bill-leaving event. 
 
(434)   ⟦Op
c
 for Bill to leave⟧ =  λxλeλw∃e'[Cause(e, e') ∧ Ag(e, x) ∧ leave(e')  
∧ Ag(e', Bill)] 
 
When combined with the causative operator, for-to clauses no longer violate the 
presuppositional restriction defined in (432). As we see in (435), try selects the coerced 
for-to clause, instantiates John as the agent of the causing event, and establishes a sub-
event relation between the event of trying and the causing event introduced by Opc. Note 
that the relevant denotation in Grano (2017a) does not include the assertion of the matrix 
subject as the agent of the causing event, but the nature of Opc as defined in (433) makes 
this assertion a necessity. 
                                                 
63 Here Grano follows Pearson (2013) in assuming that all non-finite clauses are property-denoting, and as 
such both subject-less infinitives and non-finite for-to clauses will be of type 〈e, 〈ℰ, st〉〉 (a function from 
individuals to function from eventualities to propositions). 
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(435)   ⟦John tried Op
c
 for Bill to leave⟧ =  ∃e[Ag(e, j) ∧ ∀w' ∈ INTj,w: ∃e'[e <init e'  
∧ Ag(e', j) ∧ ∃e''[Cause(e', e'') ∧ open(e'') ∧ Ag(e'', b) ∧ Th(e'', d) in w']]]  
   (Grano 2017a:12) 
 
For Grano, the availability of future-orientation in non-control instantiations of try is 
expected on the causative analysis in (435), on the hypothesis that the Cause predicate 
establishes a relation of indirect causation (see e.g., Martin and Schäfer 2014). Recall from 
chapter 5 that, for Kratzer (2005), indirect causation is the result of a causing event relation, 
rather than a relation instantiating an event of causing. As such, there is no obligation that 
the causing event and the caused event be temporally contiguous, and as such future-
orientation is available. 
 While Grano’s (2017a) account cannot accommodate DP complements, his 
utilisation of a causative component in the meaning of try will be integral to the analysis 
we construct in section 6.4. However, contra Grano, we will argue that the causative layer 
of the predicate try is not a coerced element realised in only a subset of constructions, but 
rather is present in both control and apparent non-control instantiations of the verb. 
 
6.4. A new proposal for control predicate try 
 
In this section we motivate and formalise a novel account for try in both its infinitival- and 
nominal-selecting aspects. We begin in section 6.4.1 by providing a number of novel 
observations concerning the entailment patterns of try in both nominal and clausal 
complement environments. In 6.4.2 we briefly motivate a view of intentions such that 
goals/intentions are valued relative to an event, rather than to any one particular event 
participant. Finally, in 6.4.3 we provide an analysis of try such that the predicate encodes 
two thematic internal arguments: (i) an actional DP argument and (ii) an intentional/goal-
oriented infinitival argument. 
 
6.4.1. Some novel observations 
 
We begin in this section by observing a number of patterns across try constructions that 
will inform our lexical semantic analysis in section 6.4.3. In particular, we will demonstrate 
that the actions and intentions of try may be conceived of as distinct arguments of the verb. 
Furthermore, we will show that the relationship between try’s extensional/actional 
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component and its intentional component is better captured by a relation of causation rather 
than aspectual parthood (as is argued in Grano 2017a). To start, consider again our 
observation from chapter 2 that when try takes an event-denoting DP complement, 
completion of said event is entailed, as in (436). The opposite is true of infinitival 
complement constructions; as we see in (437), there is no salient entailment that the event 
denoted by the non-finite clause is completed under try. 
 
(436) a.  The government tried the abolition of workers’ rights. 
 b.  ⇒ The government abolished workers’ rights. 
 
(437) a.  The government tried to suppress the uprising. 
 b.  ⇏ The government suppressed the uprising. 
 
We submit the hypothesis that the DP complement in (436a) represents the action while 
the infinitival complement in (437a) encodes the relevant intentions or goals associated 
with the trying event. Furthermore, we propose that in the presence of one argument, the 
other is either entailed or presupposed. That is, if try selects an action-denoting DP 
complement, the resulting construction presupposes some relevant intention. Likewise, if 
try takes an intention in the form of a non-finite clause, the construction entails a relevant 
action. 
 Initial support for this hypothesis comes from the observation that the unrealised 
argument of try is always available in the form of an adjunct. Consider, for example, the 
DP complement construction in (438a); we find that when an actional DP is selected by 
the predicate, the relevant intention may be realised in a purpose clause adjunct. Similarly, 
in the presence of an infinitival intention argument, an action is available in the form of an 
instrumental with-PP, as in (438b). 
 
(438) a.  The government tried the abolition of workers’ rights (in order to suppress the 
uprising). 
 
 b.  The government tried to suppress the uprising (with the abolition of workers’ 
rights). 
 
The fact that try + infinitival complement entails some action is not a new observation; it 
was this principle that motivated Sharvit’s (2003) progressive account of try, as discussed 
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in Section 6.3.1. In order to make this entailment explicit, we may demonstrate that the 
entailment of some action in (439) disappears under question formation (as in (440)) as 
well as under negation (see (441)). These observations suggest that the relevant action is 
truly entailed by the predicate, rather than merely presupposed. 
 
(439) a.  The government tried to suppress the uprising. 
 b.  ⇒ The government performed some action x with the intention of suppressing 
the uprising. 
 
(440) a.  Did the government try to suppress the uprising? 
 b.  ⇏ The government performed some action x with the intention of suppressing 
the uprising. 
 
(441) a.  The government did not try to suppress the uprising. 
 b.  ⇏ The government performed some action x with the intention of suppressing 
the uprising. 
 
Critically, previous work on try has failed to observe the related presuppositional pattern 
found in non-clausal complement environments. Specifically, when try selects a DP 
complement which denotes its action, it presupposes a relevant intention to bring about 
some property P. Consider, for example, the utterance in (442a). The use of try in this 
environment intuitively implies that the government has some motivation for performing 
the described action, otherwise a predicate such as carry out or perform would be deemed 
more appropriate. We note in (442b,c) that this utterance is compatible with both a reading 
in which the actions of the government are understood in conjunction with a property P 
that the government intends to manifest, as well as a reading in which the government 
performs its actions just for fun.  
 
(442) a.  The government tried the abolition of workers’ rights. 
 b.  ⇒ The government performed an action involving the abolition of workers’ 
rights with the intention of bringing about some P. 
 c.  ⇒ The government performed an action involving the abolition of workers’ 
rights (just for fun). 
 
Furthermore, we may demonstrate that the intention to bring about some property P is 
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indeed a presupposition rather than an entailment. We see in (443) and (444) that under 
question formation and negation, it is still implied that the government possesses some 
relevant intention to manifest some property P in accordance with its actions. 
 
(443) a.  Did the government try the abolition of workers’ rights? 
 b.  ⇒ The government has the intention of bringing about some P (and the abolition 
of workers’ rights may be implicated in bringing about P). 
 
(444) a.  The government did not try the abolition of workers’ rights. 
 b.  ⇒ The government has the intention of bringing about some P (though the 
abolition of workers’ rights is not implicated in bringing about P). 
 
It is furthermore useful to note that the observations in (442)-(444) readily extend to 
environments involving non-eventive DP complements. Consider the example in (445a); 
we again find in (445b,c) that this utterance is compatible with both a reading in which the 
mechanic is understood as having some intentions behind his actions (presumably to repair 
the car), as well as a just for fun reading.  
 
(445) a.  The mechanic tried a new carburettor.  
 b.  ⇒ The mechanic performed an action involving a new carburettor with the 
intention of bringing about some P. 
 c.  ⇒ The mechanic performed an action involving a new carburettor (just for fun). 
 
As expected, the presupposition of some intention to bring about some P persists under 
question formation (446) and negation (447). 
 
(446) a.  Did the mechanic try a new carburettor? 
 b.  ⇒ The mechanic has the intention of bringing about some P (and a new 
carburettor may be implicated in bringing about P). 
 
(447) a.  The mechanic did not try a new carburettor. 
 b.  ⇒ The mechanic has the intention of bringing about some P (though a new 
carburettor is not implicated in bringing about P). 
 
Having established both the entailment of an action in the presence of an intention, as well 
 226 
as the presupposition of an intention in the presence of an action, we will move on to 
consider the relation between these two thematic arguments. Specifically, we will 
demonstrate that Grano’s (2011, 2017a) aspectual approach to the relation between action 
and intention does not sufficiently capture the meaning of try. 
 First, we may observe that the relation between the action event and the intention 
event need not be one of structural parthood. Consider, for example, a scenario in which 
Mary suffers from agoraphobia. This morning she woke up with the intention of leaving 
her house and crossing the street. For hours she paced the floor in her foyer, psyching 
herself up for the task at hand. However, in the end, Mary was too frightened and never left 
her house. In this context, the try construction in (448) is perfectly acceptable. 
 
(448)   Mary tried to cross the street today. 
 
The grammaticality of (448) is unexpected on Grano’s (2017a) definition of try, in which 
try instantiates an initial sub-event relation in all suitable INT worlds (see (432) above). For 
this to be true, it is necessary to make the undesirable assumption that what Mary did in the 
evaluation world (pace back and forth in the foyer) constitutes the initial sub-event of a 
Mary crossing the street event in all worlds compatible with her intentions, despite the 
spatial dislocation of the two events. This issue is related to Grano’s (2011) observation 
that the trying event need not be physically externalised; recall that, in a scenario in which 
John has been paralysed from the neck down, the try construction in (449a) is acceptable 
while the begin construction in (449b) is infelicitous. 
 
(449) a.  John tried to raise his arm. 
 b. # John began to raise his arm. 
 
Grano accounts for this variability by appealing to the notion of mental action stages of 
events, which need only exist internally to the subject (see Kamp & Reyle 1993; Caudal 
2005). On this account, the initial sub-event relation <init would necessarily be read as 
relating an event to its initial mental action event. While this strategy provides a nice 
explanation for the minimal pair in (449) (on the assumption that the relevant sub-event 
instantiated by begin must be externalised), its relevance to (448) remains unclear. That is, 
unlike our paraplegic in (449), Mary’s actions regarding her intentions in (448) are very 
much externalised. 
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 Further still, Grano’s appeal to mental action stages of events raises a non-trivial 
problem regarding the animacy requirements of those predicates which may be embedded 
under try. To illustrate, consider again the minimal pair in (449); according to Grano, try 
requires only that the embedded event raise is realised to its mental action stage. However, 
the nature of mental action becomes unclear given the observation in (450) that raise can 
otherwise appear with inanimate subjects. Indeed, many predicate-types which appear in 
the embedded position of try constructions – such as causative predicates (451) and activity 
verbs (452) – can trivially realise inanimate subjects in alternative environments. 
 
(450) a.  The torrential rain raised the water level in the canal. 
 b.  Archimedes’ new pulley system was able to raise heavy objects with ease. 
 
(451) a.  John tried to melt the snow. 
 b.  The sun melted the snow. 
 
(452) a.  John tried to roll the ball down the street. 
 b.  The ball rolled down the street. 
 
These observations are incomprehensible on any account in which predicates such as raise, 
melt and roll encode mental action in all instantiations. It follows that Grano’s appeal to 
event stages would require a further stipulation such that the eventualities denoted by verbs 
contain mental action stages iff a given verb’s subject satisfies a [+animate] selectional 
restriction. Given the added complexity such an ambiguity introduces, we argue that an 
alternative characterisation of the relation between try and its embedded verb is necessary. 
 Finally, we may demonstrate that the aspectual/temporal relation between try and 
the eventuality denoted by the embedded verb is not accurately characterised by the <init 
relation. For instance, consider the examples in (453) involving the predicate begin. In 
(453a), we see that the habitual temporal modifier on Sundays may specifically target the 
eventuality denoted by the embedded VP go to church, thereby resulting in a going to 
church on Sundays event. Furthermore, we see in example (453b) that this kind of event 
modification may obviate the typical tense mismatch constraint associated with predicates 
of exhaustive control (see Landau 2000). We provide an appropriate paraphrase of (453b) 
in (453c) below. 
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(453) a.  John began to go to church on Sundays. 
 b.  This week, John began to go to church on Sundays. 
 c.  → John is the agent of a begin event which occurred this week, and is the initial 
sub-event of an ongoing going to church event which occurs regularly on 
Sundays. 
 
It is useful to note that the eventuality denoted by go to church in (453b) above is 
unbounded with regard to the temporal modifier this week. That is, we interpret the 
embedded event as regularly occurring beyond the scope of this particular seven-day 
interval. 
 Turning now to try constructions, we find in (454a) that – like begin – the predicate 
embedded beneath try may be modified by a habitual temporal modifier. However, we see 
in (454b) that modification of the matrix clause by this week results in ungrammaticality. 
Crucially, the example becomes grammatical again in (454c) when we replace this week 
with this year, thereby suggesting that the root of ungrammaticality in (454b) is that 
particular modifier rather than general temporal modification of the matrix clause. 
 
(454) a.  John tried to go to church on Sundays. 
 b. * This week, John tried to go to church on Sundays. 
 c.  This year, John tried to go to church on Sundays. 
 
The examples in (454b) and (454c) provide a useful minimal pair regarding the aspectual 
properties of try constructions. On the assumption that begin instantiates a bona fide initial 
sub-event relation with its complement, the unavailability of the try construction in (454b) 
suggests that try does not manifest a similar relation; try is incompatible with an embedded 
event which extends beyond its temporal bounds. Rather, we see in (454c) that try is only 
compatible with temporal modification of this sort if the habitual time of the embedded 
event is wholly contained within the scope of the matrix temporal modifier. That is, the 
example in (454c) is only compatible with a reading such that the Sundays on which John 
tries to go to church are contained within this year.  
Thus, we propose that the relation between the actional component of try and its 
intended outcome is one of direct causation, rather than one of aspectual part-whole 
structure. This notion will be fleshed out in section 6.4.3, where we will once again make 
use of Kratzer’s (2005) distinction between events of causing and events that cause. Pre-
theoretically, we will argue that the actional trying event constitutes an event of causing the 
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property denoted in the complement infinitival clause, specifically in the set of possible 
worlds compatible with the goals associated with the subject’s actions.  
 
6.4.2. The event-relativity of intentions 
 
Before we formalise our analysis of try in English clausal and nominal complement 
environments, we must first address the notion of intention worlds. Recall our assumption 
that the external argument is absent in the lexical semantics of a verb, following Kratzer’s 
(1996) Voice hypothesis. This assumption is prima facie incompatible with the encoding 
of Stephenson’s (2010) INT function in the definition of a predicate such as try (see 
example (432) above); INT returns the set of possible worlds consistent with a subject’s 
intentions, yet lexical verbs do not, by hypothesis, encode a subject. In this section we will 
pursue the notion that (some) intentions may be expressed relative to events, rather than to 
individuals.64 
 To begin, we note the observation from Farkas (1988) that some infinitival purpose 
clauses may be adjoined to VPs with inanimate subjects (see also Grano 2017b). For 
example, consider the data in (455) below; in either case, the purpose clause adjunct 
expresses an intention that cannot be construed as relative to the matrix subject’s attitude 
(given that in each utterance, the matrix subject is inanimate). 
 
(455) a.  The shopwindow has a big sale sign in it in order to attract customers. 
   (Farkas 1988:36) 
 b.  The new Fender Stratocaster comes standard with high gain humbuckers in 
order to appeal to a more contemporary demographic. 
 
For Farkas, examples such as those in (455) are indicative of the existence of an underlying 
two-place thematic responsibility relation, labelled RESP, which takes an individual i and 
a situation s and asserts that i acts with the intention of bringing about result s. Crucially, 
the individual in question need not be present in the syntax, thereby explaining the 
grammaticality of the inanimate subjects in (455). A full investigation of the RESP 
predicate and its implications would take us too far afield, but cf. Grano (2017b) for useful 
discussion of RESP in relation to the predicate intend. 
                                                 
64 It may be more conceptually harmonious to consider ‘intentions relative to events’ as an alternative term 
for ‘event goals.’ For the sake of consistency, we will retain the term ‘intentions’ and the functional label INT 
throughout. 
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 Outside the scope of Farkas’ responsibility relation, we note that the data in (455) 
is largely consistent with an assumption made by Nissenbaum (2005) such that rationale 
clauses may express the goals of a volitional event, rather than the intentions of any one 
event participant.65 By way of illustration, consider Nissenbaum’s denotation of the 
sentence Varitek took the A train in order to go to Harlem. We find that both the VP in 
(456a) and the infinitive in (456b) denote predicates of events, and thus may combine via 
predicate modification, as in (456c). Note, here and below we adopt an extensional view of 
intentional semantics; this is merely a notational decision, and nothing hereafter hinges on 
this choice. 
 
(456) a.  ⟦Varitek take the A train⟧ =  λw.λe.take(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, the-A-train)  
∧ Agent(e, Varitek) 
 b.  ⟦(in order) to go to Harlem⟧ =  λw.λe.∀w'[w' is compatible with the goals  
relevant to e in w: PRO goes to Harlem in w']  
 c.  ⟦Varitek take the A train in order to go to Harlem⟧ = λw.λe.take(e)(w)  
∧ Theme(e, the-A-train) ∧ Agent(e, Varitek) ∧ ∀w'[w' is compatible with the  
goals relevant to e in w: PRO goes to Harlem in w']  
 
Nissenbaum’s relativity of intentions to event goals provides a natural explanation to the 
examples in (455). In the case of (455a), the intention of attracting customers may be stated 
relative to the goals of the stative eventuality described by the matrix clause, in which a 
sign hangs in the window. Likewise, in (455b) the outcome of the guitar being more 
appealing to a certain demographic may be expressed as goal of the matrix event, rather 
than as an intention of some unrealised, implicit participant. 
 We submit that the kinds of intentions described by the predicate try in its various 
instantiations are best expressed as event goals, rather than individual intentions. Consider, 
for example, the utterance in (457) involving a volitional event with an arguably inanimate 
subject. 
 
(457)   Stomach acids break down complex sugars in order for the body to more easily 
process the nutrients. 
 
                                                 
65 By ‘volitional event’, we mean any event that is not understood to be involuntary. On this definition, VPs 
such as go through puberty will describe non-volitional events and are thus predictably incompatible with 
goals/intentions. This notion is likewise consistent with Farkas (1988). 
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It would be disingenuous to suggest that the noun phrase stomach acids denotes a volitional 
agent with the capacity for intentions. Likewise, it is extremely odd to say that the infinitive 
in (457) expresses the set of worlds compatible with the intentions of stomach acids. 
Rather, it is far more intuitive to assert that biological processes can be goal-oriented. As 
such, we might suggest that the purpose clause in (457) denotes the set of worlds 
compatible with the goals of breaking down complex sugars. This hypothesis is consistent 
with the unacceptability of (458); on the assumption that the predicate intend does, in fact, 
express the intentions of its subject, stomach acids does not constitute a licit intention-
holder. 
 
(458)  # The stomach acids intended to break down the chewing gum. 
 
Crucially for our purposes, the infelicity of (458) disappears when we replace intend with 
the predicate try in (459). This useful minimal pair suggests that, while the intentions 
encoded by the predicate intend are expressed relative to an individual intender, the 
intentions described by try are expressed relative to the goals of the trying event itself. 
 
(459)   The stomach acids tried to break down the chewing gum. 
 
The variation between (458) and (459) is not an isolated case; consider the minimal pairs 
in (460-463) below. In each case, an inanimate subject is incompatible with intend but 
readily acceptable as the external argument to try. 
 
(460) a. # The iPhone X intended to appeal to a new market. 
 b.  The iPhone X tried to appeal to a new market. 
 
(461) a. # Ale intended to supplant lager as the American drink of choice. 
 b.  Ale tried to supplant lager as the American drink of choice. 
 
 
(462) a. # The gas guzzlers of the 1970’s intended to find a niche in an increasingly green 
21st Century. 
 b.  The gas guzzlers of the 1970’s tried to find a niche in an increasingly green 21st 
Century. 
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(463) a. # Growing housing prices intended to push out the lower classes from south 
Brooklyn. 
 b.  Growing housing prices tried to push out the lower classes from south 
Brooklyn. 
 
These observations are unexpected on any account which holds that try encodes intention 
to the same extent that intend does. 
Given these data, we will redefine the function INT as employed in Grano (2017a) 
to be a function that takes an event e and world w and returns the set of worlds compatible 
with the goals of e in w, as defined below. 
 
(464)   INT relative to events 
   INTw,e: {w': w' is compatible with the goals of e in w} 
 
We will exploit this revised definition of INT in section 6.4.3 as we formalise our lexical 
semantics for the predicate try. 
 
6.4.3. Actions and intentions in the semantics of try 
 
In characterising the semantic definition of try, we take as our starting point the 
observations from examples (445)-(447) that the DP complement of try may be non-
eventive. That is, in the mechanic tried a new carburettor, the DP object a new carburettor 
does not denote an event but rather an individual. As such, we propose first that DP 
complements of try merge as thematic Themes of the predicate. We provide an initial Neo-
Davidsonian semantic representation in (465). Note that we abstract away from world 
variables for now. 
 
(465)   try (version 1) 
   ⟦try⟧ = λy.λe. try(e) ∧ Theme(e, y) 
 
While simplistic, the definition in (465) provides us with a method to compose try with 
both individual- and event-denoting nominals. That is, it must be assumed independently 
of our discussion here that the two-place Theme predicate may act on either an individual 
of type 〈e〉 or an event per se of type 〈v〉. This assumption is supported by the fact that 
(generally) all transitive verbs may alternate between individual- and event-denoting DP 
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objects.66 
 
(466) a.  John watched the TV. 
 b.  John watched the inspection of the factory. 
 
(467) a.  Mary likes to talk about flowers. 
 b.  Mary likes to talk about the criminal investigation of her sister. 
 
(468) a.  Bill heard about the letter. 
 b.  Bill heard about Teresa’s expression of her darkest secrets. 
 
As such, we may compose both individual-denoting DPs, such as the new carburettor, 
along with event-denoting DPs, such as the installation of a new carburettor by means of 
the same thematic function. These two possibilities are spelled out in (469a) and (469b), 
respectively. 
 
(469) a.  ⟦try the new carburettor⟧ = λe. try(e) ∧ Theme(e, ιy[new-carburettor(y)]) 
 b.  ⟦try the installation of a new carburettor⟧ = λe. try(e)  
∧ Theme(e, ιe'[install-new-carburettor(e')]) 
 
However, the examples in (469) raise two problematic questions for our burgeoning 
analysis of try. First, why does the individual-denoting DP in (469a) appear to require some 
amount of event coercion in order to be interpretable? Second, how to we account for the 
apparent exhaustive control into event-denoting nominals, such as in (469b)? 
 We submit that both of these questions may be adequately answered by 
understanding what it means for e to be an event of trying. From Sharvit (2003) we know 
that try instantiates some action on the part of the subject in the real world. That is, 
disregarding any intentional component in the denotation of try, the subject of a trying 
event does something. One rather heavy-handed way to incorporate this into the denotation 
of try is to invoke a semantic primitive along the lines of a DO predicate (in the spirit of 
Dowty 1979). In this way, we ensure that any agent of e is interpreted as the doer of any 
theme of e, thereby yielding the desired exhaustive control relation. Furthermore, this 
                                                 
66 Indeed, this is in line with work by Lasersohn (1995), who does away with the type distinction between 
events and individuals. For our purposes, we will retain this distinction, but note that our conclusions are 
compatible with either perspective. 
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definition necessitates the coercion of any non-event-denoting DPs that merge as the 
complement to try; individuals cannot, by hypothesis, undergo a DO event in the relevant 
sense. An alternative method, and the one we will pursue here, will be to assign to the 
definition of try a selectional restriction (following Grano 2017a) incorporating a requisite 
sense that e is an event of performing, as outlined in the following statement in (470) below. 
 
(470)   try (version 2) 
   ⟦try⟧(𝑦)(𝑒) is defined iff e is a volitional event of performing y. Where 
defined… 
   ⟦try⟧ = λy.λe. try(e) ∧ Theme(e, y) 
 
Motivation for incorporating an underlying perform in the definition for try comes from 
the fact that both try and perform enforce obligatory control into their event-denoting DP 
complements, as observed in (471). With this restriction in place, we have a natural 
explanation for both the apparent effects of control into eventive DPs as well as the coerced 
nature of non-eventive DP complements. 
 
(471) a.  The mechanici tried [DP PROi/*j the installation of a new carburettor]. 
 b.  The mechanici performed [DP PROi/*j the installation of a new carburettor]. 
 
Before moving on to the more intentional components of try, it is worth noting that this 
analysis of try in its DP-selecting aspect trivially predicts the entailment of any events 
within the denotation of a complement DP. That is, any event nominalisation merging as 
the theme of try will be contained within the scope of matrix Aspect, and therefore subject 
to its restrictions. By way of illustration, consider an example in which the VP the 
government try the abolition of workers’ rights merges with perfective aspect, as in (473) 
(we assume the denotation for perfective aspect as introduced in chapter 5, defined in 
(380)). 
 
(472)   ⟦PERFECTIVE⟧ = λP〈v,t〉.λti. ∃e[P(e) ∧ τ(e) ⊂ t ] 
 
(473)   λt.∃e[try(e) ∧ Theme(e, ιe'[abolition(e')])  
∧ Agent(e, ιx[government(x)]) ∧ τ(e) ⊂ t]  
 
Given that the abolition event is the thematic object of event e, and assuming some set of 
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relevant mapping parameters between events and objects (such as those discussed in Krifka 
1992), it follows that in any world in which e culminates, the direct object e' will be entailed 
to completion.67 
 Moving on, while our semantic definition in (465) provides an arguably adequate 
description for the extensional component of the predicate try, it is currently woefully 
inadequate as a full definition. Specifically, it lacks any of the intentional aspects that 
characterise the attitudinal nature of try and provides no means of composing the predicate 
with infinitival complements. In order to rectify these shortcomings, we will first supply 
the predicate with an argument P of type 〈v,t〉. Asserting the non-finite complement of try 
to be a predicate of events echoes our argumentation from chapter 5, and is in line with the 
VP/VoiceP analysis of simultaneous infinitives (see Wurmbrand 1998, 2001, 2002, et seq.). 
Next, we will employ the INT function as redefined in section 6.4.2, example (464); we 
allow INT to range over the set of possible worlds compatible with the goals of the try event 
e in w. Furthermore, we introduce an existentially quantified event e' in w' such that our 
predicate of events P holds of e' in w'. We provide a revised lexical entry for try in (474) 
below, introducing world variables in the spirit of von Fintel and Heim (2011), such that 
all predicates take a world argument which is later closed off by a pronominal world 
element. 
 
(474)  try (version 3) 
   ⟦try⟧(𝑃)(𝑦)(𝑒)(𝑤) is defined iff e is a volitional event of performing y in w. 
Where defined… 
   ⟦try⟧ = λP〈v,t〉.λy.λe.λw. try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, y) in w ∧ ∀w' ∈ INTw,e:  
∃e'[ P(e') in w' ] 
 
The use of INT in (474) gives us essentially the meaning that Nissenbaum (2005) associates 
with rationale clauses; for all worlds w' that are compatible with the goals of e in w, there 
is some event e' of which P holds. However, while this denotation may be adequate in 
describing typical rationale clauses (which arguably require only that the event they 
describe hold in all relevant possible worlds), it does not accurately depict the relation 
between the trying event e and the desired outcome P(e'). 
 We saw in section 6.3.3 that Grano attempts to solve this issue by positing an 
                                                 
67 See in particular the principles of uniqueness of objects, mapping to objects and mapping to events, as 
discussed in Krifka (1992). 
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aspectual parthood relation between e and e', such that e is the initial sub-event of e'. 
However, we observed a number of non-trivial problems with this view in section 6.4.1. 
Instead, we will leverage the apparent causative nature of try as discussed in section 6.4.1 
in order to link the extensional event e with the intentional event e'. Specifically, we will 
assume following our discussion in chapter 5 the existence of a two-place semantic 
predicate Cause that relates two event variables and encodes an event of causing, as defined 
by Kratzer (2005) as in (365) below. We furthermore submit our fourth revision of the 
lexical entry for try in (476). 
 
(475)   Events of causing other events 
   An event e is an event of causing an event e' iff e is the sum of all the members 
of some causal chain C with maximal element e'. 
 
(476)  try (version 4) 
   ⟦try⟧(𝑃)(𝑦)(𝑒)(𝑤) is defined iff e is a volitional event of performing y in w. 
Where defined… 
   ⟦try⟧ = λP〈v,t〉.λy.λe.λw. try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, y) in w ∧ ∀w' ∈ INTw,e:  
∃e'[ P(e') in w' ∧ Cause(e, e') ] 
 
According to (476), try(P)(y)(e) is true in w iff e is an event of trying some theme y in w, 
and in all worlds w' compatible with the goals of the trying event e, there is an event e' such 
that some predicate of events P holds of e' in w' and e is an event of causing e'. This 
definition seems to intuitively capture the meaning of try, such that one performs some 
action with the intention of bringing about (viz. causing) some property to hold whenever 
that action is ‘successful’ in the relevant sense.  
Crucially in (476) we arrive at the correct entailment pattern, such that event-
denoting DP complements are entailed while non-finite complements are not (see 
especially examples (436) and (437) above). As discussed earlier in this section, DP 
complements are entailed by virtue of combining as a thematic Theme argument of the 
predicate in the evaluation world w. On the other hand, the predicate of events denoted by 
non-finite VP/VoiceP complements to try exists only within the scope of the intentional 
function INT. That is, the predicate P only holds in the set of possible worlds w' in which 
the goals of e in w come to fruition; it does not hold in the evaluation world w. 
 To illustrate the semantic content of try in relation to an infinitival complement, 
consider the logical form in (477). Assuming the existential closure of the event variable e 
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as well as the theme argument y, the utterance comes to denote the set of worlds in which 
there is a trying event e in world w with some theme y in w and whose agent is the unique 
individual the government, and in all worlds w' compatible with the goals of e in w there is 
some event e' in w' such that e' is a suppressing event in w' and whose theme is the unique 
individual the uprising, and e is an event of causing e' in w'. Note that, for the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that the non-finite clause merges as a subject-less VP, and abstract 
away from the semantic contribution of Aspect and Tense. 
 
(477)  ⟦The government tried to suppress the uprising⟧ = λw.∃e∃y[ try(e)(w)  
∧ Theme(e, y) in w ∧ Agent(e, ιx[government(x)]) ∧ ∀w' ∈ INTw,e: ∃e' 
[ suppress(e')(w') ∧ Theme(e', ιz[uprising(z)]) ∧ Cause(e, e') ]] 
 
Next, consider the semantic content of try in relation to an event-denoting DP complement, 
as in example (478). Here we again assume the existential closure of the event variable e, 
along with existential closure of our predicate of events P. As such, the resulting logical 
form denotes the set of worlds in which there is an event e of trying the unique event the 
abolition of workers’ rights in w and whose agent is the unique individual the government, 
and in all worlds w' compatible with the goals of e in w there is an event e' in w' such that 
some P holds of e' and e is an event of causing e' in w'. 
 
(478)   ⟦The government tried the abolition of workers' rights⟧
= λw.∃e∃P〈v,t〉[ try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, ιe''[abolish-workers'-rights(e'')]) in w  
∧ Agent(e, ιx[government(x)]) ∧ ∀w' ∈ INTw,e: ∃e'[ P(e')(w') ∧ Cause(e, e') ]] 
 
We note that the logical form in (477) correctly predicts the entailment of a relevant action 
in accordance with the goals of the try event, as per section 6.4.1. The realisation of a non-
finite VP/VoicP names an intention; in actuality it describes the property that the goals of 
the trying event seek to manifest. In order to form a complete expression, the unsaturated 
internal theme argument must be existentially closed. Given that the theme in try 
constructions denotes the action that is to be performed by the trier, the relevant entailment 
is predicted. However, the logical form in (478) does not reflect the presuppositional nature 
of intentions in try constructions involving an action-denoting DP complement. Recall 
from section 6.4.1 that try constructions retain a sense of underlying intention/motivation 
even under question formation and negation, thereby suggesting that intentions are 
presupposed in these cases rather than entailed. In (478), on the other hand, the relevant 
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intention supplied by some predicate of events P is existentially closed, thereby implicating 
an entailment relation similar to the one observed in example (477). 
 In order to properly build in the intention of trying as a presupposition rather than 
an entailment, we will first remove the predicate of events argument P〈v,t〉 from the lexical 
semantics of try. This will yield a very simple lexical entry for try, similar to that depicted 
in (470) above. To this definition we supply the presupposition that there is some intention 
to bring about some property P in accordance with the goals of the trying event. 
 
(479)   try (final version) 
   ⟦try⟧(𝑦)(𝑒)(𝑤) is defined iff e is a volitional event of performing y in w. Where 
defined… 
   ⟦try⟧ = λy.λe.λw. try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, y) in w 
   presupposes the intention to bring about some property P relevant to the goals 
of e in w 
 
The definition in (479) provides us with almost everything we need to properly characterise 
try: (i) it provides a manner of composition for both eventive and non-eventive DPs, (ii) it 
ensures that any licit use of try will invoke a sense of performing y, thereby resulting in the 
necessary control and coercive properties observed into DP complements, and (iii) it yields 
the appropriate entailments/presuppositions, as outlined in section 6.4.1. Armed with this 
semantics, the next section will readdress the causative component of try and matters of the 
missing intentional argument. 
 
6.4.4. Composing try with its infinitive 
 
The prevailing question, then, is how do we compose non-finite clausal complements with 
try if it is not an argument of the verb itself? For inspiration, we turn to the decompositional 
approach to attitudinal predicates (see e.g. Kratzer 2006; Moulton 2009; Elliott 2016, a.o.). 
These authors critically reject the Hintikkan-style intentional semantics (cf. Hintikka 1962) 
which holds that attitudinal predicates are quantifiers over a set of doxastic alternatives.68 
Instead, they attempt to build quantification over possible worlds into the semantics of the 
CP complements to attitudinal predicates. Consider the differences between the lexical 
                                                 
68 We may define the set of doxastic alternatives for x as the set of possible worlds w' such that it is compatible 
with what x believes in w for w' to be the world that x inhabits (cf. Hintikka 1962, 1969; Lewis 1979; Chierchia 
1989, a.o.). 
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entry for believe in (480) and the lexical entry in (481). The former takes as its arguments 
a proposition p and an individual attitude holder x and asserts that p holds in all worlds in 
the set of x’s doxastic alternatives. The latter holds that believe denotes a relation between 
an eventuality e and individual x, such that e is an event of believing and x is the content of 
what is believed (we follow the notational style in Moulton (2014) in allowing xc to stand 
for individuals that have content). 
 
(480)   believe (Hintikkan-style) 
   ⟦believe⟧ = λp.λx.λw. ∀w'[w' ∈ Dox(x)(w) → p(w')] 
 
(481)   believe (decompositional) 
   ⟦believe⟧ = λxc.λe.λw. believe(xc)(e)(w) 
 
As mentioned above, the decompositional approach in (481) holds that the quantification 
over possible worlds is a component of the complement CP, rather than of the predicate 
itself. For instance, Kratzer (2006) posits a logophoric complementiser thatL which takes a 
proposition and returns a predicate of contents.  
 
(482)   ⟦thatL⟧ = λp.λxc.∀w' [compatible(xc)(w') → p(w')] 
 
Any resulting CP built from thatL will be a predicate of individuals with content (of type 
〈e,t〉), and as such may combine with the decompositional denotation of believe in (481) 
via the method Restrict (Chung and Ladusaw 2004), thereby restricting the open content 
argument xc and subsequently closing it with existential closure. For example, consider the 
logical form of the CP that there are ghosts in (483), and the composition of this CP with 
the predicate believe in example (484). 
 
(483)  ⟦that there are ghosts⟧ = λxc.∀w' [compatible(xc)(w') → ∃y[ghosts(y)(w')]]  
 
(484)   ⟦believe that there are ghosts⟧ = λe.λw.∃xc [believe(xc)(e)(w)  
∧ ∀w' [compatible(xc)(w') → ∃y[ghosts(y)(w')]]  
   (Kratzer 2006:3) 
 
The resulting logical form denotes the set of believing events such that there is some x that 
is believed, and the content of x in all compatible worlds is the proposition there are ghosts. 
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With the introduction of an external possessor argument (presumably made available by a 
non-eventive possessive Voice head) and with the existential closure of the eventuality 
argument, we arrive at the logical form in (485). Put plainly, this LF denotes the set of 
worlds in which there is an eventuality of Lucy believing some x, and the content of x is 
the proposition there are ghosts. 
 
(485)   ⟦Lucy believes that there are ghosts⟧ = λw.∃e∃xc [believe(xc)(e)(w)  
∧ Poss(e, Lucy) in w ∧ ∀w' [compatible(xc)(w') → ∃y[ghosts(y)(w')]]  
   (Kratzer 2006:3) 
 
We would like to suggest that the intentional complement to try may be handled in a manner 
similar to that found in the decompositional approach to attitudinal predicates.69 
Specifically, we will construct a modal operator OpINT (following Grano’s (2017a) 
causative operator) which will take a non-finite predicate of events P and return the set of 
events e such that, in all worlds compatible with the goals of e (viz. all worlds w' that are 
members of INTw,e), e is an event of causing some event e' and P(e'). To this end, we will 
invoke the same causative verbal structure implicated in aspectual constructions in chapter 
5, incorporating Pylkkännen’s (2008) verbal CAUSE head, as defined in (348). 
 
(486)    ⟦CAUSE⟧ = λP<v,t>.λe.λw.∃e'[P(e') ∧ Cause(e, e') in w] 
 
We furthermore define OpINT as a function from predicates of causing events to the set of 
event-world pairs compatible with the goals of e in w. As illustrated in (487), we allow the 
selectional restrictions imposed by OpINT to ensure P is causative in nature. 
 
(487)   OpINT(P)(e)(w) is defined iff P is [+CAUSE] 
   ⟦Op
INT
⟧ = λP〈v,t〉λe.λw.∀w' ∈ INTw,e[ P(e)(w') ] 
 
By way of illustration, consider the logical form in (488a), which constitutes the 
composition of the non-finite VP to suppress the uprising with the verbal CAUSE head. 
The resulting expression denotes the set of events e in w which stand in an event of causing 
relation with some e', and e' is an event of suppressing the uprising. Subsequently, 
                                                 
69 That at least some infinitives denote modal expressions is in line with Moulton’s (2009) analysis of for-to 
clause complements to perception predicates; see also Grano (2016) for related discussion. 
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composition of this CAUSE-P with our intentional operator OpINT gives us the logical form 
in (488b). Here we see that OpINT ensures that the predicate of events denoted by our 
CAUSE-P occurs strictly within the scope of INTw,e. That is, OpINT takes a predicate of 
causing events and returns a set of events e in w such that, in all worlds w' compatible with 
the goals of e, e is an event of causing some e' in w'. 
 
(488) a.  ⟦CAUSE to suppress the uprising⟧ = λe.λw.∃e'[suppress(e')(w')  
∧ Theme(e', ιz[uprising(z)]) ∧ Cause(e, e') in w] 
 b.  ⟦Op
c
 CAUSE to suppress the uprising⟧ = λe.λw.∀w' ∈ INTw,e 
[∃e' [suppress(e')(w') ∧ Theme(e', ιz[uprising(z)]) ∧ Cause(e, e') in w' ]] 
 
As a predicate of events, we may thus combine the infinitive in (488b) with the verb try by 
means of predicate modification (Heim and Kratzer 1998), as in (489a). The resulting 
construction denotes the set of trying events e with some theme y in w such that, in all world 
w' compatible with the goals of e in w, there is some event e' such that e' is a suppressing 
the uprising event in w' and e is an event of causing e' in w'. The introduction of an agentive 
Voice head plus the existential closure of the event variable e gives us the logical form in 
(489b). Crucially, we note that the expression in (489b) is truth-conditionally equivalent to 
the logical form in example (477) above, in which the intentional argument P was encoded 
within the lexical semantics of try. 
 
(489) a.  ⟦try to suppress the uprising⟧ = λe.λw.∃y[ try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, y) in w 
∀w' ∈ INTw,e[∃e'[suppress(e')(w') ∧ Theme(e', ιz[uprising(z)])  
∧ Cause(e, e') in w' ]]] 
 b.  ⟦the gov. try to suppress the uprising⟧ = λw.∃e∃y[ try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, y) 
∧ Agent(e, gov) ∧ ∀w' ∈ [∃e'[suppress(e')(w') ∧ Theme(e', ιz[uprising(z)])  
∧ Cause(e, e') in w' ]]] 
 
In approaching the intention argument of try from a decompositional perspective, we have 
provided a means by which try may combine with intention-denoting infinitives, while 
simultaneously accounting for the presuppositional status of the intention in the absence of 
an infinitival complement. Furthermore, baking the Cause predicate into the complement 
allows us to retain the causative nature of the relation between the action and intention 
components, while allowing the actual lexical definition of try to remain relatively 
simplistic. 
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6.4.5. Further complications 
 
The final question in discussing the composition of try with its various potential 
complements concerns the existential closure of the theme, as well as the impossibility of 
realising both arguments simultaneously. To this latter point, we note that there is nothing 
prima facie to rule out the projection of both a theme y and an intentional complement P, 
such as in the hypothetical LF in (490).  
 
(490)   ⟦gov. try the abolition of workers' rights to suppress the uprising⟧ = 
λw.∃e[ try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, abolition) ∧ Agent(e, gov) ∧ ∀w' ∈ INTw,e [∃e' 
[suppress(e')(w') ∧ Theme(e', ιz[uprising(z)]) ∧ Cause(e, e') in w' ]]] 
 
While the corresponding utterance to (490) is grammatical (as in (491a)), the infinitive here 
can be shown to be significantly larger than the infinitival complement to try (essentially 
as big as a typical purpose clause adjunct). For example, we find in (491b) that in order is 
possible in this environment and an overt for-marked subject may be realised within the 
clause. Furthermore, in (491c) we see that the infinitive in this environment will license a 
conflicting temporal modifier, unlike true infinitival complements to try. 
 
(491) a.  The government tried the abolition of workers’ rights to suppress the uprising. 
 b.  The government tried the abolition of workers’ rights (in order) (for the state) 
to suppress the uprising. 
 c.  Last month, the government tried the abolition of workers’ rights (in order) to 
increase tax revenue next year. 
 
Unfortunately, we have no satisfying answer to this question. One potential possibility is 
to take the strong Neo-Davidsonian perspective such that all arguments are severed from 
the lexical semantics of a given verb (e.g. Parsons 1990; Lasersohn 1995). As such, 
existential closure of the theme argument y would cease to be an issue; any theme would 
presumably be introduced externally to the verbal semantics via some syntactic Theme 
projection. However, this strategy does not address the impossibility of realising both 
arguments simultaneously, and in fact may make it more difficult to account for. We will 
instead pursue a rather ad hoc strategy, involving two stipulations: (i) the non-finite clause 
headed by OpINT projects an unvalued case feature, and (ii) the grammar makes available 
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some functionality to existentially close the internal arguments of verbs. 
 The concept of unvalued and uninterpretable syntactic features is not in and of itself 
a stipulation; a framework of (un)interpretable features is carefully constructed and 
defended in Adger (2003) and has seen robust use within the realm of minimalist syntax. 
Rather, the stipulation we are making here is that both DP objects and OpINT infinitives 
bear an unvalued case feature, ucase. Furthermore, we follow Adger’s proposal that 
feature-matching (by means of the derivational operation Agree, cf. Chomsky 2000, 2001) 
occurs under strictly local conditions. We provide Adger’s definition for feature-matching 
locality in (492) below. 
 
(492)   Locality of Matching 
   Agree holds between a feature F on X and a matching feature F on Y iff there is 
no intervening Z[F]. 
   (Adger 2003:178, ex. 55) 
 
Likewise, Adger defines intervening as follows. 
 
(493)   Intervention 
   In a structure [X … Z … Y], Z intervenes between X and Y iff X c-commands 
Z and Z c-commands Y. 
   (Adger 2003:178, ex. 56) 
 
The notion that both DP objects and VP modifiers containing OpINT bear an unvalued case 
feature combined with the principles of locality of matching and intervention as defined in 
(492) and (493) ensures that only one may be realised in any given situation. Consider, for 
example, the hypothetical derivation of the government tried the abolition of workers’ 
rights to suppress the uprising in example (357). This derivation is, intuitively, 
semantically interpretable and well-formed from a type-theoretic perspective. However, we 
find that the unvalued case feature ucase on the lower DP object cannot be valued for the 
[acc] feature borne by v, due to the fact that a ucase bearing OpINTP intervenes between v 
and DP. 
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(494)         VoiceP<v,t>        
           
  
        
  DP<e>       Voice<e,vt>       
  the gov.        
          
             Voice<vt,<e,vt>>      vP<v,t>      
   [+AGENT]       
          
          v[acc]<vt,vt>       VP<v,t>     
          
          
      OpINTP<v,t>       VP<v,t>    
   *Agree [ucase]     
          
                   V <e,vt>       DP<e>   
      try the abolition … 
[ucase] 
 
  
         
          
 
While appealing to case features may not be the most intuitive method in approaching this 
issue, we note that appealing to syntactic rather than semantic constraints captures the 
intuition that these hypothetical constructions are semantically sound. Furthermore, we 
propose that a similar syntactic constraint is necessary to explain the distinct but related 
explanans vs. explanandum phenomenon; why can the predicate explain not realise both 
simultaneously? 
Next, we need some means of closing the internal argument position y encoded in 
the lexical semantics of try. To this end, we will employ the notion of an arbitrary operator 
ARB, in the sense of Ackema and Schoorlemmer (1994). For Ackema and Schoorlemmer, 
ARB presents a means of suppressing the underlying argument in a predicate’s lexical 
conceptual structure (LCS) prior to mapping to syntax. In practice, the authors employ this 
operation to account for the suppression of agents in generic middle constructions. We will 
thus define a very simple operator ARB as in (495), whose function is to take a predicate 
P of type 〈e,vt〉 and existentially close the individual argument, returning a predicate of 
events (type 〈v,t〉). 
 
(495)   ⟦ARB⟧ = λP〈e,vt〉λe.λw.∃y[P(e)(y) in w] 
 
The utilisation of an arbitrary operator is not entirely unmotivated here. We note in (496) 
that try is readily acceptable in generic environments. Crucially, the arbitrariness in (496) 
is attributed to the actions that John performs, and not his intentions; the example below is 
compatible with a scenario in which John has a single specific intention/goal (for example, 
if John’s intentions are to learn a foreign language, but he is simply terrible at it). 
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(496)   John tries, bless him. 
 
It has been observed as early as Chomsky (1964) that arguments with specific content must 
project. That is, in an example such as burglars often steal, there cannot be a specific stolen 
item in mind; the utterance is only compatible with an arbitrary interpretation of what is 
stolen. As such, example (496) must be a case of ARB assigned to the action argument of 
try.70 
With these tools in place, we may now demonstrate the type-theoretic derivation of 
both try+DP complement and try+infinitival complement. To the former, we observe in 
(497) that when try selects a DP object as its complement, the resulting derivation looks 
like a typical transitive construction. The predicate V merges first with its DP (which in 
this case denotes an event), and then with an [acc]-bearing v projection. Finally, a non-
eventive Voice head introduces the agent in its specifier. We provide the logical form of 
(497) in (498). 
 
(497)         VoiceP<v,t>        
           
  
        
  DP<e>       Voice<e,vt>       
  the gov.        
          
             Voice<vt,<e,vt>>      vP<v,t>      
   [+AGENT]       
          
          v[acc]<vt,vt>       VP<v,t>     
          
          
      V<e,vt>       DP<e>    
    try the abolition…    
          
 
(498)  ⟦The government tried the abolition of workers' rights⟧
= λe.λw[ try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, ιe''[abolish-workers'-rights(e'')]) in w  
∧ Agent(e, ιx[government(x)])] 
   presupposes the intention to bring about some property P relevant to the goals of 
e in w. 
 
Next, the derivation of try in its infinitive-selecting aspect will proceed slightly differently 
                                                 
70 Incidentally, the availability of a specific intention in conjunction with the generic utterance in (496) 
supports the hypothesis that infinitival complements to try are not true arguments, in the strictest sense. 
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than the above. As we see in (499), we first allow try to combine with the operator ARB, 
which closes its internal argument position. The predicate then merges with the non-finite 
clause headed by OpINT, which relates the trying event to an intended outcome by means 
of an underlying causative predicate. As above, vP merges to provide an accusative case 
feature, and VoiceP introduces an agent externally. We provide a logical form for this 
derivation in (500) below. Note that we assume that V-to-v movement will provide the 
correct surface word order. 
 
(499)         VoiceP<v,t>        
           
  
        
  DP<e>       Voice<e,vt>       
  the gov.        
          
             Voice<vt,<e,vt>>      vP<v,t>      
   [+AGENT]       
          
          v[acc]<vt,vt>       VP<v,t>     
          
          
      OpINTP<v,t>       VP<v,t>    
         
          
                   V <e,vt>       ARB<<e,vt>,<v,t>>  
      try    
 
(500)   ⟦The government tried to suppress the uprising⟧ = λe.λw.∃y[ try(e)(w)  
∧ Theme(e, y) ∧ Agent(e, ιx[government(x)]) in w ∧ ∀w' ∈ INTw,e 
[∃e'[ suppress(e')(w') ∧ Theme(e', ιz[uprising(z)]) ∧ Cause(e, e') ]]] 
 
Having formalised a semantic definition for the predicate try, as well as a semantic 
characterisation of its infinitival complement, we have successfully provided a 
compositional analysis of try in both nominal and infinitival complement environments. In 
the next section, we turn to the effects and implications of our analysis. 
 
6.5. Effects and corollaries 
 
In this section we will discuss the implications of the analysis developed in section 6.4 
above. We begin in section 6.5.1 by demonstrating that our analysis correctly predicts the 
manifestation of obligatory exhaustive control in both nominal and infinitival 
environments, as well as the overt embedded subjects generalisation. Then in 6.5.2 we show 
that our account derives the strict simultaneity present in all instantiations of try. 
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Specifically, we argue that the simultaneity present in infinitival complement constructions 
results from the necessarily small structure of the infinitive, while the simultaneity in 
nominal complement constructions may be explained by more general principles of 
predication, namely with parameters of event-to-object mapping (in the sense of Krifka 
1992). 
 
6.5.1. Deriving EC and the overt embedded subjects generalisation 
 
Beginning with the manifestation of obligatory control in the complement of try, we note 
that the interpretable control effect observed into nominal complements is readily explained 
by incorporating a sense of performing into the definition of try, as discussed in section 
6.4.3. Likewise, this same principle explains the unavailability of overt embedded agents 
in compositional event nominal complements; one cannot perform an action carried out by 
another individual. For example, consider the data in (501). As observed in section 6.4.3, 
we find that any agent of a perform-class predicate must be interpreted as the agent of any 
event-denoting nominal complements (501a-c). Likewise, we note below that overt 
embedded agents are barred in these same environments (as in (501d-f)). 
 
(501) a.  The mechanici tried [PROi/*j the installation of a new carburettor]. 
 b.  The mechanici performed [PROi/*j the installation of a new carburettor]. 
 c.  The mechanici carried out [PROi/*j the installation of a new carburettor]. 
 d.  The mechanic tried [the installation of a new carburettor (*by his assistant)]. 
 e.  The mechanic performed [the installation of a new carburettor (*by his 
assistant)]. 
 f.  The mechanic carried out [the installation of a new carburettor (*by his 
assistant)]. 
 
While a full investigation into the nature of perform-class predicates is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, the inclusion of try in that set of predicates provides some means of explaining 
the control-like properties it enforces onto its nominal complements. For now, we provide 
in (502) a meaning postulate which ensures that all perform-class predicates (including try) 
implicate the desired relationship between agent and theme; we leave a full semantic 
formalisation of perform-class verbs to future work. 
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(502)   Perform-class predicates 
   For any perform-class predicate P with agent x and theme y, P(x)(y) = x does y. 
 
Moving on to infinitival complements, we argue that our compositional analysis of try and 
its clausal complement provides a natural explanation for the observed obligatory EC 
relation in this environment. As with our aspectual predicate analysis in chapter 5, our goal 
is to capture the effects of exhaustive control as an inherent property of our compositional 
semantics. To this end, we again appeal to the notion of direct control, as defined by Kratzer 
(2005) as an event of causing. We provide her definition below. 
 
(503)   Events of causing other events 
   An event e is an event of causing an event e' iff e is the sum of all the members 
of some causal chain C with maximal element e'. 
  
Assuming that the Cause predicate introduced by CAUSE and embedded beneath OpINT 
encodes an event of causing relation, inherent control follows naturally. To be explicit, we 
say that for any trying event e and intended outcome event e', such that Cause(e, e'), e and 
e' are related by a structural parthood relation. Specifically, we define e' as the maximal 
sub-event of e. As such, any argument introduced by Voice as the agent of e will likewise 
be the agent of e' just in case Cause(e, e').71 Consider this line of argumentation in relation 
to the logical form in (504), for the utterance the government tried to suppress the uprising. 
 
(504)   ⟦The government tried to suppress the uprising⟧
= λe.λw.∃y[ try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, y) ∧ Agent(e, ιx[government(x)]) in w  
∧ ∀w' ∈ INTw,e[∃e'[ suppress(e')(w') ∧ Theme(e', ιz[uprising(z)])  
∧ Cause(e, e') in w']]] 
 
We first introduce the government as the agent of the trying event e. Then, we introduce 
the intentional VP under OpINT such that for all worlds compatible with the goals of e, there 
is an event e' which is a suppressing the uprising event and e is an event of causing e' in w'. 
It therefore follows without further stipulation that in all worlds compatible with e, for all 
events e', e' is a maximal sub-event of e and the agent of e is also the agent of e' by virtue 
of predication. 
 Likewise, if OpINT combines with a VoiceP rather than a CAUSE-P, it follows from 
                                                 
71 This follows from the sum homomorphism of thematic relations; see chapter 5 for discussion. 
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the above that the only possible subject for the embedded VoiceP is a null pronoun PRO 
that is obligatorily co-referent with the agent of try. Consider, for example, the logical form 
in (505) involving the projection of an independent agent in the complement clause to try. 
We note, as above, that it follows from the definition of an event of causing that in all 
worlds compatible with e, e' is a maximal sub-event of e and the agent of e is also the agent 
of e'. Thus, the projection of another agent within the embedded VoiceP results in a 
violation of thematic uniqueness, such that e' ends up with two logical agent arguments. 
 
(505)  * ⟦The government tried for the state to suppress the uprising⟧
= λe.λw.∃y[ try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, y) ∧ Agent(e, ιx[government(x)]) in w  
∧ ∀w' ∈ INTw,e [∃e'[ suppress(e')(w') ∧ Theme(e', ιz[uprising(z)])  
∧ Agent(e', ια[state(α)]) ∧ Cause(e, e') in w']]] 
 
We have thus derived both the manifestation of exhaustive control, as well as the overt 
embedded subjects generalisation as it applies to non-finite complement clauses. To the 
former, we note that the notion that direct causation invokes an event of causing ensures 
that the agent of the causal chain will be interpreted as the agent of each sub-event in the 
causal chain, including the maximal sub-event. Likewise, this principle bars any embedded 
subjects that are not co-referent with the subject of try; anything else results in a violation 
of thematic uniqueness. As in chapter 5, we assume that the binding of PRO in these 
environments is truth-conditionally vacuous. 
 
6.5.2. Deriving simultaneity 
 
While similar in outward appearance, we observe in this section that the required 
simultaneity between try and its complement is derived very differently in the nominal and 
infinitival domains. Beginning with the temporal properties of complement VP/VoicePs, 
we again adopt the assumption from Pancheva and von Stechow (2004) that the role of any 
functional aspectual projection is to existentially bind an event variable relate its run-time 
to some reference time t ∈ Di. Likewise, we re-define our adopted semantics for the 
perfective in (506): perfective acts as a function from predicates of events to predicates of 
times (type 〈i,t〉). 
 
(506)   ⟦PERFECTIVE⟧ = λP〈v,t〉.λti. ∃e[P(e) ∧ τ(e) ⊂ t ] 
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Any phrasal projection of AspectP denoting a predicate of times is thereby predictably 
incompatible with our denotation for OpINT in (487) above; OpINT calls for a predicate of 
events. As was the case with our aspectual analysis in chapter 5, this incompatibility has 
the desirable consequence of correctly predicting the infelicity of functional auxiliaries 
within the complement clause which, by hypothesis, occur above Asp (i.e., have, be, …). 
 
(507) a. * The government tried to be suppressing the uprising. 
 b. * The mechanic tried to have repaired the car. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that OpINT selects for a predicate of events necessarily restricts the 
maximal syntactic size of its complement to that of a VoiceP. As such, we predict that the 
only time argument realised in any given try construction will be the one introduced by 
matrix Aspect. Assuming again that temporal modifiers such as yesterday restrict a 
reference time to the appropriate set of time intervals (as in (382)), we naturally derive the 
tense mismatch generalisation as it applies to non-finite complement clauses of try. Like in 
the domain of aspectual predicate constructions, the ungrammaticality of (383a) may be 
understood as the ascription of two mutually exclusive reference time constraints on the 
only available time variable t, as illustrated in (383b). 
 
(508)   ⟦yesterday⟧ = λP〈i,t〉.λt. P(t) ∧ t ⊆ yesterday 
 
(509) a. * Yesterday, John tried to run tomorrow. 
 b.  = λt.λw.∃e∃y[try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, y) in w ∧ Agent(e, John) in w 
∧ ∀w' ∈ INTw,e[∃e'[ run(e')(w') ∧ Cause(e, e') in w']] ∧ τ(e) ⊂ t  
∧ t ⊆ yesterday ∧ t ⊆ tomorrow] 
 
As such, the tense mismatch generalisation and the empirical observation that try enforces 
strict simultaneity into its clausal complements follows from the logical contradiction 
present in (383b), which follows naturally from our treatment. 
 Unlike clausal complements, we propose that the simultaneity observed between 
try and any event-denoting nominal complement results from the more general properties 
of thematic relation in extensional environments. Consider, for example, the data in (510), 
which includes verbal predicates from a variety of different verb classes (in the sense of 
Levin 1993) in the environment of a compositional event nominal complement. While the 
semantic class/content of these verbs may be wildly different from one another, they are all 
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similar in that they are all non-intentional. Crucially, we find that in each case the event-
denoting DP may not realise a temporal modifier that conflicts with a modifier in the matrix 
clause. 
 
(510) a.  Yesterday, John observed [the inspection of the factory (*today/*the day 
before)]. 
 b.  Yesterday, John lead [the inspection of the factory (*today/*the day before)]. 
 c.  Yesterday, John passed [the inspection of the factory (*today/??the day 
before)]. 
 d.  Yesterday, John escaped [the inspection of the factory (*today/*the day 
before)]. 
 
As such, rather than postulate some unique relation between try and its DP, we will instead 
appeal to the general mapping parameters that govern the relation between extensional 
predicates and their thematic objects. The particular framework adopted here will be that 
of Krifka (1992), and will minimally exploit Krifka’s principles of uniqueness of objects, 
mapping to objects and mapping to events as defined in (511-513), respectively. 
 
(511)  Uniqueness of Objects 
   ∀R [UNI-O(R) ↔ ∀e, x, x' [R(e, x) ∧ R(e, x') → x = x']]  
 
(512)  Mapping to Objects 
   ∀R [MAP-O(R) ↔ ∀e, e', x [R(e, x) ∧ e' ≤ e → ∃x' [x' ≤ x ∧ R(e', x')]]  
 
(513)  Mapping to Events 
   ∀R [MAP-E(R) ↔ ∀e, x, x' [R(e, x) ∧ x' ≤ x → ∃e' [e' ≤ e ∧ R(e', x')]]  
   (Krifka 1992:39) 
 
As a preliminary, the uniqueness of objects as defined in (511) ensures that a given event 
is related to a specific and unique object. By way of illustration, Krifka notes that in a 
drinking a glass of wine event, the act of drinking is uniquely related to a specific glass of 
wine, and to no other object. For our purposes, an event of trying the abolition of workers’ 
rights relates the action associated with trying to a unique and specific abolition event in 
the world. 
 The mapping to objects principle in (512) is such that, for all events e with thematic 
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object x such that R(e, x), for any event e' that is a sub-event of e there is an individual x' 
that is a sub-part of x, and R(e', x'). Going back to Krifka’s explanation, the mapping to 
objects parameter correctly captures the intuition that every part of a drinking a glass of 
wine event corresponds to a particular part of that glass of wine.72 Finally, the mapping to 
events principle as defined in (513) has the effect that, for all events e with thematic objects 
x such that R(e, x), for any individual x' that is a sub-part of x there is an event e' that is a 
sub-event of e, and R(e', x'). In terms of our drinking a glass of wine example, this definition 
ensures that every relevant part of a glass of wine is related to a corresponding drinking 
sub-event. 
 With these definitions in hand, we propose the enforced simultaneity observed 
between try and any event-denoting nominal complements is a direct result of the mapping 
to objects/events principles as defined by Krifka (1992). Specifically, we argue that any 
overt temporal mismatch between the trying event and the event DP violates the mapping 
to objects and mapping to events principles, as defined in (512,513). To illustrate, consider 
the ungrammatical utterance in (514). 
 
(514)  * Yesterday, the mechanic tried [the installation of a new carburettor tomorrow]. 
 
As the thematic object of try, we understand the installation of a new carburettor event to 
be the specific and unique thematic object of the trying event, as per (511). However, the 
definition in (512) demands that every part of the trying event be logically mapped to a 
corresponding part of its thematic object. Assuming that compositionally derived event 
DPs may be measured according to event run-time (given the temporal trace function τ(e)), 
then the infelicity of (514) becomes clear. Namely, if the trying event e is such that τ(e) is 
limited to yesterday and the installation event e' is such that τ(e') is limited to tomorrow, 
then there is no part of the trying event e that can be properly mapped to its thematic object. 
The mutual exclusivity of yesterday and tomorrow furthermore ensures a violation of the 
mapping to events principle, such that there is no part of the installation in (514) that can 
be logically mapped to the corresponding trying event. 
 The strategy employed here makes the stronger prediction that try constructions 
involving compositional event DPs will not permit a temporal modifier within the nominal 
                                                 
72 Although Krifka’s argumentation here concerns the incremental-theme predicate drink, the mapping to 
objects parameter is equally applicable to non-incremental environments. For instance, every part of a 
performing an aria event corresponds to a particular part of an aria. The same may be said of examining a 
patient or inspecting a factory. 
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which properly contains the temporal reference of a temporal modifier in the matrix clause. 
That is, if the event run-time of matrix try is limited to on Monday, then the event run-time 
of any event nominal complement cannot be limited to some timeframe which properly 
contains Monday, such as this week. While, such a construction would seemingly satisfy 
the mapping to objects parameter defined in (512), it would violate the mapping to events 
parameter. Specifically, while every part of a trying event that occurs on Monday could be 
logically mapped to a corresponding part of its object, not every part of an event nominal 
object that occurs this week could be logically mapped to a corresponding part of a trying 
event that occurs on Monday. As illustrated in (515), this prediction is borne out. 
 
(515) a. * On Monday, the mechanic tried [the installation of a new carburettor this 
week]. 
 b. * This week, the government tried [the abolition of workers’ rights this month]. 
 
Thus, we have provided a means of understanding the strict simultaneity observed in try 
constructions across complement domains. For infinitival complements, we showed that 
the impossibility of conflicting temporal modifiers follows directly a semantic analysis of 
temporal modifiers as predicates of times, along with the obligatorily reduced nature of try 
infinitives. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the simultaneity found in nominal 
complement environments follows directly from the general properties of thematic 
arguments, specifically regarding event-to-object mapping. 
 
6.6. A note on the status of gerundive complements 
 
Before concluding this chapter, it would be useful to consider the third potential 
complement type that English try may combine with: the gerund. As per section 6.4.1, we 
know that the entailment pattern of a try construction changes depending on the syntactic 
status of its complement. Specifically, if the complement is an event-denoting DP, that 
event is entailed as a real, completed event in the world. On the other hand, if the 
complement is a non-finite clause, the event it describes is not entailed (see in particular 
examples (436,437)). This observation led to an analysis in which DP objects of try were 
characterised as bona fide thematic arguments (denoting actions), while infinitival 
complements (denoting intentions) were analysed as predicate modifiers. 
 We observe in (516) that gerundive complements to try are ambiguous regarding 
whether the event they describe is entailed or not. Given our analysis of DP and clausal 
 254 
complements to try, we contend that the entailment pattern in (516b) reveals the ascription 
of the action argument to the gerund, while the pattern in (516c) implicates the gerundive 
complement as the intention of the predicate instead. 
 
(516) a.  The government tried abolishing workers’ rights. 
 b.  ⇒ The government abolished workers’ rights. action reading 
 c.  ⇏ The government abolished workers’ rights. intention reading 
 
The precise nature of the English gerund (or the various types of gerundive phrases that 
make up this category) has long been a contentious issue within the generative tradition (cf. 
Chomsky 1970; Reuland 1983; Abney 1987; Pires 2001, 2007, and references cited 
therein). As such, we have no intentions here of providing any formal account of the 
syntactic or internal semantic structure of the gerundive complements to try. We will 
instead discuss the potential implications presented by the data in (516), and suggest that 
the variable entailment properties above reveal a type ambiguity in verbal gerunds, such 
that they may denote a predicate of events (type 〈v,t〉) or an event per se (type 〈v〉). 
 Considering first the example in (516b), we note that the entailment of the 
embedded event implies that the gerund in this example merges as a thematic object of the 
predicate try. According to the semantic analysis of try outlined in section 6.4.3, this may 
occur straightforwardly by means of the relational Theme predicate in the lexical semantics 
of the verb. However, in order to saturate the thematic argument position, it must be 
assumed that the gerund in (516b) denotes an event per se of type 〈v〉.73 We note that this 
assumption is largely in line with the account put forward in Abney (1987), such that verbal 
gerunds with genitive marked subjects (henceforth, Poss-ing gerunds) involve the 
nominalisation of an agent introducing VoiceP, as illustrated in (517). Note that, for Abney, 
Voice (or v) is responsible for both the introduction of the external argument as well as the 
assignment of structural (accusative) case. 
  
                                                 
73 Given our semantic analysis of compositional nominalisations in chapter 4, and the overtly derivational 
nature of verbal gerunds, we ignore here the logical possibility that the gerund denotes an individual of type 
〈e〉. 
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(517)   DP        
           
  
        
  Gov.i D       
          
          
               D  NP      
   ’s       
          
    N VoiceP     
    -ing      
          
      ti Voice’    
         
          
                   Voice VP   
      [acc]    
            
       V DP  
       abolish workers’ rights  
            
 
On the assumption that the N head hosting the gerundive affix -ing is semantically vacuous, 
and that the determiner encodes the unique iota operator (as defined in chapter 4), the 
gerund in (517) will have the following logical form. 
 
(518)   ⟦(517)⟧ = ιe [abolish(e) ∧ Theme(e, ιy[workers'-rights(y)])  
∧ Agent(e, ιx[government(x)])] 
 
Note that the denotation in (518) intuitively captures the meaning of Poss-ing gerunds. That 
is, in the utterance the government’s abolishing workers’ rights was surprising, we 
understand that the unique abolishing event whose theme was workers’ rights and whose 
agent was the government was a matter of some surprise. 
 Turning back to our try constructions, we observe that Poss-ing gerunds that denote 
events per se may predictably saturate the thematic Theme position encoded in the lexical 
semantics of try. We assume, as in section 6.4.3, that events per se of type 〈v〉 are generally 
compatible with functions from individuals of type 〈e〉. Furthermore, our characterisation 
of try as a perform-class predicate ensures that any external argument introduced by 
embedded Voice will be a co-referent PRO subject. In example (519) we provide the logical 
form for the utterance in (516a) with the entailment pattern in (516b). 
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(519)  ⟦The gov. tried abolishing workers' rights⟧ = λw.∃e [try(e)(w)  
∧ Theme(e, ιe' [abolish(e')(w) ∧ Theme(e', ιy[workers'-rights(y)])  
∧ Agent(e', ιx[government(x)])]] 
   presupposes the intention to bring about some property P relevant to the goals of 
e in w. 
 
Moving on to the entailment pattern in (516c), we note that this reading of the gerundive 
complement implies that the gerund here merges as a predicate modifier of the verb, rather 
than as its argument (as discussed in 6.4.4). As such, we must assume (i) the gerundive 
complement to try contains a causative verbal layer, and (ii) that the gerundive complement 
to try is significantly smaller than so-called ‘clausal gerunds’, such that they may combine 
with our operator OpINT (contra Pires 2001, 2006). We thus assume the type-driven 
syntactic structure in (520) as the (maximal) structural constitution of gerunds appearing in 
try constructions. 
 
(520)   OpINTP<v,t>        
           
  
        
  OpINT<vt,vt> NP<v,t>       
          
          
               N<vt,vt>  VoiceP<v,t>      
   -ing       
          
    PRO<e> Voice’<e,vt>     
          
          
     Voice<vt,<e,vt>> CAUSE-P<v,t>    
         
          
                   CAUSE<vt,vt> VP<v,t>   
          
            
       V<e,vt> DP<e>  
       abolish workers’ rights  
            
 
The projection of CAUSE-P in (520) is mandated by the selectional restrictions of OpINT, 
and if Voice projects, it must take a null subject PRO (given our discussion in section 6.5.1). 
We furthermore assume that the head N is semantically vacuous, essentially currying the 
function denoted by VoiceP up the structure. While affixation by N typically leads to 
interaction with the determiner system, the NP above constitutes a licit argument for OpINT, 
as it denotes a predicate of abolishing events. At this stage, OpINT may combine with try 
via predicate modification, and subsequent projection of matrix Voice will yield the 
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denotation in (521), representing the logical form of (516a) with entailment pattern (516c). 
 
(521)   ⟦The gov. tried abolishing workers' rights⟧
= λe.λw.∃y[ try(e)(w) ∧ Theme(e, y) ∧ Agent(e, ιx[government(x)]) in w  
∧ ∀w' ∈ INTw,e[∃e'[ abolish(e')(w') ∧ Theme(e', ιz[workers'-rights(z)])  
∧ Cause(e, e') in w']]] 
 
In summary, we have hypothesised that the ambiguity present in try +gerundive 
complement constructions is predictable on our analysis of try. Namely, when the event 
denoted by the gerund is entailed, the gerund merges as the action argument of try, by 
means of an underlying thematic Theme predicate. Conversely, when the event denoted by 
the gerund is not entailed, the gerund denotes the intention of the trying event, and merges 
via predicate modification. We leave a full empirical investigation of this hypothesis to 
future work. 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have again defended the hypothesis that both nominal and infinitival 
complements to control predicates may be accounted for in a unified manner, in this case 
regarding the control predicate try. We began in section 6.2 by briefly considering the 
nature of the predicate explain, and the long-held tradition that this verb may take one of 
two potential arguments: an explanans or explanandum. Then in 6.3 we provided a 
preliminary overview of recent theoretical discussions and analyses concerning the 
predicate try. We considered the continuation branch analysis of Sharvit (2003), as well as 
the accounts of Grano (2011, 2017a), which drew on the semantics of the progressive aspect 
(Condoravdi 2009). Ultimately, none of these frameworks provided an intuitive method of 
incorporating compositional event nominal complements, and were thus rejected. 
 The rest of the chapter motivated and developed a compositional analysis of try 
such that try may realise one of two potential arguments: an action or an intention (in this 
way mirroring the behaviour of explain). Motivation for this view came from the different 
entailment/presuppositional patterns observed in infinitival vs. nominal environments. We 
thus proposed that action argument (exemplified by event DPs) merge as typical thematic 
argument of try, possessing no intentional characteristics. Furthermore, we argued that 
intention arguments are not in fact arguments of try itself, but rather merge as predicate 
modifiers. Furthermore, the causative and intentional elements of non-finite complements 
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to try were hypothesised to be syntactic components contained within the embedded clause. 
 Our account had a number of desirable consequences. First, it correctly derived the 
variable entailments and presuppositions that occur in various try constructions. Next, for 
infinitival complements to try, we demonstrated that the obligatory exhaustive control and 
enforced simultaneity resulted from the lexical semantics of try combined with the 
necessarily small structural composition of the complement clause. Furthermore, for 
nominal complements, obligatory control was assumed to follow from its classification as 
a perform-class predicate, and the simultaneity was shown to result from general principles 
governing the mapping of events to their thematic objects. Finally, we observed an 
ambiguity in gerundive complements to try that is predictable on our two-argument analysis 
of the predicate, given certain structural assumptions regarding the internal composition of 
Poss-ing gerunds. 
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7. REMARKS ON TEMPORAL ORIENTATION AND STRUCTURAL 
CONTROL 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
In this final chapter we turn away from the theoretical machinery underlying exhaustive 
control to (briefly) consider partial control and its associated effects. Recall that, although 
PC predicates enforce no salient obligatory control relation into nominal environments, 
they do enforce a particular temporal interpretation. Namely, PC predicates which select 
future-oriented infinitives exclusively enforce future-orientation in nominal complements. 
Likewise, PC predicates which select past-oriented infinitives enforce past-orientation in 
NPs. As such, much of our discussion below will be concerned with contemporary 
theoretical analysis of infinitival temporal orientation, in order to determine which 
particular account may generalise most readily to the nominal domain. We begin in section 
7.2 with a note on the necessarily structural nature of partial control. In 7.3 we evaluate 
Pearson’s (2013, 2016) lexical semantic analysis of temporal orientation in PC predicate 
constructions in light of the nominal data. In section 7.4 we present a similar evaluation of 
Wurmbrand’s (2014) syntactic analysis of temporal orientation in future-oriented 
infinitival complements. 
 
7.2. A note on structural control 
 
Before we present our discussion of the temporal properties of noun phrases, a brief note 
on the nature of PC is in order. In adopting Wurmbrand’s (2002) syntactic vs. semantic 
division of labour, along with Stiebels’ (2007) typological distinction between inherent and 
structural control, we implied that PC constitutes a distinctly syntactic phenomenon. This 
implication was supported by the observation that, unlike EC predicates, PC predicates fail 
to enforce any salient control relation into derived nominal complements. That is, the lack 
of control in PC predicate constructions involving nominal complements is expected if PC 
is tied to a particular structural phenomenon in infinitival complement environments.  
 However, although our observations in chapter 2 tell us something about what PC 
is not (e.g., not inherent), they do not provide much in the way of an explanation of what 
PC actually is. There are a multitude of theoretical devices that can and have been used to 
capture obligatory control phenomena by syntactic means, including PRO binding, A-
movement, agreement, or a combination thereof. For example, Wurmbrand (2002) keys the 
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occurrence of PC to the distribution of a bound PRO subject in non-finite clausal 
complements (recall that the binding of PRO proceeds vacuously in exhaustive/inherent 
control contexts). It is unclear, however, if a PRO-centric approach to structural control 
could be reconciled with more recent analyses of PRO as an impoverished minimal 
pronoun (see e.g., Sigurðsson 2008; Kratzer 2009). 
 One contemporary account of the EC/PC divide which captures the distinctly 
structural nature of PC comes from Landau (2015), who argues that the attitudinal 
predicates which give rise to PC relations necessarily select a complement with a CP layer. 
In particular, Landau’s account employs an embedded non-finite clause containing a 
minimal pronoun PRO which projects up to a particular C head designated for obligatory 
control (COC). The CP headed by COC includes a logophoric centre containing a concept 
generator G (in the sense of Percus and Sauerland 2003a) which necessarily enforces an 
obligatory de se interpretation in the context of COC.74 As such, Landau’s account represents 
an analysis of PC which relies on distinctly clausal phenomena without depending on the 
properties of PRO specifically. 
 While the present study is unable to provide an adequate answer as to what 
mechanisms are responsible for the manifestation of PC, it does provide a criterion that 
must be met by such mechanisms. Namely, PC implicates a derivation that is significantly 
independent from the derivation of EC, and furthermore must result (at least partly) from 
structural phenomena within the clausal left-periphery. Future inquiry into structural 
control could conceivably focus on the cross-linguistic manifestation of PC in 
nominal/mixed categories, particularly in languages with productive nominalisation 
processes that target distinctly clausal structures (e.g., Turkish). Comparative study to this 
effect may shed light on the precise functional projection(s) implicated in the derivation of 
structural control. 
 
7.3. Deriving temporal orientation semantically: Pearson 2016 
 
In this section we will explore the implications of our observations in chapter 2 for lexical 
semantic models of deriving control and temporal orientation in PC predicate 
environments. Specifically, we will evaluate Pearson’s (2013, 2016) lexical model of 
partial control in order to assess its application to nominal complement configurations. We 
                                                 
74 This is a gross oversimplification of Landau’s account, which critically relies on recent theoretical 
advancements in the ascription of attitudes de re and de se. For further discussion, see Landau 2015:41-46, 
as well as Schlenker 2003; Anand 2006; Pearson 2013. 
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will find that, although her exploitation of world/time extensions within the lexical 
semantics of PC predicates generalises well to nominal environments, her model does not 
straightforwardly predict the lack of control in PC predicate constructions. 
 
7.3.1. PC predicates as modal quantifiers 
 
Following a long tradition of theoretical analysis of attitude reports (Lewis 1979; Chierchia 
1989; Abusch 1997; Percus and Sauerland 2003; Anand 2006; Stephenson 2007, 2010a, 
2010b, a.o.), Pearson (2013, 2016) adopts the view that attitudinal PC predicates are modal 
quantifiers, quantifying specifically over world/time/individual triples. Her analysis is 
motivated by the obligatory de se interpretation of any PRO embedded beneath an attitude 
control verb, and is framed within the property view of controlled infinitives. 
 Attitude predicates, such as want, promise and expect, obligatorily express attitudes 
de se in control configurations (Morgan 1970; Chierchia 1989a). As defined in example 
(522), the attitude de se reflects the attitude holder’s awareness that the attitude she 
expresses is about herself. 
 
(522)   An attitude de se is an attitude – a belief, desire, expectation, etc. – that has the 
following properties: 
 a.  The attitude is about the attitude holder. (aboutness condition) 
 b.  The attitude holder is aware that the attitude is about 
herself. 
(awareness condition) 
   (Pearson 2016:694) 
 
The examples in (523) below provide an illustration of the obligatory nature of de se 
ascription in attitudinal control constructions. In (523a), although the attitude expressed by 
the embedded infinitive is about the attitude holder (satisfying the aboutness condition, see 
(522a)), the context ensures that the attitude holder is unaware of this fact, thereby violating 
the awareness condition defined in (522b). Contrast the infelicity of (523a) with the 
acceptability of the finite complementation construction in (523b), which does not induce 
obligatory de se ascription. 
 
(523)   CONTEXT: John is an amnesiac. He reads a linguistics article that he himself 
wrote, although he has forgotten this fact. Impressed, he remarks, ‘the author of 
this paper will become rich and famous. Unfortunately, I will not.’ 
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 a. # John expects [PRO to become rich and famous]. 
 b.  John expects [that he will become rich and famous]. 
   (Pearson 2016:695) 
 
Pearson’s primary objective, then, is to capture the obligatory de se reading of PRO within 
the lexical semantics of the selecting attitudinal control predicate. Her proposal is couched 
in a framework that treats controlled infinitives (and gerunds) as semantic properties, rather 
than as propositions (see e.g., Bach 1979; Williams 1980; Chierchia 1984, 1989b, 1989a; 
Dowty 1985; Lebeaux 1985, among many others). Example (524) provides a preliminary 
LF representation for the utterance in (523a), assuming the status of the infinitive as a 
property of individuals. Note that PRO here denotes a lambda abstracted variable, rather 
than a bound co-referential pronominal element. 
 
(524)   [CP1 λw1 [w1 John expects [CP2 λx2 λw3 [IP w3 PRO2 to become rich and 
famous]]]] 
   (Pearson 2016:695) 
 
The lambda abstractor over world variables in the left-periphery of the embedded CP binds 
the co-indexed world variable w3 within its scope. Likewise, the lambda abstractor over 
individuals obligatorily binds PRO, resulting in an infinitive which expresses a property of 
individuals (type 〈e,〈s,t〉〉, Pearson 2016). 
 Given this assumption regarding the semantic status of controlled infinitives, 
Pearson’s account requires a lexical semantic analysis of attitudinal control predicates such 
that the predicate selects for both the attitude holder as well as a property of individuals. 
To this end, Pearson employs the notion of doxastic alternatives (see Hintikka 1969, and 
our discussion in chapter 6) to represent the set of possible worlds ranged over by the 
attitude holder. Furthermore, Pearson follows Lewis (1979) and Chierchia (1989a) in 
assuming that an attitude holder’s doxastic alternatives not only include the set of possible 
candidate worlds, but also the set of candidate individuals representing the attitude holder 
in a given alternative world. That is, the set of doxastic alternatives Doxx,w consists of the 
set of world/individual pairs <w',y> which the attitude holder x takes to be suitable 
candidates for the real world w and herself (as illustrated in (525)). 
 
(525)   Doxastic Alternatives: Lewis/Chierchia-style 
   Doxx,w = {<w',y>: it is compatible with what x believes in w for x to be y in w'} 
   (Pearson 2016:696) 
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This treatment of doxastic alternatives as world/individual pairs rather than just candidate 
worlds provides some purchase on the obligatory nature of de se ascription in attitudinal 
predicate constructions. Consider first the lexical entry for the verb believe in (526). Here 
we see that believe selects a property of individuals P, an attitude holder x and a world w, 
and ensures that for all world/individual pairs <w',y> that are members of the set of doxastic 
alternatives of x, P holds of y in w'. Note that in non-de se contexts, the property view of 
predicates of propositional attitude would presumably require vacuous lambda binding 
within the embedded CP. 
 
(526)  Lexical entry of believe: Lewis/Chierchia-style 
   ⟦believe⟧ =  λP〈e〈st〉〉.λxe.λws. ∀<w',y> [<w',y> ∈ Doxx,w → P(y)(w')] 
   (Pearson 2016:697) 
 
Pearson demonstrates that the analysis in (526) may be extended to the control construction 
in (523a), involving the predicate expect. First, Pearson defines the lexical entry of expect 
as in (527), invoking a specific set of doxastic alternatives which she labels expect-
alternatives (Expectx,w). We provide Pearson’s semantic denotation for the relevant expect 
construction in (528). In (528b) we see that the embedded infinitive CP2 comes to denote 
a property of individuals, such that some x is rich and famous in some w. Critically, in 
(528c) we find that expect necessitates that the embedded property hold of all 
world/individual pairs within the attitude holder’s expect-alternatives. Recall that the 
individual component of an attitude holder’s expect-alternatives constitutes her alternative 
candidate selves within alternative candidate worlds. As a result, obligatory de se ascription 
results from the exhaustive relationship between property P and all alternative candidate 
selves y in candidate worlds w' within the set of expect-alternatives.  
 
(527)   Lexical entry of expect 
   ⟦expect⟧ =  λP〈e〈st〉〉.λxe.λws. ∀<w',y> [<w',y> ∈ Expectx,w → P(y)(w')] 
 
(528) a.  [CP1 λw1 [w1 John expects [CP2 λx2 λw3 [IP w3 PRO2 to become rich and 
famous]]]] 
 b.  ⟦CP2⟧ =  λx.λw. x is rich and famous in w 
 c.  ⟦CP1⟧
=  λw. ∀<w',y> [<w',y> ∈ Expect
John,w
 → y become rich and famous in w'] 
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The infelicity of (523a) is therefore expected, given the lexical entry for expect in (527). 
Namely, given John’s amnesia and his contextual belief-state, there is at least one 
world/individual pair in the set of John’s expect-alternatives in which the embedded 
property does not hold of his alternative candidate self, thereby violating the meaning 
requirements of the predicate. 
 Having built the necessary de se ascription into the semantics of attitudinal control 
predicates, Pearson refines her analysis in order to account for the appropriate temporal 
orientation in tandem. Following Abusch (1997), Pearson assumes that a given attitude 
holder’s mental state includes not only suitable candidates for herself, but also candidates 
for the actual time – the attitude holder’s subjective now. This hypothesis is supported by 
the fact that when the example in (529) is uttered at 4 pm, Bill’s belief state may be 
mistaken about the time without causing ungrammaticality (Pearson 2016:699). 
 
(529)   Bill believes that it is 3 pm. 
 
Given that there is no possible world in which 4 pm is 3 pm, there must be some semantic 
representation of whatever time Bill thinks it is independent from the candidate world in 
which he locates himself. To this end, Pearson proposes that an attitude holder’s set of 
doxastic alternatives also includes a time interval variable t (of type 〈i〉). As such, we now 
define the set of an attitude holder x’s doxastic alternatives as the set of world-time-
individual triples <w', t', y> such that y is a suitable candidate for x in w' at t'. Pearson 
provides the lexical semantic denotation for the predicate believe in (530); note that we 
now take embedded non-finite CPs to denote properties of type 〈e〈i〈s,t〉〉〉. 
 
(530)  Lexical entry of believe: Pearson 2016 
   ⟦believe⟧
=  λP〈e〈i〈s,t〉〉〉.λxe.λti.λws. ∀<w',t',y> [<w',t',y> ∈ Doxx,t,w → P(y)(t')(w')] 
   Where Doxx,t,w = {<w', t', y>: it is compatible with what x believes in w at t for x 
to be y in w' at t'} 
 
Further still, Pearson follows Abusch (2004) in assuming that the obligatory future-
orientation observed in some attitudinal control constructions – such as those involving the 
predicate expect – is valued relative to the subject’s subjective now, rather than to the actual 
time. That is, the time interval associated with any event embedded beneath expect will be 
located posterior to the time at which the attitude holder locates herself, which may or may 
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not be the actual time. In order to encode future-orientation at the lexical level, Pearson 
utilises a system of extensions which establish relations of either part-whole structure or 
precedence between two arguments. We provide Pearson’s definition of extensions as 
follows. 
 
(531)   For any pair of world-time-individual triples <w, t, x> and <w', t', y>, <w', t', 
y> is an extension of <w, t, x> iff for every α, β, such α is a coordinate of <w, t, 
x> and β is a coordinate of <w', t', y> of the same type as α, either: 
 a.  α ≤ β; 
 b.  α <precedes β; or 
 c.  β <precedes α 
   (Pearson 2016:701) 
 
Let us evaluate the definition in (531) first as it applies to pairs of time intervals of type 〈i〉. 
Consider the notion that a time interval t may denote a particular set of instances (e.g., if t 
= today, then t constitutes the set of all hours/minutes/seconds that make up the relevant 
24-hour period denoted by today). As such, given two distinct time intervals t and t', we 
may arguably establish a salient part-whole extension relation between t and t', such that t 
≤ t' (as per (531a)). Further still, given that the unfolding of an event/situation in time may 
be conceptualised as a directed path structure along a temporal axiom (cf. Krifka 1998; 
Piñango and Deo 2016), precedence becomes a salient method in characterising relations 
within the set of time intervals implicated in said event/situation (such that t <precedes t', or t' 
<precedes t, as per (531b,c)). As such, time intervals may by hypothesis invoke any of the 
possible extension relations defined in (531) above.  
Pearson contends that the same is not true of individuals: individuals do not 
constitute the kinds of logical objects that can form relations of precedence.  As such, any 
individual extension y of an individual x must instead establish a salient part-whole relation 
in order to satisfy the definition of extension set out in (531), such that x + y = y (see 
Pearson 2016:702 for pertinent discussion).75 Utilising these definitions of extensions, 
                                                 
75 We contend that Pearson’s characterisation of the possible relations between individuals is too simplistic; 
individuals may well establish relations of precedence if a given directed path is formed of various individuals 
arranged in a meaningfully transitive, asymmetrical order. For example, an orderly queue of shoppers at the 
deli counter of the local supermarket may be considered a directed path, and the individuals which make up 
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Pearson provides the refined lexical entry for expect in (532) below. 
 
(532)  Lexical entry of expect, v.2 
   ⟦expect⟧ =  λP〈e〈i〈s,t〉〉〉.λxe.λtiλws. ∀<w',t',y>[<w',t',y> ∈ Expectx,w → ∃<w'',t'',z> 
[<w'',t,'',z> is an extension of <w',t',y> ∧ P(z)(t'')(w'')]] 
 
The use of a lexically specified extension in the denotation of expect provides an avenue to 
derive both partial control and future-orientation simultaneously. The relation between the 
individual y in the attitude holder’s expect-alternatives and the individual z in the encoded 
extension is necessarily a part-whole relation (as per our discussion above). As such, 
Pearson’s account correctly predicts the proper subset relation between controller and 
controllee which characterises partial control. Likewise, expect by hypothesis ensures that 
the extension within its denotation specifies a precedence relation between the time interval 
t' and its extension t'' such that t' precedes t'', thereby yielding the obligatory future-
orientation. 
 
7.3.2. Pearson’s analysis and controlled nominal complements 
 
At first glance, Pearson’s (2013, 2016) lexical semantic account of partial control does not 
lend itself to deriving the desired temporal properties of nominal complements to attitude 
predicates; her analysis targets only infinitival complement constructions. The aim of this 
section will be to determine if (any of) Pearson’s analysis of infinitive-selecting attitudinal 
control predicates can be extended to account for the temporal properties of eventive 
nominal complements.  
 As per our temporal orientation in NP generalisation from chapter 2, future-
oriented control predicates enforce posteriority in their nominal complements. Likewise, 
past-oriented control predicates enforce anteriority in their nominal complements. Despite 
our analysis of compositional nominalisation in chapter 4, let us assume that event-denoting 
NPs introduce a nominal reference time argument tnp (for further discussion, see section 
7.4.3). Under this assumption – and disregarding the candidate individual element 
introduced in the attitude holder’s set of doxastic alternatives – Pearson’s lexically 
specified temporal extensions may provide some purchase on the nature of temporal 
                                                 
its constituent parts may be defined by relations of precedence between each other (see also Piñango and Deo 
2016). 
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orientation in nominal complements. For example, consider the minimal pair in (533). If 
both the infinitival complement in (533a) as well as the nominal complement in (533b) 
contain a time interval that may be manipulated by the lexically encoded extension in the 
denotation of the predicate promise, then the identical temporal behaviour in both examples 
is expected. 
 
(533) a.  Today, John promised to inspect the factory (*yesterday). 
   = λw.λt. ∀<w',t'> [<w',t'> ∈ PromiseJohn,t,w → ∃<w'',t''>[<w'',t,''> is a  
future-oriented extension of <w',t'> ∧ PRO inspect the factory =1 in w'' at t'']] 
 
 b.  Today, John promised the inspection of the factory (*yesterday). 
   = λw.λt. ∀<w',t'> [<w',t'> ∈ PromiseJohn,t,w → ∃<w'',t''>[<w'',t,''> is a  
future-oriented extension of <w',t'> ∧ ιe[inspect-the-factory(e) =1 in w'' at t'']]] 
 
The proposal that Pearson’s temporal extensions may be implicated in the interpretation of 
nominal complement environments is supported by the observation that the reference time 
of event-denoting nominal complements is understood relative to the attitude holder’s 
subjective now, rather than to the actual time. Consider, for instance, a scenario in which 
Bill – the manager of a factory – is expecting a team from corporate to come and inspect 
his premises at 3pm today. However, unbeknownst to Bill, the clocks in his office are off 
and it is actually 4pm when Bill’s expectation in (534) holds. 
 
(534)   Bill expects the inspection of the factory at 3 pm. 
 
Given that there is no world in which 3 pm is 4 pm, it must be the case that the reference 
time associated with the event-denoting nominal complement (to the extent that a nominal 
reference time argument is present at LF) is interpreted relative to the attitude holder’s 
subjective now. 
 While the derivation of the appropriate temporal orientation by means of lexically 
specified extensions may be a plausible line of inquiry, the situation becomes significantly 
murkier when we consider the role of individual extensions within Pearson’s framework. 
Recall that, for Pearson, partial control and temporal orientation are derived in parallel by 
means of extensions on a set of doxastic alternatives, each of which consists of a world-
time-individual triple. As such, wholesale application of Pearson’s analysis to nominal 
complement environments leads to under-generation: we expect the manifestation of PC, 
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contra the control into NP generalisation.76  
 Pre-theoretically, there are seemingly two alternative strategies for deriving 
temporal orientation in the complements of attitudinal predicates: either (i) there is a single 
lexical entry for any given predicate of propositional attitude which derives the appropriate 
temporal properties in all possible complement environments, or (ii) we invoke a 
systematic lexical ambiguity such that each attitudinal predicate corresponds to a number 
of lexical entries, each of which will derive/select for the correct temporal properties in the 
complement. Given the inherent under-generation in Pearson’s model when applied to 
nominal complement environments, option (i) is untenable if partial control and temporal 
orientation are derived in parallel within the lexical denotation of a given attitudinal control 
predicate. On the other hand, option (ii) is entirely compatible with Pearson’s framework, 
as long as the lexical entry for expect in (532) above constitutes a specifically infinitive-
selecting instantiation of the verb – call it expectinf. We may then propose a unique lexical 
entry – call it expectDP – which selects for appropriate nominal complements and enforces 
future-orientation, but lacks any specification for obligatory control. 
 While the above strategy will yield the desired result, it cannot explain the 
generality with which a given temporal specification (be it future- or past-orientation) holds 
of the complements to attitudinal predicates, regardless of syntactic category. For example, 
consider the pattern in (535) below. The examples in (535a) and (535b) demonstrate again 
that both infinitival and nominal complements to the predicate expect require future-
orientation. Furthermore, we see in (535c) and (535d) that the same is true of finite clausal 
complements as well. 
 
(535) a.  Yesterday, John expected to inspect the factory (tomorrow/*last week). 
 b.  Yesterday, John expected the inspection of the factory (tomorrow/*last week). 
 c.  Yesterday, John expected that Bill would inspect the factory tomorrow. 
 d. * Yesterday, John expected that Bill inspected the factory last week. 
 
As per option (ii), the data in (535) would require a third lexical entry expectfin which selects 
for a future-oriented finite CP, and which likewise lacks any specification for obligatory 
control. 
 Rather than adopting a framework of systematic lexical ambiguity, we may consider 
revisiting option (i) by removing the derivation of obligatory partial control from the lexical 
                                                 
76 We will assume without explicit formal argumentation that event-denoting nominal complements constitute 
the right kind of input to quantifiers over sets of doxastic alternatives. 
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semantics of attitudinal control predicates. With the specification of PC removed, there is 
no need for multiple lexical entries. Rather, we may unify any instantiation of the predicate 
expect under a single lexical entry which either encodes or selects for future-oriented 
complements, irrespective of their syntactic status. Though we take no stance on this issue 
in the present work, we note that this latter strategy is in line with the reductionist approach 
taken throughout this thesis. 
 We conclude this section by reiterating the consequences of Pearson’s proposals for 
the derivation of temporal orientation in nominal complements to attitude predicates. 
Irrespective of the viability of a lexically encoded control relation, deriving future- or past-
orientation via the lexical semantics of the selecting predicate prima facie predicts the 
persistence of these temporal properties in nominal complement configurations. However, 
we will find in section 7.4.3 that future-orientation may require a specifically syntactic 
element in the complement, whether it is infinitival or nominal. 
 
7.4. Deriving temporal orientation in the syntax 
 
This section will examine Wurmbrand’s (2014) model of future-oriented controlled 
infinitives, and her use of the modal future operator woll. The reader should note that we 
make no claims in this section regarding the syntactic structure of future-oriented 
infinitives. Instead, we aim to determine whether a syntactic component that is arguably 
responsible for deriving temporal orientation in controlled infinitival complements can be 
equally motivated in controlled nominal complements.  
 
7.4.1. Motivating a composite future tense 
 
Wurmbrand (2014) proposes that future-oriented controlled infinitives are, in fact, 
tenseless. That is, these infinitival complements do not contain a contentful Tense head. 
Instead, following Abusch (1985, 1988), Wurmbrand argues that future-oriented infinitives 
project a modal future operator woll. 
 This assertion is, in part, motivated by differences between finite future and 
infinitival future, as illustrated by the following examples (Wurmbrand 2014:411). First, in 
(536a), we see that future-oriented infinitives may precede the utterance time when 
embedded beneath a control predicate. The same is not true for finite will-clauses, as 
illustrated in (536b). Second, example (537a) shows that future-oriented infinitives may 
occur embedded under a matrix future tense. Conversely, finite would (as in (537b)) is only 
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acceptable in this environment if it is interpreted conditionally, rather than temporally. 
 
(536) a.  Leo decided a week ago to go to the party yesterday. 
 b.  Leo decided a week ago that he will go to the party (*yesterday). 
 
(537) a.  John will promise me tonight to tell his mother tomorrow that … 
 b. * John will promise me tonight that he would tell his mother tomorrow that … 
   [* unless conditional] 
 
Wurmbrand (2014) assumes future tense to be a complex, composite tense, made up of (i) 
a true Tense feature, either present tense (PRES) or past tense (PAST), and (ii) an abstract 
modal operator woll, which yields posteriority (Abusch 1985, 1988, see also Thomason 
1970; Condoravdi 2002; Copley 2002; Kaufmann 2005). In English, PRES+woll is overtly 
realised as will, and PAST+woll as would. This composite analysis of future tense is 
motivated by (i) the fact that future tense is absolute, and (ii) sequence of tense effects. 
 The absolute nature of English PRES is well documented (cf. Enç 1987; Abusch 
1988; Ogihara 1996; Schlenker 1999, a.o.); an utterance in the present tense must be 
evaluated with respect to the utterance time. We may demonstrate this phenomenon 
through the so-called double access reading, as illustrated in the PRES-under-PAST 
construction in (538a). Here, the embedded PRES must be interpreted as containing both 
the matrix PAST (the time of finding-out), as well as the utterance time. Crucially, an 
interpretation in which the embedded PRES occurs before the utterance time is impossible. 
The situation is identical with an embedded finite clause containing will, as in (538b): an 
interpretation in which the embedded time is after the matrix time but before the utterance 
time is equally impossible. 
 
(538) a.  Leo found out that Mary is pregnant. absolute 
 b.  Leo found out that Mary will be pregnant. absolute 
   (Wurmbrand 2014:412) 
 
The shared absolute interpretation of English PRES and English FUTURE follows from an 
analysis in which the latter is not atomic, but instead decomposes into PRES + a future 
operator. 
 The sequence-of-tense (SOT) phenomenon offers a second argument for a 
compositional account of English future tense (Dowty 1982; Enç 1987, 2004; Abusch 1988, 
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1997, 2004; Ogihara 1996; Wurmbrand 2014). SOT refers to an instance in which a 
morphologically overt tense is rendered semantically vacuous. By way of illustration, 
consider the embedded clause in example (539a), which shows past tense morphology on 
the embedded verb be: here, embedded PAST may optionally be interpreted as occurring 
simultaneously with the matrix PAST. That is, the pregnancy-time may be interpreted as 
overlapping with the finding-out time, rather than preceding it. This interpretation is 
illustrated in (539b), where SOT is expressed as deletion of the embedded tense feature 
(see Ogihara 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 2007). The interpretative variation between SOT and 
non-SOT readings is demonstrated with the paraphrases in (539c,d), respectively. 
 
(539) a.  Leo found out that Mary was pregnant.  
 b.  [Leo PAST find out [that Mary PAST is pregnant]]  
 c.  ‘Leo found out “Mary is currently pregnant”.’ SOT 
 d.  ‘Leo found out that Mary had been pregnant in the past.’ non-SOT 
 
According to Ogihara, a tense feature may be deleted at LF, so long as it is within the scope 
of a tense feature with an identical value. Just in case deletion does occur, the embedded 
clause is interpreted as NOW relative to the tense feature of the matrix clause, resulting in 
simultaneity. We abstract away from the particular deletion operation, though we note that 
embedded PAST will only delete within the scope of matrix PAST (as opposed to matrix 
PRES). 
 Turning now to English future tense, Wurmbrand (2014) notes that matrix future 
tense triggers SOT effects in embedded PRES. For example, the utterance in (540a) permits 
two temporal interpretations: (i) the embedded clause may be interpreted as true PRES, in 
which case is walking is absolute and valued with respect to the utterance time (as in 
(540b)), or (ii) the embedded clause may be interpreted as a relative NOW, in which case 
is walking is interpreted as simultaneous with the event denoted by the matrix clause (see 
(540c)). The possibility of the latter interpretation is straightforwardly explained if English 
future is composed of a future modal woll and PRES, which may subsequently activate 
SOT deletion of an embedded PRES feature. 
 
(540) a.  John will see the unicorn that is walking.  
   (Ogihara 1996:82) 
 b.  PRES woll see [NP PRES walk] non-SOT 
 c.  PRES woll see [NP PRES walk] SOT 
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Having motivated a compositional analysis of English finite future tense, we may now turn 
to future tense in infinitival complements. Recall that in (536b) we saw that English finite 
future is absolute; the embedded clause may not precede the utterance time. In contrast, the 
embedded future-oriented infinitive in (536a) is interpreted as relative to the matrix time. 
Wurmbrand (2014) proposes that this difference is due to the fact that, while future finite 
clauses contain a Tense projection and an associated tense feature (see (541a)), future-
oriented infinitival clauses do not (541b). Note that we follow Wurmbrand in assuming that 
T[PRES]+woll in (541a) will be spelled-out as will at PF. 
 
(541) a.  [TP T[PRES] [wollP woll [VP go to the party]]] finite future 
 b.  [wollP woll [VP PRO to go to the party]] infinitival future 
 
The analysis in (541) has the desired effect: future-oriented finite clauses project a Tense 
node valued for PRES, resulting in the absolute interpretation we observe in (536b). On 
the other hand, future-oriented infinitival complements project only up to wollP, resulting 
in a reading in which the embedded time is always interpreted relative to the matrix time 
(see (536a)). 
 There are a number of alternative proposals which attempt to preserve the presence 
of a Tense projection in non-finite environments. For example, one might argue that 
infinitival clauses do contain T[PRES], but that infinitival PRES is defined as relative – 
much like PRES in Japanese and Hebrew – rather than absolute. Further still, one may 
pursue the strategy employed by Martin (1996, 2001) such that infinitival future 
corresponds to would rather than will. While further investigation of these potential 
alternatives would take us too far afield, we point the reader to Wurmbrand (2014:414-419) 
for pertinent discussion and critique. 
 
7.4.2. Evidence for a syntactic future element in infinitival complements 
 
The existence of a syntactic future element woll stands in direct opposition to the hypothesis 
that the temporal orientation of controlled infinitives is determined directly by the lexical 
semantics of the selecting predicate (see e.g., Ogihara 1996; Abusch 1997; Katz 2001, 
2004; Enç 2004). In this latter case, neither a Tense projection nor a modal future operator 
woll would be necessary. Wurmbrand (2014) offers two arguments against this view: (i) a 
syntactic future element is indirectly evidenced by the distribution of restructuring effects 
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in German, and (ii) a syntactic future operator is motivated by Abusch’s (2004) scope 
argument. Given that the present work is primarily concerned with nominal complements 
to control predicates, and that restructuring effects are distinctly clausal in nature, we put 
the former argument aside. The remainder of this section will outline Wurmbrand’s 
extension of Abusch’s scope argument. 
 Consider the examples in (542). The context in which Paul mistakes the identity of 
Guido’s co-worker ensures a de dicto reading for the NP a sister in (542a); the NP must 
fall within the scope of the matrix predicate. Since the NP a sister is the presuppositional 
antecedent of the definite description the woman who might have a crush on him, the latter 
must also receive a de dicto interpretation in (542b). Finally, given the continuation in 
(542c), it is Paul’s belief that the time of the crush precedes the time of the intended 
conversation.  
 
(542)   CONTEXT: Some time ago, Paul misidentified a co-worker of Guido’s as 
Guido’s sister. 
 a.  Paul1 believed that Guido had a sister2, and that she2 had a crush on him1. 
 b.  He believed that he would eventually have a long frank conversation with the 
woman who might have a crush on him. 
 c.  But he believed that at that point she would not have a crush on him anymore. 
   (Abusch 2004: ex. 76) 
 
Abusch (2004) assumes that might introduces a temporal argument that needs to be bound, 
and concludes that, in (542b), this argument is bound by the same operator which binds the 
attitude holder’s contemporary now – the highest world/time variable within the embedded 
clause. Crucially, the temporal argument of might is not bound by the more local embedded 
future operator associated with would, which by hypothesis binds the world/time argument 
associated with the embedded VP have a long frank conversation with NP. As such, the 
time of might is interpreted as simultaneous with the attitude holder’s now rather than as 
relative the time of the conversation.  
 Further still, Abusch observes that the same phenomenon may be observed in 
constructions involving future-oriented infinitival complements, as illustrated in example 
(543). Here, despite the lack of any overt embedded future operator, the time of might may 
again be interpreted relative to the attitude holder’s contemporary now, both of which may 
be independent from the time associated with the VP have dinner with NP. These 
observations suggest that, as was the case in (542b), the embedded non-finite clauses in 
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(543a) and (543b) contain a future operator which binds the world/time variable associated 
with the embedded VP independently from the world/time variable associated with the 
attitude holder’s contemporary now. 
 
(543) a.  Paul decided to eventually have dinner with the woman who might have a crush 
on him. 
 b.  Paul promised to eventually have dinner with the woman who might have a 
crush on him. 
 
Wurmbrand (2014) provides further support for Abusch’s scope argument, employing the 
composite temporal element would rather than the modal auxiliary might. The context in 
example (544) again ensures a de dicto reading of the definite descriptions. Critically, as 
was the case in (543), the time of the relativised would clause may be interpreted as relative 
to the attitude holder’s contemporary now, and the time of the embedded infinitival VP to 
have dinner with NP may be interpreted independently from both. 
 
(544)   CONTEXT: Remy met a man who she mistakes for her friend’s doctor about 
whom everyone says that he is very reliable and trustworthy and that he always 
keeps his promises. They go out and he promises to call her back later tonight. 
Remy is very excited and starts making plans for their next date already. What 
Remy doesn’t know is that this man is exactly the opposite of her friend’s 
doctor – he is unreliable and never calls people back. 
 a.  Remy believes that she went out with her friend’s doctor and that he will call 
her back tonight. 
 b.  Remy decided to have dinner with the man who would call her back tonight. 
 c.  Remy planned to have dinner with the man who would call her back tonight. 
   (Wurmbrand 2014:421) 
 
Wurmbrand demonstrates that the interpretations in (543) and (544b,c) are best explained 
if we assume the presence of a syntactic future operator (woll) introduced within the 
infinitival complement. For example, consider the hypothetical denotation of (544b) in 
(545a) below. Note here that, for simplicity, we abstract away from the distinction between 
world variables and time intervals, and furthermore assume that world/time variables may 
be bound non-locally. We observe in (545a) that the highest world/time binder 𝜆w1 binds 
the temporal argument introduced by woll, as well as the temporal argument associated 
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with would in the lower relative clause. However, because woll also introduces a binder 
𝜆w2 it may bind the temporal argument associated with the embedded VP independently, 
yielding the desired interpretation. 
 
(545) a.  decide λw1 woll (w1, λw2 [have-dinner-with (w2, the-woman-might/would-VP 
(w1))]) 
 b. * decide+future λw1 [have-dinner-with (w1 the-woman-might-would-VP (w1/#2))] 
   (Wurmbrand 2014:422) 
 
On the other hand, the denotation in (545b), which assumes that the temporal orientation 
of embedded future infinitives is determined directly by the selecting predicate, makes the 
wrong prediction regarding the possible interpretation in (543) and (544) above. 
Specifically, with only the single world/time variable binder 𝜆w1 associated with the matrix 
predicate, example (545b) predicts that all world/time variables will be bound by the same 
binder. Crucially, this hypothesis fails to predict the independent temporal shifting of the 
world/time associated with the embedded VP, which the woll hypothesis neatly captures.77 
 In sum, Wurmbrand (2014), following Abusch’s (2004) scope argument, provides 
some motivation for the presence of a syntactic future operator within future-oriented 
infinitival complements to attitudinal control predicates. 
 
7.4.3. Nominal complements and a syntactically realised future operator 
 
We have thus far demonstrated the motivation for a composite view of English future tense, 
as well as given Wurmbrand’s empirical basis for the claim that the future operator woll is 
syntactically present in future-oriented infinitives. This final section will determine 
whether or not this analysis of infinitival complements can account for the temporal 
properties witnessed in nominal complements to PC predicates. Recall our temporal 
orientation in NP generalisation, repeated in (546) below. 
 
(546)   Temporal orientation in NP 
   The temporal properties of NP complements mirror those of the corresponding 
clausal complement, and temporal orientation (where applicable) is identical 
across these complements. 
                                                 
77 The hypothesis in (545b) is indeed problematic, in that it fails to predict even the non-shifted interpretation 
of (544b), in which the time of the relative clause occurs after the time of the embedded VP. 
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Crucially, this generalisation is independent of the manifestation of any control relation 
within the nominal. As such, any theoretical account of (546) must be equally independent 
of any one particular theory of control into NP (see section 7.3.2 for related discussion). 
Likewise, we note that the generalisation in (546) is independent of the argument projecting 
properties of the nominal complement in question. 
 Turning first to compositionally derived event nominalisations, we note that we 
reviewed significant evidence in chapter 4 suggesting that even argument-bearing de-verbal 
nominals do not contain projections of Tense and Aspect. As such, the hypothesis that 
nominalisations such as examination or investigation contain the same salient syntactic 
future operator that is implicated in future-oriented infinitives is unmotivated. We therefore 
predict that, unlike the particular temporal shifting observed in examples (543) and (544), 
future-oriented nominalisations will not exhibit independent temporal shift. That is, given 
a nominal complement containing a relative would/might clause, as well as an appropriate 
context ensuring a de dicto reading of any nominal of-argument, the time associated with 
the nominal event should always precede the time associated with the relative clause. 
 This prediction does not hold. Consider the examples in (547), which include a 
context that ensures the necessary de dicto of the argument NP and its anaphora. In example 
(547b) which contains an embedded non-finite complement, we find the expected 
interpretative possibility, such that the world/time associated with the investigating VP may 
come after the world/time associated with the meeting VP contained in the relative clause. 
Recall that Wurmbrand accounts for this possibility by appealing to a syntactic operator 
woll within the non-finite clause which may independently bind the temporal argument of 
the embedded VP. Crucially, despite the predictions laid out above, the same interpretative 
possibility is available in the nominal complement construction in (547c). That is, the time 
associated with the investigation NP may be interpreted as occurring after the time of the 
meeting. 
 
(547)   CONTEXT: James Bond of MI6 met a man at a bar who he believed was the 
international criminal Goldfinger. After some discussion, they agreed to meet 
later that night on the roofof Bond’s hotel. Once back in his room, Bond begins 
making plans for a full criminal investigation into the man who he believes to 
be Goldfinger. What Bond doesn’t know is that the man that he met at the bar is 
actually Goldfinger’s second cousin, an upstanding citizen with no ties to the 
criminal underworld. 
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 a.  Bond1 believes that he met an international criminal2, and that he2 would meet 
him1 later tonight. 
 b.  Bond promised to investigate the man who would meet him later tonight. 
 c.  Bond promised an investigation of the man who would meet him later tonight. 
 
This result is wildly unexpected if the phenomenon of temporal shifting is associated with 
a distinctly clausal woll projection, and as such calls into question our analysis of 
derivational nominalisation as discussed in chapter 4. In particular, it seems to implicate an 
extended verbal architecture underlying the process of de-verbal nominalisation, such that 
nominals of the sort in (547c) contain not just a VP, but minimally a VoiceP, an AspP and 
critically a wollP, as in (548). 
 
(548)   [nP n
o (= -(a)tion) [wollP woll … [AspP Asp [VoiceP Voice [VP investigate the 
man]]]]] 
 
However, before we abandon the less verbal analysis of derivational nominalisation put 
forward in chapter 4, it would be prudent to evaluate the interpretative temporal 
possibilities in constructions involving clearly non-derived noun phrases. That is, given an 
event-describing noun phrase such as a coffee with the man, we note that coffee has no 
salient verbal base from which an event nominal may be derived (e.g., *John must coffee 
with the man). As such, we cannot motivate an extended VP analysis for a coffee with the 
man, of the type in (548). Thus, if the interpretative temporal possibilities of (547c) are 
truly linked to a wollP projection within the extended verbal derivation of the nominal, we 
predict that a similar construction involving a coffee will not exhibit the same temporal 
shifting (as it necessarily lacks woll). 
 Again, we find that this prediction does not hold. Consider the examples in (549), 
in which we borrow the context from Wurmbrand’s (2014) example in (544). Critically, 
the examples in (549b) and (549c) permit an interpretation such that the world/time 
associated with the coffee event comes after the world/time associated with the would call 
VP. 
 
(549)   CONTEXT: Remy met a man who she mistakes for her friend’s doctor about 
whom everyone says that he is very reliable and trustworthy and that he always 
keeps his promises. They go out and he promises to call her back later tonight. 
Remy is very excited and starts making plans a coffee date. What Remy doesn’t 
 278 
know is that this man is exactly the opposite of her friend’s doctor – he is 
unreliable and never calls people back. 
 a.  Remy believes that she went out with her friend’s doctor and that he will call 
her back tonight. 
 b.  Remy demanded a quick coffee with the man who would call her back tonight. 
 c.  Remy expected a quick coffee with the man who would call her back tonight. 
 
Thus, despite its distinctly non-derivational composition, the event-describing NP a quick 
coffee behaves as though it contains a syntactic future operator. 
 The picture that emerges from the above data is one in which both compositionally 
derived nominal complements as well as non-derived NPs give rise to the kind of temporal 
shifting that is at stake in Abusch’s (2004) diagnostic. Given the temporal orientation in 
NP generalisation in (546), we must assume that the temporal properties of both 
compositional and non-compositional nominal complements are derived via the same 
mechanism. Furthermore, we must assume that whatever mechanism is responsible for the 
interpretative possibilities in (547) and (549) above cannot be a bona fide projection of 
clausal woll, given the distinctly non-derivational nature of the NP in (549). We are thus 
presented with two logical possibilities in accounting for the above phenomena: either (i) 
Abusch’s scope diagnostic is not sensitive to the presence of a syntactically salient future 
operator, but to something else entirely, or (ii) DPs (minimally those with an eventive 
interpretation) contain a syntactic temporal operator that is similar to but distinct from the 
clausal woll head. Given that a proper evaluation of option (i) is beyond the scope of the 
present work, we will focus our discussion on option (ii) below. 
 In a series of works, Lecarme (1996, 1999, 2004, 2008) defends a view of nominal 
temporal reference such that the nominal system contains a tense projection T beneath the 
determiner. Further still, Lecarme argues that the canonical relation between CP and TP 
which is generally argued to determine clausal finiteness is mirrored entirely in a relation 
of ‘nominal finiteness’ between DP and its embedded TP (Lecarme 2008). Her argument 
is motivated primarily by the morphological/inflectional reflexes of independent temporal 
reference observed in Somali noun phrases. Though we will not attempt to provide an 
empirical overview of Lecarme’s account here, we note that a proposal in which the 
nominal/determiner system makes available an independent temporal projection may 
provide some purchase on the examples in (547) and (549). That is, if nominal T introduces 
a world/time argument, and similarly acts as a binder of the world/time associated with the 
nominal, we correctly predict the temporal shifting in the above examples irrespective of 
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derivational complexity within the noun, as made explicit in (550) below. 
 
(550) a.  promise λw1 [DP-T (w1, λw2 [nP investigation-of (w2, the-man-would-VP (w1))])] 
 b.  expect λw1 [DP-T (w1, λw2 [nP coffee-with (w2 the-man-would-VP (w1))])] 
 
While promising, this account introduces considerable semantic complexity in the 
composition of noun phrases. That is, if the nominal system contains a bona fide projection 
of Tense between the definite determiner and the head noun, it becomes unclear what a 
type-theoretic derivation of a typical common noun phrase would look like.  
The nominal Tense hypothesis is refuted by Tonhauser (2002, 2007, 2008; but cf. 
Nordlinger and Sadler 2008), who argues that there is little empirical basis for asserting 
that nominal temporal markers are instances of actual Tense. Rather, Tonhauser pursues a 
formal semantic analysis of noun phrases such that every nominal predicate contains an 
implicit nominal time argument (tnp) at which the property denoted by the nominal 
predicate holds. For instance, we may say that a noun like house denotes a property of 
individuals x at time tnp, such that house(x) = 1 at tnp. Although Tonhauser’s particular 
analysis relies on contextual determination of the nominal reference time within a dynamic 
semantic framework, it may be possible to attribute the binding of tnp to some non-clausal 
syntactic element within the determiner system. This line of argumentation may provide 
some purchase on the behaviour of nominal complements within the scope of Abusch’s 
(2004) scope diagnostic, as well as on the temporal orientation of nominal complements to 
attitudinal control predicates. We leave formal and empirical discussion of these notions to 
future research. 
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